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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the international environmental relations undertaken by 
subnational governments, a phenomenon conceptualised as environmental 
paradiplomacy. Research on paradiplomacy examines subnational governments’ 
international relations without considering their engagement with environmental 
issues, while multilevel governance (MLG) theory focuses on the rescaling of 
governance of environmental problems without addressing subnational engagement in 
international relations. Combining paradiplomacy studies and MLG theory, the thesis 
develops an original conceptual framework to investigate a leading example of 
environmental paradiplomacy. 
The conceptual framework is applied to the case of the state of São Paulo, a regional 
government in Brazil that, since the 1970s, has strongly engaged in international 
environmental activities. In contrast with other findings on paradiplomacy, the state of 
São Paulo engages in international relations not only as a way of challenging, but also of 
collaborating with the national government. The major empirical data informing the 
thesis was gathered through participant observation and semi-structured interviews 
with key figures involved with environmental governance in the state and at the 
national level, as well as representatives from NGOs, universities, the private sector and 
foreign policy-makers. 
The study furthers the understanding of paradiplomacy offering analytical insight into: 
(1) how subnational governments engage in transnational relations; (2) the reasons 
driving them to undertake paradiplomacy; and (3) the outcomes of their actions. It also 
contributes more generally to research on global environmental governance, offering 
new theoretical insights on the roles of subnational governments and the changing 
relationships between different levels of government in national and international 
policymaking.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR MULTILEVEL 
GOVERNANCE 
In the past decades conventional State structures have been challenged by the 
transboundary nature of global environmental problems (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010; 
Biermann et al., 2009; Falkner, 2013; O'Neill, 2009). Global environmental problems 
such as biodiversity loss and climate change have distinguishing characteristics: they 
adhere to ecosystems, and not to political boundaries. Moreover, they have “multiple 
interdependent causes and need coordinated forms of social organization and 
institutions for their effective resolution” (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010, p. 526; Geels, 
2011; While et al., 2010). In this context, it is understood that global solutions are not 
the only way to cope with global environmental problems (Bulkeley & Newell, 2010; 
Hoffmann, 2011; Ostrom, 2010), and that agency is no longer exclusive to the State 
(Acuto, 2013a; Raustiala, 1997a; Schroeder, 2010). Rather, a number of non-State actors 
now join, influence and transform domestic and international environmental politics.  
Within the social science literature, considerable attention has been given to the role of 
multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, scientists, and national 
government officials in shaping environmental politics. All these non-State actors who 
engage in transnational relations are now widely recognised as ‘transnational actors’ 
(Abbott, 2012; Andonova et al., 2009; Risse, 2002; Stripple & Pattberg, 2010). In 
addition to these actors, subnational governments around the world are also engaging 
in transnational activities and addressing global environmental problems.  
This observation concerns a state of affairs which is not necessarily obvious or given. 
First, by definition, subnational governments usually conduct subnational activities and 
address environmental problems which affect their constituencies. Second, in many 
countries subnational governments are undertaking transnational activities without an 
actual legal framework authorizing such initiatives. Nevertheless, not only are 
subnational governments tackling problems that are generally within the auspices of 
the central government with the international community, they are also acting 
transnationally. 
However, the participation of subnational governments - and particularly regional 
governments - in global environmental governance has largely been overlooked. 
Scholars drawing upon multilevel governance (MLG) frameworks examine subnational 
action to address climate change. Although related to the object of this study, the MLG 
literature, as noted below, focuses on cities’ attempts to establish climate action and 
their participation in transnational networks, and therefore is not broad enough to 
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explain the engagement of regional governments in the governance of global 
environmental problems. More specific literature on paradiplomacy characterises 
subnational governments’ international relations. However, this literature fails to 
provide a robust theoretical foundation with which to analyse the international agenda 
of subnational governments, and only a few works on paradiplomacy consider their 
environmental activities. 
The aim of this study is to address this gap and analyse the international environmental 
relations undertaken by regional governments, from both a domestic and an 
international perspective. This phenomenon is conceptualised as environmental 
paradiplomacy. The three overarching questions guiding this research are: (1) How 
does environmental paradiplomacy evolve?; (2) What are the causes of 
environmental paradiplomacy; and (3) what are the consequences of the 
international environmental relations undertaken by subnational governments? 
The understanding and exploration of these questions involves an interdisciplinary 
account of studies in the fields of Geography, Law and International Relations (IR). The 
hypotheses are tested through a case study. The choice of the Brazilian state of São 
Paulo1 for this research relates to the fact that this subnational government has 
developed a particularly substantial international environmental agenda, and it has 
done this not only as a way of challenging, but also collaborating with the national 
government. The case selection also has a personal motivation - for many years I 
worked as an environmental lawyer in São Paulo, and I was involved in projects 
involving the adoption of climate legislation by subnational governments in Brazil.2 
The main purpose of this Chapter is to provide a background to environmental 
paradiplomacy. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the actors (subnational 
governments), their sphere of action (transnational), and the topic that is the object of 
the study (global environmental problems); it also clarifies the key concepts employed 
in the analysis. The research aim and the research questions that guide the study are 
then identified in Section 1.3. The thematic and geographical scope of the study is made 
explicit in Section 1.4, which also briefly introduces the case study used in the thesis. 
The theoretical, empirical and policy relevance of the study are presented in Section 1.5. 
Finally, the structure of the thesis is provided in Section 1.6. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis, ‘state’ in lower case refers to a subnational government (e.g. the state of São 
Paulo), whereas ‘State’ with a capital letter refers to the central government or the nation-State (e.g. 
Brazil). See Section 1.4 bellow for further information on the state of Sao Paulo. 
2 More on the case selection in Chapter 3. 
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1.2. DEFINING THE SCOPE AND KEY TERMS 
The thesis analyses the phenomenon of environmental paradiplomacy, which consists of 
subnational governments, acting transnationally, to address global environmental 
problems. I argue that for environmental paradiplomacy to occur, it has to meet three 
criteria; in this Section I define each one of these criteria. First, the main actors involved 
have to be governmental, from a level below the nation-State (‘subnational 
governments’ - Subsection 1.2.1). Second, their action – horizontal and vertical - has to 
occur across jurisdictional boundaries (‘acting transnationally’ - Subsection 1.2.2). 
Third, subnational governments’ action across boundaries has to be directed at 
addressing environmental problems that are both local in their causes and global in 
their consequences (‘global environmental problems’ - Subsection 1.2.3). After defining 
each one of these three criteria, I consider the concepts of ‘diplomacy’ and 
‘paradiplomacy’ being used, and I suggest a concept for ‘environmental paradiplomacy’ 
(Subsection 1.2.4). 
1.2.1. The actors 
While acknowledging that multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), scientists and national governments play an influential and 
increasingly significant role in environmental governance and policymaking (Andonova 
& Mitchell, 2010; Biermann et al., 2009; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Newell et al., 2012; 
O'Neill, 2009; Young, 1997), this study focuses on another distinct group of actors: 
subnational government officials. For the case study chosen, this group of actors consists 
mostly of members of the executive branch of the administration of the state of São 
Paulo; more specifically, civil servants and appointed representatives working at the 
Governor’s cabinet, for the state Secretary for the Environment (SMA), and for São 
Paulo’s environmental agency (CETESB). On the national level these actors interact with 
officials working at different ministries (e.g. Ministry of Environment, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs/Itamaraty3) and the Presidency of the Republic, as well as with national 
corporations, NGOs and scientists. On the international level, officials from the state of 
São Paulo interact with other national and subnational authorities, as well as with 
MNCs, NGOs and scientists. 
The choice of subnational governments as the key actors of this study is underpinned by 
the idea that even in an ‘era of governance’, governments continue to play a central role 
(Baker & Eckerberg, 2008; Jordan, 2008; Jordan et al., 2005). As Van den Brande et al. 
(2012, p. 5) argue: first, most multi-actor interactions still rely on governments to 
initiate actions, formulate priorities, coordinate efforts or legitimate their decisions. 
Second, governments are the only actors in multi-actor governance that have a 
legitimate democratic mandate to represent collective interests and be held accountable 
                                                 
3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is commonly referred to as the Itamaraty, after the building which hosts 
the Ministry (originally in Rio de Janeiro, and currently in Brasilia). 
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for it. Third, without governments it is impossible to promote changes in all the societal 
processes that are targeted by sustainable development. 
The analysis specifically concerns subnational governments. However, the term itself 
requires some clarification. In fact, subnational governments are not unitary actors, and 
the term encompasses different units depending on the source and context that it is 
used. For instance, countries differ in their governmental architectures and in the levels 
of government. From a central government at the highest level, an intermediate level of 
government and small jurisdictions at the lowest level, government architectures varies 
from one (e.g. Singapore) to six layers of government (e.g. Russia), (Geys & Konrad, 
2010). 
This study recognises subnational government as the “coherent territorial entity 
situated between local and national levels, with a capacity for authoritative decision-
making” (Marks et al., 2008, p. 113). The term applies to the first immediate level of 
government below the national and above the local. It involves regional governments 
such as states, provinces, domains, territories, länder, cantons, autonomous 
communities, oblasts, etc., depending on the country. Subnational governments are also 
distinct from ‘local authorities’, which include all levels of government below the 
subnational. The differences between local and regional authorities are increasingly 
acknowledged by international policymakers. For example, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), in the Decision X/22 adopted by the 10th Conference of the 
Parties (COP), stated that: 
For the purposes of this document, “local authorities” include all levels of 
government below the subnational, national or federal level (prefectures, 
districts, counties, municipalities, cities, towns, communes, etc.), while the term 
“subnational governments” (states, provinces, domains, territories, regional 
governments) applies only to the first immediate level of government below the 
national (CBD, 2010).4 
In a context where environmental problems need to be simultaneously tackled at the 
global, national, subnational and local levels, there are at least six reasons justifying the 
choice of subnational governments as a case study for this thesis.  
1) Subnational governments’ position between the local and the national levels puts 
them in a privileged place to deal with environmental issues. In relation to the 
national government, subnational governments have a comparative advantage in 
terms of knowing the needs and reality of their citizens (Posner, 2010), having 
the technical knowledge of environmental issues (Rabe, 2008a), and being able 
to adapt general policies to specific circumstances (Doremus & Hanemann, 
                                                 
4 This is the text of the first footnote of Decision X/22, and subnational governments played a role in 
defining its content (see Chapter 7, Subsection 7.4.3).  
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2008). In relation to local authorities, subnational governments encompass both 
urban and non-urban realities, a larger population, and have more significant 
budgets and responsibilities. 
2) Subnational governments can foster technological innovation (Adelman & Engel, 
2008). Although some argue that the national level might be the most efficient 
locus for scientific inquiry because of scale economies in research and possibility 
to centralise information (Esty, 1996), subnational governments are in a better 
position to operate as laboratories for regulatory agendas (Doremus & 
Hanemann, 2008). 
 
3) Once the nation-State enters an international agreement, generally subnational 
governments are responsible for its implementation. The same is true for local 
authorities (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, 2006, 2007; Bulkeley, 2005, 2010; Puppim 
de Oliveira, 2009). Yet, subnational governments are particularly able to put 
international environmental rules into effect through the implementation of 
subnational policies and regulation (Van den Brande et al., 2011). Depending on 
the distribution of powers within countries, subnational governments are the 
primary implementers of policies, programs, legislation and fiscal mechanisms in 
the areas of energy, environment, transport and land-use (Bruyninckx et al., 
2012; Chen et al., 2010; Lutsey & Sperling, 2008). 
4) Subnational governments are becoming increasingly active in global 
environmental governance. Alongside with other non-State actors, they try to 
influence international environmental policy and decision-making (Bruyninckx 
et al., 2012; Van den Brande et al., 2011).  
5) Subnational governments’ engagement in the governance of global 
environmental problems has received less academic attention than local 
governments.5  
6) In the Brazilian case, states engage not only in international relations, but also in 
(para)diplomatic activities, establishing direct contact with the national 
diplomats and with the global governance of climate change and biodiversity. 
Their international environmental agenda is, thus, broader and more robust than 
those of cities.  
However, when looking at MLG systems, units of government should not be considered 
independently or separately. As subnational governments are situated between the 
local and the national governments, they are impacted on and impact these other levels 
of governance. Considering the case study of this thesis, the state of São Paulo affects 
and is affected by the national level, as well as by the local governments which it 
comprises - 645 cities, including the city of São Paulo, its capital. The city of São Paulo 
has a population of more than 11 million people and is also engaged in the governance 
                                                 
5 This argument will be further developed in the next Chapter (Subsection 2.2.3). 
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of global environmental problems.6 Moreover, the state administration is based within 
the city of São Paulo; that is, the Governor, the Secretaries of the state, and most of 
CETESB and SMA bureaucrats live and work in the city of São Paulo. Therefore, while 
the focus is placed in one particular regional government, the study also takes into 
consideration, implicitly and explicitly, its interactions with lower and higher levels of 
government. 
1.2.2. Their sphere of action 
The second criterion that frames this study relates to the sphere of action in which 
subnational governments engage. For the purpose of this research, the sphere of action 
analysed is the transnational sphere. The word ‘transnational’, is an alternative to the 
word ‘non-State’ that has been coined by academics in order to assert that international 
relations are not limited to State actors. ‘Transnationalism’ is a concept that describes a 
movement that occurs across national borders, and which transcends the specific 
workings of the nation-State (Gregory et al., 2009, p. 773). Moreover, ‘transnational 
relations’ have been defined as the “regular interactions across national boundaries 
when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an intergovernmental organization” (Risse, 1995, p. 3).7 
Subnational governments access the transnational sphere as they engage in 
international relations. International relations are generally understood as the political 
issues that take place between States and beyond their borders (Gregory et al., 2009). In 
this conception, States are bounded and sovereign, unitary, and represent the primary 
actors on the international stage. Perceived shortcomings in international decision-
making on various global problems have called sovereign governments into question as 
the exclusive political authorities for regulating transboundary risk and harm (Held, 
2000; Young, 1997). These issues include safeguarding peace, protecting human rights, 
promoting economic and social progress, as well as dealing with environmental 
problems, international terrorism and AIDS.  
Subnational governments act transnationally by crossing jurisdictional boundaries, and 
by dealing with international or transnational actors. When acting transnationally, 
subnational governments can be categorized as hybrid actors (Hocking, 1994). They are 
governmental actors, yet not completely sovereign entities; they are simultaneously 
governmental (on the domestic level) and non-State (on the international level).8 
                                                 
6 The city of Sao Paulo has an IR department; is a member of transnational networks; enacted a municipal 
climate change law with binding reduction targets; and it participates of UNFCCC conferences as a 
member of the Brazilian delegation. 
7 The literature on transnationalism is examined in the next Chapter, Subsection 2.2.1. 
8 Hybrid actors in paradiplomatic activities are different from hybrid partnerships in governance 
arrangements. Hybrid partnerships involve public-private and social-private partnerships of business, 
NGOs, youth farmers, scientific communities, local governments and trade unions (Bäckstrand, 2008; 
Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). 
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Therefore, when acting across borders subnational governments are qualitatively 
different from States. At the same time, as institutional-territorial entities, they do not 
fit into the transnational world of non-State actors (Lecours, 2002, p. 109). For instance, 
in contrast to NGOs, subnational governments cannot readily use strategies of 
demonstration, advocacy or political/economic pressure to get involved in world 
politics (Lecours, 2002, p. 94). Subnational governments acting transnationally also 
differ from the transnational networks that represent them in the international arena, 
such as ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI), C40 Cities Climate 
Leadership Group (C40), the Network for Regional Governments for Sustainable 
Development (Nrg4SD), the Climate Group, and R20 Regions of Climate Action (R20). In 
regard to these networks, it is possible to question, for example, whether they have the 
capacity to be regulators (Heyvaert, 2013b), as well as their legitimacy, as they are not 
elected by citizens (Resnik et al., 2008). 
1.2.3. The problem they are addressing 
While the international activities undertaken by subnational governments involve other 
topics such as trade, tourism, university exchanges, agriculture and shared government 
databases (e.g. Fry, 1990; Hocking, 1994; McMillan, 2012), this analysis is concentrated 
on environmental issues, in particular, the governance of global environmental 
problems. ‘Global environmental problems’, also referred to as ‘new environmental 
problems’ have particular scale and complexity. The most common examples are 
climate change, biodiversity, and resource depletion. All of them “have a significant 
global dimension, and yet their exploitation is often local or regional in nature and 
highly dependent on the interplay of local and global factors” (Andonova & Mitchell, 
2010, p. 264). 
Global environmental problems gained prominence on the political agenda in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. For their scale and complexity, these problems differ from 
environmental problems of the 1970s and 1980s, such as water pollution, acid rain, air 
pollution and waste problems. This difference can also be understood in terms of the 
different ways that exist to address the problems. As Geels suggest, “while many of 
these problems could be addressed with end-of-pipe solutions (e.g. catalysts in cars, 
scrubbers on power stations) or clean technologies, new environmental problems such 
as climate change are more difficult to address and will require social as well as 
technical changes” (Geels, 2011, p. 13). 
The activity of subnational governments is concerned with local and cross-border 
problems such as air or water pollution and has a distinct nature compared to actions 
aimed at addressing global environmental problems. Environmental paradiplomacy is 
particularly clear in the issue of climate change, where subnational governments not 
only establish local and regional policies to address its causes and consequences, but 
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also establish new institutional structures, working in groups and cooperating across 
national borders. 
1.2.4. Diplomacy, paradiplomacy and environmental paradiplomacy 
As mentioned, this study argues that, for it to occur, environmental paradiplomacy has to 
meet three criteria – the main actors involved have to be subnational governments, 
their action has to occur transnationally, and it has to be directed at addressing global 
environmental problems. The concept of environmental paradiplomacy is new, and it 
will be presented in this Introduction and developed throughout the thesis. It is relevant 
now to clarify the concepts of ‘diplomacy’ and ‘paradiplomacy’ that are examined in the 
study. 
The concept of diplomacy is contested. Generally, diplomacy tends to be a synonym for 
foreign policy; in a more narrow sense it refers to the practices of professional 
diplomats (Jonsson, 2002, p. 213). There are also broader understandings of diplomacy. 
Hamilton and Langhorne (2011), for example, define it as “the peaceful conduct of 
relations amongst political entities, their principals and accredited agents” (p.1). Sharp 
(1999, p. 51) understands diplomacy as “a human condition that precedes and 
transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial states of the past few 
hundred years”. Common functions of diplomacy are:  representation (i.e. ‘acting on 
behalf of’) and communication. Other functions include information exchange; 
negotiation; protection of citizens’ commercial and legal interests; promotion of 
economic, cultural and scientific relations; and policy preparation.  
Recent developments in the literature on diplomacy involve the discussion on ‘old’ and 
‘new’ diplomacy (Hocking, 1998), and the changing purposes of diplomacy (Hocking et 
al., 2012). One significant change consists of the increasing number and types of 
international actors who participate in the diplomatic agenda: 
Not only has the total number of States more than tripled since 1945, but new 
types of actors have come to participate in international relations. Multilateral 
diplomacy or conference diplomacy has become a hallmark of the twentieth 
century, and diplomats are increasingly engaged in building coalitions with 
international organisations of forming contact groups outside existing 
multilateral fora (Jonsson, 2002, p. 216). 
However, whilst international in nature, much of this non-State actor activity has 
different functions and objectives from those of diplomacy (Hocking et al., 2012). At the 
same time, the involvement of a growing range of non-State actors is fundamentally 
changing the environment in which the shaping and execution of international and 
domestic policy occurs.  
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Within this context, the concept of ‘paradiplomacy’ was introduced to describe the 
involvement of subnational governments in international relations. As Cornago (2010b) 
argues, such involvement occurs through the establishment of formal and informal ties 
with foreign public or private entities, with the objective of promoting development in 
its social, economic, cultural or political dimensions. Alongside the term 
‘paradiplomacy’, the international relations of subnational governments has been 
referred to as ‘trans-sovereign contacts of subnational governments’ (Duchacek, 1988), 
‘micro-diplomatic relations’ (Rutan, 1988), ‘intermestic’ (Manning, 1977), ‘multilayered 
diplomacy’ (Hocking, 1993a), ‘constituent diplomacy’ (Kincaid, 1990; McMillan, 2012), 
among other terms. Despite the divergences, all these terms share in common an 
interest in subnational or non-central governments’ direct and indirect involvement in 
international affairs.9 
The term ‘environmental paradiplomacy’ is defined in this study as subnational 
governments’ involvement in international relations, undertaken at the national and/or 
international level, through and/or independent of the national government, aiming to 
address global environmental problems.10 
1.3. RESEARCH AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the field of multilevel environmental 
governance, providing new insights on the international environmental relations 
undertaken by subnational governments. The study is concerned with how 
environmental paradiplomacy evolves, as well as its drivers and outcomes. In order to 
uncover this process, the Brazilian state of São Paulo was chosen as a case study.  
For clarification, the research questions and hypotheses examined in the study are 
presented below. Each of these three questions and hypotheses will be applied to case 
study of the state of São Paulo in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 (see also Appendix 1). 
Research Question 111 
How does environmental paradiplomacy evolve in the state of São Paulo? 
Hypothesis 1 
Environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the international activities undertaken 
by subnational governments to address environmental problems across borders and 
scales. 
 
                                                 
9 The following Chapter reviews the literature on paradiplomacy, and develops the discussion about the 
concept. 
10 Chaloux (2010) and Chaloux & Paquin (2012) refer to ‘environmental paradiplomacy’ and ‘green 
paradiplomacy’, however without defining these terms. An earlier attempt to conceptualise 
‘environmental paradiplomacy’ is found in Rei, Setzer and Cunha (2012). See next Chapter, Subsection 
2.2.1. 
11 Research question 1 is subdivided into two sub-questions (1A and 1B), both addressed in Chapter 5. 
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Research Question 2 
Why does the state of São Paulo undertake an international agenda to deal with global 
environmental problems? 
Hypothesis 2 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo is driven by a combination of global and 
domestic factors - the characteristics of the problem; aspects related to the decline of 
the State; and aspects of Brazilian federalism. 
 
Research Question 3 
What are the results of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda? 
Hypothesis 3 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo expands the government’s capacity to 
address global environmental problems, and through it the state influences higher 
levels of governance. 
1.4. CASE STUDY: THE BRAZILIAN STATE OF SÃO PAULO 
In this thesis the theoretical framework is empirically applied to one case study: the 
state of São Paulo. The state of São Paulo is a regional government located in the South-
eastern Brazil (Figure 1-1). The state is one of the twenty-seven Brazilian federated 
units situated between the national level (the Brazilian federal government) and the 
local level (the municipalities).12 The state of São Paulo is the 12th largest state of Brazil, 
comprising of 3% of the country’s surface. It consists of 645 municipalities, which are 
grouped into three metropolitan regions, thirteen administrative regions, and forty-one 
government regions (Figure 1-2). The Metropolitan Region of São Paulo, known as 
Greater São Paulo, comprises the Municipality of São Paulo, the capital of the state, and 
other 38 municipalities, forming a continuous urban area which houses over 20 million 
people. It is the largest urban centre of Brazil and South America, and the sixth largest 
urban area in the world. 
The state of São Paulo has a population of 42 million people, around 20% of the national 
population. It is the economic centre of the country, concentrating 42% of the industries 
and 33% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (SEADE, 2010a). Its size, 
population and economy are also larger than several countries. For instance, the state is 
slightly larger in area than the UK, while its economy and population are the size of 
Argentina’s. Services comprise the majority of the state’s economic activity, responding 
for 69% of its GDP, followed by industry (29%) and agriculture (2%). The service sector 
is important also for the national economy: São Paulo generates more than 50% of total 
                                                 
12 The Federative Republic of Brazil comprises twenty-seven federative units, being twenty-six states and 
the federal district, where the federal capital, Brasília, is located. 
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Brazilian financial activity, 46% in information technology (IT) services, and 42% in 
health and education (SEADE, 2010b). 
 
Figure 1-1 Map of South America – highlighted are Brazil and the state of São Paulo 
Source: http://www.zeemaps.com/map?group=553103&location=Brazil&add=1# 
 
Figure 1-2 Political-administrative map of the state of São Paulo 
Source: SEADE (2006) 
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Overall, the state has a strong international focus. The exports of the state in 2009 
totalled US$43 billion, 28% of Brazilian exports. Of those, 90% were industrialized 
products, including high added-value ones, such as airplanes and air vehicles, mobile 
phone terminals and automobiles, and 10% of primary products or of low added-value, 
such as derivatives of sugarcane, beef and orange juice. The destination of the exports of 
São Paulo was mainly the European Union (EU), responsible for 18% of the imports, 
followed by Mercosur (16%), the Latin American Integration Association (15%), Asia 
and the Middle East (13%), and the US (12%), (CETESB, 2011, p. 15). Moreover, in 2010 
the state received about 40% of the national inflow of direct foreign investments (São 
Paulo, 2010). 
Overall, due to its economic, social and political importance, the state of São Paulo has a 
privileged position in the Brazilian context. However, together with the highest GDP, the 
second largest per capita GDP, the third best Human Development Index (HDI) ranking, 
and the largest industrial production in Brazil, São Paulo concentrates some of the 
country’s worst socioeconomic problems. The state suffers from enormous social 
disparities, which are related to limited wealth distribution, unequal access to public 
services and common goods. São Paulo, thus, follows the national indicators of a typical 
developing country, where most of the population’s basic needs have yet to be met, 
infrastructure is still incipient and substantial improvements are required. 
However, in terms of its international environmental activities, the main object of this 
study, the state of São Paulo may well be unprecedented in its breadth and extent. Since 
the late 1970s the state has been establishing international environmental relations. 
Initially these consisted mostly of decentralised cooperation initiatives with 
international organisations or other subnational governments across borders. In the 
mid-1990s the state started expanding its international presence to reach stronger 
diplomatic roles, such as engagement in the agenda-setting and negotiation phases of 
international environmental negotiations.13 
Most of this international environmental activity has been developed within the 
international relations divisions of the state Environmental Secretariat (SMA) and of 
São Paulo’s Environmental Agency (CETESB). The SMA was created in 1986 to promote 
the preservation and improvement of environmental quality in the state of São Paulo. 
Among its attributions are the elaboration and implementation of the state’s 
environmental policy. In 2008 the SMA had its structure reorganised (Decree 53,027, of 
May 26, 2008). Since then the Secretariat also became responsible for analysing public 
policies that have an impact on the environment, as well as articulating and 
coordinating plans and actions involving environmental issues. The SMA also 
participates in processes of environmental licensing and inspection, promoting 
environmental education and recovery of natural resources. It operates through ten 
                                                 
13 Each one of these activities will be examined in detail in Chapter 4. 
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issue areas (water, soil, waste, green economy, environmental planning, biodiversity, 
environmental monitoring, fauna, air, and environmental licensing), dispersed in more 
than sixty-five projects/programs (SMA, 2012, 2013). 
CETESB was created in 1968 as the state sanitation company. Five years later it was 
formally founded as a state-owned company, part of the Secretariat of Public Works, 
responsible for monitoring water pollution and sanitary engineering (Law 118, of June 
29, 1973). In 1976 CETESB also became responsible for controlling air pollution, and 
was legally authorized to establish emission and quality standards (Law 997 of May 31, 
1976, and Decree 8,468 of September 8, 1976). In 1987 CETESB became part of the 
newly created SMA (Decree 26.942, of April 1st, 1987). In 2009 CETESB was 
significantly restructured, and received new responsibilities, previously divided 
between other state agencies and entities (state Law 13,542 of May 8, 2009). Today, 
CETESB is responsible for three main activities: pollution control (e.g. licensing and 
inspecting sources of pollution; defining environmental indicators and standards; acting 
in chemical emergencies); environmental monitoring (e.g. monitoring the 
environmental quality of water, air and soil); and technology transfer (e.g. establishing 
partnerships for technical, scientific and financial cooperation). It has almost 2,500 
employees, fifty-one decentralised units in the state, and seven laboratories (CETESB, 
2012). 
In addition to promoting and monitoring environmental quality in the state, since the 
mid-1990s SMA and CETESB have been involved with the governance of global 
environmental problems. São Paulo’s engagement with global problems is not an 
isolated enterprise. Studies provide evidence that there is a relationship between global 
environmental norms and domestic environmental protection (Frank et al., 2000). 
Similarly, São Paulo’s concern with the global environment is in pace with the political 
agenda of other governments around the world. Different analysis of trends observed in 
environmental governance show that global environmental problems such as climate 
change, biodiversity and resource depletion gained prominence on the political agenda 
of governments worldwide in the 1990s and early 2000s (Geels, 2011, p. 13; While et 
al., 2010). 
Climate change, in particular, is a prominent policy area for São Paulo. This activity 
began in 1995, with the creation of a climate change program (PROCLIMA) within the 
special division for global environmental problems. In the years that followed, the 
state’s programme became a national institutional reference (Biderman, 2011, p. 229). 
The state promoted seminars and publications; it also prepared a guide for calculating 
methane emissions and an inventory of methane emissions for the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (Coelho & Guardabassi, 2007; SMA, 2011). In November 2009 the state 
enacted its own climate change policy, ahead of the federal government regulation, and 
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established a mandatory and economy-wide GHG reduction target.14 In 2011 the state 
published its First Direct and Indirect Greenhouse Gases (GHG) Anthropogenic 
Emissions Inventory, covering the period between 1990 and 2008 (CETESB, 2011).15 
The climate agenda also promoted a number of opportunities for the state to cooperate 
transnationally with other subnational and national governments across borders 
(Cunha et al., 2007). For example, in December 2005 SMA, CETESB and the California 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) to promote climate change mitigation with a focus on transportation and 
technical cooperation in the areas of renewable energy sources, environmental 
improvement, climate change and biodiversity. In July 2008 CETESB signed a 
Cooperation Project with the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which resulted in 
the elaboration of the state’s first GHG Inventory. The state’s leading approach to 
environmental policy and climate change also allowed it to become a member of 
specialised networks, such as the Nrg4SD and the Climate Group.16 
1.5. RELEVANCE  
Dedicating a thesis to the study of the international environmental relations undertaken 
by a subnational government allows for an in-depth exploration of this topic. 
Environmental paradiplomacy is both a new phenomenon and a largely unexplored 
research topic. Since commencing this research, there have been only a few studies 
investigating the international environmental initiatives undertaken by subnational 
governments (Bruyninckx et al., 2012; Eatmon, 2009; Happaerts et al., 2010, 2011). This 
Section introduces the theoretical, empirical and policy relevance of the thesis. 
In terms of its theoretical contributions, the study advances previous research on the 
engagement of subnational governments in international environmental relations. So 
far, research on paradiplomacy has examined subnational governments’ international 
relations without considering their engagement with environmental issues, while MLG 
theory has focused on the rescaling of governance of environmental problems without 
addressing subnational engagement in international relations. The thesis combines the 
paradiplomacy literature and MLG theory, offering analytical insight into the processes, 
rationale and the outcomes of the international environmental initiatives established by 
subnational governments. 
                                                 
14 The political system of the state follows the federal one, divided into executive, legislative and judicial 
powers, respectively represented by the Governor, the state Assembly and the Court of Justice. The state 
has its own state Constitution, and it also legislates through state laws, decrees, and resolutions. 
15 The inventory was coordinated by PROCLIMA and made in compliance with the methods approved by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes (IPCC) and in the federal inventory. 
16 The nrg4SD is the first network for regional government at the global level; it was launched at the 2002 
Johannesburg World Summit, and has 48 members in 27 countries (Nrg4SD, 2012b). The Climate Group is 
an NGO working internationally with companies, states, regions, cities and public figures to a low carbon 
future (Climate Group, 2013). 
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Empirically, the choice of the case study is relevant both because of the type of 
international activities led by São Paulo, and because there are no existing empirical 
studies on this state’s international environmental relations. This is also the first 
empirical study of environmental paradiplomacy in a subnational government within a 
developing country. 
In terms of policy relevance, the study allows for an exploration of the desirability of 
environmental paradiplomacy and its outcomes. For instance, can environmental 
paradiplomacy make environmental policymaking more, less, or equally legitimate and 
effective? Is environmental paradiplomacy part of the ensemble of solutions needed to 
address to current problems of conventional international policymaking? Should we 
encourage environmental paradiplomacy or should we rather restrict it? The study does 
not claim that environmental paradiplomacy is as effective and inclusive as the 
international law. Nor is it claimed that paradiplomacy will replace traditional 
diplomacy. Rather, I claim that the efforts of parallel diplomacy can alter established 
relationships between subnational, national and international actors, and may 
ultimately improve environmental policymaking. 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is composed of nine Chapters. 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to, and an outline of, the thesis. It provides a background to 
environmental paradiplomacy, clarifying the main theoretical considerations and the 
key concepts employed in the analysis. It also sets out the rationale of the study, the 
research aim and research questions, as well as the context of the case study. The 
overarching research question concerns the motivation subnational governments have 
to engage in international environmental relations, the process of emergence, and its 
outcomes. The introductory Chapter describes the relevance of the study and concludes 
by outlining of the thesis structure. 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background to the study. First, the literature on non-
State actors’ participation in IR, federalism, and global environmental governance is 
reviewed and evaluated. The purpose of this review is to map the main theoretical 
issues and themes in the research area, as well as to uncover the main research gaps. It 
is shown that the existing literature provides elements, but not a comprehensive 
theoretical framework, to explore subnational governments’ international 
environmental activities. Second, based on the literature review, the Chapter outlines a 
two-tier analytical framework based on the literature on paradiplomacy and MLG 
theory. The last part of the Chapter provides an analytical framework that combines 
these two streams and also proposes a concept of environmental paradiplomacy. 
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In Chapter 3 the methodological approach of the research is presented. The Chapter 
discusses the research design and the methods of data collection used: the single case 
study, participant observation, interviews and document data analysis. Special attention 
is given to the peculiarities of interviewing elites and the analysis of the interview data. 
The Chapter concludes by making explicit the methodological limitations of the study. 
The subsequent two Chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) focus on the processes through which 
subnational governments undertake an international agenda to address global 
environmental problems. The main objective of these Chapters is to uncover how the 
state of São Paulo develops its international environmental agenda and becomes active 
in the international environmental scene. Chapter 4 identifies five types of international 
environmental activities in which the state of São Paulo engages, and suggests a new 
typology for paradiplomatic activity, consisting of collaboration and coalition initiatives. 
Chapter 5 advances the examination of how environmental paradiplomacy evolves in 
the state of São Paulo, considering what scales are involved, and assessing whether this 
subnational government can move across scales. 
Chapter 6 examines the motivations for environmental paradiplomacy. The first part 
identifies the different reasons provided by the bodies of research from which the thesis 
draws. The second part of the Chapter explores the global and the domestic 
determinants for environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo. It is argued 
that São Paulo’s international environmental agenda is driven by the state’s history of 
leadership in environmental policymaking. This finding is contrasted with two 
alternative explanatory factors found in the MLG literature. The Chapter ends with a 
consideration of the individuals driving environmental paradiplomacy in the state. 
Chapter 7 discusses the outcomes of environmental paradiplomacy undertaken by the 
state of São Paulo. It explores the changes to the state’s capacity to address global 
environmental problems, and its capacity to influence other governmental actors 
through its international agenda. It is suggested that São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomacy has a distinctive character of promoting new legislation in the state. 
Chapter 8 infers further theoretical implications of the international relations 
undertaken by the state of São Paulo. It is argued that São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomacy results in a change of patterns, in different – if not new – types of 
political relationship, which emphasise enhanced channels of communication between 
the subnational, the national, and the international, and reinforce the image of rescaling 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 9 concludes by summarizing the theoretical and empirical contributions of the 
research. Policy recommendations are made. Limitations of the study and areas of 
potential future research are identified. The original contributions of the study are 
highlighted. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW & 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines how, in the last four decades, our understanding of the 
international relations conducted by subnational governments have been diffused 
across different disciplines, theories, and approaches. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
three spheres are involved in the analysis of environmental paradiplomacy: the actors 
(subnational governments), the scale of their action (transnational), and the topic that 
they are dealing with (environment). Reflecting these spheres, the Chapter reviews the 
theoretical and empirical studies on three streams of literature (1) non-State actors’ 
participation in IR (accounting for the international sphere), (2) federalism (accounting 
for the subnational government element), and (3) global environmental governance 
(accounting for the environmental aspect).  
A full survey of each of these bodies of literature is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Instead, I examine how each one of these theoretical perspectives, to a different extent, 
explains the international environmental activities undertaken by subnational 
governments across borders. In the intersection between the literatures on (1) non-
State actors’ participation in IR and (2) federalism, I highlight the more specific concept 
of paradiplomacy. Within (3) the global environmental governance literature I draw 
special attention to the MLG approach.  
This literature review suggests that the existing literature on non-State actors’ 
participation in IR, federalism and global environmental governance provides elements, 
but not a comprehensive theoretical framework to explore subnational governments’ 
international environmental agenda. It is argued that the MLG approach, combined with 
the concept of paradiplomacy, offers a more specific and applicable analytical 
framework to study the international environmental agenda undertaken by subnational 
governments (see Figure 2-1). Despite some limitations, the current literature within 
these two streams explains, in complementary ways, the international environmental 
relations maintained by subnational governments. 
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Literature review 
 
 
 
Analytical framework 
 
Figure 2-1 Subnational governments’ international environmental agenda: literature 
review and analytical framework 
Source: Author 
Following this introduction, Section 2.2 presents a review of the literature on non-State 
actors in IR (Subsection 2.2.1), federalism (Subsection 2.2.2) and global environmental 
governance (Subsection 2.2.3). At the end of each Subsection, the Chapter addresses the 
limitations of the current literature in explaining the international environmental 
agenda undertaken by subnational governments. This literature review also 
distinguishes environmental paradiplomacy from other types of non-State actor 
participation in global environmental governance. In Section 2.3, the Chapter offers an 
original analytical framework, which combines the concept of paradiplomacy with the 
MLG approach. This final section also proposes a concept of environmental 
paradiplomacy. A summary and a short conclusion are presented in Section 2.4. 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW: THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA OF 
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
There have been a number of calls for “improved theoretical tools to analyse, correlate, 
and explain the international agenda in which so many subnational governments now 
engage” (Aguirre, 1999, p. 189). Yet, a theory of the international environmental 
relations undertaken by subnational governments is yet to be developed. As Cornago 
(2010a, p. 91) stated on the scholarship in this field: 
This topic is commonly approached in narrowly formal or policy-oriented terms, 
but when contemplated through other lenses it reveals a deeper political 
significance. It shows unexpected yet important functional adjustments and 
symbolic struggles to which the modern diplomatic system has to respond... 
Global 
environmental 
governance 
Federalism Non-state 
actors in IR 
 
Paradiplomacy MLG 
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Among the studies that have attempted to develop a framework to understand the 
international activity of regions and the role of subnational governments in addressing 
global problems, this Chapter considers three streams of literature:  
1. Non-State actors’ participation in IR  
2. Federalism  
3. Global environmental governance 
Each one of these perspectives sheds light on subnational governments’ international 
environmental agenda in different ways. For each I outline their theoretical claims, and 
then examine some of the limitations they face in explaining subnational governments’ 
international environmental agenda (environmental paradiplomacy).  
In summary, most scholars interested in (1) the participation of non-State actors in IR 
use (i) a transnationalist lens to explore the role of NGOs and transnational advocacy 
networks. Yet, because the focus of this literature is on non-governmental actors and 
their transnational networks, its framework does not cover subnational governments. It 
is, therefore, necessary to move to theories which focus on governmental actors. With 
this specific end, a smaller number of internationalists have used the concept of (ii) 
paradiplomacy to analyse subnational governments’ international agenda. However, this 
scholarship fails to provide a robust theoretical foundation with which to analyse the 
international agenda of subnational governments, and few works on paradiplomacy 
reflect upon environmental aspects. This argument is developed in Subsection 2.2.1. 
Keeping a focus on governmental actors, (2) federalist scholars have developed a 
framework to analyse the relationship between different levels of government. Within 
this theoretical framework, another small group of scholars researching federalism has 
investigated (i) the international agenda of subnational governments, again with limited 
theoretical foundations and without consideration of an international environmental 
agenda. The environmental aspect is present in recent federalist scholarship interested 
in (ii) environment and climate change regionalism, particularly in federal countries such 
as the US and Canada. These scholars, however, place attention mostly on the domestic, 
rather than on the international aspects of such action. This argument is developed in 
Subsection 2.2.2. 
The third strand, present in the (3) global governance literature, considers the 
environmental aspect of the governance strategies adopted by subnational 
governments. This is the case of works on both the (i) MLG and the (ii) multilevel climate 
and environmental governance literature. But the governance scholarship, I argue, is 
Eurocentric and its analysis is too narrow towards cities and transnational networks; in 
addition, it offers limited consideration of the legal and institutional boundaries that 
subnational governments face in rescaling processes. This argument is developed in 
Subsection 2.2.3. 
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Three characteristics of each one of these streams of literature are summarised in Table 
2-1 below - whether the scholarship considers the international aspect of the initiatives, 
the role of subnational governments, and the environmental component. As it can be 
observed, none of the three strands or the six approaches examined within them 
considers simultaneously the three components that are required to understand 
environmental paradiplomacy. Another common limitation in all these literatures is 
that they generally do not consider the case of governments in developing countries. 
 
Strands of 
literature 
Approaches 
International 
aspect 
Subnational 
governments 
Environmental 
aspect 
Non-State 
actors in IR 
Transnationalism      
Paradiplomacy      
Federalism 
Federated units 
in IR 
     
Climate 
regionalism 
     
Global 
Environmental 
Governance 
MLG      
Multilevel 
climate and 
environmental 
governance 
     
 
Table 2-1 Summary of the conceptual framework of the thesis 
Source: Author 
2.2.1. Non-State actors in IR 
Acknowledging subnational governments’ presence in IR flows from a recognition of the 
increased participation of non-State actors in the international sphere, and that State-
centric approaches are insufficient to explain the presence of these actors in the 
international arena. After the Second World War, and particularly in the 1960s, 
multilateral international regimes emerged in world politics, and non-State actors from 
the private sector, NGOs and academia increased their global influence (O'Neill et al., 
2004). This reality was quickly depicted by scholars who were interested in the nature, 
the role and the impact of non-State actors in IR. Within the study of non-State actors in 
IR, I proceed with a closer engagement with two debates that are most relevant for this 
research: (i) transnationalism, and (ii) paradiplomacy. 
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Transnationalism 
Research on transnational relations is often driven by the proliferation of non-State 
actors, as well as by the dissatisfaction with the focus of IR scholars on States and 
Intergovernmental Organizations (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010; Betsill, 2006). Keohane 
and Nye (1971) were among the first ones to call attention to the cross-border 
interactions of non-State actors. They defined transnational relations as the “contacts, 
coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the 
central foreign policy organs of governments” (p. xi). This definition included all types 
of interactions taking place transnationally, including those carried out by the Catholic 
Church, by MNCs and by NGOs. Keohane and Nye (1974) also distinguished 
transnational relations from transgovernmental relations, defined as “sets of direct 
interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely 
guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments” (p.42). 
In the 1990s there was a dramatic increase in the number of transnational activities. 
This was motivated by the widespread use of new communication technologies, by the 
end of the Cold War, and by the continuing proliferation of non-State actors. A second 
wave of research on transnationalism emerged, and scholars recognised that 
transnational relations permeated world politics in almost every issue-area. Risse-
Kappen (1995, p. 3) conceptualized transnational relations as the “regular interactions 
across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-State agent or does not 
operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization”. 
Theoretical and empirical attention was placed on transnational actors and their 
discourses. Transnational actors broadly included grassroots organizations, scientific 
associations, special interest groups, academics (or epistemic communities), businesses, 
trade associations, environmentalists, individuals the media, religious organizations, 
independence movements, subnational governments, political parties, foundations and 
consumer groups.17 
One of the most prolific areas where scholars observed transnational relations was in 
the environmental realm, most recently in the area of climate change policy. Here, the 
term ‘transnational’ denotes the cross-border scope of the interactions, as well as the 
fact that non-State actors are involved as producers or recipients of environmental 
harms (Mason, 2008). In this field, a number of far-reaching claims have been made 
regarding the ability of non-State actors such as NGOs, scientists and businesses to 
influence the environmental policy process (Abbott, 2012; Betsill & Corell, 2007; 
Bulkeley & Newell, 2010; Falkner, 2008; Haas, 1989; Hoffmann, 2011; Newell, 2000). 
                                                 
17 Narrowing the concept, three general categories of transnational actors are considered in 
transnationalist scholarly work (Betsill, 2006): NGOs, multinational corporations, and transnational 
networks. Transnational networks include transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), 
epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), social movements (Hochstetler, 2002) and transnational networks 
of subnational governments (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). 
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These works expanded our understanding of the development of transnational climate 
governance, and the influence that non-governmental actors place over international 
environmental negotiations.  
In parallel with the work on transnationalism, transgovernmentalism also advanced in 
the late 1990s. Raustiala (1997b, 2002) identified the involvement of specialized 
domestic officials who directly interact with each other, often with minimal supervision 
by foreign ministries, as ‘transgovernmentality’. Following his work, Slaughter (2004) 
observed an intricate web of transgovernmental networks, a ‘new world order’ 
comprised of vertical and horizontal networks of governmental officials interacting with 
each other and with disaggregated international organizations. Her analysis examined 
how networks of government officials increasingly exchange information and 
coordinate activity to address common problems on a global scale. Through 
transgovernmental networks, regulators, legislators and judges and other actors across 
national boundaries carry out various aspects of global governance (Slaughter, 2004; 
Slaughter & Hale, 2010). 
The proliferation of governmental networks was described in different ways by other 
scholars. Some refer to ‘minilateralism’ (Bäckstrand, 2008; Kellow, 2006). Krotz (2007) 
developed the idea of ‘parapublic underpinnings of international relations’, to explain 
the state-financed exchanges, municipal partnerships, and a host of institutes and 
associations connecting French and Germans. For Baker (2009, p. 200), 
transgovernmentalism remind us that the national behaviour cannot simply be 
understood in terms of a crude reading of a unitary national interest and unwavering 
efforts to promote that interest. 
Paradiplomacy 
Drawing from the work on transnational and transgovernmental relations, in the 1980s 
another concept was developed specifically to describe the international relations 
conducted by subnational, regional, local or non-central governments. In this research 
the participation of such subnational actors in the international arena was named 
paradiplomacy. 
On the one hand, the first works on paradiplomacy directly related to Keohane and 
Nye’s (1971, 1974) attempt to counter the traditional realist approach in international 
relations (see, for example, Latouche, 1988). By arguing that regions possess 
sovereignty on particular issues (Duchacek, 1988, 1990) studies on paradiplomacy also 
challenged the realist definition of sovereignty as unitary and resting with the national 
government. As with transnationalism, paradiplomacy was based on the idea that the 
region (a type of non-State actor) was emerging as an international actor within the 
context of a broader re-configuration of international politics.  
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On the other hand, since its emergence the research on paradiplomacy has differed from 
the approach found in the transnationalist school. While scholars working within the 
transnationalist paradigm focused on State behaviour in contrast to markets, social 
movements, and NGOs, studies of paradiplomacy were concerned with representing 
subnational governments as a third element inbetween the State/non-State divide. For 
Keating (1999), the State/non-State categories are not all-encompassing, and regional 
governments have to be considered international actors. For Lecours (2002), regions 
constitute a ‘third world’ of world politics, adding a sphere to Rosenau’s two worlds of 
world politics.18 In his words:  
Paradiplomacy involves a ‘slice’ of domestic politics projecting itself onto the 
international scene without the medium of the state, and indeed sometimes in 
the face of considerable resistance from national institutions. In this sense, it 
blurs the external-internal dichotomy rather than simply connecting them 
(Lecours, 2002, p. 109). 
From an initial link with transnationalism, over the past thirty years research in 
paradiplomacy discreetly evolved into a separate body of literature that deals with non-
State actors in international relations, specifically with subnational presence.  
Tracing the evolution of the concept, in 1986 Duchacek used the term 'microdiplomacy' 
or 'regional microdiplomacy' to describe regional relations across borders (e.g. the US 
and Canada, or the US and Mexico). Following this work Duchacek, Latouche and 
Stevenson (1988) edited a book on ‘perforated sovereignties’ to discuss how and why 
provinces, states, cantons, and large municipalities increasingly seek access to foreign 
sources of wealth and technological information. Soldatos (1990) then suggested the 
term ‘paradiplomacy’ to identify the diverse form of non-State diplomacy undertaken by 
subnational governments. The next contributions to this literature were given by Brian 
Hocking in the book ‘Localizing foreign policy’ (Hocking, 1993a) and in an edited book 
entitled ‘Foreign relations and federal states’ (Hocking, 1993b). A few years later an 
exploration of why regions ‘go abroad’ was the focus of another multi-authored book, 
edited by Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (1999a).  
Other collective works published in English continued advancing this discussion in the 
2000s. Lachapelle and Paquin (2005) argue that paradiplomacy is being expanded 
mostly as a consequence of globalization the weakening of the nation-State, but also by 
nationalism, and processes of internationalization.19 A book edited by Michelmann 
(2009) brings a comparative perspective on the constitutional powers that sub-units of 
federal governments need to conduct foreign affairs,20 and a special issue of The Hague 
                                                 
18 In Rosenau’s theory, one world of politics is composed of States and the other one of non-State actors. 
19 Paquin (2004), published in French, suggests an explanatory framework for paradiplomacy. 
20 The analysis covers twelve federal countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
India, Malaysia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. It takes into consideration both 
regularized and informal practices undertaken. 
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Journal of Diplomacy (2010a) was dedicated to the topic. Among the contributions, 
Cornago (2010, p. 11) argues that sub-state governments’ activism is rapidly growing 
across the world, to a point where it is possible to see a worldwide “normalization of 
sub-state diplomacy”. Beyond the classic examples of Quebec, the Basque Country or 
Flanders, subnational diplomacy can be found in every continent. Bueno da Silva 
(2010), for instance, collected examples of paradiplomatic activity in Japan, Germany, 
the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Canada and Austria, as well as China, India, Russia, 
Mexico, Argentina and South Africa. In 2011 a journal dedicated to paradiplomacy, with 
contributions in Spanish and English, was launched with the objective of contributing to 
the construction of a conceptual framework regarding the international agenda of 
subnational governments and decentralised cooperation (TIP, 2011). 
In Brazil, a growing number of scholars are discussing the participation of Brazilian 
subnational governments in international policy. In the early 2000s Vigevani carried an 
extensive research project about Brazilian paradiplomacy21, which resulted in the 
publication of a series of books and journal articles (2002; 2004; 2006). Brigadão 
(2005) surveyed all twenty-six Brazilian states and concluded that between 1983 and 
2005 more than 70% had some kind of international relations department responsible 
from simple ceremonial activities to more complex foreign trade relationships. Other 
relevant works are Saraiva’s (2004) analysis of Brazilian federalism and subnational 
foreign activity, Nunes’ (2005; Salomón & Nunes, 2007) work about the paradiplomatic 
activity in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Lessa’s (2007) analysis of the legality of 
bilateral agreements signed by seven Brazilian states, Castelo Branco’s (2008) 
examination of the legality of the agreements entered by subnational governments. Also 
worth mentioning is Rodrigues’ (2006, 2008; 2009) thesis and other publications on 
Brazilian federative diplomacy, as well as a book by Andrade e Barros (2010a) which 
highlights the historical context of Brazilian paradiplomacy and the attempts to 
institutionalise it within the political and legal system.  
In many of these works, there has been an on-going opposition to the term 
‘paradiplomacy’ because of its origin in the notion of ‘parallel diplomacy’. Consequently, 
a number of scholars have suggested alternative terminologies to describe subnational 
engagement in international relations. Kinkaid (1990, p. 54), for example, argued that 
‘constituent diplomacy’ was a less pejorative term to describe subnational international 
activity: “…terms such as micro-diplomacy and paradiplomacy imply that constituent 
diplomacy is inferior to nation-State diplomacy and exhibits a nation-State bias”. The 
same term (‘constituent diplomacy’) is preferred by McMillan (2012) as 
                                                 
21 The research project “Strategic management of subnational governments face to processes of 
globalisation and integration in Latin America” was carried out between 1999 and 2005. More details and 
a complete list of publications that resulted from this project can be found in CEDEC’s website 
(http://www.cedec.org.br/pesquisas.asp?idControl=6gu2p1tO3PME1Vo5iokxSTjlvXBbt6eAKxa4538QIQr
VFZ36VqZAhbXmb0gs88SC9AO5J4NRn96ZkhH8BIDRWdCEP2UuM9xUNAdnpesquisas.asp?pesq=current
&page=pesq&subpage=gpesq_pesq&cod_pesquisa=108).  
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“‘paradiplomacy’ and ‘subnational diplomacy’ minimize the degree to which actors 
below the level of the nation- state are involved with foreign relations” (p.189). 
Hocking also vigorously rejected the term paradiplomacy. For him, the term only 
emphasizes a potential conflict between subnational and national governments. Instead, 
he suggested the concepts of 'multilayered diplomacy' (1993a) and, later, of 'catalytic 
diplomacy' (1996). Similarly, Pluijm (2007, p. 9) argued that the term paradiplomacy is 
“is unfortunate and rather inappropriate, given that state and city actors do not 
necessarily ‘ride’ along different diplomatic routes, but rather along the same route 
although in a different car”. In the special issue organised by Crieckmans for The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy (2010a), most authors employ the term ‘sub-state diplomacy’. 
In Brazil, a number of scholars use the term paradiplomacia (‘paradiplomacy’) to 
describe subnational  international initiatives undertaken by both Brazilian states and 
municipalities (Bogea, 2001; Branco, 2008; Brigadão, 2005; Lessa, 2007; Rei, Cunha, et 
al., 2012; Rei, Setzer, et al., 2012; Rodrigues, 2006, 2008; Rodrigues et al., 2009). As in 
other countries, there is also some discussion on the adequacy of this term. Andrade e 
Barros (2010a), for example, argues that ‘international public decentralized 
cooperation’ or simply ‘decentralized cooperation’ should be used instead of 
paradiplomacy.22 The Brazilian government, in its turn, uses the term ‘federative 
diplomacy’, which tries to emphasise the decentralisation of diplomacy as a trend 
deriving from the government’s foreign relations.23 
Despite the common discussions regarding the validity and adequacy of the term, a 
widely accepted definition of paradiplomacy was given by Cornago:24 
sub-state governments’ involvement in international relations, through the 
establishment of formal and informal contacts, either permanent or ad hoc, with 
foreign public or private entities, with the aim to promote socio-economic, 
cultural or political issues, as well as any other foreign dimension of their own 
constitutional competences (Cornago, 1999, p. 40). 
In this thesis, the involvement of subnational governments in international relations 
and diplomatic activities is regarded as related, yet relatively independent from, 
diplomacy.25 That is, the activities undertaken by subnational governments are part of a 
complex diplomatic environment, but there are differences between what subnational 
representatives and national diplomats can do. Consequently, the international 
relations in which subnational governments engage in can run in parallel to traditional 
                                                 
22 Yet, there is some confusion there, as decentralised cooperation only covers one type of activity in 
which subnational governments engage in (see Chapter 4). 
23 The institutionalisation of subnational diplomacy by the Brazilian federal government is examined in 
Chapter 6 and 8. 
24 However, later Cornago (2010) preferred the term ‘sub-state diplomacy’ to paradiplomacy. 
25 In the introductory Chapter of this thesis I present a definition of traditional diplomacy. 
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diplomacy without contradicting it. Therefore, the term ‘paradiplomacy’ is not 
understood here as synonymous with conflicting relations between national and 
subnational government representatives. Rather, it will be argued in this study, 
paradiplomacy can develop in parallel to national diplomacy, leading to more 
cooperation than conflict. 
Limits to explaining environmental paradiplomacy 
Generally, subnational engagement in international relations could be conceptualized as 
a kind of transnational or transgovernmental activity. In this case the terms 
‘transnational’ and ‘transgovernmental’ denote the fact that the interactions involve 
non-State actors (though always governmental), as well as the cross-border and global 
scope of these interactions. However, there are two main limitations to the extent to 
which the transnationalist and transgovernmentalist frameworks can explain the 
international environmental agenda undertaken by subnational governments.  
First, studies on transnationalism do not consider the activities carried out by 
subnational governments. Instead, transnationalism places attention onto NGOs, 
epistemic communities, and transnational advocacy networks. For example, in his study 
of transnational actors Risse (2002) includes MNCs, NGOs, epistemic communities and 
advocacy networks – and not subnational governments – as “transnational actors that 
operate in institutional environments which are largely determined by the domestic 
structures of nation-States” (p. 261).26 Furthermore, none of these works considered 
the challenges of subnational political representation in the international realm. 
Subnational governments are only considered as they join transnational networks. As 
Okereke et al (2009) point out, while the transnationalist scholarship challenged the 
way the nation-State was seen by realists, it emphasized private actors and NGOs. When 
researching environmental policy, transnationalist scholars tend to underestimate the 
great importance of the State (E. Fisher, 2012). 
Transgovernmentalism expanded the analysis to governmental actors, yet kept a 
narrow focus on the national level. For instance, Keohane and Nye (1974, p. 47) were 
interested in sub-units of different governments (“lower-level bureaucracies, as 
opposed to those of top leadership”), Raustiala (2002) examined “specialized domestic 
officials directly interacting with each other, often with minimal supervision by foreign 
ministers”. Slaughter (2004) focused on networks of government officials (police 
investigators, financial regulators, judges and legislators). In all these cases, however, 
the actors operate at the national level of governments. McMillan (2008) identified this 
limitation, arguing that even scholars such as Putnam, who acknowledge the two-level 
                                                 
26 In their edited book ‘NGO Diplomacy’, Betsill and Corell (2007) propose an analytical framework to 
assess NGO influence over international environmental negotiations. They conclude that NGO influence 
has two impacts - participation in international negotiations and the subsequent effects on the behaviour 
of other actors (Betsill and Corell 2007). There is no equivalent attempt to assess the impact of 
subnational diplomacy. 
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game, have not expanded the definition of transgovernmental actors to the subnational 
level. Baker (2009, p. 195) adds that transgovernmentalist research has been rarely 
applied in empirical research, with only a few political scientists having revised it for 
the contemporary era. 
Second, transnationalist and transgovernmentalist scholars have a narrow focus on 
networks. Transnational networks of subnational governments might help ‘localizing 
global issues and globalizing of local issues’ (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010). Yet, 
transnational networks are only one aspect of subnational governments’ international 
agenda, and paradiplomacy often occurs independently of networks. Independently of 
networks, subnational governments meet leaders of other subnational governments; act 
in the agenda-setting process that anticipates Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs); and attend UN Conferences joining their respective national delegations.27 
These accounts, however, are not encompassed by transnationalism, which focuses on 
horizontal links within the transnational realms, and not on vertical links and their 
effects in the domestic sphere. 
Third, there has been not enough attention to the implications of transnational 
governance in developing countries. Although there are theoretical frameworks for 
studies of transnational governance in the developing world (Martinez-Diaz & Woods, 
2009), developing countries and transnational governance are not considered together 
in the environmental domain (Held et al., 2012). 
In short, the definition of transnational and transgovernmental actors within the 
literature does not address subnational level foreign activity. The focus of this 
scholarship on government networks cannot account for the roles and motivations for 
subnational bureaucrats to engage in foreign policy. And there is a lack of consideration 
of developing countries and transnational governance in the environmental domain. 
Countering some of these limitations, work on paradiplomacy provides a specific lens by 
which to examine subnational governments’ international agenda. However, the 
literature on paradiplomacy is still scarce and the contributions made are modest. Five 
limitations can be pointed to in relation to this body of literature in providing an 
adequate theoretical framework to explain subnational governments’ international 
environmental relations. 
First, so far the paradiplomacy literature has failed to make a lasting impact in academic 
research. Not only with internationalists in general, but specialists in diplomatic studies 
have only exceptionally considered sub-state interventions in the international realm as 
noteworthy (Cornago, 2010a, p. 12). The “paradiplomatic activities of non-central 
governments like federal states or regions have only been object of niche studies in the 
early 1990s” (Acuto, 2013b, p. 2). The reasons behind this trend, according to Paul 
                                                 
27 This point will be further developed in Chapter 4. 
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(2002), are: the limited interest of internationalists in the implications of subnational 
practices for the operation of the global political economy; the understanding that 
subnational governments have limited importance for global processes; and the 
conventional wisdom that the global makes the local without reciprocal local effects 
upon the global. From the early days research in this field, scholars have noticed that 
subnational cross-border relations were less intensely studied than the formal 
international relations between national governments. For Rutan (1988, p. 163), this 
was because “these micro-diplomatic relationships lack the glamour, the impact, and 
most often the importance of international relations of the first rank”. 
Second, most of the research on paradiplomacy has been heavily case-oriented 
(Criekemans, 2010b; Lecours, 2002). Typical contributions document the international 
presence of a region, and the focus of its foreign policy. Examples of paradiplomacy have 
been found in Western federations or federal-like states, and the investigations consist 
of single or comparative case studies of subnational governments in Canada, Germany, 
Belgium, Australia, the US and Spain (see, for example, Balthazar, 1999; Beland & 
Lecours, 2006; Criekemans, 2010b; Huijgh, 2010; Keating, 1997; Lecours & Moreno, 
2003; Paquin, 2010; Van den Brande et al., 2011). A more recent body of research also 
started analysing subnational diplomacy in developing countries (Schiavon, 2010). This 
scholarly work commonly uses case studies to explain the existence and the nature of 
the international activity of a certain region. 
Third, and related to the previous point, the work on paradiplomacy suffers from a 
weak theoretical basis. While most studies focus on the characteristics of 
paradiplomatic efforts of one particular region, there is little effort in grounding the 
study into a theoretical perspective that could lead to a more general framework. As 
Lecours (2002, p. 94) points out, the effort in explaining the “existence and nature of a 
region’s international activity is rarely guided by general theoretical considerations and 
corresponds primarily to the identification of casual factors specific to a region”. This 
scholarship has also not offered a general theoretical perspective that can explain how 
subnational governments acquired international agency (Bursens & Deforche, 2010). 
This is partly due to the inward-looking nature of a great deal of the literature on 
paradiplomacy, which mainly focuses on a relatively small number of cases (Duran, 
2011, p. 341), usually of subnational governments that have separatist intentions. 
A fourth problem is the limited scope of the initiatives examined by the paradiplomacy 
research. While the concept of paradiplomacy refers to the international activity of 
regional governments, the empirical work on this concept is still limited. For instance, 
most studies focus on how regional governments sign international agreements, 
develop representations abroad, conduct trade missions, seek foreign investment. Yet, 
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there are other international activities that subnational governments engage in that 
remain unexplored by this body of research.28 
Lastly, so far only a small number of researchers have focused on subnational 
governments’ participation in international environmental affairs and international 
environmental decision-making processes. One of the first examples is Hocking’s (1996) 
study on the international campaign by Canadian provinces to overcome criticisms in 
Europe of its tree-cutting practices and effluent produced by its pulp mills. More 
recently, Eatmon (2009) and Chaloux (2010) used the paradiplomatic approach to 
explain the international implications of the adoption of climate policy and legislation 
by American states. Yet, their work is limited to cases of transborder and transregional 
paradiplomacy, that is, to climate initiatives along the borders of the US and Canada or 
the US and Mexico, and to initiatives that have already been understood under the 
concept of climate change regionalism.29 Rei et al (2012) study the role of the Nrg4SD in 
helping to establish subnational governments’ participation in the governance of 
climate change, and suggest what seems to be a first concept for environmental 
paradiplomacy. Finally, Bruyninckx et al (2012) analyse the involvement of subnational 
governments in international environmental decision-making.  
Despite these limitations, the concept of paradiplomacy is still analytically useful to 
explore the international activity of subnational governments, and it will be used in this 
study in a way that addresses some of its limitations. Section 2.3.1 advances their work 
by suggesting an analytical framework for environmental paradiplomacy. 
2.2.2. Federalism 
The second strand of literature - federalism – is interested in the question of levels and 
governmental hierarchies. As a constitutional theory, federalism understands that the 
sovereign State is constituted by both subnational and national entities. Piattoni (2010, 
p. 206) considers two fundamental characteristics of federalism. First, that sovereignty 
is shared equally by federal and federated units, independently of whether the federal 
structure is centripetal (as in the US and Switzerland) or centrifugal (as in Belgium). 
Second, that to preserve this equilibrium, these units exchange guarantees that are 
normally written in a constitution. A fundamental element of this constitutional balance 
is the provision that the federal or the federated units cannot upset the balance without 
the agreement of all other subjects. 
                                                 
28 See Chapter 4. 
29 The initiatives examined by Eatmon are the Climate Change Action Plan of the New England Governor’s 
Conferences and the Easter Canadian Premiers (NEG-ECP), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord . Chaloux’s 
analysis focuses on the NEG-ECP. These initiatives will be again mentioned in the next Section, when I 
present the federalist approach to climate regionalism. 
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Federalism is therefore a particularly apt theoretical framework within which to discuss 
the international agenda of subnational governments. It provides singular attention to 
the problem of reconciling the involvement of subnational levels in international 
policymaking with that of already constituted national levels of government. Within the 
study of federalism, two sub-trends are particularly relevant for the research in this 
thesis: those works which have studied (i) the participation of federated units in the 
international arena; and (ii) the engagement of federated units in climate action and 
transnational networks of subnational governments. 
Federated units in the international arena 
Since the 1970s, subnational governments in federal systems have been involved in 
foreign relations (Michelmann, 2009). As a result, a considerable amount of research on 
subnational governments’ international activities has appeared in the literature of 
federalism (McMillan, 2012). Drawing from federalist theories, scholars explain power 
sharing among and within national and subnational governments (Beland & Lecours, 
2006; Brown et al., 2006; Criekemans, 2010b; Sridharan, 2003).  
Studying the involvement of American governors in matters of international affairs, 
Kincaid (1984) argues that the governors are prompted by economic and political 
concerns. For him, “the opening of direct contacts with foreign nations represents an 
extension of the governor’s role as a ‘diplomat’ in the domestic intergovernmental 
system” (p.101). In similar lines, Fry (1990) focuses on how provinces and states 
actively promote trade and investment and operate offices abroad to pursue these 
goals. Kline (1999) further suggests that subnational involvement in transnational and 
transgovernmental relations must be understood within political and economic aspects 
of foreign relations.  
A number of scholars writing on paradiplomacy also drew upon federalist theory, and 
used federated units as their empirical case studies. Looking at the spectrum of 
paradiplomatic activities in federal countries, Duchacek (1990) suggested three types of 
paradiplomacy - regional, transregional, and global. Regional paradiplomacy refers to 
cross-border interactions between subnational governments (e.g. cooperative 
initiatives in the American-Canadian or Franco-Swiss borders). Transregional 
paradiplomacy refers to contacts between subnational governments that are non-
neighboring but whose national governments are (e.g. Quebec’s missions in Texas). 
Finally, global paradiplomacy involves direct contacts between subnational 
governments from non-contiguous countries (e.g. Quebec’s missions in Paris and 
Brussels). 
Within this strand of literature, another related concept is that of ‘cooperative 
federalism’. Cooperative federalism is based on the idea that the federal government 
and subnational governments both legislate in the same sphere. In this way, they 
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complement each other in solving a social problem (Schütze, 2009). Cooperative 
federalism was commonly called on by environmentalists in the 1970s to promote 
federal government action and responsive state and local cooperation to combat 
pollution in the US (Kincaid, 1990; Sheberle, 2004). Zimmerman (2001) confirmed that 
although competitive and conflictive at times, the relations between the nation-State 
and the federated states are generally cooperative in nature. In Kincaid’s (2002) 
analysis, the engagement of subnational governments in international relations 
“increases possibilities for inter-governmental and inter-jurisdictional cooperation, just 
as it increases possibilities for conflict, especially where domestic inter-governmental 
relations are already conflictual” (p.158). 30 
Environmental and climate change regionalism 
Scholars also draw from federalist theories to explore the engagement of federated 
units in environmental and climate change action. This literature investigates a 
“dynamic, political, multilevel context in which local, state, provincial, and federal actors 
formulate economic, environmental, and energy policies within their worn 
jurisdictions” (Selin & VanDeveer, 2011, p. 296).  
For decades environmental regionalism has been in place in the protection of shared 
environmental resources. In North America, by the 1970s, Canadian provinces and 
American states had established over 700 transborder agreements, of which 29% were 
related to environmental protection of natural resources (VanNijnatten, 2006). 
Equivalent regional environmental arrangements have also been identified in other 
parts of the world, such as in Central and Eastern Europe around transboundary air 
pollution (Andonova & Van Deveer, 2011; Haas, 1989; Levy, 1995), and in the 
Amazonian region over rainforests (Garcia, 2011). In common, these cases deal with 
situations where an ecosystem or resource spans the borders of two or more countries 
(Andonova & Mitchell, 2010; McAllister, 2009). 
Climate change regionalism is a more recent phenomenon, and it involves subnational 
governments taking the lead in adopting climate action. Several examples come from 
the US. In these cases, federalism is understood as the characteristics which allows 
subnational governments to partially offset national inaction (Harrison, 2007).31 
Climate change cooperation across the Canadian-American border is also object of 
interest. A number of studies examine regional initiatives such the Conference of New 
England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG-ECP), the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI), the Midwestern Greenhouse Accord, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) (Byrne et al., 2007; Selin & VanDeveer, 2005). Studies explore the 
                                                 
30 Chapter 8 discusses the extent to which the international agenda of Brazilian subnational governments 
affects its cooperative federalist structure. 
31 At the same time, it has been recognized that not all states in federalist countries experience the same 
level of success (Rabe, 2007). For instance, in Canada federalism had a negative force in climate policy, 
with the most influential provinces protecting GHG-intensive industries (Harrison, 2007). 
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drivers for the formation of such initiatives, as well as their outcomes (Engel, 2005; 
Olmsted, 2008; Rabe, 2009; Sunstein, 2007). 
Theories of federalism are also used by legal scholars to understand power sharing in 
situations of multiple jurisdictions and decentralisation. Osofsky’s work provides 
important pathways for thinking about the legal significance of subnational climate 
networks. She suggests that formal legal reform or the expanded recognition of cities’ 
capacity to influence formal international processes could contribute to international 
efforts to address climate change (Osofsky, 2010; Osofsky & Levit, 2008). Along similar 
lines, Engel (2007) examines the wide range of subnational networks working on 
climate change, and Resnik et al (2008) argue for their constructive role in shaping 
federal policy. Carlson (2008) describes an American context of ‘iterative federalism’, 
where the federal government is secondary, and states produce innovative programs to 
reduce GHG. Yet, Kysar and Meyler (2008) highlight the constitutional limitations to the 
foreign affairs activities of subnational governments.32 
Limits to explaining environmental paradiplomacy 
Scholars from a federalist stand have advanced the processes and causes of the 
international activities of subnational states and governors. However, systematic 
analysis is lacking (McMillan, 2012). The main question the federalist approach 
addresses is what subnational governments are doing. Yet, there is limited 
consideration of the meaning of this new capability in foreign affairs, and of diplomacy 
no longer being a monopoly of the central government (Aguirre, 1999). It falls short, 
thus, in articulating a critical discourse about federalism with the broader diplomatic 
and international consequences of subnational diplomacy. In addition, scholars working 
in this field have not given empirical attention to the environmental component in 
subnational governments’ international agenda.33 
The federalist approach to subnational environmental and climate regionalism is also 
limited in explaining environmental paradiplomacy. First, scholars place great attention 
on domestic aspects of the initiatives, but rarely extend their analysis to international 
environmental politics. As Selin and VanDeveer (2012) argue “federalist research tends 
to ignore the international level of governance” (p. 342). Second, studies on 
environmental regionalism tend to cover cases of subnational governments cooperating 
on environmental topics that are merely cross-border. Similarly, studies on climate 
change regionalism examine cooperation between subnational governments that are 
situated in a same continent, often ignoring the transnational aspect of the regional 
compacts (Byrne et al., 2007). Rabe (2009) recognized that in addition to cooperative 
initiatives between states that share the responsibility for an ecosystem, a multistate 
                                                 
32 Chapter 6 develops the idea of domestic/constitutional limits to subnational governments’ 
international relations. 
33 This is a similar point to the one made in relation to the literature on paradiplomacy (Subsection 2.2.1), 
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approach could include states that are not contiguous. Yet, such analysis is not further 
developed. 
2.2.3. Global environmental governance 
So far this literature review has examined a body of literature that emerged in reaction 
to the increased participation of non-State actors in IR, and another body of literature 
that deals with governmental hierarchies at a domestic level. The third part of this 
literature review looks at a literature that is concerned with the engagement of multiple 
actors in environmental policymaking. The global environmental governance literature 
emerged in the 2000s, with scholarly works examining the presence of non-State actors 
in the practice of global environmental politics and governance.34 This literature 
emphasizes the importance of both “the ecological and the institutional linkages across 
the scales at which environmental problems occur and are addressed” (Andonova & 
Mitchell, 2010, p. 256). 
Within the global environmental literature, the participation of a large number of actors 
and networks in environmental governance processes has been analyzed (i) as a 
multilevel governance process, and more recently (ii) as a matter of multilevel climate 
and environmental governance. While each is distinct in its focus, a common thread 
running through both of these accounts is their analysis of the way in which interactions 
at multiple levels help to constitute governance, and the ever-more-important role of 
cities in those dynamics. Both sub-trends will be examined in this section. 
Multilevel governance process 
The debate on MLG was initiated by Gary Mark’s (1992) seminal article on decision-
making dynamics within the EU. Through this lens, the EU was viewed as a multilevel 
structure of governance, dominated by horizontal and vertical linkages among national 
and subnational actors. Since then, MLG became an approach widely used by scholars 
researching European integration and IR to understand the spatial reallocation of 
authority from the centralized state (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Pierre & Peters, 2000; 
Rhodes, 2007). More recently MLG begun to be considered a theory that: 
…denotes a diverse set of arrangements, a panoply of systems of coordination 
and negotiation among formally independent but functionally interdependent 
entities that stand in complex relations to one another and that, through 
coordination and negotiation, keep redefining these relations (Piattoni, 2010, p. 
26).  
                                                 
34 Global environmental governance has been defined as “the norms, rules, laws, expectation, and 
structures established to guide behavior according to a set of public purposes” (Andonova & Mitchell, 
2010, p. 257). 
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In an attempt to define the theoretical space within which empirical instances of 
intergovernmental relations emerged, Hooghe and Marks (2003) distinguished two 
coexistent types of MLG. Type I, represented as a vertical dimension, is based on 
federalist relationships between central government and subnational governments. 
Type II, represented as a horizontal dimension, is dominated by networks and the 
jurisdictions operate at numerous territorial scales.  In other words, while the first 
emphasizes the links between administrative units, the second deals with interactions 
between public and private actors. In the same paper, they call attention to the 
advantages of MLG systems. For instance, they argue that the dispersion of governance 
across multiple jurisdictions is more flexible and efficient than concentration of 
governance in one jurisdiction. Moreover, centralized governments can explore 
economies of scale, but they are not well suited to accommodate diversity, and might 
impose a single policy on diverse ecological systems or territorially heterogeneous 
populations. 
The MLG theory encompasses fundamental aspects for understanding the engagement 
of subnational governments in IR. First, as Piattoni (2010, p. 19) puts it, the ‘multilevel’ 
aspect of the theory envisions subnational governments’ capacity to open the centre-
periphery gate and to cross the domestic-foreign divide. The ‘governance’ part of the 
theory, in its turn, allows subnational governments to become part of the daily politics 
of the EU. Second, and related to the first point, the MLG theory accepts the idea that 
decision making competences are shared by actors at different levels, and not 
monopolized by the national government (Hooghe & Marks, 1997). And third, the MLG 
theory envisions political spheres as interconnected (Kohler-Koch & Larat, 2009). This 
scenario allows subnational actors to act both in national and supranational arenas, 
creating transnational associations in the process.35 Subnational actors also try to 
influence policy and decision-making at the international level (Hooghe, 1996). As a 
result, national governments do not monopolize links between actors, but are one 
among a variety of actors contesting decisions that are made at a variety of levels.  
With the input of geographers, the spatial aspect of the MLG approach was further 
developed to reflect a move of the authority of governments upwards (to regional and 
international organizations), downwards (to subnational governments, including 
regions and cities), and outwards (to international corporations, NGOs and other 
private and quasi-private bodies). Empirically it was used to examine transnational 
interactions among world cities and their implications. Sassen (2002), for example, 
explores the ways in which economic globalization and the emergence of new 
information and communication technologies have made world cities key nodes for 
cross-border networks and resource concentration. 
                                                 
35 This idea relates to the notions of transnational and transgovernmental relations examined in 
Subsection 2.2.1. 
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A related approach in the geography of scale literature considers whether different 
governmental levels are themselves networks, with scholars such as Cox (1998) arguing 
that local spaces are comprised both of core local interactions and multilevel ones. 
Drawing from theorizations over the concept of scale, MLG scholars understand that 
spatially fixed conceptions of scale are insufficient for understanding processes of our 
present society. Recognising that scale is socially and politically constructed, this body 
of literature has called for a non-spatial concept of scale to recognise the change in the 
roles of supranational, subnational, and non-State actors (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; 
Bulkeley, 2005).36  
Multilevel environmental and climate governance 
Since the mid-1990s authors have also been using the MLG approach to understand 
current trends in the development of environmental and climate change governance 
(Bulkeley, 2010). Normatively, MLG becomes a response to the mounting complexity 
and multilayered nature of environmental problems (Buizer et al., 2011). Analytically, 
the MLG approach helps to shed light on the various actors and scales involved in 
environmental and climate governance (Bulkeley, 2005). Consequently, environmental 
and climate governance is said to occur in a MLG process across multiple arenas of 
governance and at different scales, which includes large regions, subnational regions, 
municipalities and communities (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006).  
Among the various actors and scales, cities are presented as a crucial scale for tackling 
global climate change. Scholars draw upon MLG frameworks to understand cities’ 
efforts in promoting environmental and climate change policies, as well as to their 
involvement in policymaking across different levels of government (Andonova et al., 
2009; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Rabe, 2007, 2008b; Selin & VanDeveer, 2007; Setzer, 
2009; Toly, 2011). Multilevel climate governance, therefore, provides opportunities for 
subnational actors and transnational networks to act at the city level (Bulkeley, 2010, p. 
240).  
The literature on climate governance places special attention to the role of transnational 
networks of cities. These networks are said to allow subnational governments to be 
“involved with something that reaches beyond their own boundaries” (Newell et al., 
2012, p. 372). Much of the attention surrounding local climate protection is associated 
with ICLEI (Betsill, 2006; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Davies, 2005; Holgate, 2007; Kousky 
& Schneider, 2003; Romero-Lankao, 2007; Schroeder & Bulkeley, 2009; Setzer, 2009; 
Toly, 2008)37, and the C40 (Acuto, 2013b; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007; Engle & Lemos, 
2010; Gore, 2010). Some scholars examine how these networks are created and 
maintained (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). Others consider the extent to which they foster 
                                                 
36 A conceptualisation of scale in geography and on MLG scholarship can be found in Chapter 5. 
37 ICLEI’s CCP (Cities for Climate Protection Campaign) Program was replaced in June 2012 by the Green 
Climate Cities Campaign. 
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policy learning and change (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007; Gustavsson et al., 2009; Krause, 
2012; Lidskog & Elander, 2010). Some argue that transnational networks help local 
governments adopting GHG emission reduction strategies (Andonova, 2008; Selin & 
VanDeveer, 2009). Others, still, suggest that their impact is network specific (Krause, 
2012).38 Altogether, the actual impact of these networks on member-city actions has not 
been clearly established.  
This literature on multilevel climate and environmental governance is complemented 
by scholarship that looks at bottom-up action as a form of polycentric climate change 
governance. In this view, international negotiations are one piece of a complex puzzle, 
and small scale governments can help build the trust and commitment needed to 
overcome collective action failures. The most important scholar in this trend, Elinor 
Ostrom (2010), argues, that a polycentric approach encourages experimental efforts at 
multiple levels, as well as the development of methods for assessing the benefits and 
costs of particular strategies adopted. 
Another relevant contribution to this literature is found in the idea of rescaling 
environmental governance. Andonova and Mitchell’s (2010) paper, in particular, 
demonstrates that environmental politics has been rescaled in terms of the level at 
which they take place, the actors that are engaged in them, and the linkages between 
environmental and non-environmental issues. Arguing that the rescaling observed in 
global environmental governance occurs both in practice and theory, their work 
interweaves rescaling processes, environmental politics and governance. The 
framework they propose will be discussed in this Chapter (Section 2.3.2), and a 
discussion around the rescaling of environmental governance can be found in Chapter 5. 
Limits to explaining environmental paradiplomacy 
Despite its many contributions, when it comes to understanding the engagement of 
subnational governments in IR, the existing literature on MLG and multilevel climate 
governance is problematic for three main reasons.  
First, the MLG literature cannot fully capture the international environmental activity of 
subnational governments. One aspect is that the relationships that are promoted in the 
context of MLG Type II governance have distinct characteristics from the relationships 
involved in environmental paradiplomacy. Hooghe and Marks (2010) describe three 
jurisdictions that are covered by MLG Type II. Yet, none of these covers environmental 
paradiplomacy. The first jurisdiction, termed ‘national/international frontier’, includes 
bilateral or multilateral agreements, international governmental organizations and 
public-private partnerships that try to tie national governments into authoritative 
                                                 
38 Krause (2012) analyses American cities’ involvement in transnational networks, and argues that ICLEI 
membership causes small to moderate increases in cities’ GHG-relevant activity, whereas the Conference 
of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement has no such effect. 
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transnational jurisdictions. The second jurisdiction, termed ‘cross-border regions’, 
refers to governance arrangements that extend over national borders in order to solve 
particular collective action problems (e.g. in the US/Mexican and US/Canadian borders). 
And the third jurisdiction of type II governance, termed ‘local level’, refers to cases of 
partnerships between service providers within levels of local government. Not 
encompassed by these jurisdictions, environmental paradiplomacy involves 
cooperation between regions, and regions that do not necessarily share borders.  
Another difference between both concepts regards the participation of non-
governmental actors. The involvement of non-governmental actors is one of the 
conditions for a given policymaking process to be considered an instance of MLG 
(Piattoni, 2010). These actors can be from trade unions and employers’ associations as 
well as NGOs and civil society organizations. Yet, most times environmental 
paradiplomacy involves only governmental actors. Therefore, although the ‘multi-level’ 
aspect is present in paradiplomacy, connecting the supranational, national, and 
subnational, the ‘governance’ aspect is not required, once the initiatives involve solely 
governmental actors.  
Even the more specific work on multilevel climate and environmental governance, 
which in many aspects resembles the idea of environmental paradiplomacy, cannot fully 
explain the international activities undertaken by subnational governments in 
addressing global environmental problems. As Eatmon (2009, p. 153) argues, the 
existing literature on climate governance has given less attention to ‘atypical non-State 
actors’ such as subnational governments, than to the ‘private’ non-State actors. When 
local governments are considered, the discussion focuses on the roles and impacts of 
transnational networks of cities, rather than on the significance of subnational 
governments’ participation in international climate affairs. Consequently, the MLG 
literature helps mapping the actors involved in climate governance, but it gives little 
insight into the processes that they are engaging in. 
Because environmental paradiplomacy is not completely covered by the MLG 
framework, the engagement of subnational governments in international environmental 
relations should not draw upon exclusively such framework. Otherwise, as Piattoni 
(2010) cautions, MLG runs the risk of becoming an umbrella under which many 
disparate phenomena are subsumed: 
Phenomena that would best be captured by other conceptual labels end up being 
subsumed under MLG, to the point that it loses its capacity to explain which 
phenomena are not encompassed within this concept… In order to avoid this 
sensible point, it is essential to confirm whether the phenomena object of 
analysis by this thesis really fits within the concept and the theory of MLG (p.2). 
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Second, the MLG approach offers limited consideration of the legal and institutional 
constraints that subnational governments face in rescaling processes. Rescaling 
processes (moving across levels of governance) are often taken for granted, with little 
or no consideration on whether the actors have legal authority to move across scales. 
For instance, is it constitutional or unconstitutional for subnational governments to 
meet foreign dignitaries, to sign MOUs with other subnational governments across 
borders, or to aim to influence the national position in foreign policy matters? These 
questions are within the concern of legal scholars investigating subnational 
governments’ international affairs from a federalist perspective, but have not received 
the attention of MLG scholars.39 
Third, the MLG literature is still very EU-centred (Jordan et al., 2005). The work on 
multilevel climate governance follows this trend, concentrating in cities from EU and 
other developed countries. Betsill & Bulkeley (2007) recognize that the majority of 
studies on cities and climate change have focused on the experience of cities in 
industrialised countries, leading to the question of whether findings can be generalized 
to cities in the global South. Starting to fill the gap, recent research has analysed the 
institutional setting and governance structure in cities in Brazil (Engle & Lemos, 2010; 
Martins & Ferreira, 2011; Romeiro & Parente, 2011; Setzer, 2009), Mexico (Romero-
Lankao, 2007), India (S. Fisher, 2012) and South Africa (Aylett, 2010; Holgate, 2007). 
The two scholars also recognize that the analysis of urban responses to climate change 
has placed municipal authorities at the heart of the analysis, while “relations between 
different parts of the state and other spheres of authorities were regarded in rather 
static terms” (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013, p. 144). MLG studies also have limited 
engagement with the ways in which other processes that govern production and 
consumption may sustain, limit or contest urban climate responses (Bulkeley & Betsill, 
2013). One example is the limited consideration of private actors and particularly small 
and medium-sized enterprises in the formulation and implementation of climate 
policies in cities (see Setzer & Biderman, forthcoming). 
Therefore, additional conceptual work remains necessary to describe the significance of 
the international activities undertaken by subnational governments in addressing 
global environmental problems. Environmental paradiplomacy illustrates the capacity 
of subnational authorities to cross this ‘domestic-foreign gate’ without the participation 
of the central government. This is what happens when a subnational government 
cooperates with subnational governments across borders or with foreign institutions, 
with or without very limited participation of the nation-State. Yet, the MLG scholarship 
leaves relevant questions untouched, and these can be complemented by the concept of 
paradiplomacy. The next section suggests a two-component analytical framework which 
is built upon these two bodies of literature. 
                                                 
39 This argument will be further developed in Chapter 5. 
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2.3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The literature review above suggests that no single conceptual framework can fully 
account for the existence or explain the impact of the international environmental 
relations of subnational governments. This probably explains why so far the literature 
that examines subnational engagement in international environmental relations 
combines a variety of approaches and theories. For example, Osofsky (2010) draws 
from network theory, transnational legal process, IR, and legal pluralism. McMillan 
(2012) frames his analysis within theories and approaches from IR, international 
political economy, and foreign policy analysis. Rabe (2008b) includes these efforts as 
part of broader cooperative federalism models. Bruyninckx et al (2012) and Bursens & 
Deforche (2010) refer to the framework of paradiplomacy and MLG.  
This section outlines the analytical framework of the research. As anticipated, the 
analytical framework for this thesis combines the concept of paradiplomacy and the 
theory of MLG. Both paradiplomacy and MLG have been examined in the literature 
review: paradiplomacy is a conceptual trend that emerged within the broad literatures 
on non-State actors in IR and federalism, and MLG is a conceptual trend that emerged 
within the global environmental governance literature (see Figure 2-1 above). 
It is argued that the concept of paradiplomacy, combined with the theory of MLG, provides 
a suitable analytical framework to explain the international environmental agenda 
undertaken by subnational governments. The suggested analytical framework explains 
how subnational governments engage in an international environmental agenda.40 
Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 present the details of each of the two components of the 
analytical framework, and subsection 2.3.3 designs the analytical framework that 
combines both paradiplomacy and MLG.  
This two-component analytical framework also structures the dissertation. In Chapter 4 
an overview is provided of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda, building 
mostly on the first element of the analytical framework - paradiplomacy. Chapter 5 adds 
the MLG element into the analysis, exploring São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy 
and the vertical and horizontal types of coordination that it promotes across 
jurisdictions. The analysis carried out in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 assesses the causes and 
effects of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda, drawing simultaneously from 
both elements of the analytical framework. While in most cases the literatures on MLG 
and paradiplomacy run in parallel, the thesis intertwines the theory of MLG and the 
concept of paradiplomacy, consolidating a novel conceptual approach. 
 
                                                 
40 The processes through which the state of Sao Paulo engages in international relations to address global 
environmental problems will be further developed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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2.3.1. Paradiplomacy 
The paradiplomacy element of the analytical framework focuses on how subnational 
governments have been undertaking an international environmental agenda. The 
theoretical basis of this component is provided by scholarly work on paradiplomacy. I 
draw particularly upon a recent work by Hans Bruynickx, Sander Happaerts and 
Karoline Van den Brande (2012) exploring the subnational routes to global 
environmental decision-making. This is the first – and so far only – comprehensive work 
investigating how subnational governments get involved in international decision-
making for sustainable development.41  
The authors argue that subnational participation in global environmental decision-
making occurs through two routes. The first is an intra-state route, where a subnational 
government tries to be involved in global decision-making. This can be seen, for 
example, in the UN, where subnational governments influence national decision-making 
or participate in the national delegation for global negotiations. The second is an extra-
state route, where the subnational government tries to bypass the national government. 
Examples are the participation in transnational networks of subnational governments 
and appointing a subnational attaché to the global organization. Van den Brande et al’s 
(2012) table (Table 2-2) summarises the two subnational routes to global decision-
making outside the EU context.  
Intra-State Extra-State 
Participating in national decision-making 
on global negotiations 
Participating in the national delegation for 
global negotiations 
Appointing a subnational attaché to a 
global organization 
Participating in transnational networks of 
subnational governments 
 
Table 2-2 Typology of subnational routes to global decision-making: outside the EU 
context 
Source: Van den Brande et al. (2012, p. 16)  
One of the main contributions of this typology of subnational routes to global decision-
making outside the EU context is to call attention to the international environmental 
activities of subnational governments. This typology is then applied by Chaloux and 
                                                 
41 The authors take as a starting point a work by Geeraerts et al (2004) on routes for subnational 
governments to influence multilateral decision-making - only published in Dutch. A previous paper (Van 
den Brande et al., 2011) suggested a typology of four subnational routes to EU decision-making, and a 
typology of two subnational routes to EU decision-making. The more general ‘two routes for subnational 
participation in global environmental decision-making’ was introduced in the 2012 book. 
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Paquin (2012) in a study of the environmental cross-border relations between North 
American states and Canadian Provinces within the NEG-ECP.42 However, the typology 
does not consider a number of situations where subnational governments act in an 
‘extra-State’ role, as when meeting international authorities and establishing 
decentralised cooperation initiatives. The fact that subnational action occurs nationally 
and/or internationally is also left outside the typology. Chapter 4 explores in detail the 
different kinds of activities in which the state of São Paulo is involved, suggesting a 
revised version of Van den Brande et al.’s (2012) typology. 
2.3.2. MLG 
The second component of the analytical framework, MLG theory, studies the dispersion 
of decision-making across multiple jurisdictions. Although often used as a normative 
concept for allocating governing authority, MLG has also been applied as an analytical 
model for understanding current trends in the development of climate change 
regulation (Peel et al., 2012). The MLG approach offers a particularly suitable 
framework for analysing the multi-scale and multi-actor processes observed in climate 
governance, as well as it allows for a better understanding of how the presence of 
multiple governmental tiers affects environmental policy performance (Wälti, 2010, p. 
412). More specifically, as outlined in the previous section, some aspects of the MLG 
approach help looking at subnational involvement in international environmental policy 
and decision-making.  
To analyse the specific reality of Brazilian environmental politics, Hochstetler and Keck 
(2007) have already suggested the use of a MLG framework. They justify this choice 
taking into consideration that ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ factors are often 
intertwined in Brazil. Thus, a MLG framework helps in making sense of the many 
interactions among levels of governance and kinds of actors involved. That is, it permits 
mapping of subnational governments and their vertical and horizontal interactions to 
address global environmental problems. 
To such an end, I draw primarily upon Andonova and Michell’s (2010) work on the 
rescaling of global environmental governance. Rescaling processes of global 
environmental governance, they argue, is observed in two types of situation: with a 
move vertically down to subnational governments or up toward supranational regimes; 
and with a move horizontally across regional and sectorial organizations and networks. 
In either way there is “a shift in the locus, agency, and scope of global environmental 
politics and governance across scales” (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010, p. 257). The vertical 
and horizontal rescaling of environmental politics is illustrated as follows (Figure 2-2): 
                                                 
42 The more specific typology designed for the EU context is tested by Van den Brande (2012) for the case 
of the Belgian subnational entity of Flanders, and by Hanf and Morata (2012) for the Autonomous 
Communities of Spain. 
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Figure 2-2 Horizontal and vertical dimensions of global environmental politics 
rescaling  
Source: Andonova and Mitchell (2010, p. 258) 
The figure successfully demonstrates a rescaling process - vertically up/down, and 
horizontally across - with respect to the level at which environmental governance takes 
place (subnational, national and supranational). It also illustrates the range of actors 
engaged in them (IGOs, MNCs, international NGOs, State, national business companies, 
national NGOs, local governments, local NGOs, local business organisations and 
individuals). However, it overlooks the rescaling with which subnational governments 
are involved. Put it differently, it offers only a partial account of the types of rescaling 
relationships that subnational governments are involved in. Chapter 5 supplements this 
rescaling framework, suggesting a revised version of Andonova and Mitchell’s (2010) 
figure.  
2.3.3. Combining MLG and Paradiplomacy 
So far this Chapter has examined the different streams of literature that discuss 
subnational engagement in international relations. In search for a more suitable 
analytical framework, the Chapter focused on the MLG approach and the concept of 
paradiplomacy. The MLG and the concept of paradiplomacy share some major 
characteristics and also manifest some considerable differences in explaining the nature 
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of subnational governments’ international relations. This section applies this 
comparison of paradiplomacy and MLG to subnational action addressing global 
environmental problems. The comparison suggests that both concepts can be seen as 
complementary, rather than contradictory. From this comparison, I present a combined 
analytical framework which takes elements from the MLG and the paradiplomacy 
literature, and finally I present a concept for environmental paradiplomacy. 
The foundation of the two-component analytical framework for the study of subnational 
governments’ international environmental agenda is (i) the paradiplomatic element 
that subnational governments can act nationally and internationally, through or 
independently of the central government, in addressing global environmental problems; 
and (ii) the MLG element that subnational governments can promote the rescaling of 
environmental governance down from the national and supranational level, up towards 
the national and supranational levels, and horizontally across regional and sectorial 
organizations and networks. This two-component analytical framework is summarised 
as follows (Table 2-3): 
Paradiplomacy element MLG element 
Acting internationally through the central 
government 
Acting nationally through the central 
government 
Acting internationally without the central 
government 
Acting nationally without the central 
government 
Rescaling vertically down from the 
national and supranational levels 
Rescaling vertically up toward 
national and supranational levels 
Rescaling horizontally across regional 
and sectorial organizations and 
networks 
 
Table 2-3 Two-element analytical framework of subnational governments’ 
international environmental activity 
Source: Author 
The paradiplomatic element of acting through or independently of the national 
government derives from the federalist basis that informs this body of literature. As 
mentioned earlier, most cases of paradiplomacy are situated in federal countries. A 
positive aspect of this federalist basis is the attention that the paradiplomatic element 
gives to the domestic sphere, and the fact that it takes into consideration the existence 
of legal limits to rescaling processes. A negative aspect, however, is that paradiplomacy 
has focused on the boundaries separating actors rather than on the linkages binding 
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them together, and it lacks a strong theoretical grasp on the results of subnational 
governments engagement in international relations. 
The MLG element of rescaling, on the other hand, was developed to explain 
policymaking in the EU, while at the same time it tries to counteract State-centric 
approaches found in IR theory. A positive aspect of the MLG approach is that it reminds 
us that subnational governments can engage in rescaling processes in cooperation with 
the national government. A robust theoretical body developed in the past twenty years 
demonstrates that a variety of actors, including subnational governments, can come into 
direct contact with supranational institutions through policy networks, resulting in 
multiple levels of interaction between the domestic and the supranational. On the 
negative side, MLG tends to have an internationalist view that emphasizes subnational 
governments’ participation in transnational networks, and overlooks the legal and 
institutional limits of rescaling. 
This comparison between the paradiplomatic and the MLG element suggests that 
limitations of one element are addressed by the strengths of the other element. The 
two-facets of this analytical framework, therefore, do not need to be seen as two 
separate elements. Rather, the paradiplomatic and the MLG elements can be understood 
as part of one framework, where one complements the other. In other words, a 
combined analytical framework addresses the shortcomings of each scholarship, 
suggesting that: by acting nationally and/or internationally, through and/or 
independently the central government, subnational governments can promote 
horizontal and vertical rescaling processes. 
All in all, MLG and paradiplomatic studies can benefit from being combined. Many policy 
fields in federal countries and in MLG systems are subject to the simultaneous 
influences of international negotiations, national governments and subnational 
authorities. Therefore, paradiplomacy can be understood within the idea of MLG, at the 
same time that it can contribute to the existing MLG perspective. Some of the 
discussions that are now taking place under the label of MLG are familiar to studies on 
paradiplomacy that are thirty years old. In this attempt, paradiplomacy could inform 
MLG as a general theory of subnational activity in international affairs. 
Finally, taking into consideration the specific case of the international environmental 
agenda undertaken by subnational governments, environmental paradiplomacy can be 
defined as subnational governments’ involvement in international relations, undertaken at 
the national and/or international level, through and/or independent of the national 
government, aiming to address global environmental problems. These initiatives involve: 
signing partnerships and cooperation initiatives (with subnational governments across 
borders, with other national governments, with international development agencies, or 
with international organizations); participating in international environmental 
negotiations processes where global environmental problems are addressed; 
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participating in transnational networks of subnational governments; meeting 
governmental officials abroad or hosting foreign dignitaries; and meeting national 
government officials to engage with the country’s position in international 
environmental negotiations. 
This definition of environmental paradiplomacy draws from but is distinct from the 
concepts of transgovernmental networks, multilevel climate governance, climate 
regionalism and traditional paradiplomacy. With this definition in mind, it is possible to 
test whether a given policymaking process is or is not an instance of environmental 
paradiplomacy. This definition can also help in distinguishing environmental 
paradiplomacy from other types of governance, as well as from other conventional 
forms of mobilization which do not challenge established hierarchies. 
From this framework and drawing upon the concept of environmental paradiplomacy, 
the following Chapters will try to explain how and why subnational governments 
undertake international relations to address global environmental problems, and what 
results from this agenda. 
2.4. SUMMARY 
This Chapter laid the theoretical and analytical foundation for the study of subnational 
governments’ international environmental relations.  
First it reviewed existing studies that seek to explain the participation of non-State 
actors, particularly subnational governments, in international environmental relations 
(Section 2.2). No single theory or body of literature exists to explain the nature of 
environmental paradiplomacy. A variety of elements have been raised by three streams 
of literature: non-State actors in IR, federalism, and global environmental governance. 
These broad perspectives encompass different debates that have been held in the 
disciplines of Geography, International Relations and Law. 
Within the literature on non-State actors in IR, work on transnational and 
transgovernmental relations advanced in giving non-State actors theoretical and 
empirical coverage, but gave little attention to the transnational activities of subnational 
governments. Studies on paradiplomacy addressed this limitation without, however, 
providing a robust theoretical foundation or enough consideration of subnational 
governments’ engagement in environmental policy (Subsection 2.2.1).  
Within the federalist literature scholars again investigated the international agenda of 
subnational governments, though without expanding the theoretical basis of their 
approach and with no interest in the international environmental agenda. The 
environmental aspect has been the object of attention by federalist scholars 
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investigating environmental and climate change regionalism, but without much 
examination of the international aspect of this agenda (Subsection 2.2.2). 
Lastly, within the global environmental governance literature, the MLG approach and 
studies on the MLG of climate change and the environment advanced the understanding 
of multilevel and environmental aspects of the phenomenon. Yet, this literature kept a 
focus on transnational networks, and left unexamined the barriers that subnational 
governments face in rescaling processes (Subsection 2.2.3).  
Having established that none of the research strands discussed can effectively serve as 
an exclusive reference for the research aims of this thesis, in Section 2.3 the concept of 
paradiplomacy and the MLG approach were examined more closely (Subsections 2.3.1 
and 2.3.2). Separately they do not offer a comprehensive analytical framework to 
understand subnational governments’ international environmental relations, but, 
considering that their strengths and limitations complement each other, MLG and 
paradiplomacy can be considered simultaneously (Subsection 2.3.3). Thus, the final 
Section combined the MLG theory with the concept of paradiplomacy, suggesting that 
acting nationally and/or internationally, through and/or independently the central 
government, subnational governments can promote horizontal and vertical rescaling 
processes.  
These theoretical and analytical frameworks will guide the analysis, found in Chapters 4 
to 8, of how and why subnational governments undertake an international agenda to 
tackle global environmental problems, as well as what results from this activity. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
As highlighted in the Introduction, the main goal of this thesis is to analyse the 
international environmental relations undertaken by the state of São Paulo, exploring 
how they develop, what drives this agenda, and what are its outcomes. The review of 
the existing literature on subnational governments’ international relations presented in 
the first part of Chapter 2 revealed that studies have been spread across different 
disciplines and theoretical frameworks. In the second part of Chapter 2, a combined 
analytical approach, which draws from the MLG literature and the concept of 
paradiplomacy, was suggested.  
Most of the literature on MLG and international environmental politics uses qualitative 
studies, drawing upon data obtained through interviews, archival research, participant 
observation and questionnaires (Hochstetler & Laituri, 2006). In the paradiplomacy 
literature the vast majority of studies also uses qualitative approaches, featuring case 
studies, to investigate the international agenda undertaken by subnational governments 
around the world.43 This thesis also draws upon a qualitative approach, using a single 
case study to trace the causes, rational and developments of São Paulo’s international 
environmental agenda. The reasons for this choice of methodology, as well as its 
limitations will be discussed in this Chapter. 
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the single case study approach 
chosen and the stages in which the research was developed. Section 3.3 presents the 
data collection methods. It presents the rationale for choosing the state of São Paulo as a 
case study. It also discusses issues related to participant observation, elite interviewing 
– the main method used – and document analysis. When discussing particularities about 
the fieldwork and the interviewing process, I present some reflections on my 
positionality, that is, how I situate myself in the research. Section 3.4 discusses the 
reliability of the data, limitations of the research and ethical questions. The last section 
presents a brief summary of the Chapter.  
 
                                                 
43 One of the few exceptions is McMillan’s (2012) recent book, which uses both qualitative (interviews) 
and quantitative (time-series cross-sectional model) methods to analyse how state governments in the US 
engage in foreign relations. 
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3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis is based on the empirical case study of the environmental paradiplomatic 
initiatives held by the state of São Paulo. The analysis is qualitative and it draws upon a 
single case study. In presenting the research design I consider the reasons for using a 
case study framework, a qualitative approach, and the choice of a single case study. 
There are a number of reasons for choosing a case study framework to research the 
international environmental relations undertaken by subnational governments. First, 
the case study framework supports an in-depth exploration and analysis of the 
phenomenon. As Ragin (2009, p. 523) argues, “to posit cases is to engage in ontological 
speculation regarding what is obdurately real but only partially and indirectly 
accessible through social science”. Second, the case study framework allows for the 
collection of various types of data. It is claimed that the use of ‘thick description’ helps 
to ensure that there is sufficient empirical data from which to make theoretical 
inferences (Bryman, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). Third, the use of a case study is 
further justified by the interdisciplinary nature of the research. As Bryne (2009, p. 6) 
argues, “case-focused methods are of particular importance for interdisciplinary studies 
at a time when social science is increasingly ‘post-disciplinary’ both in conceptualization 
and in practical application”. Lastly, as Yin (2003) suggests, case studies are the 
preferred research strategy when “how” and “why” type questions are asked, when 
contemporary phenomena in a real-life context are studied, and when the investigator 
has little control over events. As the research aims to acquire a rounded understanding 
of the reasons for the emergence, as well as on-going processes of subnational 
governments’ international environmental agenda, the case study framework was found 
to be the most suitable research strategy. 
In terms of the approach used, while the object of case studies can be examined through 
both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, this study 
draws exclusively on a qualitative approach. The reason is that this thesis is not 
concerned with measurements. Rather, qualitative research is concerned with the social 
structures involved in a given situation (Bryman, 2008), and with elucidating them 
within different conceptual frameworks (Winchester, 2008). Furthermore, qualitative 
approaches are recommended for works in the policy arena “because quantitative 
approaches have proved inadequate in addressing the issues of context and complex 
causation that underlie social intervention at all stages, but particularly in relation to 
actual implementation” (Byrne et al., 2009, p. 512). Qualitative research is also 
particularly appropriate to assess the influence that non-State actors - such as NGOs, but 
also subnational governments - have over international environmental negotiations. 
Bestill and Corell make this argument:  
We are not, however, in favour of a quantitative measure of NGO influence. We 
believe that precise quantification is futile and would only create a false 
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impression of measurability for a phenomenon that is highly complex and 
intangible. Instead of ‘measuring’ influence, we suggest that the influence of NGO 
diplomats can be qualitatively ‘assessed’ in terms of high, moderate, or low levels 
of influence (Betsill & Corell, 2007, p. 32). 
Finally, the research uses a single case study to trace the causes, rationale and 
developments of subnational governments’ international environmental agenda. Single 
case studies are suitable for explaining the nuances of social phenomena and addressing 
specific mechanisms that produce, reproduce, change or are otherwise related to the 
phenomena (Armato & Caren, 2002, p. 97). Although single case studies might be 
limited in the extent to which their findings can be generalised to other cases44, within a 
single case it is possible to look at a large number of intervening variables (George & 
Bennett, 2005, p. 21). Moreover, findings from single case studies can be used to make 
theoretical inferences (Fielding & Warnes, 2009, p. 271). Consequently, the research 
findings of single cases can be generalized to wider theory (Barzelay, 1993; Yin, 2003). 
As such, the researcher, through the case study, contributes to and expands theoretical 
debate.  
3.3. Data collection 
Four methods were used for data collection. The case of São Paulo was chosen on the 
basis of its relevance to the topic. Participant observation, interviews and document 
analysis were essential to collect empirical data to examine the drivers and outcomes of 
the international environmental relations undertaken by this subnational government. 
3.3.1. Case selection  
I originally became interested in São Paulo’s international environmental agenda while 
doing my MSc at the London School of Economics, in 2007-2008. I was studying how the 
city and the state of São Paulo were implementing their municipal and regional climate 
change policies ahead of the Brazilian government, and the specific aspect of the state’s 
international environmental agenda draw my attention. In July 2008 I spent one month 
in São Paulo interviewing some relevant actors in the city and the state climate change 
policy arena. Two of the interviews I did were particularly important in calling my 
attention to this ‘parallel’ diplomatic agenda that was being undertaken in the 
subnational level. One was with the Regional Director of ICLEI´s Latin America and the 
Caribbean Secretariat, who since 2002 has been coordinating the Cities for Climate 
Protection programme. The second was with the President of São Paulo’s state 
Environment Agency (CETESB), who since 2002 has become very involved with the 
Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (Nrg4SD). 
                                                 
44 Limitations and advantages of single case studies will be further discussed in the last Section of this 
Chapter. 
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In October 2008 CETESB’s President invited me to attend Nrg4SD’s II World Summit of 
Regions, held in Saint Malo, France. In Saint Malo the state of São Paulo was re-elected 
vice-President of the network for Latin America and the Caribbean region, and also 
elected Nrg4SD’s co-President for the South – with the region of Brittany as co-
President for the North. Following this experience, in November 2008 I started working 
for ICLEI-Brazil in a project that aimed at helping the Brazilian states of Bahia, 
Pernambuco and Mato Grosso developing policies and action to combat climate change. 
For two weeks during this project I accompanied a delegation of policy-makers from 
these three states in Poznan, during the negotiations of COP-14.45 In Poznan I also 
participated in a few meetings between representatives from four Brazilian states 
(Amazonas, Amapá, Mato Grosso and Pará), and the state of California. These state 
representatives were drawing the first lines of what they intended to be the first state-
to-state sub-national agreement focused on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) programs. 
These experiences enabled me to decide on my topic of study. I was interested in 
understanding what was driving subnational governments to engage in international 
relations to address global environmental problems such as biodiversity and climate 
change, and I wanted to find out what the benefits are, if any, of this agenda.  
Brazil presented itself as interesting case to examine as, in contrast to most other cases 
studies presented by the paradiplomatic literature, in Brazil subnational governments 
engage in international relations not only as a way of challenging, but also collaborating 
with the national government. In addition, the majority of empirical studies published 
to date in English concern the paradiplomatic activity of regional governments situated 
in developed countries, notably in Canada, the US, and in Europe. When considering my 
interest in the environmental, Brazil presented an interesting case as a country that 
concentrates some of the most precious natural resources in the planet, and is at the 
same time an influential economic actor and a powerful player in international 
environmental policymaking. 
The choice of the state of São Paulo as a case study also deserves consideration. 
Although I had established contact with policy-makers from different Brazilian states, I 
decided to concentrate my research in the state of São Paulo. The international 
environmental activity of other Brazilian states was more recent and less established 
than the one undertaken by the state of São Paulo. In addition, I had a stronger network 
of contacts in this region. Most importantly for my decision was the fact that São Paulo’s 
international environmental agenda was not limited to a recent interest of the states’ 
policy-makers in the topic of climate change, or focused on the potential economic 
benefits that subnational cap-and-trade mechanisms could bring. Since the aim of the 
                                                 
45 ICLEI’s project involved bringing representatives of the states of Bahia, Pernambuco and Mato Gross to 
a UNFCCC climate negotiation (COP-14, in Poznan), so that these policy-makers would understand how 
the discussion occurred in the international arena. 
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study was to gain an insight into international environmental cooperation initiatives at 
the subnational level, it seemed inappropriate to study subnational governments that 
had an ephemeral interest in undertaking international relations. 
3.3.2. Participant observation 
In recent years there has been a call for human, urban and political geographers to 
undertake fieldwork or ethnography. Fieldwork is said to address “the richness and 
complexity of human life and gets closer to understanding the ways people interpret 
and experience the world” (Lees, 2003, p. 110). Ethnography is also presented in 
contrast to the study of elite discourses, which “remains only a partial contribution to 
the construction of a fuller understanding of the spatiality of political processes” 
(Megoran, 2006, p. 625). The reason behind this argument is that even the study of the 
state must involve an examination of how the state is experienced in everyday life.  
However, ethnographic methods are not necessarily appropriate or feasible in all 
qualitative geographical research. While traditional research methods were designed 
for the study of physically centralized or territorially specific social interactions, 
researchers now face challenges of how to qualitatively study culture produced in 
situations of decentralized human interaction (Howard, 2002). This was the case of the 
examination of physically decentralized social networks such as the epistemic 
communities identified by Haas (1992), and of research on new online communities 
(Howard, 2002). Similar research on political ecology and the politics of scale has also 
adapted the idea of ethnography, so that the fieldwork can be carried out without being 
restricted to the “naively local” (Howitt & Stevens, 2008).  
The study of the diplomatic agenda of a subnational government is one such case. It 
involves multiple actors and processes, and these cannot be restricted to one physical 
location. Because the paradiplomatic activities of subnational governments do not allow 
for traditional fieldwork, participant observation of the actors involved was used to 
capture evidence of the phenomenon. The observation took place in the actors’ 
workplace, at conferences, during the in-depth interviews, during casual and formal 
interactions, and was concentrated in three periods: at the Nrg4SD Summit in St. Malo, 
in October 2008, at COP-14, in Poznan, in December 2008, and more significantly during 
my fieldwork in São Paulo, between November and December 2010.  
When I was organizing the fieldtrip to São Paulo, CETESB’s President, my key contact in 
São Paulo’s environmental agency, offered me the opportunity to have a desk in the 
international relations division while undertaking my interviews and collecting data 
from CETESB’s files. I accepted the offer and for most of the time of the first fieldwork 
period I was based at CETESB. In that setting I had easy access to staff from both 
CETESB and the state Secretariat for the Environment (SMA and CETESB share the same 
building), and I could do both formal interviews and participant observation.  
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The staff I had contact with during this time declared themselves happy for me to sit in 
on internal meetings, accompany them to seminars and conferences where they would 
present, or join them for lunch breaks. I was further permitted to look through files of 
both CETESB and SMA. Part of this willingness was due to the fact that this was 
apparently the first time that a researcher was interested in investigating CETESB and 
SMA’s international relations. In addition, having CETESB’s President as a gatekeeper 
was also helpful in ‘opening doors’ within the state bureaucracy. Yet, I was cautious not 
to present myself as his protégé, or to make the staff feel that they were being ‘coerced’ 
to help me with my research (Hennink, 2011, p. 68). 
3.3.3. Interviews 
The interviews undertaken for this thesis were either semi-structured or open-ended. 
They were carried out with a group of actors who play ‘important’ roles in policymaking 
- usually referred to as ‘elite’. The questions asked in semi-structured interviews were 
content focused, in order to deal with the issues or areas that were relevant to the 
research question (Dunn, 2008, p. 88).  
In designing the interview guide, I had a list of themes that I intended to cover in each 
interview. These were slightly different depending on whether I was interviewing a 
government official from the subnational or the national level, a representative from an 
NGO or an academic. The interview process involved using a previously prepared 
interview guide (see Appendix 2), which was developed based on the theoretical 
framework and themes identified in the literature review. Most of the interviews were 
carried out in Portuguese – unless stated differently in a footnote - and the extracts that 
are presented in the thesis I translated into English. 
In my first period doing fieldwork I interviewed forty-three Brazilian officials and 
stakeholders both in São Paulo and Brasilia. The initial contacts were given by CETESB’s 
President; these consisted of names, telephone numbers and email addresses of policy-
makers and relevant actors in the state, as well as in other Brazilian states and from 
Canada, the US, Spain, and France. I started interviewing some of the individuals from 
this list, and using the ‘snowballing’ technique I contacted other relevant people (the 
complete list of interviewees can be found in Appendix 3).  
The individuals interviewed in this period were directly involved with environmental 
governance, both on the state level (i.e. São Paulo’s environmental agency), and on the 
national level (i.e. diplomats and representatives from the Ministry of Environment). To 
avoid potential biases, I interviewed several different types of participants, including 
subnational representatives and national delegates involved and not involved in 
international relations. I also interviewed representatives from NGOs, universities and 
the private sector who participated in climate and biodiversity negotiations and/or who 
had contact with those representatives from the state of São Paulo engaged in 
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paradiplomatic activities. Across these sectors, there has been a balance between male 
and female interviewees. I also tried to keep a balance of interviewees’ political 
affiliation and inclination, for instance interviewing politicians affiliated from both the 
right and left of centre parties, NGO representatives that traditionally present a strong 
opposition against the government, and NGO representatives that often work in 
partnership with the government. Recruitment occurred until all the relevant actors 
indicated by those involved in São Paulo’s international relations had been contacted, 
and thematic ‘redundancy’ or ‘saturation’ (Baxter & Eyles, 1997) was achieved. 
In addition to this first round of interviews, a second round of interviews took place in 
November and December 2011. The second visit in 2011 was concentrated in São Paulo. 
I re-interviewed three key individuals who I had interviewed in December 2010, and I 
interviewed three other key figures who were not available for interviews during my 
first fieldwork period. My main objective with this revisit was to verify some of the 
information that I had already analysed. Whilst I was not intending to cover new 
grounds, I noticed that some changes in the state international relations organisation 
occurred after the new Governor took the office in January 2011. 
Most interviews took place in formal settings, such as offices and meeting rooms. Yet, a 
number of interviews were carried out in other locations such as restaurants, cafes, and 
conference halls. The interview with the national Secretary for climate change, for 
example, was carried out in a taxi, while she was on her way between a conference that 
I had attended and São Paulo airport. Location can be said to have impacted on the style 
and depth of the interviews. Meeting rooms provided a more peaceful setting and 
usually longer interviews, while interviews outside working places were generally 
shorter, but often more informal. Beside the face-to-face interviews, five interviews 
were undertaken by personal correspondence (email). These were carried out with 
foreign counterparts, from other environmental secretariats and agencies, as well as 
from transnational networks of regional governments that were based in other 
countries outside the geographical scope of the research (e.g. Canada, US, Spain, Wales). 
Interviewing elites 
The fact that the analysis draws substantially upon interviews carried out with ‘elites’ 
also requires some reflection. The use of elite interviewing is well established across the 
social sciences, and methodological debates about interviewing elites have received 
significant attention within human geography. Since Dexter’s Elite and Specialised 
Interviewing was published in 1970, a number of social scientists have discussed 
possible definitions of elites. Richards (1996, p. 199), for instance, argues that the 
notion of an elite implies “a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, a privileged 
position in society and, as such, as far as a political scientist is concerned, are likely to 
have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public”.  
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When examining elite interviewing, the methodological literature discusses the 
difficulties to define elites and the challenges associated with the issue of power. The 
identification of individuals as ‘elite’ or ‘non-elite’ often relies on structural notions of 
power, which understand power as something that a few individuals can possess 
(Smith, 2006). Countering this approach, poststructuralists view power in a more fluid 
manner. In this view, power is something which is exercised but that cannot be 
appropriated. 
Overall, my experience interviewing elites did not confirm the structuralist caution that 
the authority available to elites in their professional life makes getting access to them 
particularly challenging, or that they are more likely to manipulate the interview 
(Bradshaw, 2001). While elite informants might be in a position to refuse a request for 
an interview (Richards, 1996), some researchers have experienced even more 
difficulties in gaining access to marginalized groups (Smith, 2006). Furthermore, elites 
are generally used to giving interviews and speak at ease to a researcher, even if being 
recorded. 
In terms of gaining access to my interviewees, my experience was that accessing them 
was not as difficult as the literature anticipated. One of the reasons might be that in 
most cases I had some previous - direct or indirect - acquaintance with the people I 
interviewed due to previous professional and personal contacts. This was due to the 
years that I worked as an environmental lawyer, studied at graduate or postgraduate 
level, or I taught postgraduate courses in São Paulo. Some of the interviewees at 
Itamaraty were colleagues of friends who had studied with me at law school. Besides 
this factor, I also found that access was facilitated by the fact that I always presented 
myself as a researcher, and not as someone who had private or institutional interests. 
This counters Rice’s (2010) suggestion of adopting an ‘insider’ approach to gain access 
to elites.  
During the interviews, the power inequalities associated with the interviewees’ 
professional position and my position as a researcher also did not seem to transfer onto 
the interview-interviewee relationship in a way that impacted the interview. The 
methodological literature cautions that elite interviewees may want to control and 
dominate the interview, leaving the interviewer unable to direct the conversation 
(Richards, 1996). Perhaps I never felt intimidated by my interviewees because I was 
interviewing national - not foreign - elites, and the interviews took place in a setting that 
I was familiar with, in my mother-tongue language. As Herod (1999) suggest, 
interviewing elite members of our own nationality involves a very different process 
from interviewing foreign elites. For example, when interviewing foreign elites the 
researcher may face issues of transcultural communication and understanding. Also, as 
mentioned, in most cases I had some previous direct or indirect acquaintance with the 
people I interviewed. Another factor that might have contributed to this ease of power 
inequalities during the interviews relates to Rice’s (2010) recommendation that the 
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researcher should think about the interview as an intellectual discussion that is 
different in nature to the respondents’ day-to-day routine. In fact, in a number of 
occasions it seemed that my interviewees were genuinely happy to talk about their 
experiences and interested about the idea that there was someone thinking about their 
daily activities from a theoretical perspective. 
Analysing the interview data 
All the interviews lasted for a minimum of one hour. The semi-structured format of the 
interviews provided the informants with an opportunity to talk freely about topics they 
found important. Each interview was recorded on a digital recorder and after 
concluding the interviews reflective interview notes where made.  Subsequently, I 
transcribed all the interviews into Microsoft Word. Although time-consuming, this 
process allowed an additional opportunity to reflect on the content of each interview. As 
Dunn (2008, p. 96) suggests, transcription enables the researcher to engage with the 
data again, and immersion provides a preliminary form of analysis. 
The analysis of the interview data was then made using a computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software (CAQDAS). This kind of technology is recommended to manage 
large quantities of qualitative data (e.g. interview transcripts of many and long 
interviews), making data coding and categorizing more flexible (Peace & van Hoven, 
2008). Qualitative software also normally enables a more formal and systematic 
approach to the interview data, facilitates closer integration of findings and stimulates 
engagement with multimedia data sources (Fielding & Warnes, 2009, p. 270). NVivo 8.0 
was chosen as it is known for being a particularly effective tool for storing and analysing 
qualitative data. In addition to features that other similar software have, NVivo enables 
coding of the same segment of data under different categories, and allows retrieval of 
coded data through search tools (Peace & van Hoven, 2008, p. 241).  
A preliminary set of codes was established prior to analysis. These were based on what 
the literature identified as drivers and outcomes of subnational governments’ 
international relations.  The emergent themes first informed the interview guide, and 
subsequently the initial structure of the NVivo analysis. Once I had carried out most of 
the interviews, the interview and field notes transcripts were uploaded into the 
software.  As I started the NVivo analysisI had three main categories, ‘how’, ‘why’ and 
‘what’ (NVivo ‘nodes’), each with a few subdivisions. Once I started analysing the 
interview material, a more complex hierarchy of themes started to emerge.  
The ensemble of interview material was crucial for addressing the research questions. 
Some of the most representative quotes were included into the text. Verbatim 
respondent quotations “are important for revealing how meanings are expressed in the 
respondents’ own words, rather than the worlds of the researcher” (Baxter & Eyles, 
1997, p. 508). Overall NVivo proved an invaluable tool to store the data and establish 
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the categories that addressed the research questions. It also helped to visualise the 
themes, which were subsequently used in the empirical Chapters. That is, the software 
helped to bring clarity to the different types of international relations established by the 
state of São Paulo (Chapter 4), the factors driving paradiplomacy (Chapter 6), and its 
outcomes (Chapters 7 and 8). 
3.3.4. Document analysis 
In addition to the participant observation and interviews, the analysis of the case study 
was also based on an extensive review of primary and secondary sources, as well as 
legislation, grey literature and media articles.  
Access to primary document sources was facilitated by the fact that CETESB’s president 
and the state Secretary for the Environment provided me with a formal authorization to 
have free access to the CETESB’s and the SMA’s files. This included internal files and 
memos, as well as personal travel reports, which offered important information and 
insights on the causes and outcomes of the international relations. Legal documents 
such as bilateral agreements entered by the state of São Paulo and retrieved in 
CETESB’s and SMA’s files were essential primary sources for the study, as information 
about them was not available elsewhere. Though sometimes incomplete, these sources 
helped to map the characteristics of São Paulo’s international environmental relations.  
Media articles were used to identify the international activities undertaken by São 
Paulo’s Governor and other state officials. For this purpose, I used the online database 
available in the webpage of São Paulo’s state government to conduct a systematic 
search. This database compiles several hundred articles, news, video and radio 
broadcasts. In addition, grey literature was used. Grey literature included brochures, 
pamphlets, annual reports, and fact sheets published by the national and the state 
governments, NGOs and transnational networks of which the state is part (e.g. ICLEI, the 
Nrg4SD, the Climate Group). 
While examining the relevant documents and legislation, I focused on five main points, 
which were related to the research aims. First, I assessed São Paulo’s authority to both 
undertake and influence the international agenda, as well as to address global 
environmental problems. Second, I examined the federal actions (policies and 
legislation), and how this action or lack of action was depicted by state authorities. 
Third, I considered the climate change and biodiversity programs and norms put in 
place once the state started to have a more active international agenda. Fourth, I 
examined the institutions created once the state started having a more active 
international agenda. And fifth I searched the documents for indications of the factors 
contributing to and the outcomes of the state’s international agenda. 
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3.4. RELIABILITY OF DATA, LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH, AND ETHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
While the qualitative approach and the single case study method carry substantial 
benefits in terms of gaining an in-depth understanding of the research topic, these 
choices also result in limitations. Critiques of qualitative research and the case study 
approach refer to potential pitfalls regarding the problem of case selection, 
generalizability, as well as the validity/reliability of the results. Ethical considerations 
include how the researcher can impact the collection of data, and how the research 
subjects may contribute to the study. 
One of the most common criticisms of case study methods is that they might suffer from 
‘selection bias’. The use of a single case study, in particular, raises questions of 
comparability and the extent to which the study can be generalized. While this is a 
problem for statistical research, selection in qualitative research allows for a stronger 
process-tracing test of a theory, either to confirm or to contradict a theory (George & 
Bennett, 2005, p. 24). In addition, “case researchers do not aspire to select cases that are 
directly ‘representative’ of diverse populations, and they usually do not and should not 
make claims that their findings are applicable to such populations except in contingent 
ways” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 30). Specifically regarding single case studies, it has 
been argued that they have the capability to support empirical generalisations 
(Barzelay, 1993). 
In this sense, the study of São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy might not be 
representative, but it can be generalised or replicable with other subnational 
governments. Comparative analysis can be undertaken using the analytical framework 
put forward in this thesis. Moreover, some of the hypotheses about subnational 
engagement in international environmental relations challenge accepted 
generalisations present in the literature (e.g. that there are legal limits to rescaling 
processes). Other hypotheses offer empirical generalisations that have not been made 
before (e.g. that leadership in policymaking is a driver for paradiplomatic activities). In 
other words, the findings regarding the environmental paradiplomatic agenda of the 
state of São Paulo can be generalised as propositions and compared to other 
subnational governments in Brazil and around the world.  
Another limitation that could affect this study regards the validity and reliability of the 
results. In terms of rigour, the study triangulated data from interviews, participant 
observation, primary documents and secondary sources. Triangulating interview 
material with other methods is a core method to improve the reliability of research 
(Bryman, 2008). As this is the first study of environmental paradiplomacy in Brazil, it 
was not possible to compare the data I gathered with work by other researchers 
involving the same state or other states in Brazil. Nevertheless, triangulation was still 
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applied to data collection, and also to sources and theories used, and therefore became 
an important method of data analysis verification. 
In terms of ethical considerations, it is important to acknowledge that the researcher 
impacts the collection of data. In writing the thesis, I predominantly used deductive 
reasoning, where the hypotheses were drawn from the arguments and findings of 
previous academic works in the fields of IR, federalism, and global environmental 
governance. Yet, as these conceptual approaches were unable to fully explain the 
environmental paradiplomatic agenda of the state of São Paulo, the field experience 
brought to the research process an inductive element. The interview and observational 
material confirmed, added to, or challenged the literature. In terms advocated by 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), a theory can be developed from facts and 
realities on the ground. Nevertheless, particularly in the interview process, the 
researcher’s presence and personality influences the kind of information given by the 
respondents. There is also a risk that the analysis can become biased during the 
collection of data and while writing-up the findings because the researcher has specific 
research aims. 
Additionally, while the researcher has her/his agenda, the research subjects may also 
have their particular reasons for contributing to the study. In my research, the actors 
involved in São Paulo’s international agenda were clearly keen to demonstrate that 
their work is relevant, and that the state of São Paulo is a leader both in having an 
international agenda and in promoting stringent environmental policies and regulation. 
As advocates of this agenda, these actors had good reasons to promote their work and 
the advantages of São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic activity. Whilst I tried to 
encourage them to reveal problems and challenges, eventually I would find myself being 
too potentially supportive as a way of having the interviewees speaking frankly. 
More critically, concerns with the overall image of CETESB, SMA, São Paulo’s Governor, 
and also of Itamaraty and its diplomats may have prevented some interviewees from 
being completely honest with me. As Richards (1996) cautions, on the one hand elite 
groups can provide information not recorded elsewhere, or not yet available for public 
release. On the other hand, the reliability of elite informants can be questionable. In his 
view, the least satisfactory group are politicians, who often encounter pathological 
difficulties in distinguishing the truth; alternatively, civil servants can be the best 
interviewees, for being both knowledgeable and dispassionate (Richards, 1996). 
3.5. SUMMARY 
This Chapter introduced the methodological framework chosen for the research and for 
the data collection. The research used a single case study, participant observation, 
interviews and document analysis to collect data of the international environmental 
relations undertaken by a subnational government.  
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The case study framework was found to be the most suitable strategy to research the 
international environmental relations undertaken by subnational governments, and a 
qualitative approach was the recommended alternative to analyse the case study. The 
choice of the single case study and particularities of the interview process, including 
potential challenges involving elite interviewing and the strategies for analysing the 
data were discussed in more detail. The data collection strategy took into consideration 
the positionality of the researcher. It was further argued that the methodological 
limitations of the study are connected to the empirical scope of study, the quality and 
quantity of data available, and that grounded theory and triangulation strategies were 
used to improve rigour in the research.  
The following three Chapters apply the methodological framework to the empirical case 
study of the environmental paradiplomatic agenda of the state of São Paulo. 
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Chapters 4 
and 5 
CHAPTER 4: ENVIRONMENTAL 
PARADIPLOMACY IN SÃO PAULO 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter focuses on the process through which subnational governments undertake 
an international agenda to address global environmental problems. In particular, it 
looks at how the state of São Paulo develops its international environmental agenda and 
becomes active in the international environmental scene. The Chapter traces the 
development of São Paulo’s international agenda, between 1978 and 2010. It focuses on 
the international environmental relations undertaken by the state’s Environmental 
Secretariat (SMA) and the state’s Environmental Agency (CETESB). 
The research question and hypothesis that guide Chapter 4 (and Chapter 5) are the 
following: 
 
Research Question 1 
How does environmental paradiplomacy evolve in the state of 
São Paulo? 
Hypothesis 1 
Environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the international activities undertaken 
by subnational governments to address environmental problems across borders and 
scales. 
 
Figure 4-1 Research question and hypothesis that guide Chapters 4 and 5 
Source: Author 
Surprisingly, the state of São Paulo and the federal government do not keep – or at least 
do not make publicly available – a database of the international activity undertaken by 
the state.46 The research, therefore, involved a first phase of gathering information on 
all the international activities in which the state is involved. This first stage of data 
gathering suggested that the state of São Paulo is involved in five types of international 
environmental activities:  
                                                 
46 According to Sao Paulo’s International Relations advisor, the new office for international affairs, in 
charge since 2011, built a consolidated and updated database, which lists all the international activity of 
the state. During the completion of this thesis this database was unavailable to the public. 
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(i) entering decentralised international cooperation (technical, scientific or 
financial) with other actors across borders;  
(ii) meeting foreign governmental officials (hosting or meeting abroad);  
(iii) joining transnational networks;  
(iv) meeting national diplomats in the agenda-setting of international 
environmental negotiations; and 
(v) participating in international environmental negotiations. 
To identify these activities I consulted a number of sources. Information about (i) the 
decentralised international cooperation initiatives, and (iii) participation in 
transnational networks was obtained with data from São Paulo’s International Advisory 
Office, as well as from SMA and CETESB, including internal files. Information on (ii) the 
meetings with foreign dignitaries was identified through an analysis of self-reported 
activities in press releases, reports and internal files (see Appendix 6). Information 
about (iv) meetings between subnational representatives and diplomats was obtained 
through the interviews and participant observation in COP-14. Data on (v) the 
participation of state representatives in the climate and biodiversity COPs was analysed 
through the list of participants publicly available on the UFNCCC and CBD websites. 
Where pertinent I collected and checked information with the interviewees.47 While the 
types of international activity in which the state is involved were covered in their 
totality, a number of partnerships established and meetings held by subnational 
representatives with international authorities and national diplomats could not be 
identified. Hence, the list of each international activity undertaken by the state is not an 
exhaustive one. 
Based on the characteristics of the five types of activities identified, the analysis 
confirms the initial hypothesis informed by the paradiplomacy literature for the state of 
São Paulo. Further, it suggests two broad categories of international environmental 
activities in which subnational governments engage. This thesis argues that the 
international environmental activities undertaken by the state of São Paulo to address 
global environmental problems can be grouped into collaboration and coalition 
activities. In collaboration activities, the state relates to other actors across borders to 
learn, exchange experiences, and promote environmental action. In coalition activities, 
the state engages in stronger political roles, fostering its presence within transnational 
networks of subnational governments, and attempting to influence national diplomats 
and the international community to forge stronger commitments in international 
policymaking. This Chapter further suggests that while paradiplomacy and 
environmental paradiplomacy evolve in similar trajectories, environmental 
paradiplomacy’s link with the global environmental agenda creates more conditions for 
coalition activities to occur. 
                                                 
47 More details about the data collection and its limitations can be found in Chapter 3. 
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The Chapter contains six main sections. Following this introduction, in Section 4.2 I 
review what the paradiplomacy literature identifies as the processes through which 
subnational governments undertake an international agenda. In Section 4.3 I examine 
the paradiplomatic context in Brazil (Subsection 4.3.1) and the development of 
paradiplomatic activity in the state of São Paulo (Subsection 4.3.2). In Section 4.4 I 
explore the specific case of environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo; the 
five international activities in which the state is involved in are presented in 
Subsections 4.4.1 to 4.4.5. In Section 4.5 I suggest a new typology for paradiplomatic 
activity, consisting of collaboration and coalition initiatives, and I compare both types of 
initiatives. I conclude in Section 4.6 with a summary of the findings. 
4.2. HOW DOES PARADIPLOMACY EVOLVE? 
The paradiplomacy literature is interested in a number of international activities in 
which subnational governments can be involved. The first studies by Soldatos (1990) 
and Duchacek (1990) identified international missions, participation in fairs and 
international events, technical cooperation schemes, exchange of best practices, and 
agreements setting up twin cities. Lecours (2002, p. 92) emphasized representation 
abroad and seeking foreign investment. Hocking (1993a) further argued that 
subnational governments engage in diplomatic roles, with their involvement extending 
through the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-negotiation phases. Along these lines, 
Pigman (2010, p. 46) conveyed that subnational governments are routinely engaging in 
many of the same core diplomatic functions of representation and communication that 
characterize diplomacy between sovereign States. 
More recently Criekemans (2010a) suggested that the ‘full spectrum” of diplomatic 
instruments that regions can utilize encompasses seven activities: (i) political 
representation abroad; (ii) treaty-making power; (iii) entering agreements of a 
formalized nature (political declarations of intent and/or cooperation agreements, 
transnational contracts, and cultural agreements and partnerships); (iv) developing 
programmes of assistance and sharing of know-how (bilateral or multilateral 
programmes, programmes on cross-boundary cooperation); (v) participating in 
multilateral frameworks and organizations (observing or participating in technical 
committees, becoming an associate member of multilateral organizations); (vi) 
participation in formal or informal networks; and (vii) developing a public diplomacy, 
both domestic and international. 
The paradiplomatic activities undertaken can also be specific to particular realities. For 
instance, Kelman et al. (2006) explored the occurrence of paradiplomacy after disasters 
in non-sovereign islands. In this case, paradiplomatic activities involve the participation 
in disaster-related forums, disaster management coordination, and receiving 
international funds to mitigate disaster effects.  
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In regard to how paradiplomacy evolves, however, the literature has two main 
shortcomings. First, while there has been an effort to list the international activities 
undertaken by subnational governments, scholars have not systematised or classified 
these initiatives in a way that allows for further understanding and generalisation of the 
concept. Second, the paradiplomacy literature has not yet placed sufficient attention on 
the participation of subnational governments in transnational networks – a concern 
that, as seen in Chapter 2, figures at the centre of the transnationalist and MLG 
literatures.  
Van den Brande et al. (2012) offer a rare contribution which considers both subnational 
engagement in international environmental relations, as well as their engagement in 
transnational networks for sustainable development. As anticipated in Chapter 2, their 
typology of routes that subnational governments can utilize to participate in global 
decision-making outside the EU context consists of an intra-state and an extra-state 
route. Following the intra-state route, subnational governments get involved in global 
decision making, for example, at the UN, by influencing national decision-making or by 
participating in the national delegation for global negotiations. Following the extra-state 
route, subnational governments try to bypass the national government, for example, by 
participating in transnational networks or by appointing a subnational attaché to the 
global organization (see Table 2-2).  
However, by focusing on the routes taken, this typology does not explain the full range 
of activities that can be undertaken by subnational governments when developing an 
international agenda. For instance, it does not include common international activities 
undertaken by subnational governments such as meeting foreign authorities, or 
establishing partnerships and decentralised cooperation agreements. Also, while this 
typology emphasises whether subnational government are utilizing the national 
government route, or bypassing it, it gives little insight into the agency of subnational 
governments, or on their capacity to create and implement rules on the domestic level. 
Considering the different types of activities in which subnational governments can 
engage in, their typology can be supplemented as follows (Table 4-1): 
 
With the central 
government 
Independent of the central government 
 
Internationally 
Participating in the 
national delegation 
for global 
negotiations 
Appointing a subnational attaché to 
multilateral organizations  
Trying to influence international 
environmental negotiations 
 80 
 
Participating in transnational networks of 
subnational governments48 
 
Nationally 
Trying to influence 
diplomats and the 
national position 
Entering partnerships and cooperation 
(technical, scientific, technological and 
financial) with subnational governments, 
national governments, development 
agencies and international organizations 
Meeting national and subnational 
authorities abroad 
Hosting international missions  
 
Table 4-1 Typology of subnational engagement in international environmental 
relations 
Source: Author, based on Van den Brande et al. (2012, p. 16) 
In Section 4.4, the international environmental relations undertaken by the state of São 
Paulo will be further explored. Before that, the next section situates the paradiplomatic 
activity undertaken by the state of São Paulo within the Brazilian national and the 
regional state context. 
4.3. PARADIPLOMACY IN BRAZIL AND IN THE STATE OF SÃO PAULO 
This Section examines the development of paradiplomacy in Brazil and in the state of 
São Paulo. São Paulo followed the states of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, the 
first two in the country to create an international relations structure within a 
subnational apparatus. Its paradiplomatic activity dates back to the late 1970s, 
continues with the creation of the Special Advisory Office for International Relations 
within the government’s structure, in 1991. The analysis finishes with the end of 
Governor Jose Serra’s mandate, in 2010.49  
4.3.1. National context 
The interest of Brazilian subnational governments in international relations dates back 
to the 1960s. In 1960, while the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) was 
being created, the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, declared to 
President Juscelino Kubitschek that that the Montevideo Treaty would affect the state, 
and thus claimed the right to participate in the negotiation of this Treaty (Kleiman & 
                                                 
48 Some transnational networks also try to influence global decision-making. 
49 See Appendix 4 for a list of Brazilian presidents and São Paulo state governors since the country’s 
democratisation. 
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Rodrigues, 2007). Soon after, in the wake of the 1964 military coup d'état, the governor 
of the state of Minas Gerais, Magalhães Pinto, intended the creation of a Foreign 
Relations Secretariat within the state administration (Brigadão, 2005).50 During the 
authoritarian regime that followed, which ruled Brazil from March 1964 to March 1985, 
subnational autonomy was limited and the country’s foreign policy was concentrated in 
the central government. 
The democratization process in the mid-1980s allowed state governments to have more 
political freedom and, in this context, some states began to develop an international 
agenda. In its early days Brazilian subnational international activity was concentrated in 
the states of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul. In 1982 Leonel Brizola, then 
Governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, created the first international relations structure 
within a subnational government. In 1987, the state of Rio Grande do Sul also created a 
Special Secretariat for International Affairs. Therefore, the states of Rio de Janeiro and 
Rio Grande do Sul defined a milestone in Brazilian federalism, as of this moment foreign 
relations were no longer an exclusive role of the national diplomats (Nunes, 2005; 
Tavares, 2012). 
The enactment of the 1988 Constitution helped promote subnational foreign policy in 
Brazil. The political opening of the new Constitution made Brazil one of the most 
decentralised nations in the world in terms of distribution of fiscal resources and 
political power (Souza, 2005). Although international relations were made the exclusive 
responsibility of the central government (Federal Constitution, articles 21, I, and 24, VII 
and VIII), the competency assigned to the federated units with regard to local 
development (Federal Constitution, article 23) provided subnational governments with 
legitimacy to seek funds abroad and to sign cooperation agreements with foreign 
subnational governments (Salomon, 2011). As a result, for the past 30 years states and 
municipalities in Brazil have been carrying their own external relations.51 
The paradiplomatic activities carried out by the Brazilian states include city-twinning, 
participation in fairs and international events, technical cooperation schemes and 
exchange of best practices, as well as participation in transnational networks (Milani & 
Ribeiro, 2011; Salomon, 2011). In addition, some Brazilian states have trade centres 
abroad, or host representations from foreign federative or regional units. All governors 
and many secretaries of state, mayors, heads of state and municipally-owned companies 
                                                 
50 The idea of creating a Foreign Affairs Secretariat in Minas Gerais has to be understood within the 
military coup d’état that that culminated with the overthrow of President João Goulart and lasted until 
1985. The Governor of Minas Gerais, Magalhães Pinto, was one of the leaders of the conspiracy, and with 
the creation of such a Secretariat he intended to challenge the central government’s monopoly in the 
country’s external relations. With the success of the Military Coup the Secretariat was not formally 
constituted. Three years later, in 1967, Governor Magalhães Pinto left the state government and became 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs (CPDOC, 2012b). 
51 The legal limits to the international relations undertaken by subnational governments are further 
discussed in the next Chapter. 
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have gone on missions abroad to countries on every continent (Vigevani, 2004, p. 30). 
Large cities also begun to have an international presence; in 2008 more than 70% of the 
municipalities with more than 500,000 people had some form of paradiplomatic activity 
(Milani & Ribeiro, 2011).  
Paradiplomatic activities between subnational governments often evolve around 
borders (e.g. Canada and US, or US and Mexico), motivating scholars to call this 
phenomenon perforated sovereignties or percolated sovereign boundaries (Duchacek et 
al., 1988). However, this is not the case in Brazil. Subnational governments situated in 
neighbour South American counties do not feature as relevant partners for Brazilian 
subnational governments (Vigevani, 2006). Instead, Brazilian subnational governments 
traditionally establish international relations across borders, with other subnational 
governments and international organisations in Asia, Europe and the US.  
Despite this significant activity, Brazilian paradiplomacy is poorly institutionalized. 
States and municipalities that engage in external relations are not required to 
coordinate with higher or lower-level local authorities, and there is very limited data 
regarding the international activity undertaken by Brazilian subnational governments 
(Lessa, 2007). The first survey on such activity indicated that, until 2004, out of the 
twenty-six Brazilian states and the federal capital, nineteen had some kind of division 
responsible for the states’ international relations (Brigadão, 2005, p. 43). In 2012, this 
included almost all states: Tavares (2012) acknowledges that twenty-five out of the 
twenty-seven state governments maintain an international agenda and have an 
international relations structure.52 
Such accounts suggest the widespread internationalisation of subnational governments 
in Brazil. However, these figures only indicate the institutionalization of international 
relations within the state governmental apparatus. In other words, they do not indicate 
the number, nature, and focus of initiatives undertaken by different states or their 
significance. These numbers also do not reflect where international relations are 
concentrated, for instance, if they are concentrated in one or more particular 
Secretariats, nor what kind of activities each of these bodies are undertaking. The 
following subsection will address some of these limitations by examining activities are 
involved in São Paulo’s international agenda. 
4.3.2. São Paulo state government 
São Paulo’s international relations agenda is not new. Tavares (2012) argues that the 
state has been international since its foundation: its capital, the city of São Paulo, was 
founded in 1554 by two foreign Jesuit missionaries - the Portuguese Manuel da Nobrega 
and the Spanish Jose de Anchieta. From the turn of the 19th century, after the end of the 
slave trade, the state saw a long history of international immigration. Still today São 
                                                 
52 The structure varies according to the subnational government’s own particular choice. 
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Paulo hosts the largest Italian, Japanese, Portuguese and Lebanese populations outside 
their respective countries.  
In the 1970s, a more substantive international agenda emerged, with the state 
participating in international cooperation initiatives.53 The first record of such agenda 
seems to be a twinning arrangement signed in 1973 with the Japanese province of Mie 
(Tavares, 2012). In 1978 the Presidency of the Republic asked the federated states to 
engage in international cooperation projects that previously were coordinated solely in 
the national level. The state of São Paulo designated this task to the state Planning 
Secretariat, which at the time was linked to the Governor’s Cabinet.  
Between 1978 and 1987 Ana Lucia Segamarchi, a public servant so far with no 
experience in international relations, became responsible for managing all the 
international cooperation initiatives involving the state of São Paulo. In this initial stage, 
the international cooperation agreements between the state and other national and 
subnational governments or international organisations took place within the 
framework of a national agreement entered with the counterpart nation, or were 
coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gradually, the international area at the 
Planning Secretariat was dispersed to the different state Secretariats.54 
In 1991, under Fleury Filho’s administration (1991-1994) a Special Advisory Office for 
International Affairs was created within the Governor’s cabinet.55 The Special Advisory 
Office had the status of a Secretariat and was responsible for advising and assisting the 
Governor in its external relations. These relations could be established with foreign 
private companies, international organizations and specialized agencies from foreign 
governments, having a financial, commercial, cultural, scientific, technical or 
technological nature. To coordinate this Special Advisory, the Governor nominated a 
career diplomat. In the same year, the state government established a System for 
International Promotion, which aimed at promoting São Paulo’s economy in the 
international arena.56 
However, in 1996, difficulties in the implementation of the international structure 
within the cabinet’s office led Governor Mario Covas to close down the Special Advisory 
Office for International Affairs. It was not until 2005 that the state government would 
have another IR body. In the meantime, in 2003, under Geraldo Alckmin’s 
administration (2001-2006), the government created a Council for International 
                                                 
53 Although Vigevani (2004) affirms that the state had begun to show some concern for international 
affairs in 1986, the government’s international activity started at least a decade before. 
54 Information not available from written sources - obtained through an interview with Ana Lucia 
Segamarchi (Interview No.19 - SP official). In 1987 Segamarchi left the Planning Secretariat to coordinate 
the international relations advisory at the newly created Environment Secretariat (SMA). 
55 The Special Advisory Office for International Affairs was created through Decree 33.129, of March 15, 
1991, which was repealed by Decree No. 49.529, of April 11, 2005. 
56 Decree No. 34.253, of November 28, 1991.  
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Relations and Foreign Trade (CERICEX), with the objective of adopting, implementing 
and coordinating the promotion of foreign trade and international relations in the state 
of São Paulo.57 
In 2005, Governor Geraldo Alckmin approved the creation of a new Advisory Unit for 
International Affairs.58 The new Advisory Unit was linked to the Cabinet, and was 
responsible for organizing the Governor’s international meetings and missions. Under 
Jose Serra’s administration (2007-2010) the Advisory Unit kept mostly the same roles 
and structure of its predecessor.59 Both Governor Serra and Alckmin nominated career 
Foreign Ministry officials to coordinate the Advisory for International Affairs. Serra’s 
administration also created Invest São Paulo (São Paulo's Agency for the Promotion of 
Investments and Competitiveness), within the Secretariat for Economic Development, 
Science and Technology. This agency aimed at attracting investments to the state, as 
well as providing support and information to potential investors (InvestSP, 2012). 
While there was no formal IR structure within the government between 1996 and 2005, 
other bodies of the state administration were implementing their international agenda 
and creating specific divisions to deal with their international relations. Gradually, the 
number of Secretariats involved in international activities increased, reaching all 
twenty-six state Secretariats, and state owned companies started to implement or 
intensified their international activities (Tavares, 2012).60  
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Sao Paulo State Governor Fleury Filho (91-94)
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Mario Covas (95-01) Alckmin (01-06) Serra (06-10)
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at the time was linked to the 
Governor’s Cabinet
A Special 
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for International 
Affairs was 
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the Governor’s 
cabinet. Extinct 
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Figure 4-2 Timeline of São Paulo’s international relations 
Source: Author  
                                                 
57 The CERICEX was abolished in 2010. 
58 Established through Decree 49.529, of April 11, 2005. 
59 Decree 51.991, of July 18, 2007 changed the Advisory’s name to Advisory Unit for Assisting on 
International Affairs. 
60 This is the case of CETESB, and also São Paulo’s Water and Sanitation Company (SABESP), Port 
Management Company (Companhia Docas de São Sebastião), Metropolitan Train Company (CPTM), 
Highway Department (Dersa), Metropolitan Planning Company (Emplasa), Institute for Technological 
Research (IPT), Metro Company (Metrô), Technological College (Centro Paula Souza), Attorney Office 
(PGE), and Control Agency (Corregedoria Geral da Administração). 
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This timeline (Figure 4-2) suggests four phases of international activity within the state: 
(i) the early stages in the late 1970s until the Special Advisory Office for International 
Affairs was created in 1991; (ii) a first institutionalization phase between 1991 and 
1996; (iii) the years between 1996 and 2005, when despite the absence of an advisory 
unit within the state government, São Paulo’s international activity was spread among 
the different state Secretariats and state agencies; and (iv) a fourth phase starting in 
2005, when the Special International Relations Advisory Office was created, offering 
support to the Governor’s international missions. 
It is also worth noticing that between 1995 and 2010 São Paulo’s international agenda 
was developed within a sequence of Governors from the same political party, the 
centrist Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB). During the first half of this period 
(1995-2002) the tucanos or toucans, named after the party’s symbol, also governed 
country, under Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency (1995-2002). Since 2003 the 
country was ruled by the centre-left Labour Party (PT), under Lula’s presidency (2003-
2010).61 On the one hand, although there was a continuity of ideologies and programs in 
the mandates of Governor Mário Covas (1995-1998 and 1999-2001), Geraldo Alckmin 
(2001-2002 and 2003-2006), José Serra (2006-2010) and again Geraldo Alckmin (2011-
2014), during these years São Paulo’s international agenda received different 
importance. In other words, despite the political continuity, São Paulo’s international 
relations agenda suffered constant change and restructuring. On the other hand, it is 
possible to consider whether having opposing political parties ruling the state and the 
federal government since 2003 had an impact on São Paulo’s international agenda.62  
Finally, it is worth noticing that since the new Alckmin administration began, in 2011, 
there has been an attempt to establish a more coordinated and structured approach to 
São Paulo’s international relations. A new Special Advisor was nominated, for the first 
time not a career diplomat, but a researcher and previous adviser to UN’s General 
Secretary Ban Ki-moon. In 2012 the state made public its first International Relations 
Plan (São Paulo, 2012). The Plan, which covers the period of 2011-14, assigns the 
Special Advisory with nine missions, four of which relate directly to the state’s 
international initiatives: promotion of meetings with international authorities; 
promotion of international cooperation; organization of international events; and 
participation in transnational networks, international forums and international 
organizations.63 
 
                                                 
61 See Appendix 4 for a list of Brazilian presidents and São Paulo state governors since the country’s 
democratisation. 
62 This aspect will be object of further examination in Chapter 7. 
63 The other five missions assigned to the Special Advisory refer to office duties and institutional 
missions: coordinate São Paulo’s international relations with the twenty-six Secretariats; adopt and 
implement an IR plan; improve São Paulo’s international communication/marketing strategies; create a 
special unit to research good practices in policy-making across borders; and support Investe SP. 
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4.4. ENVIRONMENTAL PARADIPLOMACY IN THE STATE OF SÃO PAULO 
The state of São Paulo maintains an active international agenda in the area of the 
environment. This Section examines this activity with regard to the first part of 
hypothesis 1: 
Research Question 1 
How does environmental paradiplomacy evolve in the state of São Paulo? 
Hypothesis 1 (first part)64 
Environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the international activities undertaken 
by subnational governments to address environmental problems across borders. 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo evolves through international activities 
undertaken by the state. As with the general international agenda of the state, São 
Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda began in the 1970s, involving the 
signature of decentralised international cooperation initiatives with international 
organisations and other national and subnational governments across borders,  meeting 
international authorities abroad or receiving international missions, and joining 
transnational networks of subnational governments. In the mid-1990s, São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomatic agenda was expanded, with the state broadening its 
participation in transnational networks, as well as engaging in the agenda-setting and 
the negotiation phases of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs).  
This expansion of São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda is connected to its 
involvement in the governance of global environmental problems. In 1995 a special 
division for global environmental problems was created within SMA, and ten priority 
programs were launched, all directly related to the forty principles established by the 
Agenda 21. The most important programs - and the only ones that remain active - were 
the Global Climate Change Program (PROCLIMA), and the Ozone Layer Protection 
Program (PROZONESP).65 The adoption of these programs represented the engagement 
of São Paulo with the governance of global environmental problems. Until then the state 
mostly implemented a pollution-control approach focused on monitoring industrial 
activities (Morita, 2010, p. 290). Moreover, the adoption of these programs meant the 
engagement of the state with the international environmental treaties signed by Brazil 
since the Rio-92 Conference. For instance, it involved the implementation of the UFCCC, 
the Montreal Protocol, and the CBD in the state. São Paulo’s engagement with global 
                                                 
64 The second part of hypothesis 1 will be addressed in the next Chapter. 
65 PROCLIMA was established as a permanent forum on climate change and biodiversity in the state of São 
Paulo (SMA Resolution 22, of June 8, 1995), and PROZONESP (SMA Resolution 27, of June 27, 1995) was 
created to coordinate the actions of good practices and dissemination of ozone layer protection. The other 
programs were the Program for Biodiversity Conservation; the Environmental NGO Support Program; the 
Environmental Education Program; the Program for Environmental Control; the Program for 
Decentralised Environmental Management; the Solid Waste Program; the Water Resources Program; and 
the Consumer and Environment Program. 
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environmental problems thus resulted in an expansion of the state’s international 
environmental activities. This finding coincides with an argument made by Cornago 
(2010, p. 19), that global environmental problems fuelled the rise of subnational 
governments’ international activity across the globe. 
Addressing research question 1, the following Section presents and describes each one 
of these five environmental paradiplomatic activities in which the state engages in: (i) 
entering decentralised international cooperation initiatives (Subsection 4.4.1); (ii) 
meeting international authorities (Subsection 4.4.2); (iii) joining transnational 
networks of subnational governments (Subsection 4.4.3); (iv) participating in the 
agenda-setting phase of MEAs (Subsection 4.4.4); and (v) participating in the 
negotiation phase of MEAs (Subsection 4.4.5). 
4.4.1. Entering decentralised international cooperation initiatives 
Decentralised international cooperation constitutes an important component of 
paradiplomacy. It involves bilateral or multilateral partnerships with technical, 
scientific, technological and financial objectives. These partnerships are entered into by 
the state of São Paulo with other national or subnational governments across borders, 
with international development agencies, or with international organizations. 
In the development cooperation literature, the term ‘decentralised cooperation’ was 
used for the first time in 1995, by the review of the Lomé Convention, alluding to 
project-implementing entities other than central administrative structures.66 A few 
years later the UNDP introduced the term ‘city-to-city’ cooperation, shortened to ‘C2C’ 
cooperation (UNDP, 2000). The term covers all possible forms of relationship between 
local authorities at any level in two or more countries which collaborate over matters of 
mutual interest, whether with or without external support (Habitat, 2001). C2C, 
therefore, refers specifically to decentralised cooperation between local governments. 
Since then, the C2C and decentralised cooperation have been used as synonyms, 
although the latter embraces a wider range of actions for development generally carried 
by non-State actors.67 
Cities and local authorities have been engaged in international cooperation for many 
decades (Adame, 2011; Amezquita, 2011; Bontenbal & van Lindert, 2009; Habitat, 2001; 
Paul van, 2009; Tjandradewi & Marcotullio, 2009; Tjandradewi et al., 2006). In 1913 the 
first association of local authorities was established to promote information exchange 
between cities. After the Second World War the direct links between local authorities of 
                                                 
66 The Lomé Convention was a cooperation treaty signed between the European Union and countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. It started in 1957, with the signature of the Treaty of 
Rome, and expired in 2000 (Europeaid, 2012). 
67 Decentralised cooperation policies and C2C initiatives operate through partnerships between public 
authorities, NGOs and community-based organisations, cooperatives, the private sector, and the informal 
sector (Habitat, 2001). 
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two or more countries began to spread, initially among developed, but soon to 
developing countries as well. With the market trends of the 1990s, the scope for 
cooperation between local authorities on issues of mutual interest increased. As a 
result, by the end of that decade approximately 70% of the cities in the world engaged 
in different forms of international cooperation, including city-twinning, 68% of which 
being part of international associations (Tjandradewi et al., 2006). 
The decentralisation of international cooperation to subnational governments is a trend 
observed in Brazil (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010; Hewitt, 1998), and in the state of São 
Paulo. Today the state has over 30 international partners, dealing with science and 
technology, environment, public security, education, agriculture and disabled people's 
rights. Most initiatives focus on technical cooperation for capacity development (São 
Paulo, 2010).68 Between 1990 and 2001, the state was involved in 42% of the 126 
technical cooperation projects managed through the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation 
(ABC)69 (São Paulo, 2002). Additionally, the state is no longer a mere recipient, but it is 
also a provider of international cooperation.70 This so called ‘South-South cooperation’ 
has also been observed in the national level since the 1990s and is due to rising per 
capita income levels in Brazil (ABC, 2012; Cabral & Weinstock, 2010; Puente, 2010; 
Sousa de, 2010). 
In most cases, decentralised international cooperation initiatives are negotiated by the 
officials responsible for the international relations area of each Secretariat, and 
developed by the technical officials responsible for the issue area involved. A higher tier 
authority (i.e. the Governor or the state Secretary) will be present for the ceremony 
where the document is signed with the foreign counterpart authority. Often no federal 
authority will be involved in the process. Nevertheless, states can have the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, through the ABC, supporting the negotiation, coordination and 
implementation of the projects involving technical cooperation. This relationship, 
however, is not required and depends mostly on an initiative from the subnational 
officer in charge of the negotiation. 
Initiatives dealing with environmental topics are common within the state. Between 
2007 and 2010, decentralised international cooperation on environmental issues 
represented almost 30% of the total international activities maintained by the different 
secretariats (São Paulo, 2010). Environmental issues are also represented in the 
                                                 
68 Technical cooperation can be understood as “the transfer, adaptation or facilitation of ideas, 
knowledge, technologies and skills to foster development. It is normally executed through the provision 
of expertise, education and training, consultancies and, occasionally, the donation of equipment. In 
addition to promoting transfer of know‐how, this type of assistance aims to strengthen institutional 
capacities and generate positive advancements particularly in human resources” (Cabral & Weinstock, 
2010, p. 2). 
69 The ABC was created on 1987 to coordinate Brazilian technical cooperation, and it is institutionally 
located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
70 Interview No.17 - SP official. 
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international loan contracts that the state of São Paulo is involved in. For instance, 
between 1990 and 2001 São Paulo signed twenty-three international loan contracts, 
amounting to US$ 7.7 million, in the areas of energy, transportation systems, effluent 
treatment and solid waste (São Paulo, 2002). 
Decentralised international cooperation initiatives are part of CETESB’s and SMA’s 
agenda since their creation. CETESB’s bylaws established the development of 
partnerships for technical, scientific and financial cooperation with public and private 
sectors, as well as national and international entities, as one of the agency’s objectives 
(state Law 118, of June 29, 1973). In August 2009, CETESB had its missions and 
responsibilities considerably modified, but the promotion of information exchange and 
technology transfer with international entities remained one of the environmental 
agency’s main responsibilities (state Law 13,542, of May 8, 2009).  
In SMA’s case, since its foundation, in 1986, the Secretariat benefited from having 
probably the most experienced person on international cooperation in the state 
working in the house. Within SMA, decentralised international cooperation initiatives 
were traditionally undertaken by a Special Projects Advisory Office, which reported its 
activities to the Deputy Secretary. This Advisory Office also dealt with the participation 
of specialized officials in international forums and events, with the ceremonial of 
receiving international missions, as well as organising the agenda of the Secretary in 
missions abroad. After 25 years of existence, in 2011, the Special Projects Advisory 
Office was abolished and an International Advisory Body was created, which reports 
directly to the state Secretary. In addition to conducting international cooperation 
initiatives and organizing the visit of international authorities, the new International 
Advisory Body now also coordinates the SMA’s participation in international 
conferences and transnational networks. 
Making use of this structure, over the recent decades CETESB and SMA have signed 
agreements with a number of international organisations, including the UNDP, the 
World Health Organization (WHO), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), as 
well as the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Inter-American Development Bank (BID), 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Agency of 
Commerce of the United States (TDA), the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA), 
the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the British Government.  
Additionally, since the state began to engage in the governance of global environmental 
problems (particularly climate change and biodiversity since 1995), SMA and CETESB 
helped to bring further financial resources to the state. For instance, in 1996 the state 
designed a research program on sustainable conservation of biodiversity 
(Biota/Fapesp, officially created in March 1999), and through PROCLIMA and 
PROZONESP the state received 87% of the US$ 22.1 million granted by the Global 
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Environmental Facility (GEF): with US$ 3.8 million allocated to a sugar-cane biomass 
energy generation project, US$ 15.6 million to hydrogen-powered urban bus 
technology, and US$ 200,000.00 to develop gas recycling activities (São Paulo, 2002). 
4.4.2. Meeting international authorities 
São Paulo’s Governor, the Vice-Governor, the state Secretaries and specialized 
subnational government officials frequently meet with high-level officials, hosting them 
or leading overseas missions.  On these occasions, they meet Chiefs of State and Chiefs 
of Government, high-level officials and ambassadors, as well as subnational officials 
from other countries. Arguably, after the Brazilian President, the international agenda of 
the Governor of São Paulo is more robust than all other national authorities in Latin 
America.71 According to the state International Relations Advisory, in 2011 São Paulo 
received 400 international delegations. Among these, Governor Alckmin received 82 
international authorities, including ten Chiefs of State and/or Government, from 
Germany, France, Canada, Sweden, Uruguay, Ukraine, East Timor, Monaco, Latvia and 
Portugal (Tavares, 2012).  
The official press-releases provide an indication of the frequency and types of 
encounters established between state officials and representatives of other regions and 
countries.  Government representatives discuss topics ranging from agriculture, 
biofuels (ethanol), technology, transport, sports, education, manufacturing, 
environmental protection, climate change and tourism. The Governor of São Paulo 
might also discuss other typically foreign affairs matters, such as peace in the Middle 
East, the global financial crisis, and fostering foreign trade. Environmental topics – 
particularly biofuels, climate change policies, water management and waste 
management - are frequently under discussion.72 
Through these meetings state authorities aim to strengthen establish new partnerships 
and financing projects, or exchange information and experiences. For example, both the 
state of São Paulo and the state of California are interested in biofuels, São Paulo being 
Brazil’s leading cane-producing state, accounting for two-thirds of total sugarcane 
production. In 2005 São Paulo and California signed a MOU for technical cooperation in 
the areas of renewable energy sources, environmental improvement, climate change 
and biodiversity, and in 2007 officials from both states met again to discuss policies to 
promote the production of and reduce commercial barriers to biofuels.73 
                                                 
71 Interview No.17 - SP official. 
72 Official press releases are available online for the period between 2007 and 2011. In total the official 
press released information about 78 meetings between the Governor, the Vice-Governor and/or state 
Secretaries with foreign parties. 36 out of such 78 meetings dealt with biofuels, climate change policies, 
water and waste management. After environmental issues, the most common topic is foreign trade and 
commercial relations with the state of Sao Paulo (19 out of the 78 meetings). See list in Appendix 6. 
73 http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/lenoticia.php?id=88380&c=6 
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These meetings also have diplomatic functions of representation and communication.74 
For example, in 2008 the German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Governor Serra to 
discuss the advantages of ethanol as a clean and renewable source of energy. Serra 
defended the use of ethanol in European vehicles for both its economic and 
environmental advantages. He stressed that Brazil Volkswagen and Mercedes Benz 
already produced flexi-fuel cars.75 In this case, Governor Serra made use of the 
communication function (Pigman, 2010) that is typical to foreign ministries to discuss 
the effectiveness of policies and develop policy recommendations for another political 
leadership. 
Yet, not all meetings develop along a smooth path. In these encounters there is also 
potential for (para)diplomatic incidents. For example, in 2002, the Governor of São 
Paulo and the President of Armenia signed a Protocol of Intentions which established a 
partnership on environmental protection and reforestation. Following the signature of 
this document, the Armenian Minister of Environment invited SMA’s Secretary to visit 
Armenia. However, the Armenian Minister was very displeased when the state 
Secretary communicated that he would not go, as the mission had a technical rather 
than a political scope. After a sequence of letters where the Armenian Ambassador was 
becoming increasingly upset, the Governor’s International Relations Advisor advised 
the state Secretary to travel, as  “diplomatic problems were foreseen” in face of a 
negative answer.76 
4.4.3. Joining transnational networks of subnational governments 
Participation in transnational networks of subnational governments constitutes an 
important aspect of the state’s paradiplomatic agenda. According to São Paulo’s 
International Advisory Office, the state participates in 13 such networks: Metropolis, 
Urban Age, the World Regions Forum (WRF), the Network of Regional Governments for 
Sustainable Development (Nrg4SD), the Climate Group, the Regional Leaders Forum, the 
Forum of Regional Governments and Global Associations of Regions (FOGAR), the World 
Water Council (WWC), the Latin American Association of Metros and Subways 
(Alamys), the International Association of Public Transport (UITP), the Community of 
Metros (CoMET), Mercocidades as an observer, and ICLEI as an associate member (see 
Table 4-2 below). 
In addition to these networks of which the state is part, CETESB represents the state 
and the country in a number of other specific networks and initiatives. For instance, 
CETESB is: 
- one of the 16 environmental reference centres for the UN;  
                                                 
74 See Introduction (Subsection 1.2.4) on the functions of diplomacy. 
75 http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/lenoticia.php?id=94932&c=6 
76 SMA’s internal files, Protocol of Intensions entered between the SMA and the Ministry of Environment 
of Armenia in May, 2002. 
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- one of the five environmental reference institutions for the WHO; 
- the reference and advisory centre for the UNDP program on hazardous waste in 
Latin America and the Caribbean;  
- one of the three reference centres of the Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO) on chemical accidents.  
- a member of the Network on Sustainable Production and Consumption (SPC) for 
Latin America and the Caribbean Region under the UN Marrakech Process77;  
- part of the national communication on GHG for the IPCC;  
- the coordinator of the Latin American Network for Prevention and Management 
of Contaminated Areas (RELASC)78;  
- the coordinator of the Pan American Information Network on Environmental 
Health (REPIDISCA)79;  
- one of the eight Regional Centres to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (POPs) for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The level of participation in each of these networks varies depending on the state’s 
interests and resources (Tavares, 2012). Yet, a striking aspect about São Paulo’s 
participation in transnational networks is that all the networks that the state 
participates in are directly or indirectly related to environmental topics. As Table 4-2 
indicates, such interface can occupy the totality of the network’s scope (exclusively 
environmental), a relevant part of its scope (mainly environmental) or indirectly 
address environmental topics (indirectly environmental). 
Table 4-2 also highlights other aspects of São Paulo’s participation in transnational 
networks, such as when the state joined these networks and when they were created, as 
well as the membership criteria for each network. Generally these networks emerged in 
the late-1990s/early-2000s. With the exception of Metropolis and the three networks 
related to public transportation (Alamys, UITP, and CoMET), the other nine networks 
were created after 1990, eight after 1995, and five after the year 2000.  
The requirements for membership and representation vary greatly. All the networks 
involve sub-units of central government. In the majority of cases participation is 
exclusive to subnational governments and local authorities (Metropolis, Urban Age, 
WRF, Nrg4SD, Regional Leaders Forum, FOGAR, COMet, Mercocidades, ICLEI), but some 
admit members from the private sector and academia (Climate Group, WWC, Alamys, 
UITP). Some networks congregate the largest possible number of members and are 
open to all governments that commit to their objectives (Nrg4SD, FOGAR, WWC, ICLEI, 
UITP, Alamys, Mercocidades); other select members based on their size and/or 
economic situation (Metropolis, Urban Age, WRF, Climate Group, COMet); others select 
their members based on affinity criteria and/or previous partnerships (Regional 
Leaders Forum). In most cases the state of São Paulo has been invited to join the 
                                                 
77 http://www.unep.fr/scp/ 
78 http://www.relasc.org/ 
79 http://amro.who.int/english/hep/hep_repidisca.htm 
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networks as recognition of its size and economic importance.80 In the case of the 
Nrg4SD the state was one of its founding members. 
The core functions of these networks also varies considerably. In recent years there 
have been some attempts to establish categories or classifications for transnational 
networks of subnational governments. Adame (2011) suggests that such networks can 
be either regional or international, and within these two categories they can be general 
or thematic. In Hoffmann’s (2011) typology of climate networks (private, public and 
hybrid), networks are seen to have four core functions: networking, planning, direct 
action and oversight. Drawing upon these previous categorisations, and considering 
how each network describes its functions81, it is possible to identify three core functions 
that networks of subnational government have: (i) exchanges, learning and best 
practices; (ii) fostering decentralised international cooperation; and (iii) representing 
regional governments in global forums. 
Table 4-2 shows that all the subnational governments’ networks in which the state of 
São Paulo participates have as their core functions the promotion of information 
exchange and best practices among participants (first type). The majority of these 
networks also constitute a forum for subnational governments to discover 
opportunities and enter decentralised international cooperation (second type). Both 
evolve through technical meetings, publications, web contacts and major conferences 
held annually, bi-annually, tri-annually or sporadically. To a lesser extent, these 
networks have the representation of subnational governments in global forums as their 
core function (third type). In this case, joining public networks entails a route to 
multilateral decision making. 
Participation in such transnational networks is now officially part of São Paulo’s 
international agenda, but recent developments also indicate the growing relevance of 
such networks within the state structure. As mentioned (Subsection 4.3.2), participation 
in transnational networks was included into São Paulo’s first International Relations 
Plan (São Paulo, 2012). Within SMA, the new Advisory for International Relations is 
responsible for representing SMA in transnational networks of subnational 
governments (Resolution SMA 37, of July 20, 2011). 
 
                                                 
80 Interview No.16 - SP official. 
81 I used the network’s websites to characterize their general objectives and specific actions taken. 
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Network 
Founded / 
joined by SP 
Members Aim/ Main activities 
Environmental 
focus 
Function82 
1. Metropolis83 
 
1985/NA 
129 large cities 
and regions 
Forum for exchanges and cooperation. Triennial 
Congress, standing commissions, technical 
assistance, training, publications. 
Yes 
indirect 
1, 2 
2. Urban Age84 2005/NA 8 urban regions 
Investigation and research. Annual conference 
and publications. 
Yes 
indirect 
1 
3. World Regions 
Forum (WRF)85 
1996/ 
2009 
21 regions that 
contribute to 
more than 10% 
of the global GDP 
Identify and implement best practices in 
knowledge based economy, environmental 
sustainability and healthcare. Two WRF (2009 
and 2011) in Milan, next one to be held in 2013. 
Yes 
main 
1, 2 
4. Nrg4SD86 
2002/ 
2002 
36 regions and 7 
associations of 
regions 
Foster bilateral and multilateral partnerships and 
cooperation; access to resources; representation 
in international negotiations (written official 
positions and side-events). World Summit of 
Regions. 
Yes 
exclusive 
1, 2, 3 
                                                 
82 As mentioned, the three functions are: (1) Exchanges, learning and best practices; (2) Fostering collaboration; and (3) Representing regional governments in 
global forums. 
83 http://www.metropolis.org/(access June 2013). 
84 http://www.urban-age.net/(access June 2013). 
85
 http://www.regione.lombardia.it (access June 2013). 
86 http://www.nrg4sd.org/ (access June 2013). 
 95 
 
Network 
Founded / 
joined by SP 
Members Aim/ Main activities 
Environmental 
focus 
Function82 
5. The Climate 
Group87 
2004/ 
2009 
63 regional 
governments, 16 
local 
governments, 
the international 
leadership 
council, 
corporations, 
and 
other partners 
Promote the implementation of policies, 
technologies and investment to promote a ‘clean 
revolution’ involving the world’s most powerful 
subnational governments and corporations. Since 
2005 organizes the Climate Leader’s Summit. 
Yes 
exclusive 
1, 2 
6. Regional Leaders 
Forum88 
2002/ 
2006 
7 regions 
Establish dialogue and cooperation for 
sustainable development. Initiated by Bavaria, 
meets bi-annually since 2002. 
Yes 
main 
1, 2 
7. Forum of regional 
governments and 
global associations of 
regions (FOGAR)89 
2007/NA 
17 networks of 
Regions and 17 
regions (since 
2010) 
Design and implement solutions on the role of 
regions on climate change, integration and food 
security. Promote new governance rules at the 
global level. 
Yes 
main 
1, 3 
                                                 
87
 http://www.theclimategroup.org/ (Access on April 2011). 
88 www.wrf-test.lispa.it (Access on April 2011). 
89
 http://www.regionsunies-fogar.org (Access on April 2011). 
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Network 
Founded / 
joined by SP 
Members Aim/ Main activities 
Environmental 
focus 
Function82 
8. World Water 
Council (WWC)90 
1996/NA 
400 members 
(governments, 
NGO, and 
academic) 
Raising awareness of water issues and seeking 
means of improving water management. 
Catalyses initiatives and the results converge 
toward the tri-annual World Water Forum. 
Yes 
exclusive 
1 
9. Latin American 
Association of Metros 
and Subways 
(Alamys)91 
1986/NA 
46 subnational 
governments 
and private 
sector 
Forum for exchanges between members from 
Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula. Annual 
meeting of Technical Committees. 
Yes 
indirect 
1, 2 
10. International 
Association of Public 
Transport 
(UITP)92 
1885/NA 
3,400 members 
(subnational, 
national, private, 
academic) 
Platform for cooperation, business development 
and the sharing of know-how. Biennial UITP 
World Congress and thematic and regional events 
reserved to members. 
Yes 
indirect 
1, 2 
11. Community of 
Metros (CoMET)93 
1994/ 
1996 
14 cities and 
regions 
 
Establish metro best practice and provide 
comparative information. Annual conferences and 
a benchmarking process with performance 
indicators. 
Yes 
indirect 
1, 2 
                                                 
90
 http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/ (Access on April 2011). 
91
 http://www.alamys.org/ (Access on April 2011). 
92
 http://www.uitp.org/ (Access on April 2011). 
93
 http://www.comet-metros.org (Access on April 2011). 
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Network 
Founded / 
joined by SP 
Members Aim/ Main activities 
Environmental 
focus 
Function82 
12. Mercociudades94 
(Observer) 
 
1995/ 
2011 
228 cities 
Promote the participation of cities in the Mercosul 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguai, Uruguai, Venezuela, 
Chile, Bolivia and Peru), foster information 
exchange, and stimulate decentralised 
cooperation. Annual Summit and the Advisory 
Forum of Municipalities, Federated states, 
Provinces and Departments of Mercosul (2007). 
Yes 
indirect 
1, 2, 3 
13. ICLEI (as an 
Associate Member) 95 
1990/NA 
12 mega-cities, 
100 super-cities 
& urban regions, 
450 large cities, 
450 small & 
medium-sized 
cities & towns 
Provide technical consulting, training, and 
information services to build capacity, share 
knowledge, and support in the implementation of 
sustainable development. Tri-annual 
international world congress and Conferences to 
showcase local governments’ activities. 
 
Yes 
exclusive 
1, 2, 3 
 
Table 4-2 Networks the state of São Paulo participates in  
Source: Author, based on information obtained through São Paulo’s International Advisory Office, SMA files, and information available 
online from the networks websites (indicated in the first column)
                                                 
94
 http://www.mercociudades.org/ (Access on April 2011). 
95 http://www.iclei.org/ (Access on April 2011). Three Brazilian states are Associate Members of CCP: São Paulo, Amazonas and Minas Gerais. The Full Membership 
is offered to local governments and associations of local governments. Thirty Brazilian local governments are members of ICLEI. 
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4.4.4. Participating in the agenda-setting phase of MEAs 
When undertaking an environmental paradiplomatic agenda the state of São Paulo also 
gets involved in international policymaking. It does so by meeting national diplomats, 
participating in the debate on how the national government is responding to global 
environmental problems, and by taking part in the positions that the country’s 
diplomats defend during international negotiations. Such initiatives coincide with the 
agenda-setting phase of MEAs, where “interested parties are called upon, or mobilise 
themselves, to participate in the debate on how a government should respond to a ‘new’ 
problem” (Newell, 2000, p. 7).96 
Before international environmental negotiations take place, subnational representatives 
meet national representatives in coordination or preparatory meetings that usually take 
place at Itamaraty. Both diplomats and subnational governments can learn from these 
meetings. On the one hand, the diplomats are representing the country, and one of the 
ways for them to take into consideration the voices of all citizens is by consulting 
subnational governments’ opinions on the topics that will be object of discussion in 
international forums. On the other hand, through these meetings subnational officials, 
who as a rule are not familiarized with international policymaking, become more able to 
understand the ‘rules of the game’ played by diplomats. As the International Affairs 
Advisor of the Presidency of the Republic put it: 
The preparatory meetings constitute an important moment for members of the 
delegation and representatives from the states to participate and bring their 
opinions. But only the diplomats really understand the rules of the game, the 
positions of other countries, and what lies behind their positions, so the 
diplomats have to keep the stakeholder’s feet on the ground. At the preparatory 
meetings for COP the diplomats accepted some of the state’s arguments, and the 
Governors and state Secretaries understood the diplomats’ perspectives. As a 
result, they formed a Brazilian position that was not only made by Foreign 
Ministries, enclosed in their offices, but that represented the voice of the 
different federated states.97 
Therefore these coordination meetings allow diplomats to get closer to the real 
problems faced by local policy makers, while at the same time they allow subnational 
policy-makers to understand the difficulties and peculiarities of the international 
process. As one diplomat said, “foreign policy is the external side of national interests, 
and these are basically the interests of the federation. To be able to represent the 
                                                 
96 The international policy process is commonly divided into three phases: agenda-setting; negotiation-
bargaining; and implementation. Thought in most cases the agenda-setting is examined at the 
international level, Newell (2000, p. 7) understands that the phase of problem and interest definition in 
response to an issue occurs principally at the national level. 
97 Interview No.24 - national official. 
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internal needs at the international level, we need to coordinate our positions with the 
subnational level”.98 The state of São Paulo is gradually participating in more of such 
meetings. Yet, the International Relations advisors at the Governor’s cabinet and at SMA 
complained that coordination and preparatory meetings with the diplomats are still 
more of an exception than the rule. 
Central for the relationship between the diplomats and the subnational governments to 
develop in a harmonious way is that at the international negotiations there should be no 
divergent positions between representatives from the different levels of government. As 
the Head of the Special Advisory Office for Federative and Parliamentary Affairs of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged, “when subnational governments have a 
different opinion, and try to influence our position, as in COP-15, the coordination 
meetings allow us to agree on common ground. We certainly acknowledge that there 
might be disagreement between the different levels of government, but divergent 
opinions should not reach the international community: there is only one national 
position and it will be voiced by the diplomats”.99 
4.4.5. Participating in the negotiation phase of MEAs 
Lastly, São Paulo’s international agenda also encompasses the participation of state 
representatives in multilateral environmental negotiations. Since 1997 the state of São 
Paulo has been participating of the Conferences of Parties (COPs) under the UNFCCC 
and since 2006 under the CBD as a member of the national delegation.100 In the same 
location where leaders of nation-States are negotiating, state Governors and other 
specialized subnational officials hold their own side-events; participate on side-events 
organized by networks; and meet representatives from other state governments, NGOs, 
businesses, and national negotiators. In addition to the COPs, there are other fora for 
involvement of subnational governments in international environmental policy and 
decision-making. One example is participation in the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development (Happaerts et al., 2011). So far the state of São Paulo only participates in 
UNFCCC and CBD COPs, and this participation will be examined in the following 
pages.101  
UNFCCC and CBD 
Since 1995, when the UNFCCC entered into force, the COP for the Climate Convention 
has been meeting every year (Figure 4-3). In 1997 the state Secretary Fabio Feldman 
joined the Brazilian delegation as a representative of the state and attended COP-3, in 
                                                 
98 Interview No.26 - national official. 
99 Interview No.28 - national official. 
100 COPs are the governing bodies of MEAs. They advance the implementation of the Conventions through 
the decisions that are taken at periodic meetings. 
101 The reasons for participating and the impacts resulting from this participation will be analysed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Kyoto. Up until 1997 only the national negotiators and representatives from the 
national government participated in these conferences. At COP-1 (Berlin) and COP-2 
(Geneva) the Brazilian delegation had only nine members, all from the national 
government, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MCT), the Brazilian Space Agency (INPE), and the Ministry of 
Environment (MMA). This formation of representatives constitutes the core 
composition of the Brazilian delegation since the preparation of the Climate Convention, 
before the Rio 1992 Conference.102 
COP-3 was therefore the first COP where the delegation was not exclusively formed of 
members of the national government. In COP-3 the Brazilian delegation had 14 
members, ten from the national government (MRE, MCT, INPE and MMA), one from the 
Brazilian Industry Confederation (CNI), one from a Brazilian NGO (Vitae Civis) and one 
from the state of São Paulo (in the person of the Secretary).  
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Figure 4-3 Participation of São Paulo state in UNFCCCs COPs from 1995-2010  
Source: Author, based on data from the UNFCCC 
 
Initially the only person representing the state was Secretary Fabio Feldman, who was 
in charge of SMA from 1995 and 1998. Between 1999 and 2003 (COP-4 to COP-9) the 
state was not represented. Yet, since 2004 (COP-10), the state has been present to all 
COPs, with a delegation that varies in number and importance depending on the year. 
Whereas initially the state would be represented by the President of São Paulo’s 
                                                 
102 The MRE, through its diplomatic body, is responsible for the general co-ordination of the Brazilian 
position. For the climate negotiations, since 1991 MRE receives the advice from MCT, with technical 
support provided by INPE. The MMA only acquired a formal role in the climate negotiations in 1999, 
when an Inter-Ministerial Commission on Climate Change chaired by MCT was created. Until then the 
MMA only supported the MRE on the Biodiversity Convention (La Rovere, 2002). 
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environmental agency and/or the state Secretary, from 2005 onwards participation of 
specialized officials became the rule. As table 4-3 indicates, CETESB’s President was 
present at COP-10, COP-11, COP-15 and COP-16; and the state Secretary was present at 
COP-11, COP-12, and COP-15. The only COP in which the Governor participated was 
COP-15, in Copenhagen, when the state delegation had twenty members, including 
Governor Serra’s advisors and the Secretary for Agriculture. 
 
COP -  Sao Paulo Delegation (1995-2010)
Year Position Year Position
1995 - 2007 CETESB - Head of the Climate Change Division
1996 - 2008 CETESB - Head of the Climate Change Division
1997 SMA - Secretary of State for the Environment 2009 Governor of the State of Sao Paulo
1998 SMA - Secretary of State for the Environment SP - Advisor for International Affairs
1999 - SMA - Secretary of State for the Environment
2000 - SMA - Technical Advisor
2001 - CETESB - Head of the Climate Change Division
2002 - CETESB - President
2003 - SAA - Secretary of State for Agriculture 
2004 CETESB - Technical Advisor SP - Sao Paulo's Forum on Global Climate Change and Biodiversity
CETESB - President SP - Sao Paulo's Forum on Global Climate Change and Biodiversity
SMA - Deputy Secretary SP - Advisor for International Affairs
2005 CETESB - President SP - Deputy Secretary
SMA - Deputy Secretary SP - Governor's Press Advisor
SMA - Secretary of State for the Environment SP - State Deputy
CETESB - Head of the Climate Change Division SP - Sao Paulo's Forum on Global Climate Change and Biodiversity
SMA - Technical Advisor SP - Governor's Advisor
SP - Executive Secretary of Sao Paulo's Forum on Global Climate Change and Biodiversity SP - Governor's Advisor
2006 SMA - Secretary of State for the Environment SP - Governor's Press Advisor
SMA - Deputy Secretary SP - Head of Governor's Office
SMA - Head of Special Projects SMA - Secretary of State for the Environment
CETESB - Head of the Climate Change Division SP - Sao Paulo's Institute for Technical Research
2010 CETESB - Director of Engineering, Technology and Environmental Quality 
CETESB - Head of the Climate Change Division
CETESB - President
Source: COP  
Table 4-3 Representation of São Paulo state in UNFCCCs COPs from 1995-2010  
Source: Author, based on data from the UNFCCC 
Participation of the state of São Paulo in CBD is more recent. To date the Conference of 
the Parties of the CBD has held ten ordinary meetings and one extraordinary meeting 
when the Biosafety Protocol was adopted.103 The first time the state of São Paulo 
participated of a CBD Conference was in 2006, at COP-8, held in Curitiba, Brazil. After 
COP-8 the state was present at COP-9, in Bonn, and COP-10, in Nagoya. At COP-10 the 
state of São Paulo had a particularly strong role, joining Nrg4SD’s efforts and lobbying 
the negotiators to endorse the Plan of Action on Sub-national Governments, Cities, and 
other Local Authorities for Biodiversity (Rei, Cunha, et al., 2012).104 
At this point, one note should be made in regard to São Paulo’s participation in these 
MEAs. In such events, the Governor, the Environment Secretary and/or the technical 
                                                 
103 From 1994 to 1996 the CBD held its ordinary meetings annually. Since 1996 the biodiversity COPs are 
held every two years (http://www.cbd.int/cop). 
104 Chapter 7 further discusses the outcomes of subnational pressure over CBD and UNFCCC conferences.  
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body of states’ environmental agency attend the Conferences as members of the official 
Brazilian delegation. The national government decides who is included in the national 
delegation. In both UNFCCC and the CBD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allows a wide 
number of institutions and organisations to participate in the Conferences as part of the 
official Brazilian delegation.  
As a result, the list of the Brazilian official delegation registered for the COPs includes 
not only the country’s official negotiators, but also other representatives from the 
federal government, state and municipal government, as well as parliamentarians, 
representatives from the private sector and NGOs. This also means that not only does 
Brazil have one of the largest national delegations105, but also that all these individuals 
receive the pink badge that gives them access to all meetings. Brazil is unique in this 
aspect: while some countries allow a few civil society representatives on their 
delegations, no other allows such broad participation (Friberg, 2009). In practice, 
however, not all Brazilian delegates participate in all meetings. NGOs and other 
stakeholders are not present at sensitive stages of the negotiations, or at closed-door 
meetings. Representation of the country in the negotiations and internal discussions 
are, thus, still limited to the diplomats. 
Activities during the COPs 
Once they are at the conferences, the participation of Governors, state Secretariats and 
technical personnel is largely at side-events. Side-events are spaces where participants 
debate new ideas, discuss alternatives to the international regime, and meet with other 
non-State actors (Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). São Paulo representatives organise their 
own side-events at COPs. This is the case of the joint side-event organised by Governor 
of São Paulo José Serra and the Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger, during 
COP-15, in Copenhagen (Photo 4-1). The state can also be invited to present at side-
events organised by other organisations (i.e. the networks the state integrates – the 
Nrg4SD, ICLEI, and the Climate Group). In addition, state representatives can attend 
side-events where topics under their interest are being discussed.  
                                                 
105 http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2010/12/101209_eric_delegacao_pu.shtml 
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Photo 4-1 Governor José Serra and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger at COP-15, in 
Copenhagen 
Source: Photo retrieved from the newspaper/television Globo website (Globo, 2009) 
In addition to participation in side-events, subnational representatives also attend the 
formal negotiation meetings, and coordinating meetings where the national negotiators 
present their views and strategies. It has become common for the diplomats to call one 
or more meetings during the negotiations to update subnational representatives and 
other members of the national delegation about the pace of the negotiations and the 
strategies that the diplomats are using to achieve the expected outcomes. For example, 
at a meeting organised by the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change on the last days of 
COP-14, the head of the Brazilian delegation and the Ministry of Environment discussed 
with a group of stakeholders from government institutions, the private sector, the 
scientific community and NGOs the achievements and the pending themes in the 
Conference. Subnational officials can have further opportunities to approach the 
diplomats if, for example, they stay the same hotel as the diplomats.106 
Subnational representatives also meet other subnational leaders, previous partners and 
potential partners, to discuss on-going or new decentralised cooperation initiatives. The 
meetings and eventual negotiations are mostly informal and results are quickly 
achieved. As Osojsky (2010) argues, while leaders of nation-States struggle to negotiate 
and reach agreements, leaders of major states, provinces and cities find agreement 
much easier to achieve.  
However, as Schroeder and Lovell (2012) caution, the topics they discuss and their 
participation may or may not relate to the international negotiations. Often subnational 
representatives are interested in topics that are primarily national and local in nature. 
                                                 
106 Interview No.9 - SP official. 
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Moreover, officials primarily attend events organized by members of their own country 
delegation, who they could meet without having to travel to a different continent. There 
are language issues and the familiarity with themes and previous knowledge of the 
presenters contributes to this agglomeration of members of the same delegation. This 
tendency makes subnational government’s participation in international conferences 
less international and more closely aligned to what they have at home. 
4.5. COLLABORATION AND COALITION 
So far it has been seen that environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the 
international activities undertaken by subnational governments to address 
environmental problems across borders, and that in this context the state of São Paulo 
engages in five different types of international activities. Beyond what was 
hypothesised, it can be argued that environmental paradiplomacy evolves through two 
co-existing forms: collaboration initiatives that involve subnational governments 
collaborating with other subnational, national or international actors, and coalition 
initiatives that involve subnational governments exerting pressure over national and 
international actors. Moreover, the engagement with global environmental problems 
drives the state to establish further coalition initiatives, and therefore to clearer 
diplomatic roles in its paradiplomatic agenda. 
This typology of paradiplomatic behaviour finds parallels with a previous division of 
transgovernmental behaviour suggested by Keohane and Nye (1974). These scholars 
termed transgovernmental coordination the transgovernmental relations that were 
consistent with the targets and intentions of top leaders. Transgovernmental coalition 
building was the term proposed for situations where sub-units of like-minded agencies 
from different governments were brought together to stand against their administrative 
structures. Although designed to explain the relations occurring between bureaucratic 
subunits of national governments (e.g. between environmental ministries from two 
different countries), Keohane and Nye’s categories are helpful to understand the 
different types of relations that are established by subnational governments across 
borders.  
The typology also relates to a recent theorisation by Acuto (2013a, 2013b), which 
identifies a two-track process through which cities engage in international relations. 
Using the example of the climate network C40, he argues that the one track is 
represented by C40’s technical efforts to curb climate change. The second track has a 
‘cross-cutting lobby role’, which consists mostly of city diplomacy. In this sense, C40 
aims to impact directly on other spheres of global governance by influencing the 
dynamics of both international and domestic public mechanisms (e.g. organising 
international meetings and secretariat embassies, lobbying central governments and 
participating in international fora). 
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These two types of international activity are apparent in the case of São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomatic activities, and I suggest that they can be termed as 
collaboration and coalition initiatives. The case study also allows us to distinguish 
collaboration and coalition situations. This section examines four differences between 
these two types of environmental paradiplomatic behaviour. These are observed in 
terms of the types of activities undertaken in each, their timeframes and the topics they 
address, their aims, and the subnational officials involved in each (see Table 4-4 below 
for a summary of the differences). 
First, the activities undertaken by collaboration and coalition initiatives are different. 
Collaboration initiatives involve subnational governments collaborating with other 
subnational, national or international actors. Collaboration initiatives in the state of São 
Paulo are observed in the decentralised cooperation agreements it establishes 
(Subsection 4.4.1); and in its participation in transnational networks that aim to foster 
decentralised cooperation initiatives or promote exchanges, learning, and best practices 
(Subsection 4.4.3).  
Although not present in the case of São Paulo, another example of collaborative 
initiative in environmental paradiplomacy is the establishment of subnational markets, 
such as GHG emissions trading schemes (ETS). The most advanced of such programs is 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the US, which aims at promoting action 
at a national level, while providing a model for subnational cap-and-trade (RGGI, 2013). 
The RGGI model stimulated interest in regional ETS, with two further regional schemes 
– the Midwestern Accord and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) cap-and-trade 
schemes. The state of California is also finalising regulation for its cap-and-trade 
scheme. Within this process, California is trying to link its cap-and-trade program with 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) programs in 
developing countries (GCF, 2013; ROW, 2013). Brazilian subnational governments are 
part of this initiative. In November 2008 the states of Amazonas, Amapá, Mato Grosso 
and Pará, together with two Indonesian provinces (Aceh and Papua) and three 
American states (California, Illinois and Wisconsin), signed in California a MOU to 
establish the first state-to-state sub-national agreement promoting REDD programs. 
This MOU resulted in the Governors’ Climate and Forests Taskforce, a subnational 
collaboration between 15 states and provinces from the US, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
and Mexico (GCF, 2013). 
Coalition initiatives involve subnational governments exerting pressure over national 
and international actors. Through, or independently of networks, subnational 
governments make use of coalition initiatives to ask for increased actions by their 
national governments and the international community. For example, the network R20 
has as one of its aims to “push their respective national governments into more rapid 
actions and stronger commitments to fight climate change” (R20, 2013). The 2008 MOU 
signed within the Governors’ Climate and Forests Taskforce is intended to “send a 
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strong message that this issue should be at the front and centre during the negotiations 
for the next global agreement on climate change” (GCF, 2013). Coalition initiatives are 
observed when subnational governments meet governmental officials abroad or hosting 
foreign dignitaries (Subsection 4.4.2); when they join transnational networks that 
represent them in global forums (Subsection 4.4.3); when they meet the national 
diplomats in the agenda-setting phase of multilateral agreements (Subsection 4.4.4); 
and when they participate in international environmental negotiations (Subsection 
4.4.5). 
Second, the timeframes of collaboration and coalition initiatives are different. 
Collaboration initiatives have been observed since the 1970s, while coalition initiatives 
have existed since the mid-1990s. This time difference is also observed when looking at 
the topics which the international activities deal with. Until the 1990s collaboration 
initiatives dealt with regional and local environmental problems such as pollution, 
transport, waste, water, and groundwater contamination. From 1995 onwards global 
environmental problems such as climate change, resource depletion and biodiversity 
also started to be addressed. It is worth noticing that in this timeframe and issue area 
comparison, collaboration and coalition should not be understood as separate activities, 
but as a continuum. Indeed, since the mid-1990s both collaboration and coalition 
initiatives have been simultaneously part of the international activity of a subnational 
government, and both address local, regional and global environmental problems.  
Third, collaboration and coalition are distinct in their aims. Through collaboration 
initiatives subnational governments aim at gaining knowledge and/or financial 
resources from other national, subnational governments or international organisations. 
Coalition initiatives have a clearer political aspect of influencing governmental 
decisions, and they more directly reflect a shift in the nuclear position held by the 
central government and of the national diplomats in foreign policymaking. This aim is 
different from the transgovernmental coalition à la Keohane & Nye, which distinguishes 
itself by the fact that the bureaucratic agent actually works against its own principal 
(Thurner & Binder, 2009, p. 83). This is not necessarily the case with coalition in 
paradiplomacy, which can complement or collaborate with national policies.107 
In trying to influence governmental decisions, subnational governments might use 
direct and indirect strategies. Betsill (2006, pp. 180-181) provides a list of examples of 
direct and indirect strategies employed by transnational actors, particularly 
environmentalists and business groups. Using direct strategies transnational actors 
provide technical information or policy advice; participate in working groups; serve on 
national delegations to negotiations or conferences; lobby national governments or 
intergovernmental (IGO) officials; distribute printed materials; and/or draft proposals 
and treaty texts. Using indirect strategies transnational actors hold parallel forums 
                                                 
107 The outcomes of Sao Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic activity will be explored in Chapter 7. 
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during intergovernmental meetings; conduct public awareness events, advertising or 
educational campaigns; shame States that seek to block negotiations or violate existing 
rules; and/or interact with the media.  
However, the strategies undertaken by subnational governments are distinct from those 
employed by non-governmental actors such as environmentalists and business groups. 
First, subnational governments are governmental actors themselves. Consequently, 
subnational governments cannot undertake campaigning and advocacy activities. 
Second, coalitions of subnational actors depend on the common problems and 
experiences that governments share. In contrast, coalitions of non-governmental actors 
are held together by defined self-interests, collectively shared values, and consensual 
knowledge (Risse, 1996). In this sense, Keck and Sikkink (1998) explicitly opt for the 
term ‘transnational networks’ instead of ‘coalitions’, arguing that the term networks is 
more capable of evoking the multiple dimensions in the actions of civil society 
movements. 
Fourth, another difference affects the subnational actors involved in each type of 
paradiplomatic activity. Reinforcing the political aspect of coalition activities, more 
senior officials are involved in meeting international authorities and in representing the 
state in transnational networks than the ones involved in collaboration initiatives 
(except for the shaking-hands photo). As a rule, the Governor, the Vice-Governor, the 
state Secretaries and/or the Special Advisor on International Relations are present in 
meetings with international authorities. Representation in transnational networks is 
usually under the auspices of the state Secretary and eventually of the Governor and the 
Vice-Governor. 
 Collaboration Coalition 
1. Activities 
Entering decentralised 
international cooperation 
initiatives 
 
Joining transnational networks 
 
Establish market initiatives with 
foreign parties 
 
Travelling and hosting foreign 
dignitaries 
 
Joining transnational networks 
Meeting the diplomats 
 
Participating in international 
environmental negotiations 
2. Timeframe 
1970s-present 
 
Between 1970-mid1990s 
involved regional and local 
environmental problems 
1995-present 
 
Involves regional, local and global 
environmental problems 
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3. Aim 
Technical (best practice and 
learning) 
 
Obtaining financial resources 
Technical (best practice and 
learning) 
 
Political (influencing the national 
government on international 
rulemaking) 
4.Subnational 
actors involved 
Technical state officials 
 
State IR Department 
 
State Secretary 
 
Agency’s President 
Governor 
 
State Secretary 
 
Agency’s President 
 
Table 4-4 Comparison between collaboration and coalition in environmental 
paradiplomacy 
Source: Author 
Despite their differences, both collaboration and coalition activities have common 
features. Both in collaboration and in coalition, initiatives can be established with or 
without the direct participation of the federal government. Moreover, collaboration and 
coalition are a continuum of paradiplomatic action, and this Chapter has demonstrated 
that the last years have seen a strengthening of the diplomatic aspect of paradiplomatic 
activity. Collaboration initiatives already reflect a shift in the nuclear position held by 
the central government in foreign policymaking, and coalition activities can then 
advance the diplomatic functions that subnational governments acquired. Lastly, as 
suggested by the interviewees – and the sign at CETESB’s main entrance confirms 
(Photo 4.2) – both types of behaviours are highly valued within the state government.108 
 
Photo 4-2 Entrance hall of CETESB – a board listing international partners and all the 
transnational environmental networks the state integrates  
Source: Author 
                                                 
108 The sign lists the networks of which CETESB participates and some of its international partners. 
Chapter 7 further explores the status of environmental paradiplomacy. 
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Distinguishing subnational government’s international behaviour in collaboration and 
coalition initiatives is not only helpful in understanding paradiplomacy, but it also 
clarifies the differences between paradiplomacy and other types of transnational 
relations.109 For instance, it helps distinguishing the transnational activity of 
subnational governments from that of private actors. While transnational public-private 
partnerships evolved from lobbying and contestation in the 1990s to partnerships and 
collaborative governance in the 2000s (Andonova & Van Deveer, 2011), in 
paradiplomacy these two phases developed in the opposite order – paradiplomacy 
begun with collaboration, and then moved towards lobbying.  
The distinction between collaboration and coalition initiatives also highlights that 
establishing horizontal links across borders is only one of the transnational activities 
that subnational governments can undertake. The next Chapter will develop this idea, 
identifying the several rescaling processes implied in environmental paradiplomacy. 
Finally, a closer examination of the subnational government’s international agenda 
allows for a crucial differentiation between technical and financial objectives (in 
collaboration) and influence over international rulemaking (in coalition). This 
distinction implies a differentiation between transnational actors and agents, and will 
be discussed in Chapter 8. 
4.6. SUMMARY 
In order to contribute to the development of the concept of paradiplomacy, and more 
specifically to address the first research question (How does environmental 
paradiplomacy evolve in the state of São Paulo?), this Chapter has demonstrated 
that environmental paradiplomacy evolves through international activities undertaken 
by subnational governments to address environmental problems across borders 
(Hypothesis 1 - first part).  
The Chapter began by identifying within the paradiplomacy literature the processes 
through which subnational governments undertake an international agenda (Section 
4.2). Two problems were identified. First, there is a need to systematise or classify 
paradiplomatic initiatives in a way that allows for further understanding and 
generalisation of the concept. Second, the paradiplomacy literature is limited in 
considering the participation of subnational governments in transnational networks. 
Special attention was given to the typology of intra-state and an extra-state routes that 
subnational governments can utilize to participate in global decision-making outside 
the EU context developed by Van den Brande et al. (2012). Contributing to theory 
development, I suggested a more comprehensive typology, which includes a wider 
                                                 
109 In Chapter 2 paradiplomacy was contrasted with transnational/transgovernmental relations and MLG 
settings. 
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number of activities that can be undertaken by subnational governments through or 
independently of the central government. 
The next step was to examine the paradiplomatic context in Brazil (Subsection 4.3.1), 
and the development of paradiplomatic activity in the state of São Paulo (Subsection 
4.3.2). Brazilian paradiplomacy was seen to date back to the 1960s, and to have 
benefited from the enactment of the 1988 Federal Constitution. In the state of São Paulo 
four phases of international activity were identified, the first starting in the late 1970s, 
with the state participating in international cooperation initiatives, and the last starting 
in 2005, with the implementation of a Special International Relations Advisory Office. 
Considerations were made in terms of the political parties in power within the state and 
within the national governments during this period. 
The specific case of environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo was then 
explored in Section 4.4. The analysis of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda 
suggested five types of activities in which the state engages in: (i) entering decentralised 
international cooperation (technical, scientific or financial) with other actors across 
borders; (ii) meeting foreign governmental officials (hosting or meeting abroad); (iii) 
joining transnational networks; (iv) meeting national diplomats in the agenda-setting of 
international environmental negotiations; and (v) participating in international 
environmental negotiations. Each one of these activities was explained, analysed, and 
examples were provided. The analysis of participation of the state in transnational 
networks, in particular, advanced previous studies on networks, by identifying the three 
roles that networks of subnational governments have - promoting exchanges, learning 
and best practices; fostering collaboration; and representing regional governments in 
global forums.  
The analysis further suggested that environmental paradiplomacy evolves through 
cooperation and coalition initiatives undertaken by subnational governments across 
borders. Following this characterisation of paradiplomatic behaviour, environmental 
paradiplomacy can be differentiated from traditional paradiplomacy. While both evolve 
in similar ways, environmental paradiplomacy’s link with the global environmental 
agenda creates conditions for more complex modes of interaction, which include lobbying 
and network governance for the environment. The global environmental agenda offers 
especially fertile ground for subnational governments in managing transnational issues. 
As a result, the coalition form is further developed in environmental paradiplomacy, for 
example, with subnational governments participating in the agenda-setting of 
multilateral environmental agreements. 
Still exploring the first research question, the next Chapter introduces to the discussion 
notions of scale and rescaling that have been developed by the MLG approach. It will be 
argued that a notion of scale as socially constructed is instrumental to an exploration of 
the paradiplomatic evolution. 
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5.2 
Chapters 
4 and 5 
 
CHAPTER 5: SCALE AND LAW IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PARADIPLOMACY 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous Chapter examined how the state of São Paulo has developed its 
international environmental agenda. It argued that environmental paradiplomacy in São 
Paulo evolves through collaboration and coalition activities undertaken across borders. 
The present Chapter advances an examination of how environmental paradiplomacy 
evolves in the state of São Paulo, taking into consideration the second part of 
hypothesis 1: Environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the international activities 
undertaken by subnational governments to address environmental problems across 
scales. It thus addresses two sub-questions related to Hypothesis 1: (i) what are the 
scales involved in environmental paradiplomacy undertaken by the state of São Paulo 
(sub-question 1A)?; and (ii) can this subnational government move across scales (sub-
question 1B)? Figure 5-1 below summarizes the research questions/sub-questions and 
hypotheses that guide Chapter 5. 
 
Research Question 1 
How does environmental paradiplomacy evolve in the state of 
São Paulo? 
Hypothesis 1 
Environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the international 
activities undertaken by subnational governments to address environmental problems 
across borders and scales. 
 
Research Question 1A 
What are the scales involved in environmental 
paradiplomacy undertaken by the state of São Paulo? 
Hypothesis 1A 
Environmental paradiplomacy evolves across multiple scales, 
represented by the actors, problems and levels involved. Environmental 
paradiplomacy has a rescaling role. 
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Sections 
5.3-5.4 
 
Research Question 1B 
Can the state of São Paulo move across scales? 
Hypothesis 1B 
Legal limitations to São Paulo’s international agenda impose 
significant constraints on its paradiplomacy. 
Figure 5-1 Research question/sub-questions and hypotheses that guide Chapters 4 and 
5 
Source: Author 
 
The first argument developed is that an exploration of the international environmental 
agenda of subnational governments has a particular geographic dimension to it - the 
dimension of scale. That is to say, scale constitutes a crucial concept for the analysis of 
environmental paradiplomacy. However, studies in paradiplomacy still take concepts of 
scale for granted, and, if scale is considered, it is presented as a fixed category 
represented by the territorial levels (regional and global) involved. Drawing primarily 
from the MLG literature, the Chapter suggests that by undertaking an international 
agenda, subnational governments develop a rescaling role, through which they 
challenge conventional assumptions of territorial authority. 
The second argument deals with the question of to what extent public international and 
domestic law allow subnational governments to undertake an international 
environmental agenda. Here, as the MLG approach overlooks the legal implications of 
rescaling, I draw from the literature on paradiplomacy and federalism to consider the 
legal and constitutional challenges involved in rescaling processes by the state of São 
Paulo. 
In answering these two questions the Chapter analyses the interactions of scale and law 
in São Paulo’s international environmental relations, contributing to theory in two 
ways. First, the geographical analysis of scale adds to the paradiplomacy approach a 
theorization of the vertical and horizontal links involved in the governance of global 
environmental problems. Second, the legal perspective on rescaling adds to the 
governance approach a specific focus on the international and domestic limitations on 
state foreign affairs activities. 
The structure of the Chapter is divided into six main sections. The first sub question is 
explored in Section 5.2, which starts by briefly presenting a conceptualisation of scale in 
geography, and applies these ideas to the concept of paradiplomacy. Based on this 
analysis, the second sub question is explored in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, which consider the 
legal challenges involved in rescaling processes in international public law, in domestic 
law, and in the specific case of São Paulo and Brazil. The Chapter concludes with a 
summary of findings in Section 5.5.  
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5.2. SCALE AND RESCALING110 
Scale is a complex and disputed concept in the literature of many disciplines and a key 
theoretical concept in human geography. Whilst an extensive review of this literature is 
beyond the scope of this Chapter, to assess what scales are involved in São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomacy (research question 1A), it is necessary to make it clear 
what notion of scale is being considered, and what is involved in rescaling processes. 
This Section examines hypothesis 1A on the scales involved in environmental 
paradiplomacy. It begins with a discussion on the evolution of the literature of scale in 
the field of geography, focusing on the approach offered by the MLG literature. Rather 
than adopting the traditional notion of scale, related to size and hierarchies, scale is 
understood as a new sphere of authority (Bulkeley, 2005), and considered in a MLG 
context (Subsection 5.2.1). The analysis follows with an examination of how 
environmental governance develops as a rescaling process (Subsection 5.2.2). This 
notion of scale and rescaling is then applied to the concept of paradiplomacy 
(Subsection 5.2.3). The Section finishes with an analysis of the case of the state of São 
Paulo, which suggests a more nuanced picture of the rescaling processes involved in 
subnational governments’ international environmental agenda (Subsection 5.2.4). 
5.2.1. Scale 
In the past few decades, the notion of scale has taken greater theoretical importance 
within geographical thinking, to the point that it became a foundational concept in 
geography (Howitt, 1998). Outside the field of geography, the term has gained a 
widespread colloquial use, meaning very different things, from capital intensive (in the 
expression ‘large-scale’) to spatially extensive. In the field of geography, the concept of 
scale has evolved from having a physical to a socio-political meaning. Traditionally scale 
identified the spatial levels at which specified processes operated (McMaster & 
Sheppard, 2004; Moore, 2008). This conception of scale is still dominant and scale is 
defined as a nested hierarchy of differentially sized and bounded spaces (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2010). 
A number of theorists became increasingly dissatisfied with this fixed, hierarchical and 
abstract version of scale. Moving beyond its methodological and operational aspects, 
scale began to be understood as a joint product of social and physical processes. This 
shift began with Marxist-influenced geographers - with a significant debt to Harvey 
(1990) and Lefebvre (1991) – who were interested in how forces of capitalism shaped 
and reshaped space in the post-Fordist period,  particularly the role of production of 
scales in facilitating these processes. Calling attention to the theoretical and practical 
                                                 
110 Note to reader: This Section partially draws upon a paper I presented at the “Symposium on Scale in 
Environmental Governance: Power Reconfiguration, Democratic Legitimacy and Institutional (Mis-)fit” 
(Setzer, 2013b) 
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importance of scale, Smith (1992) then established what has become an extensive 
literature theorizing the politics of scale, an approach which sees scale as being socially-
constructed, historically contingent and politically contested (Cox, 1998; Smith, 2000; 
Swyngedouw, 1997, 2004), as well as fluid, and contingent (Cox et al., 2008; Moore, 
2008). As a result, geographical analyses of regions and  geopolitical spaces were 
supplemented by  relational accounts of space (Allen, 2003). 
Despite the efforts of (post)Marxist geographers to overcome the rigidities of 
hierarchical notions of scale, critical positions on scale continued to proliferate, to a 
point where Marston et al, (2005) called for a human geography without scale. Whilst 
their work was highly influential (Legg, 2011), scholars continued exploring the limits 
and possibilities of scale. Two trends - ecological resilience and MLG - are particularly 
relevant for this research, as they deal with the multiple spatial, jurisdictional and 
institutional scales that are involved in environmental paradiplomacy. 
The ecological resilience literature is concerned with the scale and cross-scale dynamics 
involved in managing the environment. They differentiate scales from levels, and 
suggest that interactions can occur across levels and across scales, and/or involve 
multiple levels and multiple scales (Cash et al., 2006). From this angle, society defines 
the particular scale that environmental issues should be appropriately addressed 
(Adger et al., 2005). Ultimately, the choice of how an environmental governance 
problem is handled within a jurisdiction is a reflection of the strength of the interests 
and power of the actors who define the problem (Kok et al., 2006; van Notten et al., 
2003). The resilience of systems is then defined by their ability to self-organise and is 
emergent from cross-scale and within-scale interactions (Adger et al., 2005; Cash et al., 
2006). 
Similarly, MLG scholars understand that spatially fixed conceptions of scale – intrinsic 
to international relations theory – are insufficient for understanding multi-scale 
processes. Recognising that scale is socially and politically constructed, this body of 
literature calls for a non-spatial concept of scale to recognise the change in the roles of 
non-State actors (Betsill, 2006; Bulkeley, 2005). When environmental policy is 
considered, scale is understood both in terms of the ecological and social levels at which 
environmental problems occur, as well as examining where the societal efforts to 
address them develop (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010). As the ecological problems and the 
institutions addressing them occur across scales, global environmental governance 
cannot be understood without an examination of the scales involved in these processes. 
5.2.2. Rescaling of global environmental governance 
Although human geographers increasingly agree that scale is socially constructed, there 
is still much debate over how the changing actor-spaces of environmental governance 
can be explained in terms of rescaling processes. The theme of rescaling has been 
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explored extensively in the geography literature on scale. According to Griffin (2009), 
rescaling occurs where governance processes shift from the national to the regional or 
the local.111 This understanding differs from Cash et al’s (2006) approach, where 
moving from the national to the regional constitutes a mere change of levels within the 
same (jurisdictional) scale. Significant rescaling has also been observed in the politics of 
water and climate governance, with the recognition that subnational entities are actors 
in global governance (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010; Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). The 
relational-scalar aspect of global environmental change has been further emphasised 
using topological notions of scales (Blok, 2010; Kortelainen, 2010). Rescaling processes 
from exclusively State authority to both State and non-State actors have equally been 
observed in terms of the sphere of liability for transboundary damage (Mason, 2001). 
Among these different studies of scaling and rescaling, here I chose to focus on 
Andonova and Michell’s (2010) work, because of the particular way in which they 
interweave rescaling processes, environmental politics and governance.112 They define 
rescaling of environmental politics as the shifts in the locus, agency and scope of global 
environmental politics and governance across different scales. They further argue that 
the rescaling process of global environmental governance has been observed both in 
practice and theory; indeed, they explain rescaling as a result of both the scholarship 
and the practice of global environmental politics over the last twenty years. This 
process is observed in two types of situation: with a move vertically down to subnational 
governments or vertically up toward supranational regimes, and with a move 
horizontally across regional and sectorial organizations and networks.113 In these ways, 
the rescaling of environmental politics is defined as “a shift in the locus, agency, and 
scope of global environmental politics and governance across scales”(Andonova & 
Mitchell, 2010, p. 257). This vertical and horizontal rescaling of environmental politics 
is illustrated as follows (Figure 5-2): 
                                                 
111 This process is observed by Griffin (2009) in the regional devolution of stakeholder consultation 
within the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, where a new space of dialogue between scientists, fishermen 
and NGOs was created to discuss the state of North Sea fisheries. 
112 Andonova and Mitchell recognize the multilevel nature of global environmental governance, but they 
propose an analytical shift towards the rescaling of global environmental politics. While the first refers to 
the norms, rules, laws, expectation, and structures established to guide behaviors, the second refers to 
realm where actors pursue their interests. However, it is not clear how their understanding of scales in 
global environmental politics and governance actually differs. 
113 These vertical and horizontal spheres were systematized by Hooghe and Marks (2003) as Type 1 and 
Type 2 governance. 
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Figure 5-2 Horizontal and vertical dimensions of global environmental politics 
rescaling  
Source: Andonova and Mitchell (2010, p. 258), circles added 
In this figure, the bold lines show the traditional focus of international relations, and the 
dotted arrows indicate the interactions across multiple scales at which environmental 
action occurs. The vertical rescaling demonstrates linkages of political action across 
geographical jurisdictions from the local to the global level. The horizontal rescaling 
demonstrates linkages between actors and issues that cross traditional boundaries 
between jurisdictions. This figure demonstrates rescaling - vertically up/down, and 
horizontally across - with respect to the subnational, national and supranational level at 
which environmental governance takes place, as well as the range of actors engaged in 
the levels.  
However, while there is an emphasis on the rescaling in which NGOs are involved (there 
are eight arrows pointing to or from NGOs), Andonova and Mitchell (2010) overlook the 
rescaling in which subnational governments are involved. Indeed, the figure illustrates 
only two linkages in which subnational governments are involved in: (i) horizontal 
interactions in the subnational level between local governments; and (ii) vertical 
downward interactions between a foreign State and a local government (highlighted in 
the figure with red circles). Drawing upon the paradiplomacy-side of the analytical 
framework, it is possible to supplement this figure through a deeper understanding of 
subnational governments’ role in the rescaling of environmental governance. As will be 
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elaborated below, there are other interactions that can be identified. In doing so, a 
consideration of scale is introduced in environmental paradiplomacy. 
5.2.3. Scaling environmental paradiplomacy 
Understanding the recent developments in environmental paradiplomacy described in 
Chapter 4 requires an acknowledgement of the horizontal and vertical linkages involved 
in the governance of global environmental problems. Although paradiplomacy clearly 
involves a transcendence of roles and scales by subnational governments, so far there 
has been very limited engagement of the paradiplomacy literature with the idea of scale. 
In one of his early works on the topic Duchacek (1986) defined paradiplomacy as: 
the processes and networks through which subnational governments search for 
and establish cooperative contacts and compacts on a global scale, usually with 
foreign central governments and private enterprises (Duchacek, 1986, p. 14). 
Soldatos (1990) argued that there are two main categories of paradiplomacy - global 
and regional. In global paradiplomacy subnational governments deal with issues 
concerning the international system (e.g. international trade, war and peace), whereas 
in regional paradiplomacy the issues are of a regional relevance.114 Overall, scale in 
paradiplomacy was, and still is, perceived in an unexamined matter, in terms of issues 
and interactions established by subnational governments across national borders. 
Nevertheless, once scale is understood as a fluid and socially constructed concept 
(Subsection 5.2.1), with global environmental governance developing as a rescaling 
process (Subsection 5.2.2), it becomes possible to identify the multiple scales involved 
in environmental paradiplomacy. These problems, the actors and the levels involved in 
the international environmental agenda of subnational governments (hypothesis 1A).  
In the first place, a spatial approach to scale demonstrates the complexity and 
multiscalar character of most environmental problems. As O’Riordan and Church (2001, 
p. 3) highlight, “there is little, and maybe nothing, that is global that does not have some 
sort of a local manifestation… every place reveals itself at a variety of scales….”. 
Therefore, as presented in item 5.2.1, environmental problems such as collapsing 
fisheries, transboundary pollution, vulnerability to extreme events, and the inability to 
address human-induced disease outbreaks have to be understood in terms of cross-
scale dynamics in human-environment systems (Cash et al., 2006).115  
Yet, as mentioned, it is important not to confuse scale as a concrete spatial unit with the 
meaning of scale as an analytical dimension. Consequently, the multiple actors involved 
in environmental governance also illustrate a breakdown of the long existent 
                                                 
114 Regional paradiplomacy is sub-divided in macro-regional for non-contiguous actors and problems (e.g. 
Quebec and France), and micro-regional when they are contiguous (e.g. Quebec and New England states). 
115 See the Introduction for an explanation on the use of ‘global environmental problems’ as a category. 
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relationship between the State and territory, a transformation that became the object of 
strong attention by the MLG literature. Using this approach implies a recognition that 
the scale of the problem does not necessarily dictate the scale of governance (Betsill & 
Hoffmann, 2008). In other words, global problems do not necessarily have to be 
governed by global institutions, and there are other levels and scales characterizing 
contemporary environmental governance. For instance, climate change is a global 
environmental problem that is simultaneously addressed through intergovernmental 
cooperation, national policies, regional cooperation; subnational action, private 
initiatives, as well as transnational networks that operate across scales. 
Finally, environmental paradiplomacy requires an understanding of scale in terms of 
jurisdictional, rather than territorial levels. In fact, if subnational government’s activities 
were only at a territorial level, then these actors would only have authority over their 
corresponding territory and the individuals residing in it. In this aspect, paradiplomacy 
differs from MLG, which is understood first in terms of the territorial levels involved 
(Piattoni, 2010).  
Therefore, subnational governments are transcending territorial roles and scales in 
global environmental governance. Subnational governments are local (in their 
constituency and in their representatives), but are acting across borders (meeting 
foreign authorities, engaging in multilateral environmental negotiations and in 
transnational networks) and addressing problems that are both local (in their causes) 
and global (in their consequences). Subnational governments, hence, combine the local 
and the global, and an analysis of their international environmental agenda can only 
proceed with an engagement with contemporary debates on the politics of scale. The 
next pages examine subnational governments’ international functions - and the 
performance of those functions –in terms of vertical and horizontal rescaling processes. 
5.2.4. Paradiplomatic rescaling MLG: the case of São Paulo 
To summarise, there are two limitations in the literature that analyses subnational 
governments’ international agenda. First, although the MLG literature examines the 
actors and levels involved in global environmental governance, when it comes to 
subnational governments it only provides a partial picture of rescaling (Subsection 
5.2.2); and second, although the paradiplomacy literature focuses on subnational 
governments’ international agenda, it has not yet examined the activities of these actors 
in terms of rescaling processes (Subsection 5.2.3). This Subsection tries to address both 
these gaps, arguing that an analysis of the case of the state of São Paulo contributes to a 
more nuanced picture of the rescaling processes involved in subnational governments’ 
international environmental agenda.  
The efforts that the state of São Paulo has been taking to develop environmental 
paradiplomatic activities have been examined in Chapter 4. This agenda involves the 
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state engaging in five different kinds of activities: entering decentralised international 
cooperation initiatives; meeting governmental officials abroad or hosting foreign 
dignitaries; joining transnational networks; participating in the agenda-setting of 
international environmental negotiations; and participating in the negotiation phase of 
international environmental negotiations as a member of the national delegation. These 
activites were further defined as collaborative or coalition initiatives. 
Drawing upon the MLG element of the analytical framework, the international 
environmental activities undertaken by the state of São Paulo can also be understood 
and illustrated in terms of horizontal and vertical interactions. Horizontal interactions 
are those established with other subnational actors. Vertical interactions can be 
directed upwards (from the subnational government towards the national or 
supranational level) or downwards (from the national and supranational level towards 
the subnational level). Both horizontal and vertical interactions can occur in the 
subnational, national and the international/supranational levels. Below examples of 
each one of these interactions are presented, and they are numbered from 1 to 9. The 
examples are taken from the list of international environmental activities undertaken 
by the state, listed in Appendix 5. These different types of interactions are then 
summarised in a table (Table 5-1), and illustrated in a rescaling graph (Figure 5-3).  
Interaction 1 - Horizontal at the subnational level: representatives from the state of São 
Paulo meet and/or establish partnerships with other foreign subnational 
representatives. This is the case of the MOU entered with the California Environmental 
Agency on climate change mitigation, and the visit made by the Governor of 
Massachusetts to discuss biotechnology issues. 
Interaction 2 - Horizontal at the national level: representatives from the state of São 
Paulo meet other Brazilian subnational governments in the context of a project 
implemented by a transnational network of subnational governments. For example, 
CETESB officials interacting with representatives from other Brazilian states in the 
context of ICLEI’s “Developing state policies and action to combat climate change in 
Brazil” project. 
Interaction 3 - Horizontal at the supranational level: the state participates with other 
subnational governments in side-events in the context of MEAs. Initiatives like these 
might be organised by transnational networks (e.g. Nrg4SD side-events) or by the 
subnational governments themselves (e.g. the joint side-event organised by Governor of 
São Paulo José Serra and the Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger during 
COP-15 in Copenhagen). 
Interaction 4 - Vertical downward at the subnational level: representatives from the state 
of São Paulo meet foreign national authorities in the state. This is the case of Germany’s 
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Chancellor Angela Merkel visit to the Governor of São Paulo to discuss renewable 
energies in 2008. 
Interaction 5 - Vertical downward at the subnational level: representatives from the state 
of São Paulo meet representatives from NGOs, MNCs or IOs. This is observed in the 
decentralised cooperation agreements entered with the World Bank to implement 
projects in the state level. 
Interaction 6 - Vertical upward at the national level: meeting national representatives 
during the agenda-setting of MEAs. In this situation, representatives from the state of 
São Paulo meet diplomats and/or representatives from ministries, and/or of national 
NGOs prior to a UNFCCC or CBD conference to discuss aspects of the Brazilian position 
that will be taken to these forums.  
Interaction 7 - Vertical upward at the supranational level: representatives from the state 
of São Paulo meet diplomats and/or representatives of the national government and/or 
of national NGOs during the negotiation phase of MEAs. This is the case of the 
coordination meetings held by Itamaraty in the context of climate and biodiversity 
COPs. 
Interaction 8 - Vertical upward at the supranational level: representatives from the state 
of São Paulo meet foreign State representatives at international meetings. This is the 
case of São Paulo’s participation in UNEP's Global Ministerial Environment Forum.  
Interaction 9 - Vertical upward at the supranational level: representatives from the state 
of São Paulo meet IOs and international NGOs in international meetings. This is 
observed when representatives of the state of São Paulo meet representatives from 
UNEP or The Climate Group in the context of climate negotiations, and this is an 
opportunity for them to discuss on-going or new partnerships. 
These nine interactions are summarised in the following table: 
 Horizontal interactions Vertical interactions 
Subnational 
level 
Subnational governments 
meet  and/or sign 
decentralised cooperation 
agreements (interaction 
1) 
Subnational governments meet  representatives 
from a foreign State and/or sign decentralised 
cooperation agreements (interaction 4) 
 
Subnational governments sign decentralised 
cooperation agreements with IOs (interaction 5) 
 
National level 
Subnational governments 
of a same country join a 
transnational network 
(interaction 2) 
Subnational governments meet national 
diplomats and representatives in the agenda 
setting of UN conferences (interaction 6) 
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International 
Supranational 
level 
Subnational governments 
from different countries 
meet at UN conference 
(interaction 3) 
Subnational governments meet national 
diplomats and representatives during UN 
conferences to discuss and influence the 
outcomes of the negotiations (interaction 7) 
 
Subnational governments meet foreign State 
representatives at UN conferences or other 
international meeting (interaction 8) 
 
Subnational governments meet IOs or INGOs at 
UN conference to discuss on-going and new 
partnerships (interaction 9) 
 
Table 5-1 Examples of the horizontal and vertical dimensions of São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomatic activities 
Source: Author 
Moreover, São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda makes it possible to build 
on Andonova and Mitchell’s (2010) figure of rescaling, supplementing the number of 
processes so far observed in global environmental politics and governance (Figure 5-3). 
 
Figure 5-3 Horizontal and vertical dimensions of subnational rescaling in global 
environmental politics 
Source: Author, drawing upon Andonova and Mitchell (2010) 
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Figure 5-3 illustrates all the dimensions of rescaling which subnational governments 
can promote when addressing global environmental problems across borders. The two 
blue arrows (interactions 1 and 4) indicate the interactions previously examined by the 
MLG literature, which are illustrated in Andonova and Mitchel (2010)’s Figure 5-2 
above. These are the horizontal interactions between subnational governments, and the 
vertical interactions between a foreign State and a subnational government. The seven 
red arrows (interactions 2, 3, 5-9) indicate the other possible interactions across 
borders in which subnational governments can be involved in. In total there are nine 
interactions, horizontal and vertical, which involve a subnational government (i.e. the 
state of São Paulo), a transnational counterpart (i.e. a foreign subnational government, a 
foreign national government, or a transnational network) and/or an international 
setting, in an effort to address global environmental problems. These interactions can 
be either collaboration or coalition initiatives, depending on whether they have stronger 
information-sharing or direct political advocacy objectives. 
In summary, the ﬂuidity of scales observed in environmental paradiplomacy results 
from the multiscalar nature of global environmental problems and from the regulatory 
efforts to address it. This fluidity challenges the fixed scales in which actors and 
institutions normally operate: subnational governments are legislating on global 
environmental problems and participating in international negotiations. Hence, a 
consideration of scale in environmental paradiplomacy allows for a deeper 
understanding of subnational government’s role in the rescaling of environmental 
governance.  
However, because it rescales established competences, environmental paradiplomacy 
might not be a completely fluid process. Can subnational governments actually promote 
rescaling processes? Are they legally entitled to do so? An analysis of rescaling 
processes therefore requires an understanding of the legitimacy and the competence 
that subnational governments have to act across borders and across scales. The next 
section considers the potential legal limitations over subnational governments’ foreign 
affairs imposed by the international (Subsection 5.3.1) and domestic (Subsection 5.3.2) 
legal orders, as well as by the Brazilian legal system (Subsection 5.3.3). 
5.3. LEGITIMACY AND COMPETENCE FOR PARADIPLOMACY116 
As mentioned above, environmental paradiplomacy challenges the fixed scales in which 
actors and institutions normally operate. It promotes not only a rescaling of the topics 
being regulated (e.g. subnational governments legislating on global environmental 
problems), but also a shift in governmental competences (e.g. subnational governments 
participating in international negotiations). As environmental paradiplomacy rescales 
                                                 
116 Note to reader: this Section partially draws upon a paper I presented at the ISA Annual Convention 
(Setzer, 2013a). 
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established competences, it is necessary to understand whether subnational 
governments can actually move across scales (research question 1B). The legal basis for 
the international activity undertaken by subnational governments requires further 
examination. MLG studies that examine the participation of non-State actors – including 
subnational governments - in global environmental governance, and the rescaling 
processes in which they are involved, have overlooked this aspect. For instance, are 
subnational representatives legally entitled to meet foreign dignitaries, to sign MOUs or 
establish market initiatives with foreign parties?  
This is not so much a problem faced by the paradiplomacy literature which, thanks to its 
basis in federalist theory, engages with some of the legal/constitutional limits of 
subnational governments’ international agenda (Andrade e Barros, 2010b; Bursens & 
Deforche, 2010; Cornago, 2010a). For Lecours (2002, p. 94), subnational governments 
are acting as international actors despite a lack of external legitimacy and the absence of 
a formal-legal capacity to act beyond national borders. For Blatter et al (2008) an 
analysis of subnational governments’ competence in foreign relations requires a 
consideration of the degree of autonomy, as well as of the type of role, that a region has 
to conduct foreign policy in a certain field without control from the national 
government. 
Further consideration about the legal limits of subnational climate action and of 
subnational engagement in international relations is present in recent legal literature 
on climate change federalism (Engel, 2010; Farber, 2008; Kysar & Meyler, 2008; 
LaMotte et al., 2009; Stewart, 2008). Heyvaert (2013b), for example, highlights the 
importance of considering the legality and legitimacy of the transnational initiatives 
undertaken by networks of subnational governments. Such legal considerations on 
subnational governments’ capacity to engage in the global governance of climate change 
can be further integrated into the MLG theory, adding a legal perspective to this body of 
literature. 
This and the next Section examine if in its paradiplomatic role the state of São Paulo has 
legitimacy and competence to move across scales (research question 1B). Subsection 
5.3.1 looks into the international legal limitations considering the case of both 
collaboration and coalition initiatives. Subsection 5.3.2 briefly considers the domestic 
legal limitations on subnational governments’ international relations. Subsection 5.3.3 
focuses on the Brazilian case. Section 5.4 then considers how in Brazil the legal 
limitations were overcome with the institutionalisation of paradiplomacy, and the 
challenges that remain for the Brazilian central government to recognize subnational 
actors’ international agenda. 
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5.3.1. International legal order 
For most legal scholars, States are the only international lawmakers117, and treaties are 
the primary form of international law (Goldsmith & Posner, 2007; Sands, 2003). In this 
sense, the international activity undertaken by subnational governments has no 
international legal relevance. Subnational government’s capacity to act is grounded in 
local governmental authority, and their international initiatives and agreements lack the 
binding character of treaties or customary international law among nation-States. The 
initiatives they establish are therefore soft law, that is guidelines, recommendations, 
coordinating measures and other instruments which are not formally binding 
(Heyvaert, 2011; Kirton & Trebilcock, 2004; Osofsky, 2010).118 Consequently, 
subnational governments’ international collaborative and coalition initiatives are 
limited by their voluntary nature. 
In terms of collaborative initiatives, the agreements, Protocols of Intentions and MOUs 
entered by a subnational government with other subnational governments, national 
governments or international organisations come within the ambit of a number of 
agreements whose provisions do not fall under the Vienna Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties (UN, 1969, 1986). Although non-legally binding, these instruments are 
frequently used to create a loose and adaptable framework in which information, ideas, 
and resources are shared. They are non-binding as a legal matter, but, at least in the 
view of many regulators, highly effective and far more flexible (Raustiala, 2002). 
Coalition initiatives undertaken by subnational governments across borders are also 
seen by the international legal order as mere accessories to treaty negotiations. In this 
view, nation-States are the primary subjects and objects of international law. Goldsmith 
and Posner (2007), for example, argue that international law is a deliberate process that 
political elites carefully choreograph from a the top down perspective. Even if 
subnational representatives participate in formal international negotiations (e.g. COPs), 
they usually do so with the legal status of NGOs. In the Brazilian case subnational 
governments are accepted as members of national delegations, yet without the power to 
represent the country (see Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.5). In either case, despite their 
engagement subnational governments are not given seats at the table at MEAs. 
Yet, as Levit (2007, p. 399) argues, such assumptions “simply do not reflect the 
dynamics of international law-making in an era of globalization”. Parallel transnational 
                                                 
117 Brownlie (2008, p. 57) defines subjects of the law as “an entity capable of possessing international 
rights and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims”. Yet, he 
recognises (p. 58) that some component states of federal unions are permitted to exercise capacities of 
independent states, including the power to make treaties (such as in Switzerland and Germany), or to 
enter into agreements with foreign states with the consent of the Congress (such as in the US). 
118 In international law, nonbinding agreements come under different labels: MOU, resolutions, exchanges 
of notes, joint communiques, joint declarations, political or administrative agreements, voluntary 
guidelines, handshakes, verbal promises, agreements, letters of intent, statements or declarations of 
principles, etc. 
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law-making processes are achieving Kyoto-like goals, for example, with California 
adopting mandatory reduction targets as state law, and other states working on GHG 
initiatives designed to enhance corporate transparency and reporting (Levit, 2007, p. 
402). Following such an understanding, international law-making in an era of 
globalisation is a bottom-up process, “a soft, unpredictably organic process that 
generates hard, legal results” (Levit, 2007, p. 395). Over time, these informal rules 
embed in a more formal legal system and thereby become ‘law’.119 This approach 
‘invites new worlds’ to the international law-making process. 
Therefore, despite arguments that international law is established by top-down, 
subnational governments are trying to have their international law-making attributes 
recognised. This is confirmed by their attempts to have the UN recognise a new category 
of accredited observers to subnational governments, different from that given to NGOs 
and also different from that given to local governments. Along these lines, so far 
subnational governments have seen some success. The Decision X/22 adopted by COP-
10 to CBD, for instance, acknowledged the “critical, complementary and distinct role” 
that subnational governments have in the implementation of the Convention (CBD, 
2010). Similarly, the Decision 1/CP.16 of the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements recognised 
the need to engage a broad range of stakeholders, including subnational governments, 
for effective action on all aspects of climate change (UNFCCC, 2011).  
Following these events, subnational governments started calling for the introduction of 
a new category of ‘governmental stakeholders’ among the accredited observers to the 
UN system. This category should regroup federated states, regions, cities and other local 
authorities. As the Nrg4SD stated in its input to the Rio+20 Process: 
It is not about questioning the role of UN Member States as sovereign 
representatives in UN multilateralism. It is just about empowering coherent, 
complementary and synergetic action from all tiers of government. In a nutshell, 
it is about multi-level governance and leadership in the interest of the much-
needed realistic, courageous and results-oriented path towards sustainable 
development (Nrg4SD, 2012c). 
Yet, there are still many unanswered questions. These range from whether subnational 
actors can play a constructive role in negotiations which are currently so complex, to 
how subnational government’s parallel agreements and initiatives can be incorporated 
into international law and formal international legal processes (Osofsky, 2010). In 
addition, subnational governments’ legitimacy to act internationally depends on 
national legislations. 
                                                 
119 Levit (2007) argues that private parties, NGOs, and technocrats coalesce around shared, on-the-
ground experiences and perceived self-interests, ‘codifying’ norms that reflect and condition group 
practices. She illustrates this “bottom-up international lawmaking” account using three case studies: 
export subsidies, climate change regulation, and corporate social responsibility initiatives. 
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5.3.2. Domestic legal system 
As much as the international legal perspective is necessary to understand subnational 
governments’ international legitimacy, the capacity for subnational governments to act 
across borders also depends on the domestic legal order. Where we identify vertical 
types of coordination, there is an observable hierarchy between different levels of 
government. National governments customarily establish national environmental 
targets and represent the countries’ interests in supranational or global forums, while 
subnational governments are left with the mission of implementing the regulation and 
guaranteeing that the targets are reached. Studies of environmental federalism 
understand this in terms of a central government that sets environmental standards 
that should be met in each of the jurisdictions, and lower level of governments that 
make local policies for their own constituencies (Engel, 2005). 
What subnational governments can do internationally is limited by the constitutional 
competences that they have been granted within their national contexts (Happaerts et 
al., 2011). From this angle, there are three possibilities: the national government 
explicitly recognises subnational government’s international relations; paradiplomacy 
is constitutionally and/or legally forbidden; or the national constitution and the 
domestic legislation are silent about this possibility. 
There are a few examples of countries that legislated explicitly on the international 
capabilities of subnational governments. For instance, in France a 1992 Law allowed 
subnational governments to engage in international cooperation, and a 2007 Law 
allowed them to enter agreements with other subnational governments worldwide in 
cooperation action or development aid (Duran, 2011). Belgium adopted in 1993 the in 
foro interno in foro externo principle, which allows subnational governments to conduct 
international relations for policy subjects for which they are internally competent. 
Belgium also accepts that subnational governments include representatives in the 
national delegation for international meetings. Within South America, Argentina 
explicitly granted foreign policy powers to its subunits. The constitutional reform of 
1994 introduced a ‘paradiplomacy clause’, which became a legal corollary of 
international relations of Argentinian provinces (Kleiman & Rodrigues, 2007; Prazeres, 
2004). 
In the US, the federal government retains the exclusive power to establish treaties or 
international relations with foreign governments (US Constitution, Article 1, Sections 2 
and 10). The reason behind this is that in international relations the federal government 
is expected to present a single or unified national position (Farber, 2008; Rose, 2008). 
As a result, attempts to forge interstate and international cooperation to address 
regional or global environmental problems face legal questions (Sovacool, 2008, p. 470). 
This questioning stems from of the Treaty Clause (only the President has power, with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties); the Compact Clause (which 
 127 
 
prohibits states from entering agreements or compacts with other States or foreign 
power except with consent from Congress), the Foreign Commerce Clause (the Congress 
regulates commerce with foreign nations), and the foreign affairs pre-emption doctrine 
(the federal government is the ultimate authority in foreign policy). As Farber (2008) 
clarifies, the foreign affairs pre-emption doctrine impedes state action which 
discriminates against interstate commerce, bans or burdens behaviour authorized by 
federal law, take steps with foreign countries that directly contradict presidential or 
congressional initiatives, or attaches penalties to transactions that occur outside state 
borders.  
In most cases there is an absence of national legal rules or at least a weak domestic legal 
basis for paradiplomacy to occur. As Lecours (2002, p. 104) puts it, subnational 
governments are rarely recognized by national legislations as legitimate 
actors/negotiators of international politics, and this situation stems by in large from the 
fact that national governments usually disapprove of paradiplomacy. As a result, 
subnational governments are left without knowing what they can do in international 
politics. 
Despite this relatively weak legal basis for subnational governments to engage in 
paradiplomacy, there are various examples of sanctioned initiatives. In a number of 
countries paradiplomacy evolves where the central government retains the exclusive 
power to make treaties with foreign governments and constitutional requirements limit 
the degree to which subnational governments can impose binding requirements (Engel, 
2005; Van den Brande et al., 2012). These cases provide examples “where de jure 
principles are tweaked by de facto practices” (Kelman et al., 2006, p. 565). 
In the realm of climate change, subnational governments in different countries are 
establishing an international agenda in this “grey area” of paradiplomacy. Such agenda 
includes the establishment of subnational GHG emissions trading schemes (ETS), such 
as the ones mentioned in the previous Chapter (Section 4.5). A key issue relates to 
whether the state action falls within an area of traditional State competence. If 
subnational actions violate the national government’s responsibilities for national 
security, defence, foreign affairs, or external borrowing, their involvement in 
international relations can be challenged before legal courts. In the US, the Supreme 
Court already invalidated climate state laws that presented “a risk of disruption or 
embarrassment in foreign affairs” (LaMotte et al., 2009, p. 409). The same can occur in 
relation to subnational attempts to forge climate interstate and international 
cooperation (Kysar & Meyler, 2008; Sovacool, 2008). 
In some cases, it has been possible to recast climate change from an international to a 
domestic problem, allowing subnational governments to enact climate laws and 
establish these markets with other actors across borders (Osofsky, 2009; Peel et al., 
2012). In other cases, it has been argued that subnational governments cannot be 
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preempted if the federal government is doing nothing internationally about climate 
change, and has no articulated policy for the future (Rose, 2008, p.673). Another 
possibility, still, is to consider that because climate change is a global problem, it is part 
of that realm of “foreign affairs” reserved to the federal government (Farber, 2008). 
Overall, a ‘constitutional fog’ remains in relation to non-binding MOUs: the Treaty 
Clause prevents binding treaties (though it does not seem to reach non-binding 
agreements), and it is unclear whether the Compact Clause allows them or not (Chen et 
al., 2010). 
This suggests that, domestically, the same force can impede or allow subnational 
governments to undertake international relations. Once allowed, what follows is a 
reconciliation of the already constituted governmental level involved in international 
law-making with the new levels that get involved. Where there is a weak legal basis for 
subnational governments to engage in international relations, there are instances of 
sanctioned initiatives. The problem that remains is when subnational governments 
undertake international practices which eventually challenge, deliberately or 
inadvertently, the current regime of the central government. That is, when subnational 
governments’ actions interfere with the ability of the federal government to speak with 
‘one voice’ on foreign affairs. In the next pages I examine Brazil’s position in relation to 
paradiplomacy, and how situations of potential conflict have been addressed. 
5.3.3. The Brazilian legal system 
The Brazilian legal system does not foresee international actions undertaken by 
subnational entities. On the contrary, the 1988 Constitution establishes that only the 
Brazilian federal government has the power to direct international relations. For instance, 
the section about the organization of the State establishes that the federal government is 
the sole sphere responsible for maintaining relations with foreign states and participating 
in international organizations (Article 21, item I). Among the prerogatives of the 
President of the Republic are the relationship with foreign States (Article 84, Item VII) 
and the signature of international treaties, conventions and other acts, subject to approval 
of the National Congress (Article 84, Item VIII). Subnational governments, despite being 
autonomous legal entities within the framework of public domestic law, are not included 
within the category of subjects of public international law, and there is no legal provision 
allowing states to direct international relations. The Brazilian Civil Code confirms this by 
differentiating subjects of public international law (the federal government, foreign 
States) and subjects of public domestic law (the federal government, the states, the 
federal district, the territories, municipalities and other public entities). The recent 
Supplementary Bill of Law No. 140, of December 2011 (Article 7, III) stated that the 
federal government has the power to promote the country’s environmental policy in the 
international sphere. 
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The obvious next question then becomes: how did it become possible for subnational 
governments in Brazil to participate in foreign affairs and to have an international 
environmental agenda of their own? Brazilian scholars recognise that there is a “clear 
inconsistency” of Brazilian paradiplomacy. Despite a lack of legal competence these 
activities do take place, and in some cases are quite significant (Vigevani, 2004, p. 30). A 
number of scholars focus on how paradiplomacy meets the constitutional challenges, and 
suggest it is a result of the decentralized federative architecture approved by the new 
constitutional system (Andrade e Barros, 2010b; Milani & Ribeiro, 2011; Vigevani et al., 
2006, p. 32). The general conclusion is that in spite of the lack of a specific legal 
framework, Brazilian subnational governments tend not to act contrary to the foreign 
policy of the country.  
If there was a real threat to federalism, the federal government could amend the 
Constitution, either forbidding paradiplomacy, or extending the competence to enter 
treaties to subnational governments. In 2005 there was an attempt to explicitly authorize 
paradiplomacy in Brazil, with the proposition of a so-called PEC (Proposal of Amendment 
to the Constitution), presented by the Federal Deputy and diplomat Andre Costa (Costa, 
2005b). However, the PEC was rejected with the justification that the Constitution does 
not forbid subnational governments to establish international agreements within their 
sphere of competence (Lopes, 2005).120 Behind this rejection also lies the idea that the 
Constitution could not be amended on this subject as federalism is an entrenchment 
clause (cláusula pétrea), a constitutional clause that prohibits alterations (Vigevani, 
2006).  
The means by which the Brazilian government opted to conciliate or reconcile opposing 
interests and potential conflicts between the national and subnational levels was to 
allow paradiplomacy do evolve without explicitly legislating about it. As São Paulo’s 
International Relations Advisor remarked, 
You can ask me, is paradiplomacy legal or illegal? My answer is the same answer 
as Itamaraty will give you. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a special body 
to deal with subnational diplomacy. We have very good relations with them and 
their role is to assist us when we are undertaking diplomatic functions. If there 
was any doubt about the legality of our activities, Itamaraty, as a representative 
of the federal government, would not have created an entity to assist and 
simulate its subunits to act internationally. In addition we believe that there is 
some flexibility in the Constitution. Twenty years have passed since the 
Constitution was enacted; we need to adjust the meaning of its text so that it 
                                                 
120 PEC 475/2005 was presented to the Chamber of Deputies in November 2005 and rejected in April 
2006. It proposed the inclusion of a new paragraph to Article 23, recognising that “the states, the Federal 
District and the Municipalities, within their respective competencies and with previous authorisation of 
the Union, can promote acts and enter agreements with other subnational actors across borders” (Costa, 
2005b) (Author’s translation). 
 130 
 
deals with international relations and foreign policy as they happen in the 2000s 
context.121 
In summary, Brazilian paradiplomacy was formed without a specific legal framework 
dictating the process. Facing the absence of such legal framework, the federal 
government could have legislated in this regard, explicitly authorising or forbidding the 
practice of international relations by its subunits. Instead, what happened was that the 
national government gradually incorporated paradiplomacy – labelling it ‘federative 
diplomacy’ – into the national structure. The next Section explores this shift, examining 
also some of its limitations. 
5.4. FROM A CENTRALIZING TRADITION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO FEDERATIVE 
DIPLOMACY 
Still addressing research question 1B, this Section explores how Brazilian national and 
subnational institutions have dealt with states’ international aspirations and, as a result, 
how paradiplomacy was institutionalised within the Brazilian government. The analysis 
is done through an examination of the interviews and the institutional structure of the 
international relations bodies at both the national and the state level. It demonstrates 
that instead of regulating paradiplomacy, the national government allowed it to 
continue evolving as an ad hoc policy, at the same time that it gradually took initiatives 
to institutionalise subnational governments’ international relations at the federal level. 
Within the federal government, one of the first measures taken in this process of 
institutionalisation was to rename paradiplomacy. Itamaraty named it ‘federative 
diplomacy’, a term that translated its intention of decentralising the country’s 
diplomacy (Brigadão, 2005). That is, rather than a diplomacy that runs in parallel to 
Brazilian diplomacy, the term chosen by the federal government emphasised the 
decentralisation of diplomacy as a trend deriving from the government’s foreign 
relations. 
The next step was to create within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an organizational 
space to deal with this federative diplomacy. In 1997, under President’s Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso mandate, a Federative Relations Advisory Board (ARF - Assessoria de 
Relações Federativas) was created and regional representation offices were established 
in different states.122 ARF’s objective was to promote a closer relationship between 
Itamaraty, the states and municipalities, advising them on their foreign relations, 
“observing, naturally, the constitutional competence of the Federal government in 
formulating and implementing the Brazilian foreign policy” (Itamaraty, 2012). The 
                                                 
121 Interview No.17 - SP official. 
122 There are eight Foreign Affairs representation offices, in eight states: Amazonas (North), Pernambuco 
(Northeast), Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais (Southeast), Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul 
(South). 
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novel aspect of this initiative can be traced to an interview given by President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso in the same year as ARF was created: 
...now Governors travel abroad; they enter agreements with foreign parties and 
they bring financial resources to their states. In the past this was unimaginable. 
All international relations were exclusive to the Federal government. Today, the 
number of Governors establishing relations with Europe, Asia, Latin America is 
huge. Sometimes they inform us, but often we don’t even know what they are 
doing. Diplomacy was a monopoly of the federal government, now the governors 
and some mayors also share this function (Toledo, 1998, p. 366).123 
In 2003, in the first term of President’s Lula administration, the ARF was replaced by a 
Special Advisory Board for Federative and Parliamentary Affairs (AFEPA - Assessoria 
Especial de Assuntos Federativos e Parlamentares). AFEPA is responsible for helping 
Brazilian subnational governments to develop their international relations, as well as 
promoting integration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National 
Assembly, with states, municipalities, and their respective legislative assemblies 
(Decree 4.759/03, Article 5).124 In the same year, President Lula created a Division for 
Federative Affairs (SAF - Subchefia de Assuntos Federativos), linked to the Presidential 
Office. This Division was assigned to help redefining the federative pact. Among its 
roles, SAF promotes and supports ‘federative international cooperation’ involving states 
and municipalities (Brazil, 2007b), and other international affairs established by 
subnational governments (SAF, 2012). 
The creation of a federative advisory within Itamaraty and of a federative international 
cooperation division within the Presidency confirmed Brazilian subnational 
governments’ legitimacy to exercise diplomacy. Both AFEPA and SAF recognise the 
transnational initiatives promoted by states and municipalities and aim to support them 
in undertaking this agenda. Also, both bodies are part of subnational initiatives in an 
informal way, that is, there are no legal requirements or specific guidelines establishing 
when and how Itamaraty and the Presidency should be involved in subnational 
government’s international relations. 
While some of their activities seem to overlap, in practice AFEPA’s and SAF’s roles are 
distinct. Itamaraty developed an intermediary role in agreements entered by 
subnational governments, helping them to frame their initiatives within the framework 
of an existent agreement between Brazil and the country where the other party is 
situated. It delegates international responsibility to the states, at the same time that it 
preserves the constitutional principle of national constituent power. SAF’s concern is 
                                                 
123 Author’s translation. 
124 AFEPA was created by Decree 4759, of June 21, 2003. This Decree was repealed successively, without 
any change to the dispositions regarding AFEPA, and is now in force as Decree 7304, of September 22, 
2010. 
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more centred on the relationship between the federated units and the central 
government. Reflecting these distinctions, AFEPA and SAF still use different 
terminologies to describe the international relations carried out by states and 
municipalities, AFEPA highlighting its diplomatic aspect (‘federative diplomacy’), and 
the Presidency highlighting the international cooperation aspect of the initiatives 
(‘federative international cooperation’). Yet, both demonstrate that the federal 
governments accepted and incorporated the international activity of its subunits within 
the national administration. 
5.4.1. Legal limitations to paradiplomacy 
Legal limitations to São Paulo’s international agenda impose substantial constraints on 
its paradiplomatic activity. The position of the federal government in relation to this 
process remains unclear (Andrade e Barros, 2010a, p. 57), and the relationship between 
national and subnational actors is not always harmonious.  
Firstly, as mentioned, the engagement of Brazilian subnational governments in 
international relations is limited by the Federal Constitution (Articles 21, I; 84, VII and 
VIII; and 25, § 1). The Brazilian legal doctrine is clear in that, legally, the federal 
government is sovereign and the only entitled to establish international relations 
(Bastos, 2010; Husek, 2010; Varela, 2009). Consequently, international agreements 
established by subnational governments are invalid if not intermediated by the federal 
government (Lessa, 2007).  
To remain within their constitutional competences, Brazilian subnational governments 
can only enter agreements with subjects of international law if there is a pre-existing act 
(a framework agreement) between the Brazilian government and the national 
government where the other party is located, and this agreement is incorporated into 
domestic law through a Legislative Decree approved by the National Congress, further 
enacted through a Decree signed by the President. In addition, the terms of the project 
needs to be approved by Itamaraty and these acts cannot result in any burden or 
financial commitment to the country. The additional protocols to the Cooperation 
Agreements on Decentralised Cooperation entered between Brazil and Italy (Brazil, 
2007a) and Brazil and France (Brazil, 2008) follow this formal procedure. In addition, 
they make it explicit that: 
Article 1 - Decentralised Cooperation consists of all forms of cooperation and 
international relations established between Italian and Brazilian subnational 
governments, as well as with civil society actors, to strengthen the links between 
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the two countries, in line with the Foreign Policy carried out by the respective 
National Governments (Brazil, 2007a).125 
Within these protocols, Itamaraty emphasised the limits of subnational governments’ 
initiatives. It stated that the protocols “regulate the decentralised cooperation 
undertaken by Brazilian federative units… as they lack legal personality of public 
international law”. Thus, the protocols guarantee that there will be “no conflict with the 
exclusive constitutional competence of the Union to establish international relations 
with foreign States” (Brazil, 2009). 
In the state of São Paulo a special authorisation from Itamaraty and/or from the state 
Governor is sometimes necessary to legitimise international initiatives. For instance, 
agreements with international parties require the Governors’ authorisation, but 
protocols of intentions and other preparatory instruments that do not impose 
obligations on the state are exempt of such procedure.126 In any case, the terms of the 
agreements entered have to be in harmony with the state and the national legislation. 
Secondly, most international activities undertaken by Brazilian subnational 
governments are established no fio do bigode (as a gentleman’s agreements). The 
diplomat and former SAF officer Andre Costa (2005a, p. 13) expressed this idea: 
In my experience as an officer at the Presidency’s Division for Federative Affairs 
and a career diplomat I can testify that the international agreements are entered 
by Brazilian federated units and homologous foreign parties no fio do bigode and 
lack legal basis. 
In this regard, despite the assumption that the signature of an agreement gives it legal 
effects, the international initiatives established by subnational governments are a mere 
political commitment. Thus, these initiatives are informal, and, similar to what was said 
in relation to soft law (Subsection 5.3.1), they are domestically nonbinding. The 
following examples of agreements signed by the state of São Paulo highlight their non-
binding aspect: 
[the agreement] does not result in any obligation or right, furthermore it has no 
legally binding effect, being placed in the field of ethics, as a simple manifestation 
of future intentions, informal, written or not, between the parties.127 
                                                 
125 Author’s translation. The Protocol signed with France has a very similar text, adding that decentralised 
cooperation must also be in accordance with the domestic legislation of each party. 
126 Decree No. 40.722/1996, Articles 2 and 3 (São Paulo, 1996). 
127 Legal Advise AJG 118/94. Also mentioned in Advise CJ 416/03 (Protocol of Intentions with Mexico) 
and in Advice CJ 586/05 (Cooperation with California). 
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The commitments that each party undertake, in order to become enforceable, 
should be duly agreed upon through the specific legal instruments, respecting 
the appropriate legislation.128  
Problems with the informality of subnational initiatives were raised by a number of 
interviewees. According to SMA’s legal advisor: 
From a legal point of view, a Protocol of Intentions is next to nothing. Often the 
government signs a document like this, the authorities of the two different 
countries shake hands and take photos, but in practice there are no substantial 
outcomes. Also, these relationships are still very much on the personal level, and 
poorly institutionalised: once one of the representatives leaves the government 
the whole thing is abandoned.129 
Similarly, the National Secretary for Climate Change within the Ministry of Environment 
showed her scepticism in regards to international partnerships established by Brazilian 
states.130 Specifically in relation to REDD projects, she cautioned that local initiatives 
undertaken without an international framework can create a scenario of “an 
institutional mess”, where local communities are subject to speculators offering carbon 
credits and the national government cannot respond to or control these actions. In this 
regard, whatever commitments subnational governments establish across borders, the 
validity of their acts is bounded by the domestic legislation.131 As SMA’s legal advisory 
emphasised in the process of the MOU signed between SMA/CETESB and California, 
“the outcomes of the technical partnership should not counter pre-existent rules. On the 
contrary, the partnership should result in normative rulings that, combined with 
existent rules, will improve SMA’s procedures”.132  
Legal limitations are therefore significant, yet they have not impeded subnational 
governments to engage in international relations. Despite the challenges that they might 
encounter, subnational governments engage in collaborative initiatives that imply in a 
smaller political activity, but also in coalition initiatives where they engage in clearer 
diplomatic roles. 
Political and institutional challenges 
In additional to the legal challenges (hypotheses 1B), there are political and institutional 
challenges that affect the paradiplomatic activity undertaken by subnational 
governments in Brazil. First and foremost, these challenges are related to the breakup of 
the monopoly of Itamaraty over foreign affairs. Reinforcing the legal stance that the 
                                                 
128 Clause of the Protocol of Intentions with Mexico. 
129 Interview No.5 - SP official. More about outcomes in Chapter 7. 
130 Interview No.33 - national official. 
131 Interview No.5 - SP official. 
132 SMA internal file on the MOU entered between the state of Sao Paulo and the state of California. 
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federal government has exclusive competence over international relations, since the 
1920s the legal advisory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly argued that 
subnational governments cannot undertake international commitments (Prazeres, 
2004). The last time Itamaraty was officially consulted about whether a subnational 
government could enter agreements with other subjects of international law, the 
answer was again negative.133 The transcripts that follow are extracted from the legal 
opinion given by Itamaraty’s legal advisor:134 
It is true that some Brazilian states and municipalities have their own 
international agenda. This fact is acknowledged by Itamaraty, through the 
creation of a federative diplomacy framework and the establishment of an on-
going dialogue with these actors. 
Nevertheless, he concludes that: 
Subnational governments are not competent, in the Brazilian Constitutional 
system, to enter international agreements, an attribution that is exclusive to the 
Union…The federal government is the absolute master of acting and undertaking 
decision-making functions in the field of international relations. 
In practice, Itamaraty ‘tolerates’ these initiatives. In a Memorandum (AFR/25 PEXT, of 
March, 2, 1998), the Federative Relations Advisory Board (replaced in 2003 by AFEPA) 
stated that: 
The growing extroversion of Brazilian states and municipalities has led 
Itamaraty to tolerate the signature, by subnational governments, of protocols of 
intention with their foreign counterparts.135 
Second, and related to the first point, there are internal challenges that subnational 
governments face when trying to undertake their international environmental agenda. 
For instance, subnational representatives may find resistance from the national 
government. An event mentioned by CETESB’s president illustrates this kind of 
situation where national actors demonstrate hostility towards subnational diplomacy: 
I went to Monaco, invited by UNEP, to speak on the Special Session of the Global 
Ministerial Environment Forum. Entering the plenary I met the Executive 
Secretary who was representing the Minister [for the Environment] there. As he 
saw me he immediately asked: 
- What are you doing here? Like this, in a very rude manner. 
- I was invited by UNEP, I replied 
- Why did UNEP invite you? 
                                                 
133 Municipality of Rio de Janeiro with the UN-Habitat Programme, in 1999. 
134 Itamaraty’s legal opinions have compiled by Medeiros (2009, p. 230) 
135 This Memorandum is cited by Lessa (2007, p. 150). Author’s translation. 
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- To present São Paulo’s work, I answered 
- But you should not be part of this meeting, this is only for ministers, he said. 
And he was even more impolite - when I started my presentation he stood up 
and left the room.136 
Third, political and institutional challenges are related to weak guidance on the practice 
of subnational international relations and a lack of criteria for monitoring the 
implementation and the success of internationalisation processes (Andrade e Barros, 
2010a; Romero, 2004). As a result, subnational international strategies are developed 
without focus or strategic/long term planning. The state of São Paulo is trying to change 
this pattern. São Paulo’s International Relations Plan for 2011-2014 (São Paulo, 2012) 
establishes three general goals that guide the state’s international activities as well as 
16 priorities and 54 specific objectives – quantifiable and established by all the twenty-
six state Secretariats.137 This was the first time in Brazil, and arguably one of the first in 
the world, that a subnational government established a comprehensive plan to act 
internationally.138 
Related to this weak guidance, despite the creation of a federal division within 
Itamaraty and the establishment of international divisions within the state bureaucracy, 
the channels for representatives from the different levels of government to interact are 
still limited. Key informants often claimed that there were scarce opportunities for 
dialogue and coherence building with Itamaraty.139 Lack of qualified staff to undertake 
international relations at the subnational level is problem suggested by the literature 
(Andrade e Barros, 2010a), yet the interviews did not confirm this account.140 
Lastly, there are financial costs in undertaking an international agenda (e.g. traveling, 
translators, accommodation). These become particularly problematic when, with or 
without fair reasons, international travel by civil servants is seen with suspicion by the 
population and by other civil servants. As a representative from the INGO Conservation 
International remarked: 
“Governors and many subnational government representatives go to COPs as 
tourists. They bring their wives, and their main concern is to go shopping. They 
                                                 
136 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
137 The three goals are: promote sustainable development in the state; enhance the state’s international 
participation; and contribute to the promotion of democratic governance and to the formation of 
international partnerships. 
138 Interview No.17 - SP official, and article published in the newspaper “O Estado de São Paulo”, following 
the publication of the plan (Estadao, 2012). 
139 Interview Nos. 4, 6, 9 and 17 - SP officials. 
140 Interviews Nos. 4, 17 and 19 – SP officials and Interview No.47 - NGO. 
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often don’t understand what is being discussed – not only there are many very 
technical and scientific issues, but also they often don’t even speak English”.141 
Similar comments were made by a number of interviewees, suggesting that when 
subnational representatives travel abroad on governmental missions they often are 
more interested in tourist activities or shopping than in following the agenda that they 
have been assigned; cases of officials who take their partners corroborate this 
preconception.142 
5.4.2. Paradiplomacy endorsed? 
All in all, it is questionable whether the institutionalisation of subnational governments’ 
international agenda can be seen as an endorsement of paradiplomacy. To a certain 
extent, federative diplomacy is a way for the federal government to control – rather 
than give independence to – subnational governments’ international agenda. So the 
main question remains as to whether subnational governments can act independently 
of the central government (Andrade e Barros, 2010a, pp. 57-58). That is, even if 
Itamaraty genuinely believes in the idea of federative diplomacy, it sees decentralisation 
via Itamaraty, never bypassing it. Federative diplomacy hence responds to subnational 
governments’ demand for international relations, but it incorporates their 
paradiplomatic interests into the country’s foreign policy, without admitting a direct 
action undertaking by the federated units.143 
Consequently, the margin for conflict increases when subnational governments 
undertake an international agenda that goes against the national governments’ 
position.144 On such occasions, some kind of intervention might be necessary to remove 
the underlying tensions between subnational international action and the federal 
government. 
The most emblematic case in Brazilian environmental paradiplomacy is provided by a 
coalition of states of the Amazon. As mentioned (Chapter 4, Section 4.5), in November 
2008 the states of Amazonas, Amapá, Mato Grosso and Pará, together with two 
Indonesian provinces (Aceh and Papua) and three American states (California, Illinois 
and Wisconsin), signed in California a MOU to establish the first state-to-state sub-
national agreement focused on REDD programs. On the months preceding COP-15, the 
Amazonian states of the taskforce adopted a position that was not aligned with the 
strategy defended by the Brazilian government. On more than one occasion President 
                                                 
141 Interview No.49 - NGO. The interviewee was involved in ICLEI’s project “Developing state policies and 
action to combat climate change in Brazil”, and helped the state governments of Bahia, Mato Grosso and 
Pernambuco developing their regional policies on climate change. 
142 Interview No.20 - SP official; Interview No.47 – NGO; Interview No.42 – academia; Interview No.32 – 
national official; personal experience working for ICLEI in COP-14, in Poznan. 
143 Interview No.2 - SP official. A similar account is found in the literature (Prazeres, 2004, p. 301). 
144 In this sense: Interviews Nos. 1, 2, 11, 16 - SP officials;  Interviews Nos. 24, 28, 32, 33 – national 
officials; and Interview No. 46 - NGO. 
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Lula, SAF, AFEPA and the national negotiators, met the Governors until they formed a 
“Brazilian position” that could be taken in December 2009 to Copenhagen.145 
In this case, a conflictual interaction between subnational governments and the central 
government became clear. An extreme situation like this helps to explain the 
established position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which emphasise that 
subnational governments’ agenda should be developed in accordance – rather than in 
conflict - with the national interests. This was highlighted by Chancellor Patriota, on the 
speech he gave at the launch of São Paulo’s International Relations Plan: 
When states and municipalities institutionalise areas for foreign action, a 
partnership with the federal government constitutes an indispensable condition 
for a cohesive, coherent and efficient Brazilian foreign policy. Subnational 
governments’ international relations will always be seen as an integral and 
inseparable part of the Brazilian foreign policy. In this line, São Paulo’s Plan is 
adequately aligned with the contribution that the federated entities can offer in 
the defence of the country’s interests regionally and globally (Patriota, 2012).146 
 
Photo 5-2 Governor Alckmin and Chancellor Antonio Patriota in the launch of São 
Paulo’s International Relations Plan 
Source: Retrieved from the newspaper “O Estado de São Paulo” (Estadao, 2012) 
Yet, cases of conflict are the exception in Brazilian (environmental) paradiplomacy. 
Different from the ‘political paradiplomacy’ (Lecours, 2008) undertaken by Quebec, 
Flanders, Catalonia and the Basque Country147, São Paulo’s paradiplomacy is not 
conflicting, and most of the interviewees strongly emphasised this aspect.148 This is not 
because the international activities undertaken by this subnational government are 
limited to low politics and issues of local/regional interests, as previously suggested by 
                                                 
145 Interviews Nos. 24 and 32 - national officials. Also in the media, for example, in the newspaper ‘O 
Estado de Sao Paulo’ (Estadao, 2009). 
146
 Author’s translation. 
147 Lecours (2008, p. 3) suggests that the political layer of paradiplomacy tends to feature prominently the 
international expression of an identity distinct from the one projected by the central state. 
148 Interview No.2 - SP official; Interviews Nos. 26, 27, 28 - national officials. In Chapter 7, I further 
develop whether Sao Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy results in more conflict of collaboration. 
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the majority of the paradiplomacy literature (Aguirre, 1999; Duran, 2011; Lecours, 
2002; Vigevani, 2006). Environmental paradiplomacy involves issues of global interest, 
such as climate change and protection of biodiversity, and this confirms the idea that 
paradiplomacy can be used to push forward ambitious agendas associated with high 
politics and global problems. 
5.5. SUMMARY 
 
Continuing to answer the first research question (How does environmental 
paradiplomacy evolve in the state of São Paulo?), and taking into consideration the 
second part of hypothesis 1 (Environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the 
international activities undertaken by subnational governments to address 
environmental problems across scales), this Chapter attempted to answer two related 
sub-questions on the interactions of scale and law in environmental paradiplomacy:  
 
Research Question 1A 
What are the scales involved in environmental paradiplomacy undertaken by the 
state of São Paulo? 
Hypothesis 1A 
Environmental paradiplomacy evolves across multiple scales, represented by the 
actors, problems and levels involved. Environmental paradiplomacy has a 
rescaling role. 
 
Research Question 1B 
Can the state of São Paulo move across scales? 
Hypothesis 1B 
Legal limitations to São Paulo’s international agenda impose significant 
constraints on its paradiplomacy. 
Answering the first sub-question, Section 5.2 showed that scale can be understood in a 
MLG context, and that the linkages established within environmental politics occur 
(vertically and horizontally) across scales. The case study then provided a systematic 
analysis of environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo as a rescaling 
process, which involves nine rescaling opportunities. This suggests that the linkages 
that subnational governments promote when undertaking environmental 
paradiplomacy are wider than those so far envisioned by the MLG literature. The 
Chapter further demonstrated that by establishing an international environmental 
agenda, the state of São Paulo moves across jurisdictional levels, breaking the fixed 
scales in which it traditionally operates, and as a result promoted a rescaling of issue 
areas, actors and competences. While the rescaling framing helped describe shifts in the 
social construction of scales of governance and diplomacy, it could not fully explain 
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environmental paradiplomacy’s significance. Such analysis will be made in Chapter 7, 
when I assess the outcomes of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda. 
Addressing the second sub-question, Section 5.3 showed that rescaling processes do not 
develop without contestation, and that there are legal limitations to rescaling. In public 
international law, collaboration initiatives established by subnational governments 
across borders are soft law, and the coalition initiatives they undertake can challenge 
the unity of the state as a foreign policy actor. In terms of the domestic legal order, 
subnational foreign affairs activities depend on constitutional limitations established by 
each country. In Brazil, subnational governments have a wide competence to deal with 
regional and local matters, but the Federal Constitution does not foresee international 
actions undertaken by subnational governments.  
The case study further developed in Section 5.4 highlighted that institutionalisation 
within the federal government was a way to recognise paradiplomacy, but not carte 
blanche. By establishing an institutional framework for federative diplomacy, the 
national government reacted to a reality and demonstrated a will to organise something 
that already existed. But even if the federal government’s intention was not to give 
subnational governments a real autonomy in foreign affairs, the institutional adaptation 
allowed a combination of the national primary role in foreign affairs with a growing 
subnational participation. In turn, subnational governments saw this as a green light, 
and within their respective spheres started to consolidate an international relations 
apparatus. The challenge that remains is how to minimize conflict and maximize the 
complementarity of interests (Vigevani, 2006, p. 133). In other words how to reconcile 
central government’s monopoly over international relations with the subnational 
interest, avoiding dubious situations where the legality of paradiplomacy can be 
contested. 
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CHAPTER 6: DRIVERS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PARADIPLOMACY 
IN SÃO PAULO 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, São Paulo’s international environmental agenda takes place 
through collaboration and coalition initiatives, across borders and scales. By 
undertaking such an agenda the state faces legal, political and institutional challenges, 
and, yet, promotes a rescaling of global environmental governance. Following the 
analysis, the purpose of this Chapter is to examine research question 2:  why does the 
state of São Paulo undertake this international environmental agenda? 
While much attention is given by MLG scholars to the reasons why subnational 
governments get involved in climate policymaking, the question this Chapter addresses 
has so far been overlooked by the literature. Indeed, Engel (2006) points that the 
critical unanswered question regarding subnational responses to climate change is why 
states cooperate with each other. Selin and VanDeveer (2011) also call for more 
attention to regional multilevel governance in research design and theorizing, including 
motivations and opportunities for coordinated responses for climate change. In addition 
McMillan (2008) recognises a lack of empirical or theoretical grasp on governors’ 
motivations for participation in foreign policy. 
The Chapter begins by examining possible motivations identified by scholars writing on 
MLG, federalism, transnationalism and paradiplomacy. This literature review informs 
hypothesis 2 on three determinants posited to drive environmental paradiplomacy in 
the state of São Paulo - the global characteristics of the problem; aspects related to the 
decline of the State; and the cooperative aspect of Brazilian federalism (see Figure 6-1 
below).  
Through the analysis, evidence is found that the international and the domestic 
determinants identified by the literature only account to a certain extent for São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomatic activity. The Chapter further argues for an alternative 
main reason driving environmental paradiplomacy, one related to a leadership role that 
the state of São Paulo has been playing - and wants to continue playing – in 
environmental policymaking. That is, the state undertakes international relations on 
global environmental matters mostly because it sees itself as a leader in this area, and it 
wants to confirm this position nationally and internationally. 
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Chapter 
6 
 
Research Question 2 
Why does the state of São Paulo undertake an international 
agenda to deal with global environmental problems? 
Hypothesis 2 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo is driven by a combination of global and 
domestic factors - the characteristics of the problem, aspects related to the decline of 
the State; and aspects of Brazilian federalism. 
Figure 6-1 Research question and hypothesis that guides Chapter 6 
Source: Author. 
Although there is a component of compensating for a lack or insufficiency of federal 
action (‘filling the vacuum’), and eventually an attempt to extrapolate the national 
exclusive competence in undertaking foreign affairs (‘by-passing the nation-State’), 
environmental paradiplomacy undertaken by the state of São Paulo is coherent with the 
state’s historical position of establishing environmental policies and regulation ahead of 
the federal government. 
This assessment is mostly based on interview material in which actors from the state 
and national level provide their perceptions on the reasons why the state of São Paulo 
undertakes an international environmental agenda. The analysis also takes into 
consideration observational data collected at COP-14 of the UNFCCC.149 Following the 
findings of how paradiplomacy evolves, the explanatory factors are tested considering 
both the collaboration and the coalition initiatives undertaken by the state. 
The Chapter is divided into five main sections. The motivations identified by the 
theoretical approaches of MLG, federalism, transnationalism and paradiplomacy are 
briefly presented in Section 6.2. The global determinants for environmental 
paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo are explored in Section 6.3. They involve the 
characteristics of the problems that policy-makers are dealing with (Subsection 6.3.1), 
as well as a reaction to a decline of the nation-State (Subsection 6.3.2), which in turn 
results from processes of globalisation, problems with traditional diplomacy, and the 
perceived slow progress of international environmental negotiations. The domestic 
determinants of environmental paradiplomacy are examined in Section 6.4. They derive 
from the characteristics of Brazilian federalism (Subsection 6.4.1), but most importantly 
for São Paulo’s leadership in environmental policymaking (Subsection 6.4.2). A 
summary of the findings is made in Section 6.5. 
                                                 
149 More details about the methodology in Chapter 3. 
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6.2. DIFFERENT QUESTIONS, DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS 
The focus of this Section is on the reasons why subnational governments undertake an 
international environmental agenda. The short literature review presented in the 
following pages initially revisits (see Chapter 2) the emerging research on MLG, 
federalism and transnationalism. This body of literature, however, makes limited strides 
towards exploring the international agenda of subnational governments per se. Such a 
focus is found in the paradiplomacy literature. Yet, within this approach there is not 
enough exploration of the motives for environmental paradiplomacy. 
By applying a MLG approach, scholars understand the foreign activities of subnational 
governments within a political-administrative system, often illustrated by EU 
policymaking. Under the logic of MLG, governance actors are situated both inside and 
outside the governmental realm, ranging from the local to the global level (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2001, 2003). Although scholars within the MLG approach ascribe an important 
role to subnational governments, stressing that the national government is no longer a 
unique actor in international policymaking, less attention is given to understanding why 
subnational governments move across levels of governance. Instead, subnational 
governments’ mobility across scales - interconnecting national and international 
political arenas, while creating transnational associations - is a prerequisite of this body 
of literature.150 
Scholars also use the MLG approach to examine the emergence of subnational 
governments as relevant actors in climate governance. They explore what drives 
subnational governments to become active in regulating GHGs and to join transnational 
networks of subnational governments. The type of question asked is: why do individual 
subnational governments choose to become active in regulating GHG? Why do 
subnational governments join up in transnational networks or become part of a regional 
emission reduction program? Is it justified to do so in the face of a problem area that is 
replete with free riders? This literature suggests that local governments pursue climate 
policies: as a reaction to a decline in central government’s ability to steer society; 
because of the perceived limitations of the international regime; and because of the cost 
savings and co-benefits (e.g. air pollution and improving urban spaces) associated with 
climate policy (Aall et al., 2007; Betsill, 2006; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, 2006, 2007; 
Bulkeley, 2005, 2010; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Bulkeley et al., 2003; Corfee-Morlot et 
al., 2011; Davies, 2005; Gustavsson et al., 2009; Kousky & Schneider, 2003; Sugiyama & 
Sinton, 2005). 
With a stronger emphasis on the US and Canada, federalist theorists also investigate 
subnational action on climate change and why this has become part of regional GHG 
                                                 
150 In any case, subnational presence at the EU level is less problematic, as representatives of subnational 
governments are formally allowed by the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 to represent member states in the 
Council of Ministers as long as those representatives defend national interests. 
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emission reduction programs (Dernbach et al., 2010; Engel, 2005, 2006; Gore, 2010; 
McAllister, 2009; Rabe, 2003, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010; Robinson & Gore, 2005; Selin & 
VanDeveer, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011). In the federalist literature, domestic explanations 
for subnational engagement in climate action include: political advantages on an 
international issue which the federal government is mostly ignoring; competitive 
advantages associated with the early adoption of regulations that may soon become 
widespread; concern over the public health and environmental impacts; and prior 
success in influencing national environmental policy. 
A different standpoint is taken by international relations scholars interested in 
transnational relations. Their interest is mainly on why subnational governments 
collaborate with NGOs and private sector, forming hybrid partnerships (Andonova, 
2011; Andonova et al., 2009). The broad answer is that transnational partnerships 
occur as one manifestation of the insufficiency of the State in addressing complex global 
challenges. As a result, the State ‘rearticulates’ itself engaging in new mechanisms of 
governance (Abbott, 2012; Abbott & Snidal, 2010; Slaughter, 2004) and shifting power 
to transnational actors (Bernstein et al., 2010; Keck & Sikkink, 1999). Other 
transnationalists, however, proclaim the continued primacy of States and emphasize the 
ability of those with power to manipulate governance networks (Drezner, 2001).  
A fourth view is taken by scholars studying paradiplomacy. In this case there is a more 
direct interest in understanding the motivations for regions to go into the international 
arena (Aguirre, 1999; Cornago, 1999; Criekemans, 2010b; Keating, 1999, 2000; Lecours, 
2002). In addition, contributions within this trend usually highlight both domestic and 
international factors as relevant for regions developing foreign activities (Adame, 2011; 
Andrade e Barros, 2010b; Branco, 2008). However, theoretical and empirical studies on 
subnational paradiplomacy stop short from building a theoretical framework from 
which hypotheses can be developed with respect to the conditions that lead subnational 
governments to undertake particular types of paradiplomatic activities (Bursens & 
Deforche, 2010).  
The first works on paradiplomacy attempted to assess the determinants of 
paradiplomatic activity. Soldatos (1990, pp. 44-49) presented an inventory of domestic 
determinants on the regional level, domestic determinants on the federal level and 
external causes. Favourable conditions also included the personality of the leaders, 
historical and cultural ingredients, the socio-political climate, geographic position and 
resources, national support, and legislation promoting foreign investment.151 Almost 
ten years passed and Keating (1999) returned to the question ‘why do regions go 
abroad?’. Keating’s list of motives consists of three internal drivers: economic (seeking 
trade and investment); cultural (seeking support for language and culture) and political 
                                                 
151 In the same edited volume, Michelmann (1990) lists economic, political, cultural and environmental 
motivations for paradiplomacy; he also highlights the constitutional and institutional setting of federal 
countries as relevant. 
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(seeking recognition and legitimacy as something more than regions). He also considers 
changes in the international context, such as international organizations providing 
subnational governments with FDI, and the establishment of partnerships and 
cooperation initiatives. Most of the research that followed continued discerning similar 
sets of motivations for the foreign activities of subnational governments. Kincaid (2002) 
adds to this list cross-border and cultural reasons. Among the cross-border issues, 
subnational governments try to address air and water pollution between contiguous 
regions divided by and international border. Within the cultural reasons there is an 
effort to achieve global recognition of a regions’ distinct cultural or ‘national’ identity, 
such as in the case of the Basque Country. The cultural side of identity-building was also 
emphasised by Lachapelle and Paquin (2005) and Blatter (2008).  
Yet, there is still a lack of an explanatory approach to the development of subnational 
foreign activities, particularly on the environmental realm. The most significant attempt 
so far is found in Bruyninckx et al’s (2012) work. In the introduction of their edited 
book (Van den Brande et al., 2012) the authors list five factors for why subnational 
governments get involved internationally: having a sense of responsibility to act 
globally; gaining legitimization at the international scene; strengthening their 
international presence; having their role in dealing with sustainable development 
recognised; and demonstrating their leadership.152 In addition, a few recent studies 
started to investigate subnational engagement in climate change and concluded, 
similarly to MLG and federalist works, that environmental paradiplomacy is linked to 
the nation-State’s weak leadership (in Canada) or refusal (of the US) to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol (Chaloux, 2010; Eatmon, 2009). 
Despite the variety of possible answers observed within these four strands of literature, 
a systematic empirical assessment of motives that drive subnational governments to 
develop an international agenda to deal with global environmental problems is still 
absent. While research on MLG, federalism and transnationalism offer competent 
accounts of the reasons why non-State actors respond to climate change and engage in 
collaborative environmental governance, they cannot fully account for subnational 
governments’ international activity. And while paradiplomacy explores the reasons for 
subnational foreign activity, it lacks a comprehensive framework of hypothesis, and it 
does not explain the increasingly active agenda of these actors in dealing with global 
environmental problems. 
                                                 
152 Van den Brande et al (2012) mention leadership as a driver, however this argument is not further 
developed. In more detail the authors develop four explanatory factors with respect to subnational 
governments’ sustainable development policies. These are: the international influence which results from 
sustainable development as an outside-in policy; the degree of autonomy of subnational governments 
with reference to their national constitutional context; the political context of subnational governments 
(political will and political party dynamics); and the socioeconomic conditions that allow a government to 
display higher commitment on sustainable development policies. 
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Such systematic analysis is needed not only to integrate the competing arguments 
brought by these trends of literature, but more importantly to gain a better 
understanding of what is behind the increasingly common phenomenon of subnational 
governments collaborating across borders and participating in environmental foreign 
policy. Based on claims made by these four groups of scholarly work, the next Sections 
specify three determinants situated on the interplay between the domestic and 
international determinants of why subnational governments engage in an international 
environmental agenda: the characteristics of the problem, aspects related to the decline 
of the State; and aspects of Brazilian federalism. Addressing hypothesis 2, these three 
determinants are tested using the case of São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy. A 
novel position involving the leadership determinant is then informed by the research 
findings. 
6.3. GLOBAL DETERMINANTS 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo responds to global factors. This Section 
begins by considering that policymakers in São Paulo develop a paradiplomatic agenda 
to respond to the global characteristics of contemporary environmental problems, 
particularly climate change and biodiversity (Subsection 6.3.1). Secondly, it recognises 
that São Paulo’s international environmental agenda is driven by different 
developments that indicate the weakening of the State, particularly globalisation, the 
limitations of traditional diplomacy and of multilateral environmental regimes 
(Subsection 6.3.2). Such global or international spheres are taken as a starting point of 
subnational governments’ international agenda, and the analysis tries to establish 
empirically to what extent they are directly driving São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomacy. 
6.3.1. Characteristics of the problem 
Global environmental problems were defined in the Introduction to this thesis. They 
have multiple interdependent causes, and are increasingly seen by practitioners and 
scholars as “needing coordinated and integrated forms of social organization and 
institutions for effective resolution” (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010, p. 256; Geels, 2011; 
While et al., 2010). In other words, to be addressed, global environmental problems 
need to be backed up by a variety of efforts at national, regional and local levels 
(Ostrom, 2010). The interdependent nature of global environmental problems is one of 
the factors explaining why actors on the local and regional level are engaging in climate 
change mitigation and adaptation strategies (Adger et al., 2005; Cash et al., 2006; S. 
Fisher, 2012; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Wälti, 2010; Wilbanks, 2005). This, it is argued, 
motivates subnational governments to take action despite the fact that the casual 
relationships between local actions and global outcomes are not clear. 
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Nevertheless, only recently have scholars in the field of paradiplomacy started to 
acknowledge the causal relationship between the characteristics of global 
environmental problems and subnational governments’ international agenda. For 
instance, Cornago (2010, p. 19) argued that global environmental problems have fuelled 
the rise of subnational governments’ international activity across the globe. While 
Bruyninckx et al. (2012) pointed out that sustainable development’s international 
character motivates subnational governments to become more active in the 
international sphere. 
In Brazil, global environmental problems - particularly climate change - have affected 
the occurrence and intensity of the environmental paradiplomatic activities undertaken 
by the federated units. This influence was underlined by the international affairs 
advisors of the Sub-Secretariat of Federative Affairs within the Presidency of the 
Republic (SAF) 
The issue of climate change has revolutionised Brazilian subnational diplomacy. 
Of course our states and cities get involved in other international topics, but this 
one is special. Not only do they have a genuine interest, but they often know 
more about it than anyone else does. So I think the environmental agenda brings 
together this crucial component: it is equally relevant topic for the national as 
well as for the subnational governments.153 
Few topics engage the international community, national states and subnational 
governments. The protection of the environment has been the primary one able 
to bring all these levels of government on board. While nations-states engage in 
multilateral solutions, subnational governments can help with the discussion, 
establishing their own initiatives, and implementing them on the ground.154 
Similarly, the international agenda of the state of São Paulo responds to the global 
characteristics of contemporary environmental problems. When asked why they 
undertake an international agenda, policymakers framed the idea that governance of 
climate change and biodiversity protection drives paradiplomatic activity in two 
different ways. First, at least in their intention, policymakers in São Paulo perceive 
subnational governments are part both of the causes and of the solution to problems 
such as climate change and biodiversity. Consequently, they recognize that there is an 
imperative to respond to global environmental problems. This is a moral imperative, 
which São Paulo’s Secretary for the environment summarised in the following terms: 
Locally we cause environmental problems, which in turn will affect the globe. 
Although it makes sense that global problems are dealt by global institutions 
such as the UN, subnational governments can regulate and monitor the activities 
                                                 
153 Interview No.25 - national official. 
154 Interview No.24 - national official. 
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that cause global problems. So not only are we interested parties in international 
policymaking, but also we have a crucial role to play.155 
Second, policymakers in the state of São Paulo are aware that, in order respond to issues 
that are regulated within the international sphere, they need to engage in international 
realms. As CETESB’s Manager of Sustainable and Global Affairs Division pointed out, 
“the international regime influences the emergence of a global agenda in the state, so we 
need to be present at international forums to be minimally in line with what is 
happening there”.156 The Head of Environment Division of Itamaraty also remarked that 
Subnational governments want to address global environmental problems. So 
they need to be part of the forums where international decision-making takes 
place, which are still very removed from their reality….Protecting the 
environment is a positive agenda that involves do-gooders. Officials and 
policymakers in the subnational level are motivated by the possibility of doing 
something to deal with global environmental challenges.157 
The issue area, thus, justifies the state engaging in initiatives that extrapolate the 
borders between Brazil and its neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the characteristics 
of global environmental problems constitute a driver for both collaboration and 
coalition initiatives undertaken by the state of São Paulo. In both cases, São Paulo’s 
foreign agenda develops independently of the existence of shared ecosystems. Yet, the 
nature of the problem drives collaboration and coalition initiatives in different ways 
(Table 6-1). 
In terms of its collaborative initiatives, São Paulo establishes decentralised cooperation 
agreements with national and subnational governments, from neighbouring and non-
neighbouring countries.158 The parties are driven by common understandings, and 
share interests on environmental protection. This is the case, for instance, of the 
Protocol of Intentions signed between the state of São Paulo and Provence and Cote 
d’Azur (PACA) Region, in France, which focuses on the management of protected areas. 
In the case of its coalition initiatives, subnational governments from around the world 
join transnational networks. The member states and regions are conscious of the fact 
that problems such as climate change and biodiversity loss have to be tackled across 
and at multiple levels and scales. To join the Nrg4SD, for example, members have share 
the common principles of: promoting sustainable development at the 
subnational/regional level; being represented at the global level in the field of 
sustainable development; seeking a wider recognition at international level of the 
                                                 
155 Interview No.1 - SP official. 
156 Interview No.11 - SP official. 
157 Interview No.27 - national official. 
158 This distinguishes paradiplomacy from cases of regional cooperation, which occur between regions 
from neighbouring countries. 
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importance of the commitment of subnational/regional governments towards 
sustainable development (Nrg4SD, 2011). 
There are, hence, differences on how the characteristics of global environmental 
problems drive collaboration and coalition initiatives. Whereas in collaboration 
initiatives the participants face similar ecological conditions or similar difficulties in 
dealing with certain environmental problems, this is not necessarily the case for 
coalition initiatives. For example, during collaborative initiatives the state is constantly 
exchanging experiences with environmental agencies in the US and in Europe on how to 
deal with air pollution, soil and groundwater contamination. But within some of the 
transnational networks that it participates in, the state joins their efforts with regions 
that have little common interests other than the aim to act transnationally to protect the 
global environment. 
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Table 6-1 Global drivers for environmental paradiplomacy: characteristics of the 
problem 
Source: Author 
In sum, there are relations between environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São 
Paulo and the characteristics of global environmental problems. This relation results 
from participating actors recognising the multi-scalar character of global environmental 
problems and the fact that despite being framed as global, problems such as climate 
change and biodiversity loss find their causes and effects on local and regional levels. 
Just as the recognition by nations of the ecological interdependence of environmental 
problems justifies the signature of international treaties, the acknowledgement by 
subnational governments of this reality also justifies their engagement with the 
international efforts in place. 
6.3.2. Decline of the State 
Much discussion on the internationalization of subnational governments is located 
within the broader debate regarding the idea of the ‘decline of the State’. In this regard, 
it is frequently alleged that (i) the social and economic processes that occurred with the 
intensification of globalisation have diminished the powers of the State (Held, 2000). 
Arguably, as the State became weaker, subnational governments expanded their action 
across borders and occupied spaces in foreign policy that the national state failed to 
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undertake. Arguments regarding (ii) the deficits of traditional forms of diplomacy and 
(iii) insufficiencies of multilateral environmental regimes also commonly underpin non-
State actors’ participation in global governance. Such arguments, present in research on 
the fields of MLG, federalism, transnationalism and paradiplomacy, similarly appear in 
the motivations given by policy-makers involved in environmental paradiplomacy in the 
state of São Paulo. 
Globalisation 
Empirical studies within the paradiplomacy literature suggest that the foreign activity 
of subnational governments has been facilitated by a higher level of interdependence in 
the world economy (Andrade e Barros, 2010a; Duchacek et al., 1988; Lessa, 2007; 
McMillan, 2008, 2009). Kincaid (2002) partially disagrees with this argument, 
reminding us that the first era of globalisation, which occurred between the late 
nineteenth century and the First World War, did not produce a flowering of subnational 
participation in foreign policymaking and international affairs. Instead, he suggests 
several drivers for this phenomenon (which he calls ‘constituent diplomacy’); the 
democratisation process observed since the Second World War, the human rights 
movements of the 1960s, the collapse of highly centralised regimes since the mid-
1970s, market liberalisation, technological innovation, and regionalisation (the rise of 
the EU), among other factors. 
In São Paulo’s case, the intensification of its paradiplomatic agenda in the mid-1990s 
coincides with the period of economic globalisation in Brazil. While collaborative 
initiatives in environmental paradiplomacy have been occurring in the state since the 
1970s, therefore before globalization, this correlation was made by policy-makers in São 
Paulo as well as by diplomats: 
The nation-State, as originally designed, has failed. In the last 20 years we have 
seen elements of cohesion within social structures that differ from the political 
divisions of nation-States. We turn to cultural, religious, social and economic 
values to create our identity. Within a governmental structure, this implies 
showing your face to the world. And this is what subnational governments are 
doing.159 
Our federative diplomacy, that is, subnational governments’ international agenda 
in Brazil, became more relevant as a response to globalisation processes.160 
Globalisation processes are behind both collaborative and coalition initiatives 
undertaken by the state of São Paulo (Table 6-2). First, collaboration initiatives are 
directly related to developments resulting from globalisation processes. A number of 
                                                 
159 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
160 Interview No.16 - SP official. 
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accounts given by the interviewees highlight that the expectation of economic 
opportunities and financial returns drive the state of São Paulo to establish partnerships 
with actors across borders. Within the partnership between the American state of 
Massachusetts and São Paulo to promote academic exchange between universities in 
both states, it was made explicit that: 
As governors, we've come to realize that the global economy waits for no one. 
You either get on the bus or get left behind…. In that spirit, we see opportunities 
to strengthen and grow the relationship between our states.161 
In this case, and in a number of other initiatives, international partnerships with 
subnational governments are presented as a necessity in the globalised economy. They 
are understood as “a strategic matter”.162 Further confirming this argument, São Paulo’s 
International Relations Plan is explicit in recognising that 
Globalization and the expansion of markets have made boundaries more flexible, 
thereby encouraging local governments to participate directly in international 
relations… [Federative diplomacy] bears a tight relation with the need to find 
global resources to satisfy local interests, with domestic and foreign policy 
complementing each other (São Paulo, 2012). 
Second, São Paulo’s coalition initiatives are also connected to the developments of a 
globalised world. Transnational networks, for instance, respond to contemporary 
globalization and its increasing transnational interdependence. In this context, their 
main objective is to promote the exchange ideas, promote capacity building and 
promote the harmonization of laws and rules (Slaughter, 2004).  
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Table 6-2 Global drivers for environmental paradiplomacy: globalisation 
Source: Author 
In both collaboration and coalition initiatives established by the state of São Paulo, 
seeking financial returns constitutes an indirect driver and consequence of state’s 
                                                 
161 Interview given by Governor Patrick, of Massachusetts, and Alckmin, of São Paulo, when they jointly 
announced the partnership (Patrick & Alckmin, 2011). 
162 Interview No.46 - NGO. 
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engagement in international relations. The account is given by São Paulo’s International 
Relations Advisor is clear: 
Meeting other subnational officials makes it easier to discuss new projects and 
collaborations. Before an international meeting or conference, we investigate 
others who will be attending the event. Our team here works almost like a secret 
service, getting all sort of information about our potential partners. When we 
arrive at the meeting, we are ready to discuss the conference agenda, but there 
will be moments where we will discuss bilateral initiatives.163 
In sum, as the global economy became more open and fluid, the state of São Paulo found 
more opportunities to seek resources abroad, as well as to establish direct relations 
with national, subnational and international actors across borders. Globalisation 
constitutes, thus, a driver – yet, as I show bellow, not the main determinant - for 
environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo, particularly for collaboration 
initiatives. 
Problems with traditional diplomacy 
In addition to a globalised world, there are other global trends driving environmental 
paradiplomacy. The debate about the decline of diplomacy is a well-rehearsed 
proposition (Hocking, 1998). For transnationalists such as Slaugher and Hale (2010, p. 
359) contemporary policy issues that operate simultaneously the domestic and 
international realms are challenging the strict divides between the international and the 
domestic spheres promoted by traditional diplomacy.  
In terms of its collaboration initiatives, the interactions involved in paradiplomatic 
activities are flexible and allow for responsiveness in a way that traditional diplomatic 
channels often do not  (Table 6-3). Along these lines, the informal ways through which 
subnational representatives communicate with their peers across boarders constitutes 
a reaction to the formal and complicated communication observed in traditional 
diplomacy. A number of policymakers in the state defend this position, and perceive the 
establishment of partnerships between subnational actors as a more efficient way of 
addressing global environmental problems than the one attempted by traditional 
diplomacy.164 
Coalition initiatives undertaken by the state of São Paulo, in turn, directly address the 
gap of communication between the diplomats and the reality experienced by 
subnational officials (Table 6-3). Asked why the state participates in the Nrg4SD and in 
multilateral negotiations, SMA’s international relations advisor highlighted the need to 
take diplomatic roles and to interact with the diplomats: 
                                                 
163 Interview No.17 - SP official. 
164 Interviews Nos. 6, 9, 11 - SP officials. 
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The state of São Paulo has a diplomatic role to play, and therefore it is important 
to have diplomatic spaces where we can meet with other subnational 
governments, and to be represented in multilateral forums. Many people say that 
multilateralism is a waste of time, but I still think that it is crucial to have 
opportunities to meet and to communicate, and subnational governments can 
help inputting to the negotiators and the negotiations with their experience.165 
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Table 6-3 Global drivers for environmental paradiplomacy: problems with traditional 
diplomacy 
Source: Author 
For many actors involved in paradiplomatic activities in Brazil, it is important to break 
the diplomatic monopoly of the federal government. Behind this call lays the argument 
that the traditional practice of diplomacy is limited by a separation between the 
international and the domestic, and that subnational intervention can help in 
addressing this limitation.166 Along these lines, the international advisor for the 
Ministry of Environment made a clear argument about the need to integrate the 
different levels of government in the national position forming-process. 
Itamaraty’s mission is to protect the national interest and sovereignty, as well as 
the national position in international negotiations. But Itamaraty does not have 
the monopoly over the formulation of the Brazilian position. What the country is 
defending in international forums should take into consideration the national 
interests and their specificities. The national interest belongs to all Brazilians. 
Although we have an excellent diplomatic corps, highly qualified and well 
prepared, without listening to the regional and local levels of government they 
cannot represent the whole country.167 
A similar point was made by a Brazilian diplomat after experiencing a coordination 
effort with the state of São Paulo preceding and during CBD COP-10 in Nagoya: 
                                                 
165 Interview No.9 - SP official. 
166 See Chapter 7 for a further discussion on how environmental paradiplomacy is helping to address 
limitations of traditional diplomacy. 
167 Interview No.32 - national official. 
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At Itamaraty we have the understanding of how international politics work. But 
recently we also started taking into consideration the internal needs, and trying 
to bring them to the international sphere. To do so we need to establish a 
dialogue with the federative entities. This is why coordination with the subunits 
is so important. The subnational states know better than us how things work and 
what is needed on the ground, and this role the Itamaraty and the national 
government cannot undertake. So I believe that the states have the responsibility 
of bringing this reality to us, and we have the responsibility to translate it into a 
Brazilian position that will be beneficial for all.168 
Related to this point, there is the idea, presented in the Introduction, that although the 
national and the supranational levels normally decide the framework conditions within 
which the subnational level operate, subnational governments are responsible for 
implementing international environmental policy. 
Crises of international environmental multilateralism 
Lastly, there is the argument that subnational governments are undertaking 
international relations because environmental multilateralism is in crisis. Analysts 
acknowledge that international law and regulation are essentially conservative, more 
suited to fostering stability than to driving change (Heyvaert, 2013b). Overall, 
environmental multilateralism has failed to reduce or reverse environmental 
destruction, and its processes are slowing down (Falkner, 2013).169 It is further argued 
that where international treaties cannot be agreed, other options need to be explored 
(Betsill, 2007; Giddens, 2009; Rayner, 2010). The engagement of a wider range of actors 
(including subnational governments) in environmental multilateralism is both a 
reaction to this crisis, and a way out of it. Particularly in the climate change arena, 
alternative attempts have emerged as a response to the slow progress of international 
negotiations, an absence of more effective international action, and need to respond to 
and plan for the impacts of climate change (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007; Gore, 2010). 
Falkner (2013) summarises this idea suggesting that: 
The urgency of the climate challenge does not allow us simply to wait for 
diplomats to resolve their countries’ differences. While international climate 
negotiations carry on, climate action needs to be initiated wherever possible, in 
municipalities and cities below the national level, in regional networks across 
national boundaries, in corporate organizations as much as in global civil society 
(p. 357). 
                                                 
168 Interview No.26 - national official. 
169 For some of the difficulties of the multilateral process see Saunier and Meganck (2007), offering a 
number of reasons why global environmental governance “stands at the edge of chaos”. 
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Along similar lines, the crisis of environmental multilateralism, I argue, is driving 
environmental paradiplomatic activity in the state of São Paulo. Government 
representatives who are in charge of environmental policymaking at the subnational 
level recognise the difficulties faced by international environmental regimes, and as a 
result they want to help promoting global environmental protection. A number of actors 
involved in São Paulo’s international relations cited the slow progress observed in 
international environmental negotiations as one of the drivers for their action: 
Everyone knows that international agreements between countries are extremely 
slow and complex. So subnational governments are joining forces, and trying to 
make the implementation of important environmental policies more effective.170 
Subnational governments deal with real problems, with pressing problems. For 
instance, the Amazon is burning and the state officials need to do something 
about it. If they would wait for the international community to reach an 
agreement, it could be too late. Bilaterally subnational governments can achieve 
results, for example, California can offset its emissions and states in the Amazon 
can reduce deforestation. I think they are absolutely right in doing so. Even if in 
some years a multilateral regime establishes different rules, at least subnational 
governments have started doing something.171 
Collaboration initiatives established by the state with other actors across borders 
contrasts with the slow pace at which most environmental treaty negotiations take 
place (Table 6-4). Subnational government representatives make contacts and carve out 
opportunities to establish decentralized cooperation agreements, information-sharing 
networks and forums with less formality than traditional agreements entered by the 
national government. They establish voluntary initiatives without needing to reach 
consensus with hundreds of parties. Contrary to multilateral agreements, most 
initiatives established by SMA and CETESB can be implemented by the regulators 
themselves, and do not require approval by national or state legislators.172 CETESB’s 
President summarizes this idea: 
We have an active agenda at these COPs. In parallel to the negotiations, we join 
forces with hundreds of regions in voluntary commitments to reduce GHG 
emissions. If there is still resistance from central governments, this is not true for 
subnational governments. We are ready to assume further commitments and to 
advance with policy implementation.173 
                                                 
170 Interview No.4 - SP official. 
171 Interview No.3 - SP official. 
172 These collaboration initiatives resemble the agreements entered into between domestic regulatory 
agencies that form transgovernmentalism - examined by Slaughter (2004, p. 49). 
173 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
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The limitations of multilateralism and the potential role that subnational governments 
can play addressing these limitations also constitutes a reason for the state to engage in 
international coalition activities (Table 6-4). To exemplify, at COP-15, in Copenhagen, 
Governor of São Paulo Jose Serra and Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger 
held a joint side event. On the occasion, Governor Schwarzenegger made a speech 
explicitly recognising that: 
Certainly, it would be terrific if the world's governments reached an agreement… 
Attempting to reach such an agreement is good and is actually very, very 
important. But why do we put so many hopes and eggs into the big international 
agreement basket when, according to the UN itself, up to 80% of GHG mitigation 
will be done at the subnational level? (…) So ladies and gentlemen, the world's 
governments alone cannot make progress, the kind of progress that is needed on 
global climate change. They alone cannot do it. They need everyone coming 
together, everyone working together. They need the cities, they need the states, 
they need the provinces and the regions…So ladies and gentlemen, let us regain 
our momentum, let us regain our purpose, let us regain our hope by liberating 
the transformative power beneath the national level…174 
This issue is also recognised by actors at the national level. However, while actors 
involved with paradiplomacy at the state level see their international action as a logical 
and necessary reaction to the limitation of multilateralism, actors at the national level 
are more cautious about what subnational representatives can actually do without the 
framework of an international agreement.175 Asked about why subnational 
governments are developing an international agenda, the Secretary of Climate Change 
and Environmental Quality at the Ministry of Environment replied that: 
Subnational governments may not want to wait until nation-States reach an 
agreement. The multilateral process is slow; member-states can unilaterally 
block decisions, and rules require consent to be bound. But then you see 
subnational REDD projects and subnational bilateral agreements popping up like 
mushrooms… These initiatives lack an international framework; they create 
expectations without a legal base behind them.176 
However, while environmental paradiplomacy reacts to the slow pace of international 
negotiations, subnational governments are not discrediting multilateralism. On the 
contrary, the fact that the state of São Paulo and many other subnational governments 
and non-governmental actors are participating in international rulemaking processes 
reinforces - rather than weakens - multilateral institutions. Therefore, while the crisis of 
                                                 
174 Presentation given at the joint side-event “Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger and 
Governor of Sao Paulo Jose Serra” (Schwarzenegger, 2009). 
175 As mentioned (Chapter 5), collaboration initiatives between subnational governments are voluntary 
and non-binding, and coalition initiatives can only develop within constitutional limits. 
176 Interview No.33 - national official. 
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international environmental multilateralism drives subnational governments to engage 
in international relations, by performing this engagement so these actors confirm 
multilateralism’s continuing relevance. 
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Table 6-4 Global drivers for environmental paradiplomacy: crises of environmental 
multilateralism 
Source: Author 
In summary, officials involved in environmental paradiplomacy react to the 
opportunities of a globalised world, to limitations of traditional diplomacy and to the 
challenges of multilateral environmental decision-making. But while they are reacting 
to these global determinants, subnational governments also believe that they can 
contribute to multilateral processes as well as to the implementation of policies that 
address global environmental problems. Having shown recognition in practice of these 
international factors, I now explore the domestic opportunity structures driving 
environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo. 
6.4. DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS 
Domestic factors have been more important in driving subnational diplomacy than is 
often assumed. In fact, actors involved in paradiplomatic activities in the state of São 
Paulo do not share the academic fixation with the global level, or with the changes in the 
sovereign stance of nation-States. Hence, in contrast to the previous section, I now 
examine the claim that paradiplomacy is driven by domestic determinants. I approach 
the domestic explanation for environmental paradiplomacy taking into consideration 
the decentralisation of government in Brazil, and the state leadership in environmental 
policymaking. 
First, São Paulo’s involvement in foreign affairs activities is justified in terms of a 
decentralisation movement from the national to the subnational level (Subsection 
6.4.1). Second, the state engages in foreign affairs and undertakes an international 
environmental agenda because it sees itself, and it is seen by others, as a leader in the 
area (Subsection 6.4.2). Although there is a component of ‘filling up a gap’ left by the 
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central government, and eventually an attempt to ‘by-pass the nation-State’, ultimately, 
São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy is dependent on the state’s leadership in 
regulating and implementing environmental policy (Subsection 6.4.3). The section ends 
(Subsection 6.4.4) with a consideration of the motivations for environmental 
paradiplomacy from an individual level (Subsection 6.4.5). 
6.4.1. Decentralisation 
Decentralisation established by the federal system constitutes an important driver of 
São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Brazilian 
Federal Constitution (Articles 21, I; and 84, VII and VIII) made exclusive to the federal 
government the power to promote the country’s environmental policy in the 
international spheres. Therefore, a strict interpretation of the Constitution would 
suggest that only the federal government has the power to direct international 
relations. However, Articles 1 and 18 of the Constitution established an administrative 
decentralisation which allows the national government, the federated states, and the 
municipalities to engage in environmental issues. As a result, the three levels of 
government have equal administrative competence to protect the environment and 
combat pollution (common competence - Article 23)177 and concurrent competence to 
create laws and regulations on environmental subjects (Article 24).178 
For policymakers in São Paulo, eventual constitutional limitations for the participation 
of the state in foreign policy and international decision-making can be overcome by the 
Constitutional powers granted to the states to legislate and enforce legislation to 
protect the environment. It is CETESB’s President who articulates this most clearly: 
In our federative pact there is an assumption that the nation-State represents the 
country in the international sphere. But it also recognises that Brazil is a complex 
country that cannot be represented by one single voice (…) In the environmental 
area, subnational governments can legislate and enforce environmental policies. 
Even if their international competence is not clear, with this amount of 
decentralisation, it is quite obvious that the Constitution recognised subnational 
governments’ capacity to resolve problems. Consequently, if resolving such 
problems involves having an international agenda, then this is implicit in the 
constitutional text.… So I believe that there is a space for different international 
lives, both for the nation-State and also for subnational governments.179 
                                                 
177 This common competence translates the notion of a cooperative federalism, which emphasises the 
importance of engaging multiple levels of governance in policymaking, particularly in the effort to deal 
with environmental problems (Boyd, 2011; Carlson, 2008) – see Chapter 2. 
178 This means that where there is no federal law, states have full legislative competence. The existence of 
a general federal law suspends the effects of the state law in case of discrepancy. 
179 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
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In an interview Fabio Feldmann, the main author of the environmental chapter of the 
Federal Constitution, confirmed this view. He suggested that if a new Constitution was 
written today, perhaps it would grant subnational governments not only the power to 
protect the local environment, but also to undertake international relations to deal with 
global environmental problems. In his account: 
In the 1988 Constitution we reproduced the same model of the previous 
constitutions, allocating all foreign policy to Itamaraty. This made sense in a 
world where domestic and foreign policies were independent. But if I was 
writing the Constitution today I would change this, and certainly for 
environmental issues. To give all the representation powers to Itamaraty is a 
mistake; the environment is a strategic theme for all levels of government.180 
Accordingly, several legal scholars now emphasize the importance of subnational actors 
in plural approaches to global environmental problems, especially climate governance. 
For example Resnik (2008) discusses the role of "translocalism" in climate governance, 
Stewart (2008) argues in favour of a plural model of climate regulation that allows for 
multiple regulatory systems, and Osofsky (2010) concludes that climate governance 
necessarily implicates multi-scalar, diagonal forms of regulation. 
In São Paulo’s case the decentralisation established by the Federal Constitution 
provided policymakers with incentives to undertake collaboration initiatives (Table 6-
5). Generally, decentralization offers opportunities for subnational governments to 
make direct contact with other subnational governments across national boundaries, as 
opposed to contact with foreign entities mediated at the national level (Tjandradewi et 
al., 2006). In Brazil, Itamaraty stimulates subnational governments to establish 
partnerships within the framework of an agreement previously established between the 
Brazilian government and the national government where the other party is located.181 
Yet, states still make use of the powers they have been granted by the Constitution to 
establish different kinds of cooperation without a mediation from the central 
government. 
The state’s autonomy to legislate and enforce environmental legislation locally and 
regionally also helps São Paulo to undertake coalition initiatives (Table 6-5). For 
example, it justifies São Paulo’s participation in transnational networks and its interest 
in the national position in international negotiations. CETESB’s President acknowledges 
this idea: 
It has been a natural step for the state to go beyond the establishment of good 
practice agreements and decentralised cooperation, and become engaged in a 
                                                 
180 Interview No.46 - NGO. 
181 See Chapter 5 and the recent Additional Protocols to the Cooperation Agreements on Decentralised 
Cooperation entered between the Brazilian government with Italy and France. 
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more political agenda with the United Nations and the multilateral 
environmental treaties. Our experience is that the Constitution has granted us 
wide competences to address environmental problems, and we can advance 
more if we act independently from the central-state.182 
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Table 6-5 Domestic drivers for environmental paradiplomacy: decentralisation 
Source: Author 
Therefore, São Paulo’s international agenda to deal with global environmental problems 
is driven, and at the same time expands, the application of cooperative federalism.183 
This structure is underpinned by the subsidiarity principle and by the division of 
powers that is determined by the 1988 Federal Constitution. Such a domestic structure 
makes the state capable of legislating and implementing environmental legislation, and 
also enables the state to undertake international roles in both coalition and 
collaboration initiatives across borders. 
6.4.2. Learning opportunities 
There is a vast social science literature addressing the topic of policy learning. The term 
is most commonly used as an overall category for learning in the policymaking context - 
as opposed to learning in education or cognitive human development. A number of 
definitions and sub-categories of policy learning exist. The most common are social 
learning (Hall, 1993; May, 1992; Sabatier, 1988) and lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991); 
Radaelli (2009) further suggests instrumental learning, emulation and political learning. 
Bennett and Howlett (1992) provide a widely cited overview on government learning, 
lesson-drawing and social learning. For this research, policy learning is understood as 
the process of cognitive change driven by experience and information, and the diffusion 
of policies within political systems (Selin & VanDeveer, 2007, p. 15). More specifically, it 
relates to the process of cognitive change experienced by officials and bureaucrats in 
the state of São Paulo, resulting from their international activity, which in turn is 
diffused within the state administrative structure.  
                                                 
182 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
183 The idea that paradiplomacy expands the application of cooperative federalism is further discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
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From interviewee accounts, learning is a significant reason driving collaboration 
activities in the state (Table 6-6). The idea that by establishing partnerships and 
participating in information-sharing networks SMA and CETESB can learn from 
international experiences was present in a number of accounts: 
By collaborating with other subnational governments and environmental 
agencies we have access to more knowledge. This is not to say that the state is 
lagging behind in environmental policymaking, but there are some countries that 
have been dealing with similar problems for longer. We don’t want to make the 
same mistakes they already made, and we want to be partners of other 
institutions of excellence.184 
More than command and control, we [the environmental agency] have to 
promote governance and information exchange. Information-sharing networks 
help promote this. They are an open, free and transparent space for 
communication. Having access to the experiences of other subnational 
governments we can form stronger policies...185 
The learning aspect also justifies São Paulo’s participation in coalition activities (Table 
6-6). Asked why ICLEI brought a delegation of state representatives to UNFCCC COP-14, 
the Latin America/Caribbean Director replied that: 
We want to promote the capacity building of state officials and state decision-
makers. First, this is a unique opportunity for them to understand the 
international policymaking process. Second, by experiencing it they can realise 
the importance that is being given by the international community to the topic. 
Third, we want them to get familiarized with the Brazilian position. Related to 
this, we hope that their presence will help promote an interaction between state 
representatives and the Brazilian delegation.186 
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Subnational governments 
exchange information and 
experiences  
Subnational governments can 
understand the international 
policymaking process and confirm the 
importance of the topic 
 
                                                 
184 Interview No.8 - SP official 
185 Interview No.11 - SP official. 
186 ICLEI took to COP-14, in Poznan a group of representatives from three state governments 
(environmental Secretaries of Mato Grosso and Pernambuco, plus two state officials of each one of the 
three participant states). The project, funded by the British Embassy, helped these three states 
developing policies and action to combat climate change, and it took place between 2008 and 2009. 
Interview No.47 - NGO. 
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Table 6-6 Domestic drivers for environmental paradiplomacy: learning 
Source: Author 
 
In summary, policymakers from the state of São Paulo engage in international relations 
because they expect to learn from other subnational governments’ experiences. They 
can also understand the international policymaking system, and learn the content and 
the type of measures that will be established by the international community before it 
becomes national legislation.  
6.4.3. Environmental leadership 
Although environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo benefited from Brazilian 
decentralised federalism in environmental policymaking and learning opportunities, the 
interview findings suggest that the main driver for São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomatic activity is the leadership status of the state in environmental 
policymaking. When asked why they believed the state undertakes an international 
agenda, in different ways officials and/or staff in the national and subnational levels 
suggested that São Paulo exercises a leadership on environmental policy development, 
which in turn drives the state’s international agenda - both for collaboration and 
coalition initiatives (Table 6-8). 
In fact, the state of São Paulo is a national reference point for environmental 
policymaking (Lucon & Goldemberg, 2010; Ribeiro & Pacheco, 2011), as well as for 
supervising and monitoring polluting activities (Garcia-Johnson, 2000). In addition, the 
climate change agenda offered the state an opportunity to play a particularly strong 
leadership role. This leading approach to global environmental problems began in 1995, 
when the climate change prevention programme was launched, and it culminated in 
November 2009, when the state enacted its own state climate policy (Law 13,798). Not 
only São Paulo’s climate law was enacted ahead of the federal government regulation, 
but most importantly it established a mandatory and economy-wide GHG reduction 
target of 20% by 2020, considering 2005 as a baseline. As Lucon and Goldemberg 
(2010, p. 348) argue, the target confirmed São Paulo’s position as “the other Brazil”: it 
“has no precedent in the developing world and stands as the most far-reaching climate 
policy initiative on the subnational level in a developing economy”. The Coordinator of 
the Climate Campaign for Greenpeace Brazil also acknowledged that “São Paulo is 
usually on the avant-garde of environmental policymaking, and once again it took the 
forefront establishing a reduction target - and a mandatory and ambitious one”.187   
This leadership, in turn, fuels the international agenda of the state. In terms of its 
collaboration initiatives, the leadership aspect constitutes a bond between the state and 
its counterparts. Actors in the state and at the national level often refer to or compare 
the state’s position in Brazil with that of California in the US. São Paulo is referred to as 
                                                 
187 Interview No.48 - NGO. 
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‘the South American California’188, or the ‘equivalent to California in Brazil’189. This is 
explicit in the MOU entered between the two states, which recognises that both São 
Paulo and California “are leaders in adopting policies related to climate change”, 
California by establishing targets and leading governments to adopt policies related to 
climate change, and São Paulo by wanting to be recognised as the first subnational 
government from a developing country to adopt reduction targets.190 
In addition, CETESB and SMA represent the state, as well as the country, in a number of 
transnational information-sharing networks.191 By participating in these networks state 
representatives expect to share their experiences in environmental policy development, 
disseminating them nationally and internationally. Being chosen to become a member 
of such networks further confirms the states’ expertise. For instance:  
The decision of making the state a Regional Centre to the Stockholm Convention 
on POPs implied in the Ministry of Environment recognising that CETESB and 
SMA are better qualified than any other national institution, state agency or 
university in the country to discuss the issue of persistent organic pollutants.192  
The state can also play an active participation within the networks. For instance, it was 
within São Paulo’s environmental agency that the idea of a UNEP network for 
sustainable consumption and production emerged: 
When I met the representative of UNEP’s Regional Office for Latin America and the 
Caribbean to sign the third protocol on the International Declaration on Cleaner 
Production I told him that I didn’t think a protocol was the most adequate 
implementation mechanism for the Declaration. My suggestion was that CETESB 
could help UNEP to build and implement a new network [Red PyCS]. He accepted the 
proposal and in 2009 the network was launched. Now we are part of the network’s 
advisory group and we help UNEP to manage it. We input information and we invite 
institutions and governmental agencies to join.193 
                                                 
188 Interview No.12 – SP official. 
189 Interview No. 32 – national official. 
190 California passed its Global Warming Solutions Act in 2006, aiming at reducing GHG emissions by 25% 
by 2020. Sao Paulo passed its state Climate Policy in 2009, aimed at reducing GHG emissions by 20% by 
2020. Other similarities between both parties are also mentioned: Sao Paulo and California are 
responsible for the major share of economic production in their countries (representing 30 and 15% of 
their respective GDPs); both are the most populous of their respective countries, with each having more 
than 35 million inhabitants; both face the most serious air pollution problems in their respective 
countries; both have been making efforts and legislating to reduce air pollution; both are significant GHG 
emitters; and both are interested in the economic benefits resulting from pro-active efforts to mitigate 
GHG and improve energy efficiency. 
191 See Chapter 4 for a list of such networks. 
40 Interview No.10 - SP official. 
193 Interview No.11 - SP official. 
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In terms of coalition initiatives, the environmental leadership of the state also plays a 
relevant role in driving São Paulo to international realms. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
since the 2000s representatives from the state have been engaged not only in 
information-sharing networks, but also in transnational networks that represent 
subnational governments at global level. Back in 2002 São Paulo was a founding 
member of the Nrg4SD, in 2008 it was elected the co-chair for the South, and re-elected 
for this position in 2011.194 São Paulo’s environmental leadership motivates such active 
participation in this network. Literally: “We [the state of São Paulo] represent the 
southern hemisphere within the Nrg4SD because of our leadership in environmental 
policymaking”.195 
São Paulo’s leadership also drives the state to engage with national representatives in 
the agenda-setting of UNFCCC and CBD meetings, as well as to attend such meetings as a 
member of the national delegation. In the agenda-setting phase, state representatives 
meet national representatives and offer their opinions on topics that are under 
discussion. For example, before CBD COP-10 subnational officials met the diplomats 
responsible for representing the country in the negotiations. The state of São Paulo, as a 
member of the Nrg4SD, wanted the CBD meeting to recognise the importance of 
subnational governments in implementing the Convention. During the meeting in 
Nagoya the state continued articulating its position and views with the national 
negotiators. The state Secretary for the Environment confirmed these efforts: 
We arrived at Nagoya [for COP-10] with an agreed action plan. São Paulo, as the 
co-chair of the Nrg4SD, intervened before Itamaraty, collaborating towards the 
draft. We also articulated with the province of Quebec, among other 
stakeholders. We confirmed that São Paulo has an avant-garde position among 
other subnational governments, standing out for its policies, including the 
payment of environmental services established by the state policy on climate 
change and the establishment of three marine protected areas that account for 
1.1 million hectares. I could attest to the diplomat’s enormous effort to reach an 
agreement. And São Paulo helped to consolidate responsibilities that were in line 
with its capabilities and with its importance within the federation.196 
At these international environmental negotiations, the state of São Paulo undertakes 
different roles. Representatives from the state not only attend the negotiations and side-
events, but also organise their own side-events, and hold formal and informal meetings 
with business, NGOs, and members of the national delegation. The leadership aspect 
justifies the state’s participation in such meetings. For instance, São Paulo went to COP-
                                                 
194 The two Chairs and Vice-chairs are elected by the General Assembly by simple majority (50% plus 
one) for a mandate of three years, renewable once (Nrg4SD, 2011). 
195 Interview No.42 - academia. 
196 Interview No.1 - SP official. Similar account in an article published in the newspaper Folha de Sao 
Paulo (Azevedo, 2010). 
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15 of the UNFCCC representing the Nrg4SD because it had recently enacted its climate 
legislation.197 SMA’s International Relations Advisor further suggests that “it is crucial 
that we go [to international meetings] and present what we are doing…. If we don’t, 
other regions won’t know that we have a model that can be followed.198 
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policymaking. 
 
Table 6-8 Domestic drivers for environmental paradiplomacy: environmental 
leadership 
Source: Author 
These accounts resonate only in part with previous investigations of why non-State 
actors attend COPs and side-events at UNFCCC Conferences. In Newell et al’s (2012) 
view, for example, non-State actors want to engage in networking. This involves 
debating new ideas, discussing alternatives to the international regime, and meeting 
other non-State actors. Yet, São Paulo’s officials want to influence the Brazilian position 
and eventually the outcome of the negotiations. Representatives from the state of São 
Paulo speak as governmental representatives, with the bonus that they have a robust 
technical knowledge and great experience in environmental policymaking. São Paulo’s 
international advisor gives a clear account of this motivation: 
We want to promote the state of São Paulo as an international reference. It is a 
matter of image. But it is also important for us to have our own interests 
incorporated into the international legal frameworks. We don’t want to be mere 
policy implementers. We want to make clear what is good for us and to inject São 
Paulo’s view in the international debate in order to satisfy our own interests.199 
The next Chapter further discusses subnational influence over international rulemaking. 
Briefly, it is still unclear whether subnational representatives can influence the national 
position or the international outcomes. Nevertheless the mere idea of being able to 
make a difference in global environmental governance constitutes a driver for 
subnational representatives to forge an international agenda as well as to place efforts 
in influencing the national foreign policy and eventually international outcomes. 
                                                 
197 Interview No.11 - SP official. 
198 Interview No.9 - SP official. 
199 Interview No.17 - SP official. 
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6.4.4. Leadership, filling a vacuum, or bypassing the nation-State? 
Subsection 6.4.3 argued that São Paulo’s international environmental agenda is driven 
by the state’s long history of environmental stewardship and environmental policy 
action. This account differs from the most common explanation found in the MLG and 
federalist scholarships - that it is the absence of federal action that drives individual 
states to become active in climate policy (filling the vacuum). It differs even more 
significantly from an explanation often found in the paradiplomacy literature that 
subnational governments undertake an international agenda to go against or to bypass 
the nation-State (bypassing the nation-State). In the following pages I contrast these two 
alternative explanatory factors with that of subnational leadership as the principal 
driver of international action. The analysis confirms that São Paulo’s desire to be 
involved in the debate of global environmental problems largely follows a leadership - 
rather than a competitive or a separatist - objective. 
Filling the vacuum  
MLG and federalist scholars commonly explain the high level of subnational action on 
climate change as an attempt to compensate for a lack or insufficiency of national action. 
A number of empirical studies of local and regional initiatives to promote climate 
mitigation and adaptation strategies examine countries where national governments 
are reluctant to take action (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010; Engel, 2006; Ostrom, 2010; 
Selin & VanDeveer, 2009; Thomson & Arroyo, 2011). Derthick (2010) coined the phrase 
"compensatory federalism"' to describe this situation. Other studies examine 
subnational action taken where there is weak federal effort (Dernbach et al., 2010; Gore, 
2010; McAllister, 2009). Others, still, examine this hypothesis comparing the US and 
Canada, and conclude that the raise of action in North America is related to the US’ 
refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and to Canada’s weak leadership (Gore, 2010; 
Harrison, 2007; VanDeveer, 2004). 
The initial absence and the further insufficiency of federal action are also relevant 
factors explaining São Paulo’s action to address climate change. Initially São Paulo 
established its climate policy ahead of the nation-State, and the absence of a national 
position or framework was an important driver behind the state’s action (Setzer, 2009). 
Even after the national climate policy was enacted, São Paulo’s climate policy continues 
to act ahead of the national government (Lucon & Goldemberg, 2010). While the 
national policy only defined broad principles and no reduction targets, São Paulo’s 
climate policy established mandatory reduction targets. 
But to what extent is this correlation also valid for the case of São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomacy? In some cases, environmental paradiplomacy is used by state 
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representatives to distinguish the state from the federal government. As CETESB’s 
president commented: 
By participating in transnational networks of subnational governments we 
distinguish ourselves from the central government. One of the reasons why the 
state of São Paulo joined the Nrg4SD was because it did not agree with the 
country’s position in relation to climate policymaking – the fifth major GHG 
emitter refusing to adapt or mitigate climate change, refusing to take present and 
future responsibilities. São Paulo was tired of hearing the ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ and the historical emissions story. Also, we didn’t 
want to be laggards or to hear developed countries saying that nothing is being 
done to address climate change in the South.200 
Even if related, the absence of federal action is not a determinant explanatory cause for 
the state’s international agenda. By enacting its climate law, the state found an 
opportunity to become an international precedent - the first subnational government in 
a non-Annex I country to establish a mandatory reduction target. Moreover, thanks to 
its state climate law, São Paulo became a member of the Climate Group, a “strong global 
network of leading governments” which “acts as a catalyst for the wold’s most powerful 
governments, brands and public figures” (Climate Group, 2011). Therefore, rather than 
filling the vacuum of the federal government, São Paulo’s leadership in addressing 
climate change is a way of further propelling the state into international grounds. 
This argument complements a point made by Bruyninckx et al. (2012), that subnational 
governments are conscious of the fact that sustainable development is a policy with 
international drivers, and thus they have to act internationally to shape the decisions 
that they have to implement. Similarly, when asked why subnational governments 
attend multilateral negotiations, the International Affairs Advisor within the Presidency 
of the Republic answered that: 
Subnational governments want to see their interests being recognised by the UN. 
That is nothing to do neither with deficiencies of the multilateral system, nor 
with something that the national government should be doing and is not 
doing.201 
In summary, the drivers for subnational climate action are different from the drivers for 
environmental paradiplomacy. São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda (both 
collaboration and coalition initiatives) is driven by the state’s capabilities and 
leadership in environmental policymaking. This capacity underlines São Paulo’s 
decision of undertaking an international agenda, of establishing transnational relations, 
and of influencing the national government on matters of foreign affairs. 
                                                 
200 Interview No.1 - SP official. 
201 Interview No.25 - national official. 
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Bypassing the nation-State 
Within studies on paradiplomacy, scholars have identified a strong political motivation 
for subnational foreign activity in regions with national aspirations or governed by 
parties seeking sovereign statehood. In some cases (e.g. Quebec), the term 
'protodiplomacy' has been applied to describe subnational governments’ aim of 
achieving independence and, therefore, replacing the diplomacy of the current state 
within which that entity is trying to develop its own external relations (Aguirre, 1999; 
Aldecoa & Keating, 1999b; Bursens & Deforche, 2010). More commonly, however, is a 
strategy of seeking recognition as something more than a mere region, but without 
raising the spectre of separatism (Keating, 2000). This is the case of Catalonia, the 
Basque government and Wales. In such cases, foreign activity and linkages serve the 
purpose of consolidating the image of the region as an international personality with 
forging common interests. Moreover, as Happaerts et al. (2012, p. 15) suggest, it shows 
subnational governments’ intention of bypassing the state by trying to influence 
positions in global negotiations. 
Environmental paradiplomacy undertaken by the state of São Paulo could potentially be 
conflicting, with the state bypassing the national exclusive constitutional competence in 
undertaking foreign affairs. Although the state has no separatist objectives, many times 
in history São Paulo has upheld an audacious or even provocative position against the 
federal government. The most emblematic episode was the Constitutionalist Revolution 
of 1932, a regionalist revolt lead by the state against the provisional government of 
Getulio Vargas. The state mostly aimed at reinstalling the autonomy that it had until 
Varga’s coup d’etat. Yet, part of the movement evolved in the direction of advocating the 
secession of São Paulo from the Brazilian federation. During the almost three months of 
conflict, São Paulo experienced a war effort, with a balance of 934 official deaths, though 
non-official estimates report up to 2,200 dead (CPDOC, 2012a). In spite of its military 
defeat, still today the day that the uprising started (July 9th) is a holiday in the state, 
celebrated with a parade in the capital. 
In addition to São Paulo’s historical past, the bypassing hypothesis could be supported 
by the argument that the state’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda is driven by 
political matters. An indication would be the recent increase in São Paulo’s 
paradiplomatic activity, which coincides with a period when opposing political parties 
were governing the national and the subnational levels. However, the ‘bypassing the 
nation-State’ account finds limitations in the case of environmental paradiplomacy 
undertaken by the state of São Paulo.  
Firstly, in the past 15 years the federal government gradually began to accept the 
international agenda of its subunits, institutionalising it within the governmental 
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structure (see Chapters 5 and 8). Even if policymakers in the state of São Paulo believe 
that having a paradiplomatic agenda is necessary to overcome the federal inaction or 
ineffectiveness to deal with environmental problems, the institutional structure found in 
both the national and state levels provides little indication that São Paulo is trying to 
bypass the federal government in undertaking international relations. With the federal 
government’s acceptance of the idea of a subnational ‘federative diplomacy’, and 
without any incident or conflictual event so far, it is clear that São Paulo’s objective is 
not to challenge the national order or the Federal Constitution. 
Secondly, São Paulo’s involvement is related to a desire to confirm the state’s technical 
capacities and through such recognition to be present at the global level.202 São Paulo’s 
state Secretary for the Environment, for instance, acknowledged that “Itamaraty pays 
attention to what the state is doing, and they are happy for us to participate because of 
we have such wide experience in environmental policymaking”.203 A similar account 
was given by the International Relations Advisor at the Ministry for Environment: 
In most cases the drivers are political and economic, rather than technical. But 
eventually a subnational government will have a view on some topic being 
discussed in international negotiations and will try to contribute to the 
discussion. The state of São Paulo has traditionally proven to have more 
sensitivity and technical baggage to make contributions to international 
processes.204 
A few interviewees even contrasted São Paulo with other subnational governments that 
are members of the Nrg4SD, such as the Basque Country and Quebec, to whom the main 
driver for engaging in international activities would be to go against their central 
government.205 Or, as a CETESB officer declared, “many members of this network 
[Nrg4SD] have separatist intentions, but this is clearly not our case … at most we want 
the federal government to recognise that we require a special treatment because of our 
technical capabilities”.206 CETESB’s President also expresses this idea, highlighting the 
absence of conflict between the state and the national levels: 
The environmental agenda is very technical, and Itamaraty knows that the state 
of São Paulo is a reference in this area, from climate change to solid waste, 
biodiversity, and POPs… What the state of São Paulo wants is not to go against 
the federal government, but to have its own international life, to establish 
                                                 
202 Similarly, the Flemish involvement in environmental paradiplomacy is explained "by a desire to be 
present at the global and at the European level”, what Happaerts (2010, p. 73) designates a ‘politics of 
attendance’. 
203 Interview No.1 - SP official. 
204 Interview No.32 - national official. 
205 Interviews Nos. 3, 20 - SP officials; Interview No.42 - academic. 
206 Interview No.11 - SP official. 
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relationships with other regions across borders that have similar interests and to 
get involved in the international decision-making arena.207 
Thirdly, São Paulo’s international environmental activities are very much connected to 
the state’s engagement with the governance of global environmental problems.208 
Rather than going against the national government, São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomatic activity allows the state to follow the on-going decisions on these matters. 
In the view of São Paulo’s Deputy Secretary for the Environment:  
Our approach to addressing climate change and biodiversity loss follows the 
international regime. So having an international agenda allow us to calibrate our 
developments in these areas with the international debate. And so far we think 
we have been moving in the right direction.209 
Finally, there has been some debate in the paradiplomacy literature about the extent to 
which subnational governments participate in foreign relations varies depending on the 
partisan relationships between the two levels of government (McMillan, 2008; Porto de 
Oliveira, 2010; Schiavon, 2010). As mentioned in Chapter 4, between 1995 and 2002 the 
same political party (PSDB) governed the country and the state of São Paulo, and from 
2003 to 2010 PSDB continued to be in power in the state, while the country was ruled 
by its main opposing party, the centre-left labour party (PT).210 This rupture naturally 
impacted the relationship established between the state of São Paulo and the national 
government. However it is not possible to conclude whether the opposing parties at the 
two levels also affected São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda. When asked 
about this possibility, actors operating in the federal and state levels affirmed that the 
state’s international agenda is developing independently of partisan relationships between 
the two levels. 
In sum, São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda is not driven by an attempt to 
bypass traditional diplomacy. The state participates in international decision-making 
mostly because it hopes to support the national government in expanding its capacity to 
confront transnational issues such as global environmental problems, and not to replace 
the role of diplomats. In this aspect, environmental paradiplomacy is similar to 
transgovernmental networks, in which domestic officials consult and coordinate with 
foreign counterparts to more adequately fulfil their responsibilities (Slaughter & Hale, 
2010). Therefore, rather than bypassing or creating conflict, environmental 
paradiplomacy is driven by the state’s established leadership in environmental 
policymaking, and it aims to bring coordination to areas of policymaking that foreign 
ministries alone are unable to handle. 
                                                 
207 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
208 See Chapter 4. 
209 Interview No.12 - SP official. 
210 See Appendix 4 for a list of Brazilian presidents and São Paulo state governors since the country’s 
democratisation. 
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6.4.5. Individual level 
Although this Chapter has so far considered the global and domestic motivations for 
environmental paradiplomacy, policy decisions are made by individuals. That is, while 
environmental paradiplomacy is a governmental policy, under which norms are broadly 
shared, each paradiplomatic action is made by policy-makers in charge. Therefore, it is 
also necessary to consider the motivations for environmental paradiplomacy from an 
individual level. In other words, to examine to what extent individuals are driving 
environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo. But if individuals play a role, 
who should we consider? Is environmental paradiplomacy driven by the high-level 
bureaucrats such as the Governor and the Secretary or the lower-level representatives 
who are actually implementing the environmental agenda?  
In their analysis of transgovernmental activities, Keohane and Nye (1974) regarded 
only the activities of the lower-level bureaucracies, excluding presidents and other 
heads of state. Fifteen years later, Putnam (1988) developed the idea of the “two-level” 
game, whereby heads of state were seen to operate autonomously in order to improve 
their own domestic standing and that of their counterparts. In the case of municipal 
climate action, the MLG governance literature has argued that local government 
abatement policies are primarily based on the rational policy choices of officials and 
staff members (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007; Kousky & Schneider, 2003). 
In examining the global and domestic drivers for environmental paradiplomacy in the 
state São Paulo a number of key officials (technical personal, as well as heads of the 
state and national government) were interviewed. Their accounts suggest that some 
state political leaders have been paramount in driving São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomatic agenda. At the state level, a sequence of high-level officers who valued 
global environmental topics as well as the consolidation of an international area within 
the state environmental apparatus helped promote the state’s paradiplomatic agenda. 
This was the case of most state Secretaries and the president of the environmental 
agency in charge between 1995 and 2010:211  
…the presence of key leaders was necessary to allow the state to effectively 
contribute and influence the national position. Fabio Feldmann is one of such 
individuals; he has an exceptional understanding of the topic [climate change], of 
environmental policymaking and implementation, and also of international 
processes. But overall subnational governments’ international agenda is still 
personal, with only a handful of individuals really contributing to it.212 
                                                 
211 Particularly Fabio Feldmann (environmentalist, MP and state Secretary for the environment from 
1995-1998), Professor Jose Goldemberg (scholar in energy and climate change, state Secretary for the 
environment from 2002-2007), and Dr. Fernando Rei (scholar in energy and climate change, director 
president of CETESB from 1995-2011). 
212 Interview No.32 - national official. 
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Some officers acknowledged being influenced by the opportunity to participate in 
international conferences and joining transnational networks213, while others 
considered using these forums to share a view that they already had.214 In either case, 
subnational officials and politicians with strong technical knowledge of environmental 
rulemaking and environmental policy implementation contributed to the international 
process by sharing their views with diplomats and national negotiators.  
Moreover, state officers can have personal reasons why they want to become more 
involved with international issues. In the paradiplomacy literature it has been argued 
that an important motivation for subnational diplomacy is the symbolic capital that is 
generated for those politicians and officials involved. In Wales, it was found that 
politicians reveal “pride and pleasure at being feted by other regional leaders, delighting 
in the VIP treatment received” (Jones & Royles, 2012, p. 252). 
In São Paulo, the international advisor for SMA suggested that working with the state’s 
paradiplomatic agenda has a “glamour that other areas don’t have”215, and an officer at 
CETESB recognised that undertaking a paradiplomatic agenda is an “upgrade to civil 
servants’ ordinary duties”216. Indeed, actors involved in collaboration initiatives within 
the state apparatus can have a more international routine than most people working for 
multinational corporations. CETESB’s and SMA’s international relations managers, for 
example, are often meeting representatives from the World Bank and foreign 
authorities or travelling abroad to accompany the negotiation of new partnerships. This 
is even clearer in the case of coalition initiatives, which create an opportunity for 
subnational officials to participate in UN meetings, and to interact with the national 
negotiators, as well as with other international officials and leaders. 
Lastly, within this idea of personal reasons, subnational government officials’ 
motivation to engage in an international agenda can be interpreted with a less positive 
view. As mentioned in Chapter 5, a number of interviewees suggested that when 
subnational representatives travel abroad on governmental missions they often are 
more interested in tourism or shopping than in following the agenda that they have 
been assigned.217 From the perspective of some non-governmental actors, 
environmental paradiplomacy could also be called ‘subnational tourist diplomacy’.218 
All in all, tracing the specific impact of any given actor is exceedingly difficult, arguably 
requiring a careful reconstruction of the institutional journey travelled by the actors 
                                                 
213 Interviews Nos. 2, 11 - SP officials; Interview No.46 - NGO. 
214 Interview No.16 - SP official and Interview No.42 – academic, talking about Governor’s Serra position 
in Copenhagen. 
215 Interview No.4 - SP official. 
216 Interview No.20 - SP official. 
217 Interview No.20 - SP official; Interview No. 47 – NGO; Interview No.32 - national official; Interview 
No.42 – academic; personal experience working for ICLEI in COP-14, in Poznan. 
218 Interview No.48 - NGO. 
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and the ideas to which they were exposed (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004). Yet, most 
attempts are limited in assigning certain policies or results to specific individuals or 
institutions. As Piattoni (2010, p. 94) argues, even when responsibility for a given policy 
idea can be imputed to a particular individual and institutional structure, it is very 
difficult to trace where individuals got their first inspiration or to establish whether 
other institutional structures could have not achieved even better results. 
In summary, alongside global and domestic factors, individual leaders can be seen to 
play a role in driving São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic activity. While this 
section did not attempt to reconstruct the institutional pathways undertaken by the 
actors involved in the state’s international environmental agenda, it highlighted the fact 
that paradiplomatic action is made by individuals, and that the consolidation of this 
agenda in the state can also be related to the presence of certain officials in power. 
6.5. SUMMARY 
This chapter analysed the drivers for environmental paradiplomacy undertaken by the 
state of São Paulo. Research question 2 posed: Why does the state of São Paulo 
undertake an international agenda to deal with global environmental problems? 
Addressing this question involved understanding why the state collaborates with other 
actors across borders, and why the state is involved in coalition activities. The analysis 
showed that the explanations given by scholars in the traditions of MLG, federalism and 
transnationalism for why individual subnational governments address climate change 
and join transnational networks are insufficient to explain the rationale for 
environmental paradiplomacy. More attention was given to the paradiplomacy 
tradition, and particularly to the analysis initiated by Bruynickx, Van den Brande and 
Happaerts (2012) on why subnational governments act internationally for sustainable 
development. 
Drawing from claims made by these four groups of scholarly work, the Chapter 
hypothesized three determinants situated on the interplay between global and domestic 
determinants of why subnational governments engage in an international 
environmental agenda: the nature of global environmental problems; the international 
context (which covered the issues of globalization, problems with traditional diplomacy, 
and the crises of environmental multilateralism); and the federal context (which 
covered the issues of decentralization, learning opportunities, and environmental 
leadership). These seven motivations were tested using the case of São Paulo’s foreign 
agenda, and distinguished in terms of the collaboration and coalition initiatives 
undertaken by the state. The findings are also summarised in Table 6-9 below. 
First, the analysis showed that environmental paradiplomacy is a form through which 
subnational governments respond to the global nature of today’s environmental 
problems (Subsection 6.3.1). The characteristics of the problem drives collaborative 
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initiatives with whom the state shares particular interests and concerns; in the case of 
coalition initiatives, the actors share a wider sense of duty for protecting the global 
environment.  
Second, São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda is driven by the decline of the 
nation-State (Subsection 6.3.2). In this sense, globalisation drives subnational 
representatives to establish collaborative initiatives through which the state expects to 
obtain financial resources; in coalition initiatives networking is clearer. Problems with 
traditional diplomacy drive collaborative initiatives, which occur in a more flexible and 
effective way then those established by diplomats; in terms of coalition initiatives, the 
diplomats expect to bring regional/local realities into the international process. The 
crises of environmental multilateralism drives collaborative initiatives which are less 
formal than attempts of agreement in the international level; it also drives coalition 
initiatives, with subnational governments from all around the world committing to 
action to address global environmental problems.  
Third, while participation of non-State actors (e.g. NGOs, businesses, epistemic 
communities) in international politics might be driven by the weakening of the State, 
the participation of subnational governments in international environmental politics is 
mostly driven by domestic factors that make them strong governmental actors. 
Decentralisation drives collaboration initiatives, allowing the state to contact other 
actors across borders; it also drives coalition initiatives, permitting them to participate 
in international relations. The prospects of learning drive collaborative initiatives 
through which subnational representatives expect to exchange information and 
experiences; it also drives coalition initiatives through which subnational 
representatives can learn about how the international policymaking processes works, 
and confirms the importance of the topics they are discussing. Finally, leadership drives 
collaboration initiatives, bonding active subnational governments who have 
experiences to share; it also drives coalition initiatives, where forerunners join 
transnational networks and use their leadership to influence the national position and 
international policymaking.  
In the analysis, São Paulo’s leadership in environmental policymaking emerged as the 
main factor driving the state’s international agenda to address global environmental 
problems. That is to say, based on empirical evidence from São Paulo case, hypothesis 2 
was only partially corroborated. A strong subnational government, with a leadership in 
environmental policymaking, constitutes the main determinant for environmental 
paradiplomacy (Subsection 6.4.3). Leadership in environmental policymaking as a 
driver for São Paulo’s international relations plays a more relevant role than other 
political motivations such as the state ‘filling up a vacuum’ left by the federal 
government, or trying to ‘bypass the nation-State’ (Subsection 6.4.4). Rather, in this case 
the state undertakes an international agenda mostly in a consensual way, helping the 
national government to expand its capacity to confront global environmental problems. 
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In assessing the reasons why the state of São Paulo has an international global 
environmental agenda of its own, this Chapter expanded the view on foreign activities 
of subnational governments beyond the usual focus on EU policymaking and cities’ 
climate action. Further, the focus on governmental actors and on domestic politics 
avoided the common fascination with the global factors and the ‘zero-sum’ debate on 
the power and authority of the State and transnational actors. Although not a 
comparative study, the analysis also helped to explain why the state has forged an 
environmental paradiplomatic agenda while until recently (e.g. the Amazon states 
Climate Task Force, in 2009) other Brazilian states have been relatively inactive in 
doing so.  
However, while it discussed what drives environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo, the 
Chapter did not assess to what extent the reasons why São Paulo undertakes such an 
agenda are translated into traceable outcomes. For instance, whether São Paulo’s 
paradiplomatic activity effectively addresses the limitations of the international 
process, if it promotes policy learning, or if it really influences the national foreign 
policy and international decision-making processes. These topics will be examined in 
the next Chapter. 
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 DRIVERS COLLABORATION COALITION 
G
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Characteristics of 
the problem 
Drives initiatives with actors with whom the state 
shares interests and concerns 
Drives initiatives with actors with whom the state 
shares a sense of duty and concern for the global 
environment 
Globalisation 
Drives subnational governments to seek resources 
and partnerships abroad 
Drives subnational governments to exchange 
ideas, network and seek new partnerships 
Problems with 
traditional 
diplomacy 
Interaction is flexible and can have more immediate 
results 
Communication between subnational government 
representatives and the diplomats bring the 
regional/local reality to the international process. 
Crises of 
environmental 
multilateralism 
Agreements entered by subnational governments 
are less formal and can be implemented by state 
regulators without further approval of legislators 
Subnational governments from all around the 
world commit to take action to address global 
environmental problems 
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 d
e
te
rm
in
a
n
ts
 
Decentralisation 
Subnational governments contact other actors 
across borders 
Subnational governments contact other actors 
across borders and participate in the country’s 
foreign policy 
Learning 
Subnational governments exchange information 
and experiences  
Subnational governments understand the 
international policymaking process and confirm 
the importance of the topic 
Leadership 
Bonds active subnational governments who have 
experiences to share 
Join transnational networks (that represent 
subnational governments at the global level), 
influencing national negotiators and international 
policymaking 
Table 6-9 Drivers of environmental paradiplomacy (collaboration and coalition). 
Source:Author
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Chapter 
7 
CHAPTER 7: OUTCOMES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PARADIPLOMACY 
IN SÃO PAULO 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the outcomes of environmental paradiplomacy 
undertaken by the state of São Paulo. Chapters 4 and 5 explored how environmental 
paradiplomacy evolves in the state (Research Question 1), while Chapter 6 examined 
what drives the state to undertake international relations to address global 
environmental problems (Research Question 2). In this Chapter, I critically assess the 
legal and institutional outcomes of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda. The 
research question that guides the analysis is what are the results of the international 
environmental agenda undertaken by the state of São Paulo (Research Question 3)? 
The analysis builds upon the analytical framework which combines the literatures on 
MLG and paradiplomacy. Drawing from this framework, it is hypothesised that São 
Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda impacts environmental policymaking in 
the state. It is also hypothesised that as a result of its international environmental 
agenda dealing with global environmental problems, São Paulo is influencing higher 
levels of governance, that is, decision-making processes on the national and 
international levels.  
 
Research Question 3 
What are the results of São Paulo’s international 
environmental agenda? 
Hypothesis 3 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo expands the state government’s capacity to 
address global environmental problems, and through it the state influences higher 
levels of governance. 
Figure 7-1 Research question and hypothesis that guides Chapter 7 
Source: Author 
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The Chapter further argues that São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy has a 
distinctive character. The case study demonstrates that this agenda is capable of 
creating new legislation in the state, transforming soft law into hard law. São Paulo’s 
international environmental agenda is also influencing the national position-forming 
process and, to a lesser extent, international environmental negotiations. 
The Chapter reflects and reports on discussions found in previous Chapters. That is, the 
outcomes of environmental paradiplomacy relate to how and why environmental 
paradiplomacy evolves. Yet, if assessing the processes of and rationale for 
environmental paradiplomacy meant looking at its potentials, I now proceed with a 
more critical analysis and assess the extent to which those objectives are being met. 
Such analysis is based fundamentally on interview and observational data. This was 
necessary as, surprisingly, the Brazilian and São Paulo’s governmental bodies do not 
assess the results of their subnational diplomacy activities. In addition to the accounts 
given by the actors involved in environmental policymaking at the subnational and 
national levels, in this Chapter I make use of interviews with policy-makers from other 
countries involved in regional governance and international policymaking, who had 
some interaction with representatives from the state of São Paulo. While there are 
limitations in relying on subjective data, the use of primary source data provides a 
unique and original picture of the results and impacts of São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomatic activity. 
The Chapter contains five main sections. In Section 7.2, I consider how the conceptual 
framework upon which this research draws might explain the outcomes of 
environmental paradiplomacy. In Section 7.3, I explore the changes to the state’s 
capacity to address global environmental problems, and, in Section 7.4, I discuss its 
capacity to influence other governmental actors through its international agenda. In 
Section 7.5, I conclude with a summary of the findings. 
7.2. OUTCOMES OF SUBNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 
It is not easy to assess the impacts of the international environmental relations 
undertaken by subnational governments. Ideally it would be possible to measure such 
outcomes in terms of the extent to which undertaking an international environmental 
agenda resulted in actual improvements to the environment. Undertaking an 
international agenda would, for example, result in better environmental quality, 
reduction of GHG emissions, or improved protection of biodiversity. However, 
understanding input in terms of improved environmental outcomes is not a 
straightforward matter (Betsill & Corell, 2007, p. 203). Some argue that subnational 
efforts are unlikely to have any major impact on GHG emissions reductions (Rose, 
2008), while others suggest that subnational regulations are adept at influencing 
behaviour, and through behavioural changes they can indirectly promote GHG 
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reductions (Doremus & Hanemann, 2008). The fact is that there are no substantial 
indicators for measuring this and, in addition, an improvement of environmental quality 
is the result of multiple factors, interacting at multiple levels, of which governance 
strategies and institutions constitute no more than a means through which better 
environmental quality might be achieved. 
In this study, rather than trying to assess environmental improvements, the outcomes of 
environmental paradiplomatic activities undertaken by the state of São Paulo are 
measured in terms of their legal and institutional effects. But even after setting this 
focus, a number of possible questions can be posed. For instance, are we interested in 
examining the influence, the impact and/or the transformations that an environmental 
paradiplomatic agenda promotes? At what level should this be assessed, the 
subnational, national, and/or international level? In evaluating influence, what types 
and degrees of influence would be considered, and in what moment in the policy cycle is 
change important (agenda-setting, negotiation, and/or implementation)?  
The fact is that a systematic empirical assessment of the outcomes of subnational 
governments’ international agenda to deal with global environmental problems is 
lacking in the literature.219 In this case, a review of the two conceptual categories that 
underpin the thesis’ analytical framework - MLG and paradiplomacy – provides some 
insights of the outcomes of subnational foreign activity. When examining the case of the 
state of São Paulo, contributions provided by the literature on federalism and on 
participation of non-State actors in IR are also brought in as they help confirm and/or 
falsify the explanatory value of the hypothesis. 
Scholars writing under the MLG approach have already discussed the impact of 
subnational mobilisation (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 1997; Jeffery, 
2000). Overall, the understanding of these scholars is that the dispersion of governance 
across multiple jurisdictions is both more efficient than, and normatively superior to, 
central state monopoly (Hooghe and Marks, 2010, p. 17). When considering the MLG of 
climate change, a number of empirical studies envision the outcome of subnational 
involvement in higher levels of governance as facilitating access to funding (Bulkeley & 
Kern, 2006), and providing incentives for learning. These, in turn, can lead to socio-
technical transitions (Geels, 2011, p. 18). Additionally, involvement in transnational 
climate governance can promote information-sharing, capacity-building, and rule-
setting (Bulkeley, 2010). Participation in transnational networks is also said to trigger 
local action (Schreurs, 2008), but the impact of these networks on member-city actions 
seems to be network specific (Krause, 2012).  
However, it is possible that the MLG literature is overstating the autonomy of 
subnational authorities, mistaking subnational mobilisation for evidence of influence. 
                                                 
219 I also highlighted that a there are no frameworks to assess the motives driving environmental 
paradiplomacy (Chapter 6). 
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Piattoni (2010), for instance, argues that mobilization often results from an attempt on 
the part of subnational governments to overcome the informational advantage that 
government executives derive from their role as gatekeepers between the national and 
the supranational level. Yet, subnational influence on the provisions and procedures of 
higher level policies might be actually very small (Piattoni, 2010, p. 94).220 Behind this 
limitation lies the fact that the governance literature rarely separates out law from 
other socio-political ordering (Osofsky, 2009). MLG scholars also seem to forget that in 
order to be able to act as international actors, subnational governments should be 
competent to do so.221 
Attempts to assess the impacts of the international agenda undertaken by subnational 
governments are also found in scholarly work on paradiplomacy. In this case there has 
been some examination of subnational influence over national foreign policy. In the 
environmental realm, Happaerts et al (2010) examine the impact that participation has 
on the Nrg4SD on members’ policies. Their conclusion is that the impacts can vary from 
virtually non-existent to tangible benefits.222 In a more recent work Bruyninckx et al 
(2012) started assessing subnational governments’ influence over multilateral decision-
making. Using the case of the C40 network, Acuto (2013b) analyses the role of cities in 
reshaping the structures of global governance. 
Altogether, the outcomes of subnational governments’ international agenda remain 
insufficiently illuminated. MLG scholars take into consideration both the domestic and 
the international levels, but overstate subnational governments’ autonomy. These 
scholars also envisage the outcomes of subnational foreign agenda at the domestic level 
(in terms of their influence over the national government), but give less attention to 
their international impact. The scarce literature on environmental paradiplomacy 
concentrates on access to international forums and actors, rather than on what actually 
results from their international agenda. 
Having already discussed how and why environmental paradiplomacy evolves, I now 
advance these findings revealing what results from this agenda in the state of São Paulo. 
The effects identified by the theoretical framework are: economic returns; learning 
opportunities; new policies and action; and influence over higher levels of governance. 
These outcomes are tested in terms of the extent to which (i) through its environmental 
paradiplomatic agenda São Paulo expands its capacity to address global environmental 
                                                 
220 Piattoni (2010) suggests five criteria according to which MLG should be assessed: the mode, the 
degree, the timing, the scope, and the impact of action. Based on these criteria, she argues that in the EU 
policy-making decisions are basically made by the Commission and national governments. 
221 See Chapter 5. 
222 Their conclusion is based on three case studies. In Flanders, Nrg4SD’s activities appeared in some 
policy documents, but had no concrete influence on Flemish sustainable development policy. In the 
Basque Country, the network was often mentioned in policy documents, and it offered Basque officials 
access to COPs. In the North Rhine-Westphalia, participation in the network resulted in bilateral contacts, 
sometimes leading to bilateral cooperation. 
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problems (Section 7.3); and (ii) São Paulo is influencing higher levels of governance 
(Section 7.4). In addition to these outcomes identified by the literature, I suggest that 
São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy is transforming soft law into hard law 
(Subsection 7.3.3). I also provide a more specific account of the impacts that a 
subnational government can have over both the national position-forming process and 
the international environmental regime (Subsections 7.4.2 and 7.4.3). 
7.3. EXPANDING GOVERNMENTS’ CAPACITY TO ADDRESS GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
This Section analyses the outcomes of São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic 
agenda taking into consideration the first part of hypothesis 3: 
Research Question 3 
What are the results of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda? 
Hypothesis 3 (first part) 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo expands the state government’s 
capacity to address global environmental problems. 
Lessa (2007) argues that Brazilian paradiplomacy is constrained by its informality, 
dispersion of objectives, asymmetry, extrapolation of competences, personal basis and 
discontinuity. To a certain extent, such constraints affect the outcomes of the 
international environmental agenda undertaken by the state of São Paulo. Take the 
signature of a MOU or a Protocol of Intentions, for example. Although it is assumed that 
these instruments have a presumption of legality, and thus the state should undertake 
the obligations therein assumed, MOUs and Protocol of Intentions are weak 
commitments (the problem of informality). Most are written in generic terms, and list 
open aims, with no assessment of the results (the problem of dispersion of objectives). 
Often their benefits are uneven, benefiting one party more than another (the problem of 
asymmetry). Moreover, the initiatives can be legally challenged if subnational 
governments act beyond their constitutional competences (the problem of 
extrapolation of competences). Once legally accepted, the permanence of the initiatives 
depends purely on political will; a new Governor or state Secretary in power is not 
required to continue the projects established by their predecessors. Participation in 
transnational networks is even looser, and almost exclusively dependent on officials 
who are interested in carrying out such initiatives. As one interviewee suggested, “it all 
depends on the energy of the individuals involved in one particular moment, and no one 
can be made accountable for not giving continuity” (the problem of the personal basis 
and continuity).223  
                                                 
223 Interview No.41 - academic. 
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In this view, a simple conclusion would be that São Paulo’s international environmental 
agenda cannot contribute to expanding the state’s institutional capacity to address 
global environmental problems. The relationships established by state officials across 
borders would result in little more than a series of informal political acts, the 
implementation and continuity of which is subject to individual engagement, and often 
simply abandoned (e.g. when one of the parties leaves the government). In the case of 
environmental paradiplomacy, the fact that the initiatives deal with topics that escape 
the regional constituency of subnational governments aggravates the situation. As some 
actors involved in environmental policymaking in Brazil believe: 
In general, I don’t see many tangible results to the states. The subnational 
representatives that attend international negotiations will say ‘I was there’, but I 
don’t see them coming back and doing much about it.224 
However, there are changes in the way that the state of São Paulo addresses global 
environmental problems that are associated with its paradiplomatic agenda. For 
example, as the manager of the global affairs division at CETESB highlighted, once the 
state presented its mandatory GHG emission reduction target at the COPs and within 
the networks it participates in, “São Paulo gave a message to the world... There is no 
return now, the next Governor, it doesn’t matter who or from which political party, 
won’t be able to take a step backwards”.225 
This Section examines to what extent São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda 
is capable of expanding the government’s capacity to deal with global environmental 
problems. It does so by examining the economic returns (Subsection 7.3.1), the policy 
learning (Subsection 7.3.2), as well as the new legislation (Subsection 7.3.3), that 
resulted from São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda in the period between 
1995 and 2010. Each one of these outcomes is considered for São Paulo’s collaboration 
and coalition initiatives.226 
7.3.1. Economic returns 
For many decades economic returns have motivated subnational governments to have 
an international agenda. A recent study by McMillan (2012), which analysed sixty-six 
governors of twenty-five American states from 1995 to 2005, concluded that American 
governors’ involvement in foreign economic relations occurs mostly through the 
recruitment of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the promotion of state exports.  
                                                 
224 Interview No.32 - national official. 
225 Interview No.11 - SP official. 
226 The differences between collaboration and coalition initiatives were presented in Chapter 4, and were 
further developed in Chapter 6. They are again highlighted in this Chapter when considering the extent to 
which environmental paradiplomacy contributes to Sao Paulo’s capacity to address global environmental 
problems. 
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In the state of São Paulo, a number of accounts given by the interviewees suggested that 
the expectation of economic opportunities and financial benefits drives the state to 
establish partnerships with actors across borders (Chapter 6, Subsection 6.3.2). São 
Paulo uses its international environmental activities to attract FDI to the state. The 
state’s International Relations Plan (São Paulo, 2012) suggests that these resources 
could create 1.5 million direct and indirect jobs in the state until 2014.227 With the 
increase of the state debt ceiling, it became even more necessary for the government to 
go abroad in search of credits.228 As a result, the state government officially defined 
attracting foreign investments and loans as a priority policy, establishing quantifiable 
objectives for most state Secretariats (São Paulo, 2012).229 
Over recent years, São Paulo’s collaboration initiatives have resulted in direct financial 
benefits to the state. Between 2002 and 2012 approximately 13 million US dollars were 
granted by the World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), the French Development Agency (AFD), the Latin American Development Bank 
(CAF), the Japanese Bank and its Agency for International Cooperation (JBIC/JICA) 
mostly to infrastructure projects in the state.230 In addition to direct benefits, 
collaboration initiatives can result in indirect financial benefits to the state. The 
signature of a MOU is perceived as a demonstration of commitment and effort, and is 
considered by the World Bank when providing grants and loans to subnational 
governments.231 
However, there is some discussion whether FDI received by the state results in positive 
or negative outcomes. One of the points raised involves how the money is invested.232 
While at the federal level the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Brazilian Agency for 
Cooperation (ABC) establishs general guidelines and geographic and thematic areas that 
are prioritised (Puente, 2010), at the subnational level international cooperation 
projects develop with limited coordination. Coordination with Itamaraty is not 
sufficient, despite the existence of state legislation which requires that international 
relations should be held in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (state 
Decree 33.129, of March 15, 1991).  
Another limitation is that these foreign investments can create a dependence of the 
state on foreign resources, and certain policies and projects risk being interrupted if the 
donor stops financing it. For instance, it is unclear what will happen if the British 
                                                 
227 As does the press release http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/lenoticia.php?id=218538. 
228 In 2012 Sao Paulo’s debt ceiling was raised to 7 million Brazilian Reais (almost 3.5 million US dollars), 
a factor that also drove the state to adopt its IR Plan. Interview No.17 - SP official. 
229 No specific objective was given by the Plan to SMA in terms of obtaining foreign funding or adopting 
exchange and cooperation programs. 
230 Figure provided by Sao Paulo’s International Relations advisor, based on data from the state Treasury 
Office (personal communication, October, 2012). 
231 Interview No.37 - private. 
232 Interviews Nos. 29, 31 - national officials. 
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Government stops supporting CETESB to develop São Paulo’s GHG Inventory.233 In this 
sense, there is an understanding that “there are many opportunities that are being 
missed out… These resources should be seen as ‘anchors of continuity’ of state 
policies”.234  
Coalition initiatives can also result in economic returns. As mentioned (Chapter 6, 
Subsection 6.3.2), the state of São Paulo participates in UN conferences or transnational 
network meetings because it expects to forge new partnerships. And indeed this is one 
of the outcomes of the state’s international agenda. For example, when the state 
participated of COP-10 in Nagoya, new initiatives with Quebec and JICA were discussed. 
As the state Secretary concluded “being there made it easier to meet other subnational 
governments with whom we established new partnerships”.235 This is a result that 
transnational networks of subnational governments promise to their members. For 
example, the R20 network suggests that “…cooperation between subnational 
governments of developed and developing countries will mobilize and leverage 
technology and private sector finance aimed at promoting robust economic recovery 
and based on a new green paradigm...”236 
However, while the paradiplomatic agenda offers economic returns, it is still unclear 
whether having an international agenda is a “good-business” for the state. There are 
costs involved in travelling, organising side-events, and the environmental co-benefits 
are difficult to perceive. Often the public and even subnational officials see international 
initiatives with suspicion, suggesting that the actors involved are more interested in 
travelling abroad than in implementing policies which would be more directly relevant 
to the state. The extent to which cooperation and coalition initiatives result in positive 
outcomes depends on the extent to which they develop local capacities, or at least 
promote the continuity of policies and projects. This is what I examine in the following 
pages. 
7.3.2. Policy learning 
It has been seen (Chapter 6, Subsection 6.4.2) that policymakers in the state of São 
Paulo engage in environmental paradiplomatic initiatives because they seek 
opportunities to learn from and exchange experiences with peers across borders. To 
what extent is their aim to learn actually leading to learning processes?  
                                                 
233 The £130,000 agreement entered between CETESB and the British Embassy was signed in 2008 for 
estimating GHG in the state (http://www.cetesb.sp.gov.br/proclima/convenios-e-parceirias/217-
13/agosto/2008). 
234 Interview No.46 - NGO. 
235 Interview No.7 - SP official. 
236 http://ces.ucdavis.edu/ggcs3/index.cfm?fuseaction=app.R20. The R20 is a non-profit organization 
founded in 2010 by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and other global leaders in cooperation with the 
UN (R20, 2013).  
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MLG scholars investigate processes through which cities learn from one another to 
advance climate action. They argue that the participation of subnational governments in 
transnational networks results in policy learning and exchange (Betsill & Bulkeley, 
2004; Sugiyama & Takeuchi, 2008). Policy learning has also been identified as an 
implication of transborder environmental relations between Canadian provinces and 
the US (Selin & VanDeveer, 2005). Garcia-Johnson’s (2000) study suggests that 
transnational communication with American experts promoted environmental ideas 
and attitude changes in Brazil and Mexico. Subnational participation in COP side-events 
is said to have similar effects (Schroeder & Lovell, 2012).  
Recent work on paradiplomacy also assesses policy learning as a result of subnational 
governments’ international environmental agenda (Chaloux & Paquin, 2012; Jones & 
Royles, 2012). Views vary, however, on the extent to which subnational diplomacy 
promotes policy learning. Happaerts et al. (2010), for instance, found limited impacts 
resulting from the engagement of active members of the Nrg4SD on their sustainable 
development policies. Possible explanations given by scholars writing in this trend are 
that policy learning is an intangible benefit of engaging in networks, that there might be 
little to learn, and that ultimately subnational diplomacy is associated with promoting 
and legitimizing nation-building (Royles, 2012). 
In São Paulo, views vary on the extent to which the state’s international environmental 
agenda enables policy learning. Views also vary depending on the type - collaboration or 
coalition – of activities.  
Collaboration activities helped the state in establishing its environmental management 
apparatus, and in becoming a national reference in supervising and monitoring 
polluting activities. In the 1970s the state had a limited capacity and needed help to 
start setting up an environment policy system. The partnership arrangements that 
representatives at the newly created environmental agency established with 
counterparts in developed countries promoted technical know-how and skills transfer. 
These international collaboration initiatives promoted learning and brought financial 
resources to the state environmental apparatus, which were used to develop and 
implement policies.237  
As CETESB’s international relations manager stated that, “thanks to these international 
partnerships our technical body is always updated. We learn from other agencies’ 
successes and mistakes. We choose what is adequate for us and we adapt for our 
reality”.238 In this case, one of the conditions for learning to occur is that the interaction 
should be established with parties who have common problems and successful 
solutions to share. According to the manager for global environmental problems at 
                                                 
237 Interviews with CETESB officials. Also see Garcia-Johnson (2000, p. 169). 
238 Interview No.6 - SP official. 
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CETESB, “if the relevant actors are participating, these networks really promote 
exchanges, learning, and increase our capacity to have good ideas.239 
The learning aspect is also observed in coalition initiatives. Networks of subnational 
officials serve as platforms for policymakers to present their experiences and learn 
what their peers are doing in other parts of the world. The state of São Paulo also used 
these networks to act as a regional leader. As the international affairs advisor within the 
Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment of Aragon, Spain, affirmed: 
“São Paulo enabled Latin American and Caribbean regions to join efforts and to carry 
out a stronger commitment to tackle climate change”.240 Participation in the agenda-
setting of international negotiations and in the negotiations further enables subnational 
governments to learn about the importance given by the international community to 
global environmental problems, as well as to learn about the international policy-
making process. 
In both collaboration and coalition initiatives, the learning process within these 
networks is not unidirectional, with the state following the examples from developed 
countries. Rather, a point often missed by the literature is that there is a mutual learning 
and exchange processes are occurring. In their book ‘Greening Brazil’, Hochstetler and 
Keck (2007) explicitly try to address this limitation by focusing on domestic politics. 
The authors recognise that “the best-known stories of Brazil in these contexts have 
stressed its resistance to environmental protection when pushed from abroad” (p.6). 
They conclude that international and transnational actors influence Brazil’s 
environmental politics by engaging Brazilians who have the authority, charisma, or 
organisational ability to bring about changes in policy and practice (p.7). Conversely, in 
the case of São Paulo’s climate policy, the state became a reference case, and CETESB 
and SMA officials have been promoting training to other subnational governments 
abroad:241  
We participate in these networks and we present what we have been doing. We 
realise that other subnational and national governments can learn from our 
experiences. The state of São Paulo already influences the federal government 
and other regions in Brazil. Now we think we can influence other regions around 
the world.242 
The state’s International Relations Plan (São Paulo, 2012, p. 19) confirms this potential 
by assigning to the SMA (and also the Secretariats of Public Safety, Water & Sanitation, 
Energy, Agriculture, and Housing) the responsibility for strengthening the state’s 
                                                 
239 Interview No.11 - SP official. 
240 Interview No.50 – foreign policy-maker (original in English). 
241 Interview No.2 - SP official and Interview No.53 – foreign policy-maker (original in English). 
242 Interview No.9 - SP official. 
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position as a provider of technical cooperation to developing nations in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia. 
Still, policy learning is not a guaranteed outcome of the state’s international 
environmental activities. Collaboration initiatives face problems of continuity, and so far 
there are no monitoring mechanisms to assess their effectiveness. Many Protocols of 
Intentions and MOUs are never put into practice.243 As for coalition initiatives, some 
argue that “the only tangible result is tourism, the state Secretary going abroad with his 
wife on holidays and doing some shopping … they are so unprepared that when they 
have to design a strategy that is a bit more complex, they have to ask the NGOs for 
help…”.244 Or, as another NGO representative affirmed, “even if the individuals that 
participated learn something, in most states the institutions are weak, and learning is 
not shared with the institution; if the official leaves, then all the knowledge will leave 
with him/her”.245 
Perhaps, the accounts of NGO and government representatives would not be so distinct 
if there was a framework to assess the results of the state’s international environmental 
activities. The need to establish mechanisms and forums for the parties to meet and 
evaluate the results was foreseen by the Protocol of Intentions entered between Brazil 
and Italy (Brazil, 2007a): 
Article 5.1. To verify the level of implementation of this Protocol and identify 
new instruments aiming at increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of 
decentralised cooperation, the Parties agree in establish a Joint Committee, 
formed by representatives from the national governments and regional/local 
entities of the two countries, which will meet annually.246 
Learning might not always happen. Or at least it might be an outcome observed in a 
context where institutions are strong and thus more capable of transforming what one 
official has learnt into a project or a policy that will see some continuity within the state 
organisation. In the case of São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy, although state 
officials have many opportunities to share environmental ideas, values and experiences, 
the continuity of these processes is not guaranteed.  
7.3.3. New policies – and new legislation 
Chapter 5 considered that the initiatives that structure São Paulo’s international 
activities create soft law. Soft law is a loose and adaptable framework in which to share 
                                                 
243 Interview No.4 - SP official. 
244 Interview No.49 - NGO, talking about his experience with the Amazon states. 
245 Interview No.45 - NGO. 
246 A similar disposition is found in the Protocol entered with France. 
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information, ideas, and resources.247 On the one hand, despite obligations being weak 
and non-legally binding, the opportunities for exchange of experiences and learning are 
high: soft law arrangements can be highly effective (Raustiala, 2002; Slaughter, 2004). 
There are examples where collaboration between subnational governments across 
borders has led to environmental improvements. The action between New England 
states and Eastern Canadian provinces in the mid-1980s, for instance, promoted a 
region-wide action on sulphur emissions, which paved the way for subsequent federal 
action (Aulisi et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010). On the other hand, the voluntary nature of 
these initiatives can limit their effectiveness. As soft law cannot be enforced, parties 
might take advantage, and the agreements are less likely to survive changes in 
leadership (Chen et al., 2010). 
As seen above, paradiplomatic activities in Brazil suffer from a number of constraints 
(including those highlighted by Lessa, 2007 - informality, dispersion of objectives, 
asymmetry, extrapolation of competences, personal basis and discontinuity). 
Furthermore, even if new policies emerge within the government, advances met 
through public policies are seen as precarious. One of the reasons is that Brazilian 
public policy is highly politicised, and often suffers from weak enforcement (Hochstetler 
& Keck, 2007). In sum, the effectiveness of São Paulo’s international initiatives is limited 
when its outcomes are soft law arrangements and public policies.  
What is different in São Paulo is that the outcomes of environmental paradiplomacy go 
beyond non-binding soft law and public policies. Indeed, environmental paradiplomacy 
also promotes an increase of new formal legislation in the state. As CETESB’s President 
affirmed when explaining why the state enacted its climate change law, “we mix public 
policy with law, and only legislation is recognised as something that should be followed 
and that can be enforced”.248 Driving new norms in the state, thus transforming soft law 
into hard law (i.e. new environmental legislation), is an important outcome of São 
Paulo’s international agenda.  
Hard law can be an outcome of collaboration initiatives established by the state of São 
Paulo. One of the best examples is the collaboration established between CETESB and 
the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development.249 The 
technical cooperation agreement they established in 1993 aimed at building up 
institutional capacities for management of contaminated sites in the state. Beyond the 
learning opportunities, a working group was established, and a Division for 
Contaminated Areas was created within CETESB’s structure. Moreover, the working 
group drafted the text of what in 2009 became a state law, approved by the Legislative 
                                                 
247 Soft law is a concept that refers to “guidelines, recommendations, coordinating measures and other 
instruments which are not formally binding but nonetheless normative” (Shelton, 2003). 
248 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
249 The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) was replaced by the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in January 2011. 
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Assembly, establishing guidelines and procedures for protection of soil quality and 
management of contaminated areas.250 As one of the officials involved in the 
collaboration and in the work group declared: 
The law was drafted by the specialists who had been involved in the cooperation. 
The law took full use of what they learned in Germany, 100% really. So the 
partnership created expertise among CETESB, which justified the creation of a 
special division, and then the Law came as a necessity to legitimise the acts that 
we were taking without an adequate legal framework.251 
Hard law can also result from coalition initiatives. For instance, the process through 
which São Paulo’s climate change policy was established can easily be connected to its 
participation in UN environmental conferences and in transnational networks. This 
process began three years after the realisation of Rio-92, with the creation of 
PROCLIMA, the state program on climate change. In February 2005, the same month as 
the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, the state created the state forum on climate 
change and biodiversity (‘Forum Paulista’), the first of the type in the country. Among 
its responsibilities, the Forum should elaborate the state climate policy; promote 
synergies between the themes of climate change and biodiversity; and incorporate 
decisions made by the UNFCCC, the CBD and other MEAs into the state policy.252 In 
October 2009, a few weeks prior to COP-15 in Copenhagen, São Paulo’s Climate Law was 
approved. 
Overall, São Paulo’s Climate Law had a strong connection to international norms, and 
with the international activities of the state. As the state had been following the 
international debate on climate change since 1995, policymakers in São Paulo had a 
sound understanding of was being discussed, as well as of other norms enacted by other 
countries and other subnational governments. Also, as one of its main authors 
confirmed, “Big effort was made so that our legislation did not to contradict existing 
international norms”.253 A clear indication of the connection between São Paulo’s 
climate change policy and its international activities is that participation in the Nrg4SD, 
as well as the collaboration initiatives established by the state are explicitly mentioned 
in the justification of the climate law: 
                                                 
250 State Law 13,577, of July 9, 2009. 
251 Interview No.8 - SP official. 
252 The Forum was created through the state Decree 49,369, of February 11, 2005. It is chaired by the 
Governor, headed by 11 state Secretaries, and has representation from business, academic and civil 
society actors. Among the international treaties it should consider the Decree mentions: the Vienna 
Convention and Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer; the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); the Ramsar Convention; and the Inter-
American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. 
253 Interview No.46 - NGO. Similarly, one of the main authors of the climate legislation for the state of 
Amazonas affirmed that “you need to understand the archetypes and create something that is within the 
international and the national frames” (Interview No.34 - private). 
 190 
 
With due regard for the sovereignty of nations, and recognising the importance 
of the sub-national level for making ambitious progress in current discussions 
about the environment, São Paulo must take a leading role in the question of 
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. To that end, it has already set up several 
cooperation agreements with other states and provinces, and is the focal point in 
the Americas for the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable 
Development (Nrg4SD).254 
São Paulo’s state climate policy therefore illustrates how São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomacy motivates the emergence of new regulation in the state. While in the 
first instance soft law constitutes the main result of environmental paradiplomacy, in 
the second instance the interactions it promotes are capable of generating hard, legal 
instruments. Put differently, new enforceable legislation can emerge from collaboration 
and coalition initiatives undertaken under a paradiplomatic agenda.  
Of course, having a law does not necessarily lead to law enforcement. On the one hand it 
is common in Brazil that “some laws catch on, and others don’t” (tem lei que pega, e tem 
lei que não pega), and those laws that don’t catch on will simply “stay on paper” (ficam 
no papel). On the other hand, in recent decades Brazilian prosecutorial enforcement has 
contributed to enforcing environmental legislation in the country (McAllister, 2009; 
Milaré, 2009). Policymakers in the state recognise this and the fact that they might face 
legal action if the GHG reduction targets established by the state law are not met: 
The difference [in relation to Kyoto] is that there will be sanctions if we don’t 
achieve our reduction target. Not only we face a moral sanction… but because 
our target is established through a Law, the state government can be prosecuted 
if we don’t achieve it.255 
In summary, the analysis above of the outcomes of São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomatic agenda showed that by engaging in international relations the state is 
expanding its capacity to address global environmental problems. The first part of 
hypothesis 3 is confirmed in that: (i) collaboration and coalition initiatives bring 
economic resources to the state; (ii) learning opportunities arise from the engagement 
of state officials with peers across borders; and (iii) new policies are put in place as a 
result of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda. In addition, São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomatic agenda resulted in enforceable environmental legislation 
which is directly related to the state’s international agenda. In the next section the 
analysis turns to the second part of research question 3, assessing the state’s influence 
over higher jurisdictions. 
                                                 
254 The draft and the justification of Sao Paulo’s state climate change policy are available from 
http://www.cetesb.sp.gov.br/tecnologia/draft_climate.pdf 
255 Interview No.3 - SP official. 
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7.4. INFLUENCE 
The analysis so far showed that undertaking an international environmental agenda can 
expand the governments’ capacity to address global environmental problems. This 
Section continues by analysing the outcomes of São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomatic agenda taking into consideration the second part of hypothesis 3: 
Research Question 3 
What are the results of São Paulo’s international environmental agenda? 
 
Hypothesis 3 (second part) 
Through its environmental paradiplomatic activities São Paulo influences higher 
levels of governance. 
The actors involved in environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São Paulo explicitly 
aim to influence higher levels of jurisdiction. References were made to influence over (i) 
the national government and national environmental policymaking; (ii) national 
environmental foreign policy; and (iii) international environmental negotiations. I 
address whether, and to what extent, the state of São Paulo, through its international 
environmental agenda, can influence the policies of higher levels of governance. I focus 
on coalition initiatives256, and on the three levels of influence which the interviewees 
referred to – national policy, foreign policy and international negotiations. 
A fourth type of influence could be considered, one which involves the diffusion of São 
Paulo’s environmental policy and opinions to other subnational governments, e.g. to 
other Brazilian cities and states. In this case, cities and states that lag behind learn from 
leading subnational governments, with the benefit that the frontrunners will not act 
alone in a way that could disadvantage their economy (McAllister, 2009; Rabe, 2009). 
São Paulo’s environmental policies clearly impact other states and municipalities in the 
federation. In the climate change matter, for instance, after the state created its Forum, 
in 2005, other states followed, and today sixteen states also have climate forums 
(Romeiro & Parente, 2011). However, this type of policy diffusion is a very indirect 
result of environmental paradiplomacy and therefore it is not an object of analysis in 
this study. 
I draw particularly on Betsill and Corell’s (2007) definition of influence in 
environmental policymaking. They define influence as the process that “occurs when 
one actor intentionally communicates to another so as to alter the latter’s behaviour 
from what would have occurred otherwise” (p.24). Although used to explain the 
influence of NGO’s over international environmental negotiations, this definition is 
                                                 
256 Collaboration initiatives (e.g. MOUs signed with other subnational governments across borders) 
generally do not have this political component of trying to influence higher levels of government (see 
Chapters 4 and 6). 
 192 
 
broad enough to be extended to other non-State actors such as subnational 
governments.257 
The following analysis suggests that there is evidence that São Paulo's actions have 
resulted in relevant incremental changes in federal action, as well as over the national 
foreign policy. The evidence also shows that influence over the international regime has 
been limited, yet existent. On a scale of intensity of influence, the highest degree of 
influence is over the national government’s policies, followed by the influence over the 
national foreign policy, and lastly over the international regime. 
7.4.1. National policy 
Scholars drawing from MLG and federalism often understand subnational governments’ 
influence in terms of cities prompting climate action at the national level. First, 
subnational governments can serve as a model for federal regulators creating the 
political and legal climate necessary to induce enactment of a federal regulatory 
program (Engel, 2006; Kousky & Schneider, 2003; Stewart, 2008). Second, facing weak 
national action, municipal initiatives can potentially inspire citizens to support or call 
for national policy change (Gore, 2010; Rabe, 2009; Schreurs et al., 2009; Selin, 2011; 
Selin & VanDeveer, 2005, 2007). Third, city networks gaining international attention 
may create pressure for national change (Gore, 2010; Resnik et al., 2008; Selin & 
VanDeveer, 2005). Scholars researching paradiplomacy reach a similar conclusion, that 
bypassing federal authorities subnational governments exert direct influence over 
federal policies (Chaloux & Paquin, 2012). In the Brazilian paradiplomatic literature 
scholars have placed little attention on the extent to which increased international 
participation of subnational governments can affect national politics.  
While there seems to be a correlation between subnational and national action, it is 
unclear from these literatures how influence over national policymaking is measured. 
Federalist scholars have tried to develop specific frameworks. In Engel’s (2006) 
analysis, three mechanisms of influence are considered: developing programs that form 
the basis of federal policies (state as ‘laboratories’), catalysing regulatory action by 
higher jurisdictional levels of government, and banding together with other subnational 
governments in regional coalitions or interstate groups. More recently, Gore (2010) 
suggested a set of indicators to evaluate the potential influence that municipal climate 
networks have over Canadian national climate policy. These include: knowledge 
generation and dissemination; use of demonstration effects; market expansion and 
                                                 
257 Betsill and Correll (2007) suggest a set of five indicators to assess the influence of NGO diplomats. The 
first three indicators focus on the effects of NGO diplomats on negotiation processes (influencing the issue 
framing, the agenda-setting process, and the positions of key actors). The other two indicators focus on 
negotiation outcomes (influencing procedural issues, and/or substantive issues in the final agreement). 
They demonstrate that it is possible to make qualitative judgements about levels of NGO influence. The 
differences between influence by NGOs and subnational governments were noted in the Introduction 
(Section 1.2). 
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transformation; policy learning; the creation of norms; research to support policies; and 
evidence of achievement. This work assumes that if a network holds these 
characteristics, its national influence will increase.258 
Transnational networks of subnational governments explicitly advocate that 
subnational governments are laboratories for future national policy, which help to 
accelerate the implementation of international agreements. For example, the R20 
network, states that: 
Environmental policies and projects successfully implemented at the subnational 
level are often adopted by national governments. Subnational action will spur 
action at national levels.259 
Alongside its tradition of being a leader in environmental policymaking (see Chapter 6), 
policy-makers, NGO representatives and academics suggest that the state of São Paulo 
influenced the national government in promoting its climate policy. To illustrate this 
idea, I turn again to the state’s climate policy.260 São Paulo’s Climate Law was not only a 
legal outcome of the state’s international agenda (Subsection 7.3.3), but also it triggered 
action at the national level. Previous research confirms that the adoption of the 
Brazilian climate policy was related to the early adoption of a more ambitious policy by 
subnational governments. Two works in particular, Romeiro and Parente (2011) and 
Lucon and Goldemberg (2010) argue that São Paulo’s legislation played a key role in 
advancing the national policy. The same argument was made by a number of relevant 
actors at the state and at the federal level. 
In fact, the federal government approved its National Climate Change Policy on the 29th 
of December 2009, six months after the city of São Paulo, and almost two months after 
the state of São Paulo enacted their municipal and state climate policies. The national 
policy, on the one hand, established a “voluntary commitment” to adopt mitigation 
actions for GHG emissions that reduce between 36.1% and 38.9% of projected 
emissions by 2020 (article 12). The state and the city, on the other hand, established 
mandatory reduction targets of 20 and 30%, based on their 2005 inventory of emissions 
(Table 7-1). In this view, the climate laws enacted by the city and the state of São Paulo 
not only broke the national inaction, but, establishing a mandatory (not voluntary) goal, 
and in establishing the reduction of CO2 emissions in absolute terms (not only a 
deceleration or a decrease per unit of GDP) they continued to be more ambitious than 
                                                 
258 Gore (2010) also suggests indicators of sustainability: stability, diversity, recruitment, financial 
resources, traction of issue, information exchange. His conclusion is that the influence of Canadian 
networks is weak, “given the loose nature of the network and the fact that municipalities are not 
significant units of political analysis in national political and policy debates”.  
259 See: http://ces.ucdavis.edu/ggcs3/index.cfm?fuseaction=app.R20.  
260 There are other examples of state policies that influenced the national government, for instance, the 
state policy on waste management (Interview No.6 - SP official) and the state policy on groundwater 
contamination (Interview No.8 - SP official). However, these are not object of attention here as they deal 
mainly with local/regional, rather than global, problems. 
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the national legislation, as well as ahead of the major deadlock in climate negotiations - 
the cumbersome issue of ‘historical responsibilities’. 
 
São Paulo’s Municipal 
Policy on Climate 
Change 
São Paulo’s state 
Policy on Climate 
Change 
National Policy on 
Climate Change 
Norm 
Municipal Law 14,933, of 
June 5, 2009 
State Law 13,798, of 
November 9, 2009 
Federal Law 12,187, of 
December 29, 2009 
Targets 30% by 2012 20% by 2020 
36.1% and 38.9% 
voluntary reduction by 
2020 
Baseline 
Based on the inventory 
of 2005 
Based on the inventory 
of 2005 
Emissions projected by 
2020 
 
Table 7-1 Climate change policies in the national, state and municipal level 
Source: Author 
The pressure on the federal government was not limited to the fact that subnational 
governments were taking a leadership role. Politicians and policy-makers from São 
Paulo261 started questioning and addressing President Lula, the Minister for the 
Environment, and the diplomats, calling for further action and for the adoption of 
reduction targets. While São Paulo’s law was being discussed, Fabio Feldmann, one of 
the lead authors of the state law, had an informal conversation with Carlos Minc, the 
Minister for the Environment. 
I told Minc that we were planning to include reduction targets in our law. And he 
said ‘I think it’s great. If you do this, I will use São Paulo’s case to push forward 
the idea of national targets’.262 
It is not unanimous, but a number of national officials emphasised the role played by the 
state of São Paulo. The following fragments from an interviewee from Itamaraty and 
another from the Ministry of Environment draw attention to the relative importance of 
São Paulo’s climate policy over the federal government’s decision to enact a federal law 
with voluntary reduction targets: 
São Paulo’s law is probably not the only or the main factor behind the national 
policy, but when a state with the importance of São Paulo establishes reduction 
                                                 
261 Although it is easy to consider the city and the state of Sao Paulo together, I focus in the state by 
concentrating in accounts given by officials of the state bureaucracy. 
262 Interview No.46 - NGO. 
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targets, it clearly influences the federal government to take more ambitious 
action.263  
São Paulo’s climate law had a relevant political weight. When the richest state 
enacts a piece of legislation like that, and manages to do so with the support of 
the private sector, it sends a clear message to the national government. It makes 
us think ‘if they did it, why wouldn’t we be able?’ And this is what the Minister [of 
the Environment] said when he was making a point for approval of the national 
policy... The two laws are very different, but by legislating and adopting targets 
symbolically São Paulo impacted on our position.264 
Alongside the view expressed by the actors involved, the state incorporated the 
argument that it influenced the federal government in official documents. The report 
prepared by SMA to be distributed at the biodiversity COP-10, in Nagoya, for example, 
emphasised that the state “has played and is still playing a fundamental pioneering role 
in the federative scope”, and that it “leads and boosts the laws, programmes and 
projects for the preservation of ecosystems and the promotion of sustainable 
development” (São Paulo, 2010).265 
Yet, subnational governments might overstate their influence. It is also possible to argue 
that the national and the state policy are unrelated. Since 2007 national policy had been 
under discussion266, and the national government aimed at presenting results at COP-15 
in Copenhagen (the national law was announced there and enacted two weeks after the 
Conference). In addition, national policy makers design policies that are broad enough 
to be applicable for the entire nation, which not necessarily is the case with 
regional/state policies. In the words of the National Secretary for Climate Change within 
the Ministry of Environment: 
The different levels of government certainly communicate. However, I don’t 
think that their work impacts us. The technical aspects are different and we need 
to create our own methodologies, which will work for the whole country. Their 
most important role is pressure. We can’t work in a total comfort zone because 
they are also taking action. We have to speed up.267 
All in all, even if the state was not the exclusive driver, its climate action played a role in 
motivating the federal government to enact a national climate policy, and most 
                                                 
263 Interview No.26 - national official. 
264 Interview No.32 - national official. 
265 The report mentions the law that protects the Cerrado biome (state Law 13,550/2009), the decree that 
instituted the sustainable procurement programme (state Decree 53,336/2008), and the Climate Law. 
266 In November 2007 the federal government created an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change, 
which was assigned with preparing the National Policy on Climate Change and the National Climate 
Change Plan. The Committee was coordinated by the Office of the President of the Republic, and 
composed of seventeen federal bodies (Decree 6,263/2007). 
267 Interview No.33 - national official. 
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importantly to establish a voluntary CO2 reduction target.268 Further, influencing the 
national government is not the same as saying that the subnational level tried to impose 
something that the national government disagreed with. The conversation between 
Minc and Feldmann mentioned above, for example, supports the idea that the national 
level agrees that it benefited from the subnational level setting the example, as this can 
help the national government to do the same.  
7.4.2. National position-forming process 
As seen previously (Chapter 6, Subsection 6.4.2), another objective of São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomacy is to influence national environmental foreign policy. 
Waltz’s (1959) classic formulation suggests that foreign policy can be influenced at the 
individual, the national and the international level. In other words, negotiation 
processes and their outcomes are shaped by more than what happens during the formal 
negotiating sessions (Betsill & Corell, 2007).  
São Paulo’s pressure over the national position-forming process is observed over these 
three levels: in the efforts of particular leaders or policymakers (individual), in formal 
and/or informal meetings that state officials have with the country’s negotiators during 
the agenda-setting phase (domestic), and during the negotiations (international). On 
these occasions, subnational contribution is targeted to help the diplomats’ understand 
the highly complex, technical and specific nature of most environmental issues. 
Evidence that pressure is occurring at the individual, domestic and international levels, 
however, primarily tells us how São Paulo engages in the country’s foreign policy and in 
international environmental negotiations, but does not confirm the subsequent effects 
of its subnational diplomacy.269 Therefore, it still remains to be assessed whether and to 
what extent São Paulo actually influences the national position-forming process and the 
positions that the country takes at international environmental negotiations. 
The origin of foreign policy in Brazil has historically been under the monopoly of 
Itamaraty. Scholarly treatment of Brazilian foreign policy agrees that “Itamaraty has 
maintained an impressive degree of bureaucratic autonomy and isolation” (Cason & 
Power, 2009, p. 120), and that until recently its policy responsibilities were 
monopolistic (Cason & Power, 2009; Rodrigues, 2008; Vigevani, 2006). In the post-1995 
period, however, the traditional bureaucratic insulation of Itamaraty started to change. 
According to Cason and Power (2009) this was due to an increase in the number of 
                                                 
268 In parallel, businesses, NGOs and academics were also pressuring the federal government through the 
Brazilian Corporate GHG Protocol Program (lead by the World Resources Institute, the Brazilian branch of 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and FGV), the Business for Climate Program, the 
Climate Observatory, the Forum Clima (lead by Ethos Institute), the National Federation of Industry´s 
Climate Change Program, the Carbon Disclosure Project and the BMF&BOVESPA stock exchange ICO2 
carbon index. However these initiatives are not coordinated and do not include relevant emissions 
reductions commitments. 
269 A similar argument is made by Bestill and Corell (2007) in relation to NGO diplomacy. 
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actors who were influencing or attempting to influence foreign policymaking, as well as 
an increase in presidential diplomacy. But, as the authors highlight, any pluralisation of 
the foreign policymaking process since the mid-1900s has to be understood in relative 
rather than absolute terms: “pluralisation departs from a unique baseline, the quasi-
monopolistic reputation of Itamaraty” (p.120).  
Similarly, in this research, the interviewees confirmed that in the mid-1990s 
subnational governments started to have more access to foreign officers.270 
Nevertheless, actors involved in national and subnational policymaking confirmed the 
understanding that the design and execution of Brazilian policymaking is still closed and 
non-transparent. In many ways, then, it is not easy for any actor in Brazilian politics to 
exert influence over the country’s foreign policy. It is the perception among national and 
subnational policy-makers, as well as from NGO representatives, that the opportunities 
for participation are scarce: 
All foreign policy is exclusive to the federal government. Consequently, the 
subnational level playing field is very strict. Without Itamaraty’s authorization, 
the state of São Paulo cannot be part of anything related to the UN system. 
Therefore I don’t believe that the federal government is really open to discuss 
with state representatives. They might be more open to the CNI [National 
Confederation of Industry] than to a state government. For me, this is all very 
limited. Our federalism is extremely complicated, and we are far from reaching a 
balance.271 
Not even representatives from the Ministry of Environment consider that they are 
capable of influencing the national position: 
Our international position-forming process is not really transparent, and not 
sufficiently rich to contemplate the variety of interested actors. Itamaraty is a 
very strong institution within the government, and during the Lula government 
it became even stronger; he increased the number of diplomats, as well as their 
salaries. Of course there are situations where we [the Ministry of Environment] 
are heard, and where we are part of the position-forming process. But for most of 
the time we are seen as external actors trying to influence the process.272 
Nevertheless, when the diplomats were asked whether subnational governments could 
or have already been exerting some influence over their position, their answer was 
generally positive. The Head of Environment Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for 
example, mentioned that “subnational governments are increasingly putting more 
                                                 
270 This coincides with the period when coalition initiatives in Sao Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic 
agenda emerged (see Chapter 4). 
271 Interview No.5 - SP official. 
272 Interview No.32 - national official. 
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pressure over Itamaraty”.273 When asked to give examples, he mentioned two situations 
in the period before and during the COP-15 in Copenhagen: when the governors of the 
Amazonian states were pressuring the national government to accept a REDD proposal, 
and when the state of São Paulo was calling for the acceptance of reduction targets.  
Since the Kyoto Protocol, in 1997, Itamaraty has been defending the position that 
industrialised countries should be responsible for their historic emissions before 
developing countries are expected to forgo development to reduce their emissions. For 
the past fifteen years most Brazilians – policymakers, academics and even NGOs – 
accepted this strong version of the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ adopted by the diplomats.274 The state of São Paulo, however, 
positioned itself explicitly against it, and started calling for the country to commit to 
reducing its emissions and invest in mitigation and adaptation policies. As mentioned 
above, in 2009 the state exerted a strong pressure over the national government 
arguing that the country should adopt a reduction target in its national policy. Yet, São 
Paulo’s influence was not limited to the national level. The state also wanted to 
influence the national government to take a different stand at COP-15.275 
The state began by participating in coordination meetings with the negotiators. 
Generally, coordination meetings occur before the negotiations, to promote the dialogue 
between the federal government, the Foreign Office and the subnational governments. 
In such meetings subnational governments’ voice tends to be incipient. MMA’s 
international advisor was one of the interviewees who made this point: 
The states are invited to participate [in coordination meetings], but their 
considerations are very rarely taken into consideration. When Itamaraty invites 
a state to one of these meetings, it is because there is a specific question related 
to that state that Itamaraty wishes to hear about. In addition, subnational 
governments don’t really know how to contribute. Understanding these 
international conferences requires an expertise that they don’t usually have. And 
this is natural, as subnational governments are mostly focused in the local and 
regional levels, and in financial resources that they can obtain. The national 
government and particularly Itamaraty can think more broadly.276 
However, in 2009, subnational governments not only wanted to understand the 
position that Itamaraty would take to Copenhagen, but they also wanted to influence it. 
In a meeting organised by the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change one month before 
                                                 
273 Interview No.27 - national official. 
274 The formulation indicates that all countries need to address global warming, but that they should have 
different time frames and obligations according to their historical contributions. 
275 In parallel, the Amazon states were asking Itamaraty and the President to change their strategy in 
terms of accepting REDD. 
276 Interview No.32 - national official. 
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COP-15, President Lula and the future President Dilma Rousseff277 met the Governors of 
the Amazon states and São Paulo’s Governor. With the state law already approved, 
Serra’s speech was described as strategic in convincing the President. As the diplomat 
and International Relations Advisor for the state reported, “Governor Serra was capable 
of summarising the most important reasons why the national government should be in 
favour of reduction targets. He said this was an opportunity for Brazil to assume a 
leadership role, and that the state of São Paulo had already shown the path”.278 
At Copenhagen, for most of the time, President Lula and the national diplomats were 
still demanding that developed countries needed to set more ambitious targets for their 
emissions reductions. Nonetheless, in his formal plenary address in 2009, President 
Lula highlighted that Brazil was ready to spend US$160 billion of its own money by 
2020 to reduce its expected emissions by 35% or more.279 The next day, in an informal 
plenary session, he went further and said that Brazil would not only shoulder its own 
cost of emission reductions, but would step up to provide the financial resources to help 
other countries (Hochstetler, 2012). 
A number of actors involved in Brazilian climate policy posited that the national 
position in Copenhagen was influenced by São Paulo’s action: 
We are not being pretentious in claiming that the national position in 
Copenhagen is directly related to the adoption of São Paulo’s climate policy. In 
face of what we had done in the state, it would have been embarrassing for the 
diplomats to arrive at Copenhagen without a minimally decent proposal… 
Because of São Paulo, in the last minute before Copenhagen Brazil had to change 
its strategy.280 
We were consciously trying to influence the national position. I was representing 
the state in the meetings of the Brazilian Forum [on Climate Change – FBMC]. I 
would constantly ask whether the country would adopt reduction targets. In one 
of the meetings they asked those who were in favour of the adoption of targets to 
raise their hands. I raised my hand, and my hand was worth 40 million hands. Of 
course they had to consider this seriously. Until we enacted our climate policy 
the federal government kept saying that they would not commit to targets. But a 
fortnight after we approved our law the federal government also decided to 
adopt a reduction target.281  
                                                 
277 Dilma Rousseff was President’s Lula Minister of Energy until 2005, and Chief of Staff until March 2010, 
when she left the cabinet to run for President. She was elected President in a run-off on 31 October 2010, 
assumed the presidency on January 1st, 2011. 
278 Interview No.16 - SP official. 
279 Media coverage: http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/vidae,em-copenhague-lula-diz-que-reuniao-do-
clima-nao-e-jogo,483701,0.htm.  
280 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
281 Interview No.3 - SP official. 
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Up to November President Lula and the diplomats were saying they would not 
have targets. Then São Paulo enacts a law with mandatory CO2 reduction targets, 
and the Amazon states call for deforestation reduction targets. The NGOs start 
echoing the same claims. The federal government had little alternative other 
than to establish targets. It is all quite subtle, but I am positive that the states 
were successful in influencing the position the country took to Copenhagen.282 
At Copenhagen, Governador Serra organised a side-event with Governor 
Schwarzenegger. On that occasion, Governor Serra emphasised that the state of São 
Paulo influenced the national strategy. In his speech, he affirmed that “the purposeful 
action of the state of São Paulo encouraged Brazil to put forward its proposal at COP-15, 
especially the target – even if voluntary – of GHG reductions. The pioneering work of 
governments such as those of Quebec, California and São Paulo are reference points for 
their countries and other regions around the world”.283 
Despite the content of all these claims, of course São Paulo was not the only actor or 
factor influencing the national government. First, there were other actors lobbying the 
federal government before and during COP-15. As the Conservation International 
representative remarked, “I doubt the state of São Paulo was as influential as they 
believe. São Paulo was just one more actor adding pressure, but the NGOs, business 
representatives, and academics were also very active”.284  
Then, there were also other subnational governments trying to influence the national 
government. The pressure exerted by the Amazonian states was even more influential. 
Not only did they want to influence the national government, but they were advocating 
an “Amazonia states’ position”, which consisted of supporting REDD and avoided 
deforestation mechanisms. Such an approach, however, was beyond what the 
negotiators accepted, and the federal governments reacted against the Amazonian 
states position. As the international advisor for the Ministry Environment clarified, 
“there is only one position to be presented, and this is the Brazilian position. We can 
even incorporate their perspective, but subnational governments can’t have a distinct 
stand”.285 
Second, there was a political aspect surrounding the national decision. While agreeing 
that São Paulo influenced the Brazilian position, the coordinator of Greenpeace’s climate 
campaign in Brazil stated that: 
President Lula saw that Serra had a mandatory reduction target, so he wanted to 
do the same. It’s like a race, São Paulo took the forefront and the federal 
government had to pick it up. So São Paulo and the Amazon states were 
                                                 
282 Interview No.38 - academic. 
283 Speech by Governor Jose Serra (2009). 
284 Interview No.49 - NGO. 
285 Interview No.32 - national official. 
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influenced by the international regime, and they influenced the national strategy. 
However, there was also a heated political game happening: the elections that 
would soon take place, and all the main pre-candidates were there [at 
Copenhagen], starting to present their platforms.286 
Indeed, Copenhagen had a strong appeal for Brazilian politicians. It happened less than 
one year before the Presidential elections. Not only President Lula was present, but the 
three main pre-candidates José Serra (PSDB), Dilma Rousseff (PT) and Marina Silva (PV 
– Green Party) also participated. These candidates “transformed the climate negotiation 
deadlock in their pre-electoral dispute”.287 Yet, this political dispute between 
Presidential candidates did not diminish the voice of subnational governments at the 
Conference. In addition to the collective meetings with the Brazilian negotiators 
(together with representatives from NGOs, businesses and subnational governments), 
Governor Serra and the Amazon Governors had a more exclusive meeting with 
President Lula, Carlos Minc (Minister for the Environment) and Dilma Rouseff. 
 
Photo 7-1 President Lula, Carlos Minc and Dilma Rouseff in a meeting with the 
Governors from São Paulo, Amazonas, Tocantins, Pará, Acre and Amapá, in Copenhagen 
(December 16, 2009) 
Source: Retrieved from http://www.casacivil.gov.br/multimidia/fotos/ministra-dilma-
rousseff/6/presidente-lula-e-a-ministra-dilma-rousseff-durante-encontro-com-
governadores-copenhague-dinamar5.jpg/view 
The results achieved by the member-States at COP-15 fell short of the stated objectives. 
A new binding agreement was not achieved, and instead the member-States signed the 
“Copenhagen Accord”, which ratified the commitment to limit the temperature increase 
                                                 
286 Interview No.48 - NGO. 
287 http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/ambiente/ult10007u666600.shtml. December 15, 2009. Serra 
and Marina defended that Brazil should contribute with US$ 1billion to the Green Climate Fund, while 
Dilma was against the proposal. 
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to 2°C and required signatories to confirm their unilateral commitment proposals 
announced during the conference. Despite COP-15’s failure, the state of São Paulo left 
Copenhagen feeling victorious. As the statement made by São Paulo’s International 
Relations Advisor at the time recounts: 
NGOs, subnational governments, businesses, transnational networks, all these 
actors exert pressure over the negotiators. A subnational government has little 
chance of influencing the final outcomes of the negotiations, but it can influence 
the national position. And, in my view, this is what happened at Copenhagen; the 
state of São Paulo succeeded in its mission of influencing the national position.288 
All in all, evidence suggests that in the past few years subnational governments in Brazil 
are exerting more pressure on the national government, and playing an increasingly 
significant role in forming the national position in its international environmental 
policy. Other than the actual influence over the matter of targets, the outcome of São 
Paulo’s – and other subnational governments’ – engagement was twofold. First, it made 
the Brazilian position a more democratically legitimate proposal. As a SAF officer put it, 
“thanks to the states the Brazilian proposal did not emerge from an office, without 
consideration of regional realities… it enabled Itamaraty to be closer to the real 
world”.289 Second, it changed the way the diplomats see subnational governments. This 
idea was acknowledged by another SAF officer, when he remarked that “the Governors 
changed the way the diplomats saw the states. When the diplomats went to the 
negotiation table they didn’t see the topic in the same way they used to”.290 As a result, 
“more and more subnational interests will be considered in the formation of the 
Brazilian position”.291 
7.4.3. International environmental regime 
Although subnational governments are one of the ‘nine Major Groups’ that can 
participate in the UN activities on achieving sustainable development292, influence of 
subnational governments over the international environmental regime has been the 
object of limited attention. Generally, to influence international negotiations, 
subnational governments join transnational networks that pressure decision-makers at 
the international level. Still, scholars in the MLG tradition suggest that local 
governments apply important pressure on governments, but that there are practical 
limits to how effective they can be during the negotiations (Newell et al., 2012; 
                                                 
288 Interview No.16 - SP official. 
289 Interview No.24 - national official. 
290 Interview No.25 - national official. 
291 Interview No.34 - private. 
292 The Agenda 21 actually refers to ‘Local Authorities’, together with Women, Children and Youth, 
Farmers, Indigenous Peoples, NGOs, Trade Unions, Science and Technology, Business and Industry. 
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Schroeder & Lovell, 2012, p. 32).293 In the legal literature, there has been some 
investigation of cities’ influence over international efforts to address climate change 
(Osofsky & Levit, 2008), and how transnational networks of cities could be integrated 
into the treaty process (Osofsky, 2010). 
In the paradiplomacy literature, it has been argued that subnational governments’ 
ability to impact the international environmental regime is contingent on networks’ 
capacity to enable subnational governments to influence sustainable development 
discussions at the international level (Royles, 2012, p. 166). Others have gone further 
and suggested that subnational governments rarely influence international decision-
making on sustainable development. The reasons are, firstly, that subnational 
governments have more opportunities via the national context, and, secondly, because 
most EU institutions are not involved in the discussions (Happaerts et al., 2012, p. 257). 
So far, most non-State actors’ influence seems to happen before and not actually at the 
negotiations. In Brazil, subnational impact on international dynamics is arguably 
becoming increasingly important (Vigevani, 2004), but there are no empirical examples 
of the impact of Brazilian subnational governments on the international regime. Overall 
the role of subnational governments and transnational networks of subnational 
governments influencing international environmental governance requires more 
attention.  
Before proceeding with an examination of São Paulo’s influence over the international 
environmental regime, it is important to stress that the scope of this thesis is not to 
proceed with an in depth investigation of subnational influence at multilateral 
environmental negotiations. To do so, the theoretical framework, the methodology and 
the actors interviewed would have to be different. For example, it would be necessary to 
consider to a greater extent the accounts given by policymakers involved at the 
international level in order to characterise subnational governments’ potential 
contribution to intergovernmental policy debates or change. Nevertheless, from the 
interviews given by national diplomats and subnational representatives, together with 
the accounts given by policymakers who experienced environmental paradiplomatic 
activities, it is possible to draw some conclusions on the impact that subnational 
governments are having/can have in the international environmental regime. 
Subnational influence over international environmental negotiations mostly aims at 
having the UN recognise them as governmental actors in the multilateral rule and 
decision making process. That is, rather than influencing the outcomes of the 
negotiations, so far subnational government’s influence has been limited to (or focused 
on) making the nation-States, recognise the legitimacy that this level of governance has 
                                                 
293 While it tries to assess the impact of side-events over formal UNFCCC negotiations Newell (2012) 
strangely uses as a measure the extent to which the side-events presenters and participants referred to 
the formal negotiations. 
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in promoting sustainable development and addressing climate change. This is 
illustrated in the following statement made by the Secretary General of the Nrg4SD: 
The full potential of subnational and local governments as governmental 
stakeholders must be recognized and transposed into enhanced engagement 
within the United Nations decision-making processes. This is not about 
questioning the role of United Nations Member States as sovereign 
representatives in United Nations multilateralism. It is about empowering 
coherent, complementary and synergetic action from all tiers of government. In a 
nutshell, it is about multi-level governance and leadership in the interest of a 
much-needed realistic, courageous and results-oriented path towards 
sustainable development (Cardame, 2012, p. 43). 
Transnational networks of subnational governments play an important role in this 
objective. These networks act “as the voice and representative of subnational 
governments at global level in the field of sustainable development” (Nrg4SD, 2012a). In 
the past years Nrg4d’s capacity represent its members has been enhanced. The network 
gained accreditation to the UN, including observer status within the UNFCCC and the 
CBD.  The state of São Paulo and other subnational governments have been using their 
memberships within the Nrg4SD to advocate a better recognition of this level of 
government in the international environmental governance and institutional 
sustainable development framework. As the international relations advisor of the 
Ministry of Environment commented: 
The networks give more visibility to subnational governments, but all within the 
parallel process of the side-events. I don’t see many interactions with the 
negotiators or opportunities to influence the final decisions. The character of 
subnational participation is mostly one of claiming that their voice is heard, 
rather of content. Similar to indigenous peoples or the other Major Actors, they 
have to be included in the discussion, but their contributions are still limited. 
This might change, but for the time being I’m still sceptical.294 
The state of São Paulo has embarked on this effort to have the UN recognise subnational 
governments as governmental actors. In October 2010 the state actively participated at 
COP-10 to the CBD in Nagoya, and together with other subnational governments the 
state exerted pressure to influence the outcomes of the Conference. As SMA’s 
international relations advisor reports: 
The state Secretary, two experts in biodiversity and I attended the COP and had 
several meetings with other Nrg4SD members. We articulated mostly with 
Quebec, and we influenced the final text of the Action Plan [on Subnational 
Governments, Cities and other Local Authorities for Biodiversity]. We wanted 
                                                 
294 Interview No.32 - national official. 
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them to recognise that after the nation-State, regions and states are the most 
important level of governance. But also we wanted to distinguish ourselves from 
local governments. This is why we needed to negotiate the term ‘subnational 
governments’ in the document. Thanks to our work, a footnote was included into 
the final document stating that subnational governments are different from local 
governments.295 
Decision X/22, adopted by the parties of the CBD, endorsed the Plan of Action on 
Subnational Governments, Cities and other Local Authorities for Biodiversity 2011-
2020. The Plan includes the footnote referred to above, which distinguishes subnational 
and local governments.296 The Plan also provides national governments with set of 
guidelines in support of subnational implementation of the Convention. It invites the 
CBD parties to involve subnational governments when revising their national 
biodiversity strategies and action plans; and to encourage them to elaborate their 
respective subnational strategies and action plans. Additionally, the Plan refers to the 
establishment of advisory committees on subnational governments.297 
However, similar to the influence over the national government, subnational influence 
might be inflated by state representatives. Although participating in UN Conferences 
and organising side-events became an important aspect of the state’s international 
agenda, it is open to debate whether the state has really been successful in influencing 
the negotiations. According to the international relations advisor for the Ministry of 
Environment: 
In Nagoya subnational representatives were present, they had an active 
participation, but nevertheless I don’t think they had an expressive influence 
over the results. Their experiences, opinions and policies are circumscribed, they 
will hardly reverberate internationally. Maybe it is because there are few 
international mechanisms for them to be heard. Subnational participation is 
poorly institutionalised. Maybe if there was a clearer process, where subnational 
governments were officially called to present a paper, then their opinion would 
have more chances to be reflected in the final decisions.298 
                                                 
295 Interview No.9 - SP official. 
296 As mentioned in the Introduction (Subsection 1.2.1), the footnote states that “For the purposes of this 
document, ‘local authorities’ include all levels of government below the subnational, national or federal 
level (prefectures, districts, counties, municipalities, cities, towns, communes, etc.), while ‘subnational 
governments’ (states, provinces, domains, territories, regional governments) applies only to the first 
immediate level of government below the national”. 
297 Decision X/22 identified the Nrg4SD as a key partner for the Advisory Committee of Subnational 
Governments, which was launched in April 2011 in Curitiba, Brazil. The Nrg4SD is accredited to the UN 
CBD and a partner in the Global Partnership for Biodiversity, so it enjoys close collaboration with the 
Secretariat of the Convention. 
298 Interview No.32 - national official. 
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Most subnational representatives will interact with other subnational governments. 
“Subnational government representatives seek their similar, they have their own 
agenda, and they are not interested in influencing the negotiations”.299 This confirms 
previous findings that although side-events are effective forums to exchange ideas and 
network, their current format as events ‘on the side’ does not offer sufficient 
coordination between non-State actors and the UN process (Schroeder, 2012): 
Subnational governments might be able to give their options and influence their 
national delegation. However, during the negotiations they do not have a voice. 
They are governmental actors, but not the nation-State.300 
Subnational governments’ influence over the international negotiations is, therefore, 
mainly indirect (via the negotiators), and occurring through contacts and advocacy 
carried out before the negotiations, in the agenda-setting phase. In this case, subnational 
influence over the national negotiators is achievable and can reflect more tangible 
results, for example, with the national government implementing policies and 
regulation domestically. Nevertheless, it is a fact that environmental paradiplomacy is 
being incorporated within the most important international environmental regimes - 
UFCCC, CBD, Rio+20. So far subnational governments’ efforts are resulting in 
recognition. This confirms Schroeder (2012)’s argument that non-State actors “are 
acting authoritatively and in their own right in the informal climate arena beyond the 
formal UNFCCC regime” (p.26). It also suggests an argument put forward in Chapter 8, 
that subnational governments have acquired both transnational actorness and agency. 
All in all, maybe it is just too early to affirm whether subnational governments can spur 
on or steer international environmental regimes. 
In summary, the analysis carried out in Section 7.4 of the outcomes of São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomatic agenda showed that by engaging in international 
relations the state is influencing higher levels of governance. The second part of 
Hypothesis 3 was, therefore, also confirmed: the state has influenced (i) the national 
government and national environmental policymaking; (ii) the national position-
forming process on climate change and biodiversity; and (iii) the international 
environmental regime on the extent to which it recognises the important role played by 
subnational governments in the governance of global environmental problems. This 
analysis advances the existent literature by providing a more specific account of the 
impacts that a subnational government can have over both the national position-
forming process and the international environmental regime. Further, it suggests that 
on a scale of intensity of influence, the highest degree of influence is over the national 
government’s policies, followed by the influence over the national foreign policy, and 
lastly over the international regime. 
                                                 
299 Interview No.35 – private. Also, Interview No.32 - SP academic. 
300 Interview No.26 - national official. 
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7.5. SUMMARY 
Addressing research question 3 (What are the results of São Paulo’s international 
environmental agenda?) this Chapter analysed the effects of São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomatic agenda in the state of São Paulo, in Brazilian domestic 
policy, in Brazilian foreign policy, and in international environmental negotiations. The 
processes used by the state to bring about these effects were assessed in Chapters 4 and 
5, whereas the reasons why they engage in such activities were explored in Chapter 6. 
Some outcomes of environmental paradiplomacy were tightly linked with how and why 
environmental paradiplomacy evolves, while others were not so clearly related. In any 
case, the Chapters should not be understood separately. Indeed, the factors influencing 
subnational governments to undertake an international environmental agenda are 
likely to shape the outcomes of their agenda.  
The analysis showed that we still lack a systematic theoretical explanation of what the 
implications of subnational (environmental) diplomacy are. By integrating the 
competing arguments suggested by the literature on paradiplomacy and the MLG 
approach, and analysing what results from São Paulo’s international environmental 
agenda, this Chapter advanced previous research in developing such a framework. The 
assessment considered the impacts of environmental paradiplomacy over subnational 
governments’ capacity to deal with global environmental problems (first part of 
Hypothesis 3 – section 7.3) and to influence higher levels of governance (second part of 
Hypothesis 3 – section 7.4). The impacts were measured in terms of legal and 
institutional effects as assessed by participating actors and observational findings. 
In summary, environmental paradiplomacy undertaken by the state of São Paulo is part 
of broader transnational and paradiplomatic processes, but it has specific dynamics and 
impacts in its own right. First, São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomatic agenda can be 
concretely translated into state legislation. Face-to-face interactions and learning 
opportunities are incorporated into state laws and decrees. Second, São Paulo is 
influencing the national government to enact new policies and legislation, and to change 
its strategy in international environmental negotiations. Put differently, the state is 
transforming a soft international agenda into hard regional legislation, and there is an 
indication that the state has been able to influence national foreign policy, as well as 
international environmental negotiations. 
Because the state is able to transform policies and informal commitments into 
enforceable law, environmental paradiplomacy exceeds the outcomes of other 
transnational activities. Following Heyvaert’s (2013b) definition of transnational 
environmental law and regulation as “a shorthand for law that deliberately engages with 
those challenges that characterize contemporary global environmental threats, with 
climate change first in line” (p.81), the law and regulation established by the state of São 
Paulo to address global environmental problems is a form of transnational 
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environmental law and regulation. Moreover, São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy 
might contribute to ‘bottom-up lawmaking processes’ (Levit, 2007), where informal 
rules embed in a more formal legal system and thereby become law.301 
The next Chapter continues by examining the outcomes of environmental 
paradiplomacy by drawing out some of the broader implications of São Paulo’s 
environmental paradiplomatic agenda. 
 
                                                 
301 Levit (2007, p. 395) suggests that private parties, NGOs, and/or mid-level technocrats coalesce around 
shared experiences and interests, codifying norms that reflect and condition group practices. 
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CHAPTER 8: THEORETICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PARADIPLOMACY 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 7 addressed the third research question: What are the results of the 
international environmental agenda undertaken by the state of São Paulo? 
Drawing from the MLG and paradiplomacy framework, it was hypothesised that by 
engaging in environmental paradiplomacy the state expands its capacity to deal with 
global environmental problems. It was also hypothesised that São Paulo is influencing 
higher levels of governance, that is, decision-making processes on the national and 
international levels. Chapter 7 further suggested that São Paulo’s environmental 
paradiplomacy has a distinctive character of promoting new legislation in the state.  
The purpose of this Chapter is to infer further theoretical implications of the 
international relations undertaken by the state of São Paulo. Is it possible to argue 
that paradiplomatic activities direct our attention towards new forms of government or 
new forms of State? Do they represent a challenge to the sovereignty of the nation-
State? I argue that São Paulo’s environmental paradiplomacy results in a change of 
patterns, in different – if not new – types of relationship, which emphasise enhanced 
channels of communication between the subnational, the national, and the 
international, and reinforce the image of rescaling that was discussed in Chapter 5. 
Ultimately, environmental paradiplomacy represents new alignments of authority in 
global environmental governance.  
These new alignments of authority promoted by environmental paradiplomacy are 
seen, first, in the changing relationships between subnational governments and the 
nation-State. In the case of the international environmental relations undertaken by the 
state of São Paulo, these new relationships are observed in terms of (i) how 
paradiplomacy is being instutionalised within the national government and the state; 
(ii) how the international environmental agenda undertaken by subnational 
governments is expanding Brazilian cooperative federalism; and (iii) the prospects of 
conflict and cooperation between the national government and its subunits. 
These new alignments of authority are seen, second, in terms of subnational 
government’ transnational presence. I argue that by engaging in international initiatives 
subnational governments produce a distinctive paradiplomatic identity, where (i) by 
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undertaking collaborative initiatives they become transnational actors; and (ii) by 
undertaking coalition initiatives they acquire transnational agency. 
This Chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 8.2 goes back to the different 
bodies of literature that guided the research, looking at how they identify the broader 
implications of subnational governments’ engagement in international relations. Section 
8.3 assesses the changing relationships that can be observed between subnational 
governments and the nation-State as a result of environmental paradiplomacy. Section 
8.4 looks at how the international environmental initiatives undertaken by subnational 
governments translate into a broader transnational presence. Section 8.5 presents a 
summary of the findings. 
8.2. NEW ALIGNMENTS OF AUTHORITY 
The theoretical implications of subnational governments’ engagement in international 
relations for the international system can be approached through the different bodies of 
literature that guided the research.  
For transnationalists, the expanding role of non-State actors in international affairs 
motivates a discussion of sovereignty and implications for State authority. Almost forty 
years ago Keohane and Nye (1974) acknowledged that the nation-State was no longer 
the only foreign policy actor. Wapner (1998) developed the argument and claimed that 
transnational actors reoriented the notion of State sovereignty. Studies within this trend 
indicate that transnational actors are addressing the limitations of traditional interstate 
diplomacy. Their involvement in institutionalised policy processes contributes to the 
democratisation of world politics (Raustiala, 2002), promotes flexibility and 
responsiveness: through information exchange, discussion and coordination, they avoid 
the obstacles that draw out efforts to negotiate formal treaties (Slaughter, 2004). 
Transgovernmental actors, in particular, contribute to the discussion of highly technical 
issues in which foreign ministries lack expertise (Slaughter & Hale, 2010, p. 359). 
Moreover, transnational actors challenge environmental multilateralism. They 
represent a more multiscalar notion of the actors involved in environmental 
multilateralism (Osofsky, 2010), and enhance the legitimacy of governmental and 
intergovernmental policies (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010; Osofsky, 2010; Raustiala, 
1997b; Schroeder & Lovell, 2012; Zürn, 1998).302 
MLG scholars also envision the changing role of the State. It is argued that the idea of 
‘foreign affairs’ is no longer a sustainable category separate from ‘domestic concerns’: 
globalization has brought a wave of situations in which the two categories overlap 
(Piattoni, 2010, p. 188). MLG permits the participation and representation of 
subnational interests that are not always authorised to be involved in policymaking in 
                                                 
302 See Chapter 6. 
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their national contexts (Piattoni, 2010, p. 242). Researchers drawing upon a MLG 
framework further argue that the nation-State is no longer the principal entity in 
climate governance (Bulkeley, 2005; Gore, 2010). Along these lines, cities became a 
prime example of a public authority that transcends such dichotomy. From this 
perspective, there is only an elusive boundary between the foreign and the domestic, 
and often these concerns are intertwined (Acuto, 2013a; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; 
Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003). 
Alternatively, Hoffmann (2011) understands this situation as a transition from a 
centripetal to a centrifugal cycle. On the one hand, the participation of transnational 
actors in international environmental negotiations confirms the importance of 
multilateral processes. By attending the negotiations and orienting their discourses and 
practices, non-State actors reinforce the idea that multilateralism is the way to respond 
to global environmental problems. On the other hand, in a context where multilateral 
processes are no longer the only way to approach environmental problems: 
Cities, states/provinces, corporations, and more have begun to see themselves as 
authoritative actors in general, and this translates into an enhanced proclivity to 
see themselves as authoritative actors in climate change (Hoffmann, 2011, p. 66). 
Within the paradiplomacy literature there has been less interest in understanding the 
new alignments of authority that result from the engagement of subnational 
government in international relations. Some scholars writing within this trend point out 
that the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policy has become harder 
to sustain (Hocking, 1993a; Kincaid, 1984). Diplomacy, which was regarded as a 
phenomenon of international politics, assumes a domestic dimension. The exclusive 
territories of the domestic and international are blended by a range of forces located at 
differing political levels (Aguirre, 1999; Hocking, 1993a). Others argue that diplomacy is 
losing its traditional function as NGOs and subnational governments continuously 
overlap or bypass central governments' foreign policy (Aguirre, 1999).  
However, the extent to which transnational actors and new modes of governance 
impact the State remains insufficiently supported by empirical research (Andonova & 
Van Deveer, 2011). The literature also lacks a consideration of the global impacts of the 
growing interaction between cities and global governance (Acuto, 2013b). Trying to 
draw further theoretical insights of paradiplomacy, I consider the new alignments of 
authority that are established when a subnational government undertakes an 
international agenda. More specifically, the analysis suggests that environmental 
paradiplomacy impacts the relationships between subnational governments and the 
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nation-State (Section 8.3), and it characterises subnational governments as both 
transnational actors and agents (Section 8.4).303 
8.3. CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND 
THE NATION-STATE 
The environmental paradiplomatic agenda undertaken by the state of São Paulo affects 
the interactions or relationships between the national and the subnational in foreign 
policymaking. In this web of interactions, subnational governments are exerting 
diplomacy with the approval of the central government, and paradiplomacy is being 
institutionalised within the national and the subnational level (Subsection 8.3.1). As a 
result, environmental paradiplomatic activity is playing a role in expanding cooperative 
federalism in Brazil (Subsection 8.3.2). Examining the outcomes of these relationships, 
it is possible to conclude that environmental paradiplomacy in Brazil results in more 
cooperation than conflict (Subsection 8.3.3). 
8.3.1. Institutionalising paradiplomacy 
In the paradiplomacy literature, the institutionalisation of the international relations 
apparatus of subnational governments has been measured in terms of the number of 
people involved in subnational diplomacy, the organisation type (i.e. Department, 
Secretariat etc.), the type and amount of activity undertaken, and the level of 
communication established with the central government (Salomón & Nunes, 2007). The 
fact that the international activity of Brazilian subnational governments is poorly 
institutionalised was mentioned in Chapter 4. The states and municipalities that engage 
in external relations have limited resources, they establish different types of 
organisation, and there is no requirement to coordinate the activities with higher or 
lower-level authorities.  
Institutionalisation of paradiplomacy (or federative diplomacy, to use the official term 
chosen by Itamaraty) was further discussed in Chapter 5. In the national level, in 1997 
an advisory board was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help subnational 
governments to develop their international relations (ARF, replaced in 2003 by AFEPA). 
In parallel, a Division for Federative Affairs (SAF) was created within the Presidential 
Office, which also supports international cooperation in involving states and 
municipalities. Within São Paulo state government, the first Special Advisory Office for 
International Affairs was created in 1991, abolished in 1996, and reinstated in 2005. In 
2010, the Green Party coalition submitted a white paper requesting the creation of an 
International Relations Secretariat within the newly installed state government. The 
document justified it on the basis that São Paulo has an economic relevance and its own 
                                                 
303 Note to reader: Sections 8.3 and 8.4 partially draw upon a paper I presented at the ISA Annual 
Convention (Setzer, 2013c). 
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interests in the international scene.304 The proposal was based on one of the items of 
Fabio Feldmann’s candidature for Governor of the state, which argued that: 
São Paulo has its own interests and economic weight on the international 
scenario. This justifies the creation of a state International Relations Department 
that can act in defence of our state’s interests (…), establish cooperation 
agreements and foster technological and scientific interchange with other 
countries, as well as contribute to São Paulo’s international visibility as the 
country’s economic and political centre (Feldmann, 2010). 
The institutionalisation of paradiplomacy in the state also reduces the 
personal/individual character of São Paulo’s international relations. When asked about 
it, Fabio Feldmann explained that: 
We need to institutionalise our international agenda. It can no longer remain 
dependent on the politicians and officials who are in charge in a particular 
moment. In six years in power Governor Covas travelled only once abroad. The 
Governor has to defend the state in this globalised world…. However, just 
creating a department or a secretariat does not guarantee this… we need to 
create a paradiplomatic culture within the government. The costs are very little 
compared to the potential benefits.305 
Although a specific Department was not created, clear measures to strengthen the 
state’s international relations were put out in place. In April 2012 the state made public 
its International Relations Plan, the first of its kind in Brazil, providing the state with 
guidelines in the field of international relations for the period of for 2011-14, with a 
view to fostering sustainable development in the state and augmenting the state’s 
international influence (São Paulo, 2012).  
Environmental paradiplomacy, in particular, was institutionalised within the state 
structure. After 25 years of existence, in 2011, the Special Projects Advisory Office was 
abolished and a specific International Advisory Body was created, which reports 
directly to the state Secretary for the Environment. The new International Advisory 
Body is now in charge of international cooperation and of organizing the visit of 
international authorities, but it was designated two new responsibilities that directly 
relate to coalition activities: participation in international conferences and participation 
in transnational networks.306 
                                                 
304 Article on the Green Party request for the creation of an International Relations Secretariat available 
on http://blogs.estadao.com.br/radar-politico/2010/11/25/pv-pede-a-alckmin-criacao-de-secretaria-
de-relacoes-internacionais/ 
305 Interview No.46 -NGO. 
306 Resolution SMA 37/2011. 
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Despite these measures, SMA and CETESB officials called for better staffed and 
equipped structures to meet expanding organisational demands. There are three 
officers within SMA and six within CETESB working in the international relations 
division. Also, the state lacks stronger channels of communication and coordination 
with the SAF and/or the diplomatic body at Itamaraty. SAF has no control over the 
initiatives established by subnational governments. As the international relations 
advisor at SAF confirmed, “if the state signs a MOU that conflicts with a previous MOU, 
or if an initiative is abandoned, we will never know”.307 Itamaraty might be more 
involved and better informed, but not on a regular basis. The diplomat who was São 
Paulo’s international advisor until 2010 acknowledged that: 
Because I am a diplomat I try to make this bridge between the state government 
and Itamaraty, and to keep Itamaraty informed of what we are doing. I also often 
get information from my colleagues in Brasilia, and add the specific information 
provided by the state secretariats. But not all subnational governments have a 
diplomat working in their international relations division.308 
Regulating paradiplomacy could help address this institutionalisation and 
communication problem. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this is what the PEC (Proposal of 
Amendment to the Constitution) presented by the federal deputy and diplomat Andre 
Costa attempted to do. According to a SAF officer, “if subnational diplomacy was 
regulated through a specific law it would help Itamaraty have more control over 
subnational international initiatives”.309 It is also, perhaps, a matter of time. As another 
interviewee highlighted, “until recently subnational governments didn’t have a 
permanent forum to act internationally. The bridges have been built; the challenge now 
is to maintain them. As the saying goes ‘one swallow doesn’t make a summer’”.310 
8.3.2. Expanding cooperative federalism 
In the changing relationship between subnational and the central governments, 
environmental paradiplomacy is also impacting Brazilian federalism. If initially 
Itamaraty was reluctant to support subnational diplomacy, diplomats are becoming 
more open to cooperation with state representatives. As a result, not only it is expected 
that the state will maintain its international life, but it can also be said that this 
paradiplomatic activity is playing a role in expanding cooperative federalism in Brazil. 
Such a change was acknowledged by SAF’s international relations advisor: 
                                                 
307 Interview No.24 - national official. 
308 Interview No.16 - SP official. 
309 Interview No.25 - national official. 
310 Interview No.34 – private. 
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These last events [climate COPs] have offered us an opportunity to explore how a 
cooperative federalism operates, a true federalist dialogue has been taking 
place.311 
The notion of cooperative federalism was introduced in Chapter 2 and further developed 
in Chapter 6. Cooperative federalism emphasises the importance of engaging multiple 
levels of governance in policymaking, particularly in an effort to deal with 
environmental problems (Boyd, 2011; Carlson, 2008). Environmental paradiplomacy 
emphasises this idea, while it relativizes the federal governments’ exclusivity on 
international relations. 
However, by emphasising the notion of cooperative federalism, paradiplomacy is not 
promoting a devolution movement from the national towards subnational governments. 
Under a context of devolution, the division of powers (administrative, judicial or 
legislative) is conferred by the central government, which retains the capacity to revoke 
them (Gregory et al., 2009, p. 156). Duran (2011) argued that in France subnational 
governments’ external relations and diplomatic activities are driven by devolution 
processes. In a context of cooperative federalism, the division of powers is instead 
determined by the Constitution. This is the case of Brazil, where subnational 
governments’ power emanates from the original constituent power, and is exercised 
within the limits established by the Federal Constitution (Article 225, Paragraph 1). 
Instead, this structure is underpinned by the subsidiarity principle, according to which 
decisions within a political system should be taken at the lowest level consistent with 
effective action. It also relates with to already established idea in the MLG literature, 
that the involvement of lower levels of government can make policymaking reflect local 
citizens’ preferences more closely (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Jordan & Jeppesen, 2000; 
Scharpf, 1988). Yet, environmental paradiplomacy cannot be justified by the idea that 
the level of jurisdictional authority should best ‘match’ the geographic scale of the 
problem - referred by environmental lawyers as the matching principle (Sovacool, 
2008). If environmental paradiplomacy strictly followed the matching principle, then 
global environmental problems would only be addressed through institutions of 
equivalent scope of the problem in question. Foreign affairs would remain an exclusive 
competence of the federal government. 
Therefore, São Paulo’s international agenda to deal with global environmental problems 
is driven by, and at the same time it expands, the application of cooperative federalism. 
This structure is underpinned by the division of powers that is determined by the 
Federal Constitution (and not by devolution processes) and by the subsidiarity principle 
(and not by the matching principle). Such a domestic structure makes the state capable 
of legislating, implementing environmental legislation, and also undertaking 
international roles in both coalition and collaboration initiatives across borders. More 
                                                 
311 Interview No.24 - national official. 
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generally, environmental paradiplomacy affects our thinking about the constitutional 
dimension of federalism. 
8.3.3. Between conflict and cooperation 
The institutionalisation of paradiplomacy and the expansion of cooperative federalism 
characterise the international environmental relations undertaken by the state of São 
Paulo mostly as a cooperative relationship.  
So far, the paradiplomatic literature has been examined using a dichotomist approach, 
where a subnational foreign agenda is either conflicting with or cooperative to the 
diplomatic activities of the nation-State (Cornago, 1999; Duran, 2011). The majority of 
studies have identified paradiplomacy as conflictual involving subnational governments 
and the nation-State in the execution of international relations. Subnational diplomacy 
is seen to potentially fuel tension with the central government and can strengthen the 
position of nationalist leaders (Lecours & Moreno, 2003). Empirical studies also 
emphasise the conflicting nature of the relations between subnational and central 
governments. A number of cases examine subnational governments that are pushing the 
boundaries of what is subnational and what is foreign policy by strengthening their 
national identify (Royles, 2012), or placing themselves as “a minority nation in the 
wider family of nation-States” (Keating, 1997, p. 708).  
A minority of studies have argued that paradiplomacy can increase the potential for 
cooperation in central-subnational relations (e.g. Aldecoa, 1999). Along these lines, 
Soldatos (1990, p. 51) argues that paradiplomacy should place less emphasis on conflict. 
In his words, “it will increasingly be a cooperative rather than a parallel paradiplomacy; 
but, although cooperative, it will continue to pose problems for federal governments' 
foreign policy in terms of harmonization and global coherence”. Following his work, 
Hocking (1993a, 1999) called for a concept of ‘multilayered’ diplomacy, where 
subnational governments integrate a complex diplomatic environment which blends the 
domestic and international. Duran (2011) further argued that diplomatic practices 
surpass the conflictual logic according to which subnational entities win what the 
national diplomatic level loses. Instead, paradiplomacy is “an integral part of diplomacy, 
aimed at emphasizing the commonalities instead of the differences or separateness 
between polities” (p.340). 
In Brazil environmental paradiplomacy has resulted in more cooperation than conflict. 
As noted above, through this increased the dialogue of São Paulo with the nation-State, 
diplomats were able to reach more balanced and representative national positions 
(Subsection 7.4.2). Furthermore, although a paradiplomatic agenda makes international 
relations more complex, with more actors involved, at no point has São Paulo 
challenged the national authority over the country’s foreign affairs. Andre Costa, the 
diplomat who wrote the paradiplomacy PEC, argued that subnational governments are 
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not intending to question or replace the nation-State as the country’s representative in 
foreign relations:  
Brazilian federated units have the support of the Presidency and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the division of competences is clear - the national 
government establishes and defends the national interests in the international 
sphere, while on the other side subnational governments undertake initiatives in 
areas such as commerce, culture, and cooperation (Costa, 2005a, p. 12).312 
Many actors at the state and national level confirmed this idea that “although states 
have their claims, they are not made in a confronting way”313, and that “when São Paulo 
disagrees with the national foreign policy, we take a differentiated, yet respectful, 
position”.314 Agreement was achieved even in potentially conflicting situations, such as 
the pre-Copenhagen period: 
Before COP-15 the states and Itamaraty defended antagonist positions. We [SAF] 
helped mediating them, and President Lula was also involved. At the end I think 
that the states won the dispute, with the federal government giving its support. I 
don’t know if the diplomats share this opinion, but in my view the states played 
an important role and emerged victorious.315 
While in their assessment of influence the accounts of state and national 
representatives were unbalanced, the understanding of what paradiplomacy means in 
terms of a co-existence between diplomats and subnational representatives was more 
harmonious. This implied that subnational representatives accepted the need for 
national endorsement when loans are involved, as well as accepting Itamaraty’s 
primacy in international policymaking: 
The fact that we have an international environmental agenda does not create 
conflict with the federal government. When there are financial aspects involved, 
we ask for federal endorsement. In the other situations we remain in contact 
with Itamaraty. We know until where we can go with our international 
agenda.316 
Even when the state government has a different stand, there is a general 
understanding that the national position in an international negotiation is made 
by the federal government and by Itamaraty. The governor can emphasise São 
Paulo’s achievements and policies, but this is not the same as saying this is the 
national position. In any meeting between the governor and foreign authorities, 
                                                 
312 Author’s translation. 
313Interview No.24 - national official. 
314 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
315 Interview No.24 - national official 
316 Interview No.1 - SP official. 
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we make it clear that the governor’s opinion is a personal one, or the opinion of 
the state government, and not the position being defended by the country. So 
there is no margin for conflict if the state makes it clear that its position is 
distinct from that of the negotiators. Itamaraty accepts it as normal because 
there is no confrontation.317 
At the same time, the participation of subnational government representatives in 
diplomatic processes allows them to understand the roles of ‘real diplomats’, and the 
difficulties that they face. Many subnational representatives who experience 
multilateral environmental negotiations feel overwhelmed and frustrated with the pace 
at which decisions are taken. Nevertheless, they leave with an increased respect for the 
diplomats’ ability to deal with complex themes, especially after sleepless nights in the 
final stages of the negotiations.  
At the federal level, the acceptance of subnational diplomacy requires trust, and an 
understanding that divergent opinions must be coordinated domestically. This is 
reflected in the comments made by the head of AFEPA: 
We stimulate subnational participation in bilateral agreements and multilateral 
forums. We are not worried or suspicious that subnational governments will act 
in a way that is contrary to our orientation. There is no distrust... The 
Constitutional competence is clear, and I don’t think subnational governments 
would encroach on this… Even when subnational governments have a divergent 
opinion and try to influence us, as in the case of COP-15, after a few coordinating 
meetings we were able to achieve a common ground... Domestically we can 
disagree, but internationally there is only one position, the Brazilian position”.318 
The recognition that multilateralism is not the only way to address global 
environmental problems is also implied. As the Head of the Environment Division at 
Itamaraty put it: 
There might be [potential conflict between subnational governments and the 
negotiators], but I have never experienced such a situation. Maybe there is some 
bureaucratic jealousy, not more. The MOU entered between Governor Serra and 
Schwarzenegger had intensive media coverage, but it did not lead to conflict. The 
agendas are not conflicting, subnational and national governments want similar 
things, even if eventually through different means. We just need to understand 
that multilateralism is not the only way to address global environmental 
problems.319 
                                                 
317 Interview No.16 - SP official. 
318 Interview No.28 - national official. 
319 Interview No.27 – national official. 
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In addition, Itamaraty’s support of federative diplomacy underlies the idea that 
subnational engagement in international regimes helps legitimise the diplomat’s role in 
international policymaking. 
Although the opportunities for dialogue between subnational representatives and 
foreign officers are still limited320, the analysis above shows that cooperation features 
prominently in Brazilian environmental paradiplomacy. Subnational representatives 
might say that Itamaraty does not have exclusivity over Brazilian foreign policy321 and 
that multilateralism is not the only solution to global environmental problems.322 Yet, 
subnational representatives respect the diplomats’ authority. Thus far, the federal 
reaction to subnational foreign affairs has been mostly cordial and supportive. There 
have been no major conflicts, and when some animosity began (e.g. prior to COP-15 in 
Copenhagen), it was clear that Itamaraty’s voice represented the national opinion. 
These accounts draw attention to the fact that environmental paradiplomacy 
undertaken by the state of São Paulo gave rise to more cooperation than conflict and, 
ultimately, it leads to new interactions and relationships between the actors in the 
subnational and national levels. 
8.4. ACQUIRING A TRANSNATIONAL PRESENCE 
In addition to changing the interactions or relationships between the national and the 
subnational in foreign policymaking, undertaking international environmental 
initiatives affects how subnational governments place themselves internationally. 
Taking into consideration the case study of this thesis, I argue that by undertaking a mix 
of collaboration and coalition activities323 the state of São Paulo produces a distinctive 
paradiplomatic identity, through which it becomes a transnational actor and acquires 
transnational agency. Overall the analysis shows that subnational actorness and agency 
coincides with the characteristics that define subnational government’s international 
environmental agenda in terms of collaboration and coalition initiatives (Table 8-1). 
 Collaboration Coalition 
Transnational actorness Yes Yes 
Transnational agency No Yes 
 
                                                 
320 Interview No.19 - SP official, and the previous Subsection. 
321 Interview No.46 - NGO. 
322 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
323 Chapter 4 suggested a new typology for paradiplomatic activity, consisting of collaboration and 
coalition activities. Coalition initiatives were shown to be particularly strong in Sao Paulo’s environmental 
agenda: all the networks in which the state participates have environmental and sustainable development 
objectives; the only multilateral negotiations which the state follows are on global environmental 
problems (climate change and biodiversity); and the majority of the international missions that the state 
hosted had environmental topics in their agenda. 
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Table 8-1 Relation between collaboration and coalition, actorness and agency in 
environmental paradiplomacy 
Source: Author 
Subsection 8.4.1 presents the state of São Paulo as a transnational actor. The state’s 
actorness is evaluated using the paradiplomacy literature, mostly Duran’s (2011) 
conceptual framework. Subsection 8.4.2 examines how subnational governments 
acquire agency. The transnational agency of subnational governments is considered 
through the lenses of the MLG literature, using the conceptualization of agency brought 
by O’Neil et al (2004) and Schroeder (2010). The analysis also addresses a call in the 
literature for further clarification of the differences between actors and agents (O'Neill 
et al., 2004). 
8.4.1. Transnational actorness 
The notion of ‘actorness’ has been subject of considerable discussion within the IR 
literature, especially with scholars assessing EU’s actorness in foreign policy. In this 
context, different criteria for actorness have been developed. For instance, in their 
analysis of the EU as an actor in international environmental politics, Bretherton and 
Vogler (2008) conceptualised EU’s actorness based on the notions of opportunity, 
presence and capability.324 Whilst it has been possible to understand EU’s actorness, 
would it be appropriate to consider such propriety in relation to subnational 
governments? 
Scholars writing on paradiplomacy assume, in a rather unproblematic way, that 
subnational governments become ‘international actors’ because of their involvement in 
international activities (e.g. Cohn & Smith, 1996). Hocking (1999) expanded this 
analysis looking at subnational government’s actorness and the different criteria which 
demonstrate their capacity to pursue foreign policy. He demonstrates that foreign 
policy constitutes only one dimension to subnational government’s international 
activity. Drawing upon Bretherton and Vogler (2008), Duran (2011) developed a 
conceptual framework of actorness for subnational governments. In his examination of 
the French region of Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (PACA), Duran defines actorness as 
“the ability to make one’s presence felt internationally” (p. 346), and proposes four 
criteria to discern the actorness of a region: 
(i) Authority, which deals with the legal competences that allow a region to 
engage in international relations;  
                                                 
324 For Bretherton and Vogler (2008), presence conceptualizes the ability of the EU to exert influence 
beyond its borders. Opportunity refers to ideas and events that constrain or enable actorness. Capability 
refers to the capacity to formulate and implement external policy. 
 221 
 
(ii) Presence, which refers both to the external recognition by which other 
actors recognize the region’s international role, as well as the internal 
identity of the region as an international actor;  
(iii) Autonomy, which is the ability to set up and develop an institutional 
diplomatic structure; and  
(iv) Opportunity, which refers to the external environment enabling the 
international activities. 
Applying this framework Duran concludes that PACA is an international actor. The 
criterion of authority is met as French regions can manage foreign policy issues which 
touch upon their competences, for example, through decentralised cooperation. The 
criterion of presence is met as French regions are allowed to sign international 
agreements325 within the domain of their competences (external recognition), and PACA 
entails a distinct identity integrating the Mediterranean macro-region (internal 
recognition). The criterion of autonomy is observed as PACA has a department for 
international relations. Finally the criterion of opportunity manifests itself in 
institutional niches (Committee of the Regions), transnational cooperation frameworks 
(European Territorial Cooperation) and geographical partnerships (Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership) through which the region acts beyond the State borders. 
This framework has some conceptual and terminological shortcomings. First, Duran 
(2011) uses the term ‘international’ as a generic designation for the relations between 
actors across borders, whether they are private or public, State or non-State. As clarified 
in the Introduction, non-State actors are now widely recognised as transnational actors 
(Stripple & Pattberg, 2010). The term ‘transnational’ is, hence, more appropriate to 
characterize the international agenda of non-State actors, including that of subnational 
governments. Second, Duran (2011) considers actorness and agency as synonyms. 
However, not only the differences between actorness and agency are crucial (O'Neill et 
al., 2004; Schroeder, 2010), but also, I argue, they reflect the differences between 
collaboration and coalition. 
Despite these differences, Duran’s framework can be extended to the analysis of São 
Paulo’s transnational actorness. As previously examined: 
(i) Authority – the state is allowed to engage in international relations, with 
some limitations (see Chapter 5); 
(ii) Presence – the state establishes decentralised cooperation agreements 
within the domain of its competences (external recognition – see Chapter 
4). It also demonstrates a distinct regional identity through its leadership 
role in environmental policymaking (internal recognition - see Chapter 6); 
                                                 
325 There is a problem with the way in which Duran uses the term ‘international agreements’. It would be 
more adequate to use ‘cooperation agreements’. See Mitchell (2003). 
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(iii) Autonomy – the state has a department for international relations, which 
during the past 20 years have become more institutionalised; the same 
can be said for SMA’s and CETESB’s international relations advisory 
offices (see Chapters 4 and 5); and  
(iv) Opportunity - São Paulo participates actively in initiatives through which 
it acts beyond the state borders (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
Therefore, establishing cooperation initiatives across borders and formalising an 
international agenda gives subnational governments the authority, presence, autonomy, 
and the opportunity they need to become transnational actors. In the case of the state of 
São Paulo, considering the characteristics of its international environmental agenda 
examined during this thesis, it is possible to conclude that by having formalised an 
international agenda, and undertaking collaboration initiatives across borders, the state 
of São Paulo acquired transnational actorness. 
8.4.2 Transnational agency 
In addition, it can be argued that São Paulo’s international agenda advances a step up 
the ladder of paradiplomatic activity. São Paulo’s international activity is not limited to 
information-sharing opportunities enabled through decentralised cooperation or 
through participation in networks. It’s international environmental agenda promotes a 
real paradiplomatic shift which involves a consistent presence in international 
negotiations, engagement in the agenda-setting for these negotiations, membership in 
transnational networks that represent regional governments in global forums, and 
engagement with topics that are global - and not only regional and local - in nature. Such 
leap characterises the state as a transnational agent.  
The argument that the state of São Paulo is not only an actor, but also an agent, requires 
a brief consideration of the concept of agency. Agency is a widely applied concept in 
social science and among one of the most difficult to define (O'Neill et al., 2004). While 
traditional IR theorists suggested that States were the sole agents, more recent 
scholarship understands agency in terms of influence of actors, both State and non-
State, over international politics. This capacity is observed within networked 
individuals and groups (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Stripple & Pattberg, 2010), as well as 
within units of government (Keohane & Nye, 1971; Raustiala, 2002; Risse, 1995; 
Slaughter, 2004). However, not all actors are automatically agents. As Schroeder (2010) 
clarifies, actors participate in decision-making without directly shaping outcomes, while 
agents prescribe behaviours with consent of the governed. In short, an agent is an 
‘authoritative actor’ (Schroeder, 2010), who has the capability to ‘make a difference’ in 
the production of definite outcomes (O'Neill et al., 2004). For agency to occur, it is 
necessary to have a “purposeful steering of constituents either indirectly (by influencing 
the decisions of other actors) or directly (by making steering decisions)” (Schroeder, 
2010, p. 320).  
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Transnational networks of subnational governments such as ICLEI and C40 have 
already been seen to have agency. They “illustrate that the drivers of climate policies 
can no longer be equated with governments and their diplomatic corps, but have 
diversified to include the local as a central level of climate governance” (Pattberg & 
Stripple, 2008, p. 379). The transnational political agency of C40 “has focused on 
formulating joint statements, calls for actions and collective plans targeted towards 
expanding and reproblematising the role of metropolises in global environmental 
politics” (Acuto, 2013b, p. 8). 
The state of São Paulo, through and also independently from transnational networks, 
follows these paths. São Paulo’s agency in the governance of global environmental 
problems was confirmed in the interviews conducted with different policy makers in 
the state and in the federal level. For instance, SMA’s International Affairs Advisor 
remembers 1995, the year when the special division for global environmental problems, 
the PROCLIMA and the PROZONESP programs were established, as the landmark for 
São Paulo’s international environmental agenda:  
Until 1995 we were mainly concerned with our own problems, the creation of 
parks, air pollution. The Special Advisory was in charge of international 
cooperation, but the topics we dealt with were local in nature. When Fabio 
Feldmann became the state Secretary, the international treaties signed at Rio 
1992 and global international problems started to become part of our concerns. 
We organized a publication containing all the international environmental 
treaties so far in force, and a team of SMA’s officials travelled all around the state, 
explaining the new International Conventions and the topics they dealt with. 
Until then, people had no idea about these Treaties or about global 
environmental problems. Soon after, we began to join international forums and 
networks. This is when we really became international.326 
After 15 years of a constant international activity focused on global environmental 
problems, it is now possible to make sense of this agenda, grouping the different 
activities undertaken by SMA and CETESB in the two major types of behaviour 
mentioned above (collaboration and coalition), and recognising the diplomatic and rule 
making roles acquired by the state. Once again, this was implicitly acknowledged by 
CETESB’s President and by SMA’s Legal Advisor: 
São Paulo’s international agenda goes beyond the South-South or North-South 
cooperation. We have a political agenda within the United Nations and the 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, where we engage in many of the same 
core diplomatic functions that characterize the work of the diplomats.327 
                                                 
326 Interview No.4 - SP official. 
327 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
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We don’t see international cooperation initiatives as international diplomacy. 
But São Paulo has a diplomatic agenda when it participates in international 
conferences and transnational networks.328 
Importantly, and confirming what the previously analysed scholarship envisioned as 
agency (Schroeder, 2010), the international activities undertaken by the state of São 
Paulo are not confined to lobbying and advising national governments in the creation 
and implementation of rules. Rather, the state of São Paulo frequently becomes an agent 
substantively participating in and/or setting its own legislation (see Chapter 7). In 
addition, policymakers in the state have joined other subnational governments in calling 
for recognition within the international system:  
I believe that subnational governments have to be recognised as ‘special 
international public-law entities’, and the networks as ‘special international 
organisations’. It is important to differentiate subnational governments from 
NGOs in the international system. Initially subnational governments accepted to 
being classified as NGOs, because this was the only way they found to attend 
international negotiations. Now this terminology is an object of much discontent 
among subnational governments. Still, I believe it doesn’t matter the name or the 
colour of our hat. What matters is to be part of the process, and to have a voice. 
With time I’m sure that the UN system will react and correct this.329 
São Paulo’s agency is also recognised by policy-makers across borders. In fact, the state 
is generally perceived as a relevant player in environmental paradiplomacy. For 
example, the climate change and sustainable development coordinator within Quebec’s 
Department for International Relations acknowledged São Paulo’s leadership role 
within the Nrg4SD, and the fact that “São Paulo’s diplomacy is clearly getting more 
important, structured and organised”.330 In the view of the former Secretary General of 
Regions United (FOGAR), “São Paulo’s international relations play an important role in 
promoting Brazil as an emerging force in global politics”.331  
While these sources confirm the transnational agency of this subnational government, 
they inevitably include a degree of personal bias. They all represent subnational 
governments and they are either state officials, or had direct involvement with São 
Paulo officials. The view of a NGO representative and also of a diplomat São Paulo’s 
transnational agency this is not so obvious:  
                                                 
328 Interview No.5 - SP official. 
329 Interview No.2 - SP official. 
330 Interview No.52 – foreign policy-maker. Justifying this statement he mentions Sao Paulo’s involvement 
in the Regions Leaders’ Summit, the state’s IR Plan and its increased contact with the federal government 
in dealing with international issues. 
331 Interview No. 51 – foreign policy-maker (translated from French). 
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Itamaraty still doesn’t really see subnational governments as international 
actors. For them all this activity is marginal. They have a division to deal with 
subnational governments, but it’s a very small division, and it works almost as a 
travel agency, booking tickets and organising international trips for governors 
and subnational representatives.332  
…Care must be taken, as international relations require particular skills that only 
real diplomats have. When the Governor goes abroad, I always do the final 
revision of his speech. And the international community knows how to 
differentiate the Brazilian official position, from that of the Governor, state 
Secretaries and other subnational representatives.333 
Despite challenges that still exist in regards to subnational governments engaging in 
international relations, the amplitude of São Paulo’s international environmental 
activities produces a distinctive identity which provides the state with transnational 
agency. Positioning itself as a leader in environmental policymaking, both for 
local/regional and global problems, the state of São Paulo has expressed what Acuto 
(2013b, p. 8) calls “entitlement to membership in the complex of stakeholders engaged 
in global environmental governance”. 
8.5. SUMMARY 
This Chapter aimed to draw out further theoretical implications in respect to the 
international environmental agenda undertaken by the state of São Paulo. The analysis 
started with a review of the literature that examines the impacts of subnational 
governments’ engagement in international relations for the international system 
(Section 8.2). It was shown that the increased participation of non-State actors - 
including subnational governments - in international environmental relations reflects 
broader changes in the nature of diplomacy and of multilateralism in world politics. 
With the aim of contributing to the development of theory, two arguments were made: 
that environmental paradiplomacy can change the relationships between subnational 
and national governments in foreign policymaking (Section 8.3); and that 
environmental paradiplomacy can provide subnational governments with a 
transnational presence (Section 8.4). 
First, the case study helped to demonstrate the changing relationships established 
between subnational and national governments which can arise from environmental 
paradiplomacy. These changing relationships were observed in terms of the 
institutionalisation of environmental paradiplomacy (Subsection 8.3.1), the softening of 
federal governments’ constitutional exclusivity on international relations (Subsection 
                                                 
332 Interview No.49 - NGO. 
333 Interview No.16 - SP official. 
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8.3.2), and the cooperative mode in which environmental paradiplomacy is being 
undertaken by the state of São Paulo (Subsection 8.3.3). In contrast to what seems to be 
the case for the majority of examples of subnational diplomacy, São Paulo is pushing the 
boundaries of subnational/foreign policy without conflicting with the nation-State.  
Second, the analysis showed that by having formalised an international agenda and 
undertaking collaboration initiatives with other actors across borders, the state of São 
Paulo acquired transnational actorness (Subsection 8.4.1). It also showed that coalition 
initiatives promoted a real paradiplomatic shift, which characterises the state of São 
Paulo as a transnational agent (Subsection 8.4.2). Altogether, subnational actorness and 
agency coincide with the characteristics that define subnational government’s 
international environmental agenda in terms of collaboration and coalition initiatives. 
Following the systematization of environmental paradiplomacy suggested in Chapter 4, 
the study suggests that by undertaking a mix of collaboration and coalition initiatives 
the state of São Paulo produces a distinctive paradiplomatic identity, through which it 
becomes a transnational actor and acquires transnational agency. By establishing 
partnerships and attracting foreign direct investment the state becomes an 
international actor, and by engaging in further diplomatic roles the state acquires 
transnational agency. Therefore, it becomes possible to differentiate subnational 
governments as actors with agency based on their paradiplomatic agenda being of 
collaborative or coalition initiatives. 
The analysis also indicates that through environmental paradiplomacy the local, the 
regional and the global levels become interdependent and in some cases co-existent. 
Beyond a rescaling of environmental policy, the simultaneity of local, regional and 
transnational levels embodied in environmental paradiplomacy make subnational 
governments transnational agents capable of restructuring in environmental policy. 
They transcend the hierarchical divide between the different levels of government 
observed in the description of rescaling and promote new alignments of authority in 
global environmental governance. 
This is why, for the most part, environmental paradiplomacy is a new concept, which 
required a specific framework to explain its rationale and outcomes. Indeed, the existing 
concepts were simply insufficient to understand the transnational activity of 
subnational governments aimed at addressing global environmental problems. 
Environmental paradiplomacy is unique in terms of the nature of its actors, the scale 
that it operates, and the kind of problem it addresses. The analysis of how 
environmental paradiplomacy evolves, its reasons, and its outcomes, pointed to broader 
theoretical implications of this phenomenon. These implications, include the changing 
relationship between subnational and national governments in foreign policy-making, 
and the transnational presence that subnational governments acquire once they start 
undertaking international relations to address global environmental problems. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
The study has demonstrated that subnational governments are engaging in 
international environmental relations. In doing so, subnational governments are 
altering established relationships between different levels of government in national 
and international policymaking. The study has called attention to this phenomenon, 
developing a conceptual framework to analyse its processes, drivers and outcomes.  
The framework was applied to the case of the state of São Paulo, a subnational 
government that is strongly engaged in international environmental activities. The 
thesis analysed the processes by which São Paulo develops its international 
environmental agenda, the reasons behind it, and its impact on regional and national 
policymaking, as well as on the dynamics of global environmental governance. This 
research generated both empirical findings and analytical insights. 
The purpose of this conclusion is to provide a summary based on the case study 
examined in the thesis, to highlight the original contributions of the thesis, and to 
identify avenues for future research. The structure of the Chapter reflects these three 
aims. In Section 9.2, the findings are summarized by reviewing the research questions 
and hypotheses. The original contributions of the study and its policy implications are 
discussed in Section 9.3. Section 9.4 concludes with suggestions for future research. 
9.2. SUMMATIVE OVERVIEW AND REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This Section summarises the findings of each chapter of the thesis, highlighting the 
answers given to the three research questions that informed the study. While the key 
points of the work will be presented here, in-depth results can be found in the 
concluding sections of the respective chapters. 
The Introduction argued that, for it to occur, environmental paradiplomacy has to 
meet three criteria: the main actors involved have to be subnational governments; 
their action has to occur across borders; and they have to be directed at addressing 
global environmental problems. The chapter also justified the choice of subnational 
governments for the study, and outlined the three main research questions, as well as 
their related hypotheses.  
To contextualise the research questions, Chapter 2 introduced the different strands of 
literature that examine the international environmental relations undertaken by 
subnational governments: non-State actors participating in IR, federalism, and global 
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environmental governance. Within these three strands, special attention was drawn to 
MLG theory and to the concept of paradiplomacy. The Chapter argued that the existent 
literature provides elements, but not a comprehensive framework, to explain 
environmental paradiplomacy. A combined MLG and paradiplomacy analytical 
framework was developed to explain the international environmental relations 
maintained by subnational governments.  
Once the research questions and the analytical framework to address them were 
established, Chapter 3 presented the research methodology. The chapter justified the 
choice of a (single) case study framework and a qualitative approach to research. 
It also explained the case selection, the use of participant observation, interviews, and 
document analysis, as well as some of the limitations of the research and ethical 
considerations involved.  
The first research question - How has environmental paradiplomacy evolved in the 
state of São Paulo? - was addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 confirmed that 
environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the international activities undertaken 
by the state of São Paulo to address environmental problems across borders 
(Hypothesis 1 - first part). The analysis of São Paulo’s international environmental 
agenda suggested five types of international activities that the state engages in. The 
chapter further advanced the existing literature, suggesting that environmental 
paradiplomacy evolves through cooperation and coalition initiatives undertaken 
by subnational governments across borders. 
Chapter 5 examined how environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the 
international activities undertaken by the state to address environmental problems 
across scales (Hypothesis 1 – second part). With such an end, two related research 
questions were addressed: What scales are involved in environmental paradiplomacy 
undertaken by the state of São Paulo? And can the state of São Paulo move across 
scales? A systematic analysis of environmental paradiplomacy in the state of São 
Paulo was shown to involve nine rescaling opportunities. This suggests that the 
linkages that subnational governments promote when undertaking environmental 
paradiplomacy are wider than those currently envisioned by the MLG literature. The 
case study also explored the legality and legitimacy of rescaling processes, and 
showed the process through which paradiplomacy was institutionalised by the Brazilian 
government.  
The second research question - Why does the state of São Paulo undertake an 
international agenda to deal with global environmental problems? - was addressed 
in Chapter 6. Drawing from claims made by the literature, three determinants situated 
at the interplay between the domestic and international motivations were identified 
and tested: the nature of global environmental problems; the international context 
(which covered the issues of globalization, problems with traditional diplomacy, and the 
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crises of environmental multilateralism); and the federal context (which covered the 
issues of decentralization, learning opportunities, and environmental leadership). While 
the weakening of the nation-State is generally driving the participation of non-State 
actors in international environmental politics, subnational governments are mostly 
driven by domestic factors. More specifically, São Paulo’s leadership in environmental 
policymaking emerged as the main factor driving the state’s international agenda to 
address global environmental problems.  
The third research question - What are the results of São Paulo’s international 
environmental agenda? - was addressed in Chapter 7. Investigating the direct 
outcomes of the environmental paradiplomatic activity undertaken by the state of São 
Paulo, the Chapter advanced previous research, demonstrating that São Paulo’s 
international activity has impacts of its own right. The state is transforming a soft 
international agenda into hard regional legislation, and there is indication that 
the state has been able to influence the Brazilian foreign policy, as well as 
international environmental negotiations. 
The broader implications of São Paulo’s engagement in international environmental 
relations were examined in Chapter 8. Two implications were identified. First, that 
environmental paradiplomacy promotes changes in the relationships between 
subnational and national governments in foreign policymaking. This change was 
observed in terms of the institutionalisation of environmental paradiplomacy, the 
softening of federal governments’ constitutional exclusivity on international relations, 
and the cooperative mode in which environmental paradiplomacy is being undertaken 
by the state of São Paulo. Second, that environmental paradiplomacy provides 
subnational governments with a transnational presence. By undertaking a mix of 
collaboration and coalition initiatives the state of São Paulo produces a distinctive 
paradiplomatic identity, through which it becomes a transnational actor and acquires 
transnational agency.  
9.3. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
As mentioned in Section 1.5, the study has theoretical, empirical and policy relevance. 
The three research questions that guided the analysis provided new and important 
findings, made possible by the use of the combined MLG and paradiplomacy framework. 
In this Section I consider the contributions of the study to theory (Subsection 9.3.1), to 
methodology (Subsection 9.3.2), and the policy recommendations that can be drawn 
from the research (Subsection 9.3.3). 
9.3.1. Contributions to theory 
First, the study sheds light upon a new phenomenon. In general terms the international 
participation of subnational governments in diplomatic activities is not new. State 
sovereignty never wielded complete control over diplomatic activities (Constantinou & 
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Der Derian, 2010, p. 12), and subnational actors have practised diplomacy since the 
Middle Ages (Cornago, 2010b, p. 90). However, environmental paradiplomacy is a new 
trend within paradiplomacy: it is new in the subject matter and the scale it deals with, 
as well as in some of the activities it involves, some of its drivers and outcomes. 
Although a few key scholarly works have begun to investigate it, so far environmental 
paradiplomacy has not yet been object of an in-depth analysis. Therefore, it is possible 
to affirm that this study contributes to the literature by offering the first systematic 
theoretical and empirical analysis of environmental paradiplomacy. 
Second, the study contributes to theory development providing an original conceptual 
framework with which to analyse the international environmental activities of 
subnational governments. On the one hand, the combined framework added to MLG 
theory: 
- a focus on the international relations undertaken by subnational governments 
from a regional level (Chapter 4); 
- the idea that subnational governments can act through or independently of the 
national government (Chapter 4); 
- specific categories to classify transnational networks of subnational 
governments (Chapter 4); 
- a more complete picture of the rescaling processes which subnational 
governments promote in global environmental governance (Chapter 5); 
- a consideration of the legality and legitimacy of rescaling processes (Chapter 5); 
- an analysis of why subnational governments get involved in international 
environmental relations, beyond the commonly addressed questions of why they 
get involved in climate policymaking and why they participate in transnational 
networks (Chapter 6); 
- a consideration of the leadership aspect driving subnational governments, rather 
than the opportunistic one of ‘filling up the gap’ left by the nation-State (Chapter 
6); 
- an indication of the impact that subnational governments have over domestic 
law-making and international environmental policymaking (Chapter 7); 
- an account of the effects of rescaling processes in terms of institutionalising 
initiatives and softening hierarchical divisions within federalist structures 
(Chapter 8) 
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- a distinction between transnational actorness and agency in international 
environmental policymaking, depending on the type of paradiplomatic 
behaviour undertaken by subnational governments (Chapter 8). 
On the other hand, the combined framework added to the concept of paradiplomacy: 
- a more robust and systematic theoretical grasp of the international relations 
undertaken by subnational governments (Chapters 2, 4-8); 
- a typology of paradiplomatic behaviour – termed collaboration and coalition 
initiatives (Chapter 4); 
- a deeper consideration of the horizontal linkages (i.e. transnational networks) 
involved in paradiplomacy (Chapter 4); 
- the notion of scale and, consequently, that subnational governments can engage 
in rescaling processes (Chapter 5); 
- a focus on the linkages binding, rather than separating, actors located in different 
jurisdictional levels (Chapters 5 and 8); 
- a consideration of the leadership aspect driving subnational governments, rather 
than the conflicting one of ‘by-passing the nation-State’ (Chapter 6); 
- an analysis of the impacts over higher levels of governance that can result from 
paradiplomatic activity, including influence over national policy, the agenda-
setting and the negotiation phases of international environmental negotiations 
(Chapter 7); 
- a consideration of the new alignments of authority that results from the 
engagement of subnational governments in international relations (Chapter 8); 
- an understanding of paradiplomacy offering subnational governments the 
capacity for agency in international policymaking (Chapter 8) 
The combined MLG and paradiplomacy framework proved to be effective in 
understanding environmental paradiplomacy. Altogether, the thesis contributes a 
general theory of subnational activity in international environmental relations. 
Third, the thesis took an interdisciplinary approach, which integrated theories from 
the fields of Geography, Law and IR. This approach has demonstrated its explanatory 
strength. The complex combination of insights brought by each one of these disciplines 
advances, I argue, our understanding of the international environmental relations 
undertaken by subnational governments. For example, the legal basis of the study 
added to the geography literature a consideration of the legality involved in subnational 
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governments moving across levels of governance; at the same time, geography works on 
the politics of scale added the notion of rescaling processes to the legal and IR 
literatures. The original contribution of this thesis, thus, also rests on its 
interdisciplinarity. 
9.3.2. Contributions to methodology 
Three key findings were made in relation to the methodology chosen for the study. 
These findings relate to the analysis made in Chapter 3. First, the single case study 
approach proved to be a viable method for a comprehensive analysis of the 
development of environmental paradiplomacy in practice. Another option would have 
been, for instance, a comparative analysis between two or more subnational 
governments, or a subject-based analysis of individual aspects such as climate change or 
biodiversity. While this might have led to broader results, it would not have been able to 
address the goal of the thesis, which sought to be a comprehensive analysis of the 
processes, drivers and outcomes involved in environmental paradiplomacy. 
Second, the issue of representativeness, which arguably affects the validity of case study 
approaches, was not a constraint. Some of the findings challenged accepted 
generalisations present in the literature (e.g. that only soft law results from subnational 
engagement in international environmental relations). Other findings offered empirical 
generalisations that have not been made before (e.g. that leadership in policymaking is a 
driver for paradiplomatic activities). The findings regarding the environmental 
paradiplomatic agenda of the state of São Paulo, thus, can be generalised as 
propositions and/or compared to other subnational governments in Brazil and 
around the world. Such comparative analysis can be undertaken using the analytical 
framework put forward in the thesis. 
Third the use of expert elite interviews and participant observation produced 
wide-ranging qualitative data, permitting the analysis of the various aspects involved 
in the international relations undertaken by subnational governments. Indeed, direct 
access to key actors involved provided critical views and original material. These 
constituted vital sources for the analytical narrative of the thesis, particularly 
considering the lack of data regarding the international activities in which Brazilian 
subnational governments engage in. Furthermore, as discussed in the methodology 
chapter, a quantitative approach would not have been an appropriate method for such 
interdisciplinary analysis of developments in the policy arena. 
9.3.3. Policy implications 
As previously emphasised, the international environmental activity of subnational 
governments assumes great importance in a context where (i) the effective solution of 
global environmental problems requires a coordinated and integrated approach, 
involving efforts at the global, national, regional and local levels; (ii) agency is no longer 
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exclusive to nation-States; (iii) traditional forms of diplomacy face a number of deficits; 
and (iv) environmental multilateralism is in crises. As a result, international 
environmental relations cannot – and no longer are - a monopoly of national 
governments and foreign officials. Based on this finding, three main policy 
recommendations can be made.  
First, the extent to which subnational governments’ international environmental 
relations can be successful or limited relates to the amount of cooperation between 
the subnational and the national level. The institutionalisation of paradiplomacy 
within the regional and the national government is an indication of the importance that 
this agenda is being given. Yet, subnational governments’ potential contribution to 
foreign policy is overall dependent on supportive framework conditions. The effective 
involvement of subnational governments, therefore, depends on formal and informal 
channels of communication and actual communication between subnational 
policymakers and diplomats.  
Second, environmental paradiplomacy continues to be institutionalised at the 
international level. In this sense, more attention should be given to the changes that 
subnational governments have achieved in terms of the UN recognising their role, and 
gradually incorporating them in the multilateral process. In addition to the CBD Plan of 
Action and the UNFCCC decision taken within the Cancun Agreement, the World Water 
Council has acknowledged the major role of subnational and local governments in 
achieving water-related targets under the Millennium Development Goals and has 
developed a Local and Regional Authorities Process in the framework of the editions of 
the World Water Forum. Further UN recognition is most likely to take place in the 
coming years. 
Third, in approaching the engagement of subnational governments in international 
environmental relations it is important to consider that environmental 
paradiplomacy is not giving cause to an erosion of sovereignty. The international 
activity of subnational governments is not supplanting or eroding State sovereignty in a 
zero-sum game paradigm. Rather, the participation of subnational governments in 
international relations is creating new links between subnational governments and the 
international system. Environmental paradiplomacy can only continue to occur with the 
consent of States, and even if this activity bypasses the nation-State, overall it serves to 
enhance its legitimacy. 
9.4. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Based on the research carried out, three issues worthy of further study are suggested. 
First, the theoretical approach used in this study can be used to analyse the 
international environmental activity of other subnational governments in 
developed and developing countries. The application of this theoretical approach 
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allows for comparative analyses, for instance, comparing more than one subnational 
government within one country, or within different countries, as well as comparing 
environmental paradiplomacy with other types of paradiplomacy. Comparative work 
could also focus on the leadership aspect driving subnational governments into 
international activity. For example, assessing how the leadership of the state of São 
Paulo could be compared with that of California in the US, Quebec in Canada, and 
whether there is a new form of the ‘California effect’334, where national leadership on 
environmental policy making drives subnational leaders from both developed and 
developing countries to engage in international activities.  
Second, the study investigated a number of activities undertaken by subnational 
governments which challenged domestic and foreign divides. While academics, 
transnational networks and subnational representatives might see subnational and 
foreign divides disappearing, future research could explore the extent to which 
subnational governments’ international environmental agenda is influencing 
international environmental politics and, ultimately, restructuring global 
environmental governance. Related to this point, future research could explore 
matters of accountability, and whether this increased participation of subnational 
governments in international relations is capable of improving the democratization of 
global environmental governance. 
Third, the study of environmental paradiplomacy could be linked to the study of 
subnational markets and emission trading schemes. Such initiatives, which clearly 
involve and promote the international environmental activity of subnational 
governments, can have a “laboratory function” that other subnational governments, as 
well as national governments and the international regime may want to emulate. In 
addition to the problems that subnational markets face, such as leakage problems and 
overlapping regulations, the analysis of these initiatives through the lens of 
paradiplomacy could further consider the legal limits of these markets, as well as issues 
related to the effectiveness of the initiatives. 
In conclusion, the engagement of subnational governments in international 
environmental relations is a reality, and it can lead to improved policymaking at the 
regional and international levels. This research aimed at offering a valuable tool for 
policymakers and researchers to ask and answer questions about the governance of the 
global environment, and hopefully it will be developed further. 
                                                 
334 The process which Vogel (1997) originally referred to ‘California effect’  suggests that more stringent 
regulation leads large companies to adapt to that regulation, providing them with a competitive 
advantage, and shaping their interests in other jurisdictions (also Heyvaert, 2013a; Perkins & Neumayer, 
2011; Shaffer & Bodansky, 2012). 
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Appendix 1: Summary of the research questions, hypothesis, and structure 
 
Research Question 1 
How does environmental paradiplomacy evolve in the state of São 
Paulo? 
Hypothesis 2 
Environmental paradiplomacy evolves through the international activities 
undertaken by subnational governments to address global environmental 
problems across borders and scales. 
 
Sub-question 1A 
What are the scales involved in environmental paradiplomacy 
undertaken by the state of São Paulo? 
Hypothesis 1A 
Environmental paradiplomacy evolves across multiple scales, 
represented by the actors, problems and levels involved. Environmental 
paradiplomacy has a rescaling role. 
 
Sub-question 1B 
Can the state of São Paulo move across scales? 
Hypothesis 1B 
Legal limitations to São Paulo’s international agenda impose significant 
constraints on its paradiplomacy. 
 
 
Research Question 2 
Why does the state of São Paulo undertake an international 
agenda to deal with global environmental problems? 
Hypothesis 2 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo is driven by a combination of 
global and domestic factors - the characteristics of the problem; aspects related 
to the decline of the State; and aspects of Brazilian federalism. 
 
Research Question 3 
What are the results of São Paulo’s international environmental 
agenda? 
Hypothesis 3 
Environmental paradiplomacy in São Paulo expands the government’s capacity to 
address global environmental problems, and through it the state influences higher levels of 
governance. 
Source: Author 
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Appendix 2: Interview guide 
 
I. Environmental agency and secretariat - English version 
Section A. General information about the initiatives 
1. What international initiatives have been taken? 
(i) When were they signed, implemented and/or renewed? 
(ii) What kind of initiatives are they? 
Section B. Legal and institutional aspects  
2. What instruments were used (i.e. MOU, partnerships, terms of cooperation) to 
formalize the initiatives? 
3. Is there a specific person and/or a department responsible for the international 
relations? If that is the case, how does this person/department relates to other 
departments? 
4. Was the legality/constitutionality of these initiatives considered? 
Section C. Reasons 
5. What drove you/the institution to engage in international relations? 
6. How did the negotiation and implementation processes take place? Who were 
the people involved in each of these stages? 
7. Who else participated in the process? Were there networks, universities, NGOs, 
businesses, and other areas or levels of the government also involved? 
8. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of these initiatives? 
9. What are the biggest challenges encountered? 
10. How do you think these initiatives relate to (i) international agreements on the 
same topic; (ii) national/federal policy and legislation; (iii) local/municipal 
policy and legislation 
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Section D. Outcomes 
11. How do you see the results of the initiative(s)? What are/were their main 
outcomes, benefits and limitations?  
12. Are these outcomes measured (or measurable) in any way? 
13. Do you think the state’s international relations brought about further 
international participation to the state? 
14. Can you assess whether there were any impacts on (i) international negotiations; 
(ii) national/federal policy and legislation; (iii) local/municipal policy and 
legislation 
15. What other impacts could partnerships like this have? 
 
II. Environmental agency and secretariat – Portuguese version 
A. Informações gerais sobre as iniciativas 
1. Em quais iniciativas internacionais vocês estão envolvidos? 
(i) Quando foram assinadas, implementadas, renovadas essas iniciativas? 
(ii) Qual o escopo dessas iniciativas? 
B. Aspectos jurídicos e institucionais  
2. Quais instrumentos foram utilizados (i.e. MOU, parceria, termo de cooperação) 
para a concretização das iniciativas? 
3. Existe alguma pessoa e/ou departamento responsável pelas relações 
internacionais? 
4. Houve alguma consideração quanto à legalidade dessas iniciativas? 
C. Motivos 
5. De onde surgiu a idéia de estabelecer relações internacionais? 
6. Como essa idéia se concretizou? 
7. Quem mais participou do processo? Houve envolvimento de redes, 
universidades, ONGs, empresas, outras áreas ou esferas do governo? 
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8. Você acha que existe alguma vantagem/desvantagem para o estado integrar uma 
rede transnacional ou atuar independentemente de redes? 
9. Por que você acha importante o estado se relacionar com governos estaduais de 
outros países? 
10. Quais aspectos legais, políticos e administrativos motivaram as iniciativas?  
11. Quais os maiores desafios enfrentados e/ou superados? 
12. Como você acha que essas iniciativas relacionam-se com (i) negociações 
internacionais; (ii) as políticas e a legislação nacional/a posição do governo 
federal; e (iii) as políticas e legislação dos municípios 
D. Resultados 
13. Quais são os resultados das iniciativas? Quais os benefícios e limitações? 
14. Esses resultados são medidos de alguma forma? 
15. Você acha que as relações internacionais mantidas resultaram em uma 
ampliação da presença internacional do estado? 
16. Você consegue avaliar se houve algum tipo de impacto no âmbito (i) das 
negociações internacionais; (ii) das políticas e a legislação nacional; e (iii) das 
políticas e legislação dos municípios 
17. Quais outros impactos parcerias como essa poderiam ter? 
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Appendix 3: List of interviewees 
 
Category No. Name Institutional affiliation Date 
SP state 
official 
1 
Pedro 
Ubiratan 
Escorel de 
Azevedo 
Secretary, the state of São Paulo Secretariat for 
the Environment (SMA) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
2 
Fernando 
Cardozo 
Fernandes Rei 
 
President of São Paulo’s state Environmental 
Agency (CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
3 
Oswaldo 
Lucon 
Technical Advisor on Energy and Climate 
Change, the state of São Paulo Secretariat for the 
Environment (SMA) 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
SP state 
official 
4 
Margarette 
Escobar 
Sabella 
Special Projects Advisor, the state of São Paulo 
Secretariat for the Environment (SMA) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
5 
Marcelo 
Gomes Sodre  
Procurador do Estado, the state of São Paulo 
Secretariat for the Environment (SMA) 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
SP state 
official 
6 
Fatima A. 
Carrara 
Manager, Office of International Cooperation, 
São Paulo’s state Environmental Agency 
(CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
7 
Rosimeire 
Molina 
Journalist, Office of International Cooperation, 
São Paulo’s state Environmental Agency 
(CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
8 
Ana Luiza 
Silva Spinola 
Attorney, Legal Department, São Paulo’s state 
Environmental Agency (CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
SP state 
9 
Ana Paula Foreign Affairs Special Projects Advisor, the 
state of São Paulo Secretariat for the 
São Paulo, 
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Category No. Name Institutional affiliation Date 
official Fava Environment (SMA) November/2010 
SP state 
official 
10 
Lady Virginia 
Traldi 
Meneses 
Coordinator of the Regional Centre for the 
Stockholm  Convention 
Manager of the Environmental Management 
Tools, Conventions and Multilateral Agreements, 
São Paulo’s state Environmental Agency 
(CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
SP state 
official 
11 
Flávio de 
Miranda 
Ribeiro 
Manager of Sustainable and Global Affairs 
Division, São Paulo’s state Environmental 
Agency (CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
12 
Casemiro 
Tércio 
Carvalho 
Deputy Secretary, the state of São Paulo 
Secretariat for the Environment (SMA) 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
SP state 
official 
13 
Marcelo 
Morgado 
Environmental Affairs Advisor, CEO’s Office, 
Water & Sanitation Company of the state of São 
Paulo (SABESP) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
14 
Fernando 
Marcato 
Advisor to the CEO, Water & Sanitation Company 
of the state of São Paulo (SABESP) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
15 
Stela 
Goldstein 
Special Assistant to the Governor of São Paulo 
(1995-1997); Secretary for the Environment of 
the State of São Paulo (1998-2001); Secretary 
for the Environment of the City of São Paulo 
(2001-2003); Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
Municipality of São Paulo (from 2004) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
16 
Paulo Elias M. 
de Moraes 
Special Advisor for International Relations, 
Government of the state of São Paulo 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
SP state 
official 
17 
Rodrigo 
Tavares 
Adviser for International Affairs Government of 
the State of São Paulo 
São Paulo, 
December/2011 
SP state 
18 
Ana Paula Foreign Affairs Special Projects Advisor, the 
state of São Paulo Secretariat for the 
São Paulo, 
 241 
 
Category No. Name Institutional affiliation Date 
official Fava Environment (SMA) December/2011 
SP state 
official 
19 
Ana Lucia 
Segamarchi 
Advisor of International Relations at the state 
Secretariat for the Rights of the Person with 
Disability 
São Paulo, 
December/2011 
SP state 
official 
20 
Josilene Ferre Manager, Climate Change Program, São Paulo’s 
state Environmental Agency (CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
December/2011 
SP state 
official 
21 
Fatima A. 
Carrara 
Manager, Office of International Cooperation, 
São Paulo’s state Environmental Agency 
(CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
November/2011 
SP state 
official 
22 
Fernando 
Cardozo 
Fernandes Rei 
President of São Paulo’s state Environmental 
Agency (CETESB) 
São Paulo, 
November/2011 
SP state 
official 
23 
Margarette 
Escobar 
Sabella 
Special Projects Advisor, the state of São Paulo 
Secretariat for the Environment (SMA) 
São Paulo, 
November/2010 
National 
official 
24 
Ana Carolina 
Lorena 
International Affairs Advisor, Presidency of the 
Republic, Secretariat of Institutional Relations, 
Sub-Secretariat of Federative Affairs 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
National 
official 
25 
Alexandre 
Bastos Peixoto 
International Affairs Advisor, Presidency of the 
Republic, Secretariat of Institutional Relations, 
Sub-Secretariat of Federative Affairs 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
National 
official 
26 
Maximiliano 
Arienzo 
Deputy Director, Environment Division, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
National 
official 
27 
Paulino 
Franco de 
Carvalho Neto 
Head of the Environment Division, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
National 
official 
28 
Carlos 
Eduardo de 
Minister of External Relations, Head of the 
Special Advisory Office for Federative and 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
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Category No. Name Institutional affiliation Date 
Ribas Guedes Parliamentary Affairs 
National 
official 
29 
Antonio 
Junqueira 
Project Analyst, Coordination of Received 
Bilateral Cooperation, Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
National 
official 
30 
Carlos 
Alexandre 
Fernandes 
Considera 
Chancellery Official, Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
National 
official 
31 
Frederico 
Paiva 
Project Analyst, Coordination of Received 
Bilateral Cooperation, Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
National 
official 
32 
Fernando 
Antonio Lyrio 
Silva 
Advisor for International Affairs, Ministry of 
Environment 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
National 
oficial 
33 
Branca 
Americano 
Secretary for climate change, Ministry of 
Environment, negotiator in the Brazilian 
delegation to the UNFCCC. Worked since 1998 at 
the Coordination on Global Climate Change of 
the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
Private 34 
Ludovino 
Lopes 
Partner, Ludovino Lopes Advogados São Paulo, 
November/2010 
Private 35 
Tiago Ricci Partner, Ludovino Lopes Advogados São Paulo, 
November/2010 
Private 36 
Renata Pires 
Castanho 
Partner, Pires Castanho Advogados São Paulo, 
November/2010 
Private 37 
Reginaldo 
Sales 
Magalhães 
Civil Society Specialist at International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
Academic 38 
Rachel Deputy Director, Center for Sustainability São Paulo, 
 243 
 
Category No. Name Institutional affiliation Date 
Biderman 
Furriela 
Studies, Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) December/2010 
Academic 39 
José Eli da 
Veiga 
 
Professor in the Economics Department of the 
University of São Paulo, Research Associate at 
the Capability & Sustainability Centre of the 
University of Cambridge 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
Academic 40 
Paulo Artaxo 
 
Professor of environmental physics at the 
University of São Paulo, member of the IPCC 
Panel on Global Aviation Effects, member of the 
Scientific Steering Committee of the LBA 
Experiment and member of the IPCC working 
group on climate change impacts 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
Academic 41 
Salen Nasser Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) São Paulo, 
December/2010 
Academic 42 
Jose 
Goldemberg  
Professor Emeritus of the University of São 
Paulo and Member of the Brazilian Academy of 
Sciences, Previously National Secretary for 
Science and Technology, Minister for Education 
(1990-1992), and Secretary for the Environment 
of the state of São Paulo (2002-2006). 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
NGO 43 
Daniel Aguiar 
Grabois 
Climate Change Projects Manager, British 
Embassy, Brasilia 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
NGO 44 
Miriam 
Duailibi 
 
Director, Instituto Ecoar São Paulo, 
November/2010 
NGO 45 
Mario 
Mantovani 
Diretor, SOS Mata Atlântica Brasilia, 
December/2010 
NGO 46 
Fabio 
Feldman 
 
Environmentalist, consultant, Company Manager 
and Executive Secretary of the São Paulo’s 
Forum on Global Climate Change and 
Biodiversity. Federal Legislator (1986-1998), 
major author of the chapter about the 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
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Category No. Name Institutional affiliation Date 
environment in the text of the Brazilian Federal 
Constitution. Secretary for the Environment of 
the State of São Paulo (1995-1998), Executive 
Secretary of Brazilian Forum on Climate Change 
NGO 47 
Laura Valente 
de Macedo 
 
Cabinet advisor to Congressman Fabio 
Feldmann (1991-1994), senior advisor to Fabio 
Feldmann at the State Secretariat for the 
Environment of São Paulo (1995-1997), 
Coordinator of the Brazilian Climate Change 
Forum (2000-2002), Regional director of ICLEI´s 
Latin America and the Caribbean Secretariat and 
campaign coordinator of CCP in the South Cone 
since 2002 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
NGO 48 
Guarany 
Osório 
Coordinator of the Climate Campaign for 
Greenpeace Brazil 
São Paulo, 
December/2010 
NGO 49 
Alexandre 
Prado 
Manager of Conservation, Conservation 
International (CI) 
Brasilia, 
December/2010 
Foreign 
policy-
maker 
50 
Natalia Vera 
Pérez 
In charge of international affairs within the 
International Centre for Water and Environment 
- Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Environment of the Regional Government of 
Aragon, Spain. Secretary for ENCORE network 
Email, December 
2011 
Foreign 
policy-
maker 
51 
Xavier Girard Former Secretary General of Conference of 
Peripheral and Maritime Regions of Europe 
(CPMR), Regions United (FOGAR) and former 
Treasurer of the Nrg4SD 
Email, December 
2011 
Foreign 
policy-
maker 
52 
Vincent Royer Coordinator for Climate Change and Sustainable 
Development, Department of International 
Relations, Francophonie and Foreign Trade. 
Quebec, Canada 
Email, December 
2011 
Foreign 
policy-
maker 
53 
Lucy 
Mathieson 
Policy and Advocacy Officer for the Nrg4SD. 
Brussels, Belgium 
Email, December 
2011 
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Category No. Name Institutional affiliation Date 
Foreign 
policy-
maker 
54 
Jon Townley Head of International Sustainable Development 
and the Wales for Africa Team. Cardiff, Wales 
Email, December 
2011 
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Appendix 4: Brazilian presidents and São Paulo state governors since democratisation 
 
President of the Republic 
Mandate President Political party 
1985-1990 José Sarney PMDB 
1990-1992 Fernando Collor de Mello PRN 
1992-1994 Itamar Franco PMDB 
1995-2003 Fernando Henrique Cardoso PSDB 
2003-2010 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva PT 
2011- Dilma Rousseff PT 
 
São Paulo state Governor 
Mandate Governor Political party 
1987-1991 Orestes Quércia  PMDB 
1991-1994 Luiz Antônio Fleury Filho PMBD 
1995-2001 Mário Covas PSDB 
2001-2006 Geraldo Alckmin PSDB 
2006-2007 Cláudio Lembo PSB (Alckmin’s Vice-Governor) 
2007-2010 José Serra PSDB 
2010-2011 Alberto Goldman PSDB 
2011- Geraldo Alckmin PSDB 
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Appendix 5: List of international environmental activities undertaken by the state 
 
1. Collaboration with other subnational governments 
 
Implementing 
agency 
Signature Foreign counterpart Instrument Issue area Summary 
SMA Nov/2002 Provence and Cote 
d’Azur (PACA) Region, 
France 
Protocol of 
Intentions 
(SPGov)335 
Strengthen economic, 
social and cultural 
links 
Promote cooperation projects in the areas of 
education, research and technology; cultural 
interchange; tourism; environment and planning. 
 
SMA Nov/2003 Basque Country  Protocol of 
Intentions 
(SMA files) 
Sustainable 
development and 
cooperation within 
nrg4SD 
Develop strategies, based on the Basque Strategy for 
Sustainable Development 2002-2005, and collaborate 
in the areas of industrial and household waste 
management, renewable energy and planning, cleaner 
production, industry improvements, GHG inventory, 
sustainability and environmental indicators, inventory 
of land contaminating activities, capacity building for 
the identification and management of contamination, 
interchange of experts and scientists, landscape 
management.  
SMA 2002/2004 Provence and Cote 
d’Azur (PACA) Region, 
France 
Cooperation 
agreement 
(SPGov) 
Protected areas Signed within the Protocol of Intentions established 
between the state of São Paulo and PACA Region in 
2002 and the MOU signed between Brazil (Ministry for 
the Environment) and France (Ministry for Ecology 
and Sustainable Development) in 2004. The 
cooperation focuses on management of protected 
areas, particularly on sustainable development. 
 
SMA Ago/2003 Mexico state - Economic 
Development Secretariat  
Protocol of 
Intentions 
Sustainable 
Development 
Foster cooperation for environmental protection and 
development of public policies for sustainable 
                                                 
335 http://www.ambiente.sp.gov.br/verNoticia.php?id=1138 
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Implementing 
agency 
Signature Foreign counterpart Instrument Issue area Summary 
(SMA files) development. Support common projects, plan and 
implement activities and projects and research for 
environmental protection, and develop cleaner 
production in partnership with businesses. 
SMA Dec/2004, 
addendum 
signed in 
Jan/2011 
Department of the  
Environment, Health 
and Consumer 
Protection of the State of 
Bavaria, Germany 
Protocol of 
Intentions 
(SPGov) 336 
Renewable energy and 
waste management 
Managing domestic solid waste in metropolitan 
regions, by evaluating the management systems 
practiced using case studies and looking at new 
alternatives. Expanded with the signature of 
addendum in Jan/2011 to develop a waste-to-energy 
plant in São Paulo, and plans for the reduction of 
landfilling.  
SMA Dec/2005 California 
Environmental Agency, 
of the State of California, 
USA 
MOU for 
Technical 
Cooperation 
(SMA files) 
Renewable Energy 
Source, Environmental 
Improvement, Climate 
Change and 
Biodiversity 
EPA shares its experience with SMA and CETESB on 
the implementation of clean air legislation; and SP 
shares experience in dedicated bus lanes. Share 
methodological approaches and research in areas such 
as alternative fuels, renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. Share information and methods to preserve 
forest stocks and recovery deforested areas. Explore 
the possibilities for emissions offset programs through 
the CDM. Consider a short-term educational program 
focusing on new environmental issues 
SMA Dec/2005, valid 
for two years, 
and resumed in 
2009  
Buenos Aires Province, 
Argentina 
Protocol of 
Intentions 
(SPGov)337 
Environmental 
management 
Developing technical, scientific and technological 
cooperation for environmental management 
(workshops, seminars, conferences, and organize 
expert interchange in the areas of environmental 
management and education). There has been no 
further action within this Protocol 
SMA Jul/2006 Bavaria, Germany Letter of Intent 
on Cooperation 
(SMA files) 
Biofuel and Climate 
Protection 
Improvement in the regional production and use of 
biofuels or other fuels derived from renewable energy 
sources. Support research and development work 
towards producing synthetic fuels, and towards 
reducing air pollutant and CO2 emissions in the 
transport sector. 
                                                 
336 http://www.wtert.de/Default.asp?Menue=18&NewsPPV=10055; (Coelho & Guardabassi, 2007). 
337 http://www.ambiente.sp.gov.br/destaque/2005/dezembro/22_convenio.htm 
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Implementing 
agency 
Signature Foreign counterpart Instrument Issue area Summary 
SMA 2007  Île-de-France Region, 
France 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Research Make available the botanic collection of Auguste F.C.P. 
de Saint-Hilaire for scientific and historical research. 
Sanitation and 
Energy 
2010 Secretariat of 
Infrastructure, Water 
and Energy, and 
Secretariat of Industry 
and Commerce, Valencia, 
Spain 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Sanitation and waste 
management 
Knowledge transference and development of projects 
in the areas of regulation, monitoring and energy 
services, drainage, community cleaning, and waste 
management. 
Source: Author, with data obtained from the document “Balanço de Atividades Internacionais Governo do Estado de São Paulo 2007-2010”, June, 
2010 (“SPGov”), and from SMA’s Internal files (“SMA files”) and online information/press releases indicated as footnotes 
 
 250 
2. Collaboration with other national governments 
 
Implementing 
agency 
Signature Foreign 
counterpart 
Instrument Issue area Summary 
SMA Nov/2001 Australian 
Consulate-General 
Letter of 
Intentions (SMA 
files) 
Environmental 
management 
Jointly identify potential projects to develop technical 
cooperation in the following environmental fields: energy 
management, air pollution control, water and wastewater 
management, solid waste management, soil and groundwater 
remedy, noise and vibration control, and ecotourism. 
SMA May/2002 Armenian 
Consulate-General 
Letter of 
Intentions (SMA 
files) 
Environmental 
management 
Support the development of cooperation for environmental 
protection and technology development and transference. 
SMA Feb/2007 Republic of Kenya Cooperation 
Project (SPGov) 
Fauna 
protection 
Signed within a MOU entered between Brazil and Kenya for 
fauna protection, aiming to promote the exchange of expertise 
in concession management, payment for environmental 
services and ecotourism. 
CETESB Jul/2008 
to 
Mar/2011 
Foreign and 
Commonwealth 
Office, UK 
Cooperation 
Project (SPGov) 
Climate change Support the preparation of the state’s inventory of anthropic 
GHG. The First GHG Inventory (1990-2008) was presented in 
April 2011. 
SMA Feb/2009 Ministry of the 
Environment and 
Territory, Italy 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Environmental 
protection and 
sustainable 
development 
Promote environmental protection and sustainable 
development in the areas of energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, urban green spaces, climate mitigation, and 
environmental education. Develop financial mechanisms to 
promote cleaner technologies and access international 
financial assistance through cooperative initiatives on 
environmental and climate protection. 
SMA 2009 New Zealand Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov)338 
Ecotourism Technical cooperation to promote the management of 
protected areas. In April 2011 representatives from the SMA 
and the New Zealand Embassy met and agreed the extension 
of the Agreement to cover GHG reduction policies. 
Source: Author, with data obtained from the document “Balanço de Atividades Internacionais Governo do Estado de São Paulo 2007-2010”, June, 
2010 (“SPGov”), and from SMA’s Internal files (“SMA files”) and online information/press releases indicated as footnotes 
                                                 
338 http://brunocovas.com.br/embaixador-neozelandes-visita-secretaria-do-meio-
ambiente/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+BrunoCovas+%28Dep.+Bruno+Covas%29 
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3. Collaboration with International Organizations 
 
Implementing 
agency 
Signature Foreign 
counterpart 
Instrument Issue area Summary 
CETESB 1997 to 
2002 
US Trade and 
Development 
Agency (USTDA) 
Cooperation 
Project (SPGov) 
Environmental 
management 
Technical assistance and exchange of experiences in 
monitoring technologies and environmental management. 
Secretariat for 
Metropolitan 
Business, 
through the 
Secretariat for 
Metropolitan 
Business of the 
São Paulo’ 
State (EMTU) 
Oct/2001 Global 
Environment 
Facility (GEF), 
through the United 
Nations 
Development 
Program (UNDP) 
Cooperation 
Project339 
(SPGov) 
Transport – 
hydrogen bus 
Cooperation to develop a fuel cell bus. The project is executed 
by the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, and it is 
included in the federal government’s policy of hydrogen 
introduction in the Brazilian energy spectrum. The financing 
by the GEF (US$ 12.3 million) results from the environmental 
concept of the project (zero emissions and clean fuel - the 
hydrogen is produced by electrolysis, using electricity from 
hydro-power). The Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP), 
invested US$ 3.3 million. 
SMA 2005, 
extended 
until 
Aug/2011 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(IDB) 
Loan 
Agreement340 
(SPGov) 
Ecotourism Loan to support an ecotourism project to promote the 
conservation of the Atlantic forest and to foster socioeconomic 
development through the sustainable growth of ecotourism. 
The project will establish and strengthen six state parks as 
tourism products; five parks are located in the Ribeira valley 
and one in Ilhabela island. The loan is for a 25-year term, with 
a 4-year grace period at an adjustable interest rate. Amount 
US$9 million, being U$6 million funded by local counterpart. 
CETESB Aug/2005 
to 
Jan/2007 
US Trade and 
Development 
Agency (USTDA) 
Cooperation 
Project 
(U$448,000) 
(SPGov) 
Hazardous 
substances 
Agreement signed to implement a Programme for the 
reduction of Hazardous Substances in industries, involving 
technical support and research to for the development of 
public policies, plans and programs aiming to reduce the use 
of raw material potentially hazardous and the generation of 
hazardous waste. 
CETESB Dec/2006 
to Dec 
The Federal 
Environment 
Cooperation 
Project (SPGov) 
Soil and 
groundwater 
The Federal Environment Agency and GTZ supported the 
creation and implementation of the Latin American Network 
                                                 
339 http://www.emtu.sp.gov.br/h2/index.htm 
340 http://www8.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2005-11-09/idb-approves-9-million-loan-for-ecotourism-in-the-mata-atlantica-region-in-state-of-sao-paulo-
brazil,1232.html 
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2008 Agency (UBA) and 
GTZ (now Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für 
Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit - 
GIZ) 
contamination for the Prevention and Control of Soil and Groundwater 
Contamination (ReLASC)341. This network seeks to facilitate 
the identification of responses to the challenges related to the 
prevention and management of contaminated areas, sharing 
the existing knowledge in the public, private and academic 
sectors in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Uruguay. In July 2008 ICLEI was hired by GTZ to manage and 
implement the Project. In November 2008 the management 
was transferred to Mexico’s Environment and Natural 
Resources Secretariat. 
SMA and 
CETESB 
Jun/2008 
to 
Jun/2010 
World Bank/IBRD Projeto de 
cooperação 
(SPGov) 
Climate change Develop a low carbon case study on reducing GHG emissions 
from waste management. 
 
São Paulo State 
Government 
(Development 
Secretariat) 
Apr/2008 Japan Bank for 
International 
Cooperation (JBIC)  
Protocol of 
Intentions 
(SPGov) 
Clean 
Development 
Mechanism 
(CDM) 
Sharing information on the CDM between JBIC and São Paulo 
state to give impetus to financial support for CDM projects in 
JBIC's International Financial Operations. Focus on biomass 
power generation using bagasse (what remains of crushed 
stalks of sugar cane after extracting juice), and the recovery of 
methane gas from cow and pig manure. In the same occasion 
JBIC signed a MOU for Promoting Economic Exchange with the 
Federation of the Industries of the State of São Paulo 
(FIESP)342. 
CETESB Sep/2009 
to July 
2010 
US Trade and 
Development 
Agency (USTDA) 
Grant 
Agreement343 
(SPGov) 
Cleaner 
Production 
Identify technological solutions to reduce wastewater from 
industrial production. Fund an evaluation of new technologies 
that will minimize water consumption and reduce industrial 
wastewater generation, thereby establishing cleaner methods 
of industrial production. Amount US 683,000. 
SMA/CETESB Sep/2009 Japan International 
Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Technical 
cooperation 
Develop programs, projects and activities in the area of 
technical cooperation. 
SMA Aug/2009 World Bank/IBRD Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Environmental 
licensing 
Maintainence of side roads in the state of São Paulo. SMA and 
CETESB received R$10,692,500 to promote improvements the 
environment licensing system in the state. 
                                                 
341 http://www.relasc.org 
342 http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/about/press/2008/0422-01/index.html#_1 
343 http://www.ustda.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/LAC/Brazil/BrazilWater_091709.asp (Access April, 2011) 
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SMA 2010 World Bank/IBRD Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Water Contribute to the protection of water supply basins in the 
metropolitan region of the state of São Paulo. Amount US$ 
233.80 millions. 
SMA 2011 World Bank/IBRD Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Riparian 
vegetation 
Develop the instruments and methodologies to promote 
riparian vegetation recovery in the state. Amount US$19.5 
millions, being US$7.7 millions from GEF, via IBRD. 
SMA Being 
negotiated 
World Bank/IBRD Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Sustainable 
Rural 
Development 
Promote sustainable rural development. Amount US$24 
million, half from IBRD. 
SMA Being 
negotiated 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(IDB) 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPGov) 
Forest 
conservation 
Promote the conservation and sustainable use of protected 
areas in the state. Amount US$470,2 million, being US$196,5 
million from the IDB, US$214,5 million from the state 
government, and US$59,2 million from the federal 
government. 
Source: Author, with data obtained from the document “Balanço de Atividades Internacionais Governo do Estado de São Paulo 2007-2010”, June, 
2010 (“SPGov”), and from SMA’s Internal files (“SMA files”) and online information/press releases indicated as footnotes 
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Appendix 6: List of meetings between representatives of the state of São Paulo and other national or subnational governments’ 
representatives 
 
Date Foreign Gov / organization Foreign authority Brazilian authority Topic discussed
Dec-11 France Prime-Minister Governor Transport and pollution
Dec-11 Massachussetts, US Governor Governor Clean energy and technologies, and biotechnology
Dec-11 IMF Managing director Governor World economy
Oct-11 Ukraine President Governor and state Secretary For Economic Development, Science and Technology Foreign trade
Aug-11 Cordoba, Argentina Governor President of the Paula Souza Center and Special Advisor for International Relations Education
Aug-11 Canada Prime-Minister Secretaries for Development, Science and Technology, Transport and Public Security Science and technology, transport and public security 
Jul-11 Letonia Prime-Minister Governor Cooperation on foreign trade
May-11 Sweden Prime-Minister Governor Science, technology, innovation, environment and sustainable development
May-11 Germany President Governor Environment, renewable energy, climate change, transport infrastructure
Apr-11 JICA, Japan Vice-President Governor Projects on water, public security
Apr-11 France Foreign Trade Ministry Governor Foreign trade
Apr-11 PACA region, France President Governor Scientific and Technology Cooperation
Mar-11 Costa Rica Chancellor Governor Environment, climate change, biofuels, transport and waste management
Mar-11 China Ambassador Governor Foreign trade
Mar-11 US Trade Secretary President of Investe São Paulo Foreign trade
Mar-11 Uruguai President Governor Foreign trade
Mar-11 East Timor Prime-Minister Governor Tribute to East Timor
Feb-11 Italy Ambassador Governor Tribute to Geraldo Alckmin
Oct-10 UN Secretary of CBD Secretary for the Environment Biodiversity
Oct-10 Czech Republic Czech Ambassador President of Investe São Paulo Foreign trade
Oct-10 Geneva, Switzerland
Canton representatives and medium 
businesses
President of Investe São Paulo Ethanol and PPPs on infrastructure, transport, World Cup, oil & gas
Sep-10 IDB N/A Governor Financing housing and environmental recovery
Sep-10 Argentina President of Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos S.A.President of Sabesp Technical cooperation on water
Sep-10 South Korea N/A Governor Cooperation for technology in food industry
Jul-10 Japan Ambassador Ministry for Foreign Affairs Financing environmental recovery
May-10 Austria Chancellor Coordinator at the Secretariat of Development and Director of Investe São Paulo. Foreign trade
May-10 Letonia Government and business delegation President of Investe São Paulo. Biomass, technology, car industry and port infrastructure
May-10 US Government and business delegation officers from the Secretariat for Agriculture Cooperation in Agriculture
Apr-10 Israel Ambassador Governor Cooperation on sanitation and agriculture
Apr-10 World Bank N/A Coordinator for Technical Assistance Rural sustainable development
Apr-10 Chile President Governor Foreign trade
Mar-10 South Africa Vice-Minister Governor World Cup
Mar-10 Valencia, Spain Vice-Governor Secretary for Development and President of Investe SP PPPs
Feb-10 South Korea N/A Secretary for Sport, Leisure and Tourism Sports
Nov-09 Czech Republic President Governor Foreign trade
Nov-09 Israel President Governor Peace in the Middle East, water and sanitation, trade  
Source Author, based on news available from http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/344 
                                                 
344 Search words: chancellor, ambassador, minister, prime-minister, foreign relations, international, networks 
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